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Abstract 
 
This research explores the role of cities in energy transitions using heat 
networks as a case study. Drawing on both discursive institutional and socio-
technical transitions literature the interaction of discourses, ideas and 
institutions are analysed in relation to heat networks in England and Germany. 
Heat networks are framed within this research as embedded within wider 
debates regarding scales of governance, scale of energy provision and the role 
of various forms of state, with the co-production of discourses and institutions 
reflecting the struggle between these competing ideas.   
 
The thesis highlights the complex interactions between national and local scales 
in mediating material change to energy systems. At the local scale, in both 
countries, there was a growing narrative of the need for local governments to 
adopt more direct forms of governance in order to secure wider public good 
benefits of energy infrastructure. In developing heat networks all locations were 
adopting multiple roles but there was increased focus on ensuring modes of 
governing. These findings provide an empirical demonstration of the multiple 
modes of governing adopted by local governments, and suggests that previous 
assertions that England and Germany are converging on an ‘enabling’ model of 
climate change governance may no longer be the case. 
 
Much discursive institutional literature presents ideas as influencing policy 
outcomes only when fully formed (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016; Gillard, 
2016), however this research suggests that the contestation of deeply held 
views can be constituted through not a single large-scale crisis but the 
amalgamation of several emerging challenges to existing ideas. A loss of 
confidence in the private sector to deliver the best outcomes, a financially 
constrained public sector, growing familiarity with sustainable energy projects in 
many local authorities and increasing recognition of the potential for heat 
networks to support whole system approaches to decarbonisation all led to 
ideas about the role of local government in the energy system to be challenged. 
This provides insight into how ideas can be influential, potentially at different 
scales, without necessarily being dominant nationally, or used consistently 
across local actor networks. At the same time obdurate existing storylines, such 
as the need to de-risk commercial finance, can act to marginalise other 
storylines. This highlights the complex interaction between dominant and 
emerging storylines with ideational bricolage at the local level leading to a 
reappraisal of the role of local government in energy system change. This was, 
to a degree, providing a route to resist embedded national norms and providing 
a platform for a stronger local governance role to be debated in relation to 
decarbonisation and energy system change. 
 
Applying a discursive institutional approach is also demonstrated to add 
richness to explorations of regime politics within socio-technical change, 
particularly in relation to investigating processes of change at different scales. 
Socio-technical regimes are often characterised as stable with relatively short 
periods of change initiated by niche experimentation. Incorporating a discursive 
approach provides for a more diffuse and gradual explanation for change, 
enabling exploration of how individual experiments link to long-term debates at 
both the local and national scale.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview and context: heat and cities 
It is now widely accepted that addressing climate change will necessitate 
fundamental restructuring of our energy systems. While many of the 
technologies to reduce emissions are well established, progress against energy 
decarbonisation targets is slow and researchers are increasingly seeking to 
explore the political and governance processes that are central in shaping the 
development of energy systems (International Energy Agency, 2018). Despite 
this, sub-national governance interactions remain neglected as a research focus 
and there are particularly limited contributions that consider the interactions 
between city and national scales (Cowell, Ellis and Strachan, 2017). 
 
Demand for heating accounts for a significant portion of global energy demand. 
In the EU final energy demand for heating exceeds that of electricity or 
transport, accounting for half of total energy (European Commission, 2016). 
Despite this 75% of the fuel used for heating and cooling in the EU comes from 
fossil fuels (International Energy Agency, 2014a). 
 
Increasingly there is recognition that greater attention needs to be paid to heat 
decarbonisation. Not least because the decarbonisation of heat (and transport) 
has not been keeping pace with decarbonisation in the electricity sector 
(Carbon Connect, 2015; UNEP, 2015; Committee on Climate Change, 2018). 
Additionally there is growing awareness of the links and synergies between 
decarbonisation in the heat, electricity and transport sectors (Energy and 
Climate Change Committee, 2016; Deutsch Umwelthilfe, 2017). 
 
Forecasts indicate that 75% of the European citizens will live in urban areas in 
2020 and that this share will increase to 84% by 2050 (Connolly, Nielsen and 
Persson, 2013). This has significant implications for the decarbonisation of heat 
as action at the urban scale will be important in shaping the delivery of energy 
efficient buildings and low carbon heating. 
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At the same time there have been considerable changes in the economic 
position and climate leadership role of cities in many countries in recent years. 
For example, in the UK, government funding to local authorities reduced by an 
estimated 37% in real-terms from 2010-11 to 2015-16 and there is an ongoing 
move to refocus funding from a central settlement to the local collection of 
council tax and business rates (Lowndes and Mccaughie, 2013; National Audit 
Office, 2014). Over the same period the role of cities in climate governance has 
received greater attention, with the creation of a UN Special Envoy for Cities 
and Climate Change, the development of increasing numbers of city and sub-
national climate governance networks, and the importance of sub-national 
implementation recognised in the 2015 Paris Agreement for Climate Action 
(Castán Broto, 2017). 
 
Recognising the increasing profile of heat decarbonisation, together with the 
importance of local actors in delivering low-carbon heating technologies, this 
thesis seeks to explore the relationship between cities and the institutional 
framework for energy decarbonisation. It takes as its analytical focus the 
development of heat networks in England and Germany. Analysis of heat 
network discursive framings, actor networks and institutions is undertaken, 
together with a number of city case studies in each country, in order to explore 
the relationship between ideas and institutions. The two country contexts of 
England and Germany are selected as two settings which are currently seeking 
to expand the penetration of heat networks as part of decarbonisation 
strategies, but which exhibit differences in political economy, energy system 
history and policy approach to heat networks. 
 
There is a growing focus in many countries on the role of heat networks in 
decarbonisation and, as outlined in chapters 2, existing literature has 
established that many of the obstacles to further heat networks development 
relate to the institutions, regulation and structure of the energy system. Heat 
networks are based on physical networks of pipes and network development 
invariably necessitates the involvement of a range of partners; commonly local 
authorities, other local public sector heat loads, commercial and industrial heat 
loads, energy companies and heat network developers/operators. These actor 
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networks are complex and involve organisations operating across a range of 
scales. It is, however, unclear how actors at different scales engage in shaping, 
or are shaped by, the institutional structures relating to heat networks. This 
thesis explores this topic. 
 
The rest of this introductory chapter outlines the rationale for the focus on heat 
networks, the conceptual and analytical approach adopted, research questions 
and details the key findings and contribution of the research. The final section 
introduces the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Heat networks 
1.2.1 What are heat networks? 
Heat networks, sometimes called district heating, comprise of networks of 
insulated pipes which transport hot (or cold) water or steam from the point of 
generation to end users, meeting residential and commercial needs for space 
heating, hot water and potentially cooling. As a result, individual buildings 
served by a heat network don't need their own boilers, chillers or air 
conditioners (UKDEA, 2014). In contrast to electricity supply, which is currently 
largely delivered by large, centralised electricity generation plants, heat 
networks are necessarily local infrastructure based on physical networks of 
pipes. Heat networks can be supplied with heat from a range of sources 
including heat recovered from power stations and industrial processes, waste-
to-energy facilities, large-scale heat pumps, biomass combined heat and power 
(CHP) plants, gas-fired CHP units, electric boilers and solar thermal arrays. The 
systems usually consist of heat plants and a network of distribution and return 
pipes (CHPA, 2014). The structure of a typical heat network is illustrated in 
figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Typical structure of a district heat scheme. 
 
Source: Parsons Brinkerhoff, 2014 
 
Heat networks have a long history with early networks developed in the late 
1800’s in the United States. In Europe many cities developed small networks 
around a similar period but the first commercial systems tended to be 
developed in the early 1900’s (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010; Magnusson, 2013). 
However, in Europe, it was not until the post-war period that development took 
off as the reconstruction of cities destroyed during World War II and rising social 
expectations regarding internal heating resulted in a large number of cities 
across Europe developing heat networks in the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s.  
 
While district heat networks can use heat from a wide range of sources, 
networks are currently predominantly fuelled by gas-fuelled combined heat and 
power (CHP) (DECC, 2013b; UNEP, 2015). CHP integrates the production of 
usable heat and electricity, in a single, efficient process. It works by recovering 
heat from the power generation process and using it to heat domestic and 
commercial buildings as well as some industrial processes. CHP systems can 
deliver energy and carbon savings of up to 30% by reducing energy lost as 
waste heat compared to separate power and heat generation from the same 
fuel. In the OECD countries 79%1 of heat networks utilise cogeneration and 
                                                          
1 Based on 2011 data. 
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across Europe approximately 13% of total heat demand is met by heat networks 
(Euroheat and Power, 2013; International Energy Agency, 2014). 
 
Although gas-CHP systems have lower emissions than separate power and 
heat generation, in order to meet the carbon emission reduction targets the heat 
sector in both the UK and Germany will need to be entirely decarbonised 
(DECC, 2011; BMWi, 2012). The UK Government (DECC 2013a) suggests that 
heat networks are compatible with decarbonisation targets provided that in the 
long-term gas is replaced by biofuels, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and 
large-scale heat pumps (powered by renewable electricity). Renewables based 
heat networks are not yet common however a number of Scandinavian heat 
networks are currently progressing plans to transition to operating on a 100% 
renewable basis, often incorporating thermal stores to reduce the demand for 
heat at times of peak electricity demand2. Additionally a number of energy 
system analyses (such as Chittum & Østergaard, 2014; Lund et al., 2010, Agora 
Energiewende, 2013) suggest that heat networks may be important to enable 
the cost-effective integration of low emission energy sources through providing 
balancing services. For example heat storage is technically unproblematic and 
heat can be stored or fed into district heating grids for at least a few hours 
without any major challenges. This can help to store excess electrical power, 
such as from wind power generation, in the form of heat for use at peak heat 
demand. Additionally heat networks can allow heat loads to be aggregated thus 
making sources of heat, such as waste heat or geothermal, economical.  
 
1.2.2 How heat networks differ from other energy infrastructure 
Although heat networks have been a small part of global energy systems for 
many decades there has been renewed interest in their role in energy system 
decarbonisation, as outlined in the following chapter. There has been particular 
focus on the ability of networks to incorporate various low carbon sources of 
heat and therefore be progressively decarbonised over time as different 
technologies become more economic. However heat networks also have a 
number of attributes that differ from the majority of other decarbonisation 
                                                          
2 For example the Sunstore 4 project in Marstal which incorporates solar thermal, biomass, a heat pump 
and thermal storage. 
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technologies. For example other decarbonisation technologies tend to be either 
decentralised to the household level (heat pumps, domestic PV, energy 
efficiency) or connected to existing gas or electricity networks (wind, PV, EfW, 
biogas/hydrogen injection). In contrast, the development of heat networks 
generally3 necessitate the concurrent development of generation, distribution 
and supply infrastructure, together with operational business models.  
 
Additionally heat losses over large distances and the need to engage multiple 
local partners and consumer groups in development also means that networks 
tend to be developed at a local (or city-) scale. Heat network supply also does 
not conform to the liberalised model of energy supply dominant in European 
contexts as, once connected, customers are effectively supplied by a monopoly 
as the costs of installing alternative household-level heating technologies, such 
as a gas boiler or individual heat pump, are generally prohibitive. 
 
Increased focus on heat networks and their different attributes to other heat 
decarbonisation options suggests that analysis of actor discourses and 
institutional approaches in different contexts, particularly between the local and 
national, may be useful to expand understanding of both the role of heat 
networks and also in the relationship between difference scales in energy 
transitions.  
 
1.2.3 Heat network business models 
Globally heat networks operate under diverse business models and regulatory 
structures (UNEP, 2015). Business models range from fully publicly owned 
systems, to public-private partnerships and cooperative models, to fully private 
systems. The relative involvement of the public or private sector depends 
broadly on three factors: 1) the degree of control each partner seeks to exert 
over project objectives, 2) the degree and type of risk project partners are 
willing to hold and, 3) the financial profile of a project, with structures negotiated 
by complex actor networks (Homes and Communities Agency, 2011; Rao et al., 
2017). Additionally, country specific norms relating to public and private sector 
                                                          
3 In theory heat network generation, distribution and supply can be unbundled however unbundling was 
rejected in Sweden on the basis that it was likely to increase costs (Werner, 2017) and current networks 
in England and Germany tend to be operated on an integrated basis. 
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involvement in energy provision can also be significant in shaping business 
models (UNEP, 2015). 
 
Analysis of heat network business models suggests that the wholly public 
business model is the most widely adopted globally (UNEP, 2015). Under this 
model local authorities or local public utilities retain full ownership and control of 
the network in order to deliver social and environmental objectives. The public 
sector holds the majority of the risk and either finances the project through 
reserves or borrowing. Projects may be developed within a local authority 
department or via a special purpose vehicle depending on returns and the 
approach to financial liability. Public business models which utilise public debt 
can result in higher rates of return due to reduced risks and a lower cost of 
capital (UNEP, 2015). 
 
An alternative to full public ownership is a hybrid model which incorporate 
involvement of the public and private sector with control, risk and returns 
negotiated between partners. Hybrid models include: 
 public and private joint ventures where both parties financing network 
development. The joint-venture model typically involves the creation of a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) with both partners providing equity, and 
potentially debt, finance and the creation of a board which reflects the 
ownership split. 
 concession contracts where the public sector is involved in the 
development of a project but then procures a private sector partner to 
design, build, finance and operate the network under a long-term 
concession. The models usually provide provision for the city to buy back 
the project at the end of the concession agreement. The concession 
holder bears the risks of designing, building and operating the district 
energy system but benefits from risk reduction through the involvement 
of the local authority in initial development and the provision of public 
sector anchor loads. Agreements may include requirements relating to 
charging structures or profit sharing but the local authority has limited 
control of the concession (Rao et al., 2017). 
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 community-owned or cooperative business models. These schemes can 
be developed by communities with limited involvement of the municipality 
but in practice tend to closely involve local authorities in early 
development and potentially in financial underwriting.  
 
Finally, heat networks can be developed under wholly private business models, 
although these tend to only be pursued when limited public sector coordination 
is required and the rate of return is sufficient to attract private investment. Such 
models are more likely to be pursued in new developments, rather than retrofit 
projects, where pipework installation costs are lower. 
 
A broad categorisation of business models for heat networks as wholly public, 
hybrid public-private and wholly private is illustrated in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Categorisation of business models for heat networks (UNEP 2015) 
 
 
 
1.4 Research questions and theoretical approach 
It is argued in this research that the role of sub-national governance is under-
explored in analysis of socio-technical change in energy systems. Given that 
local actors, particularly local authorities, are likely to be central to the 
development of heat networks greater consideration of city-scale interactions, 
process of negotiation and development, and the interplay between local-scale 
projects and wider national and international regimes, is likely to contribute to 
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understanding of both energy transitions and socio-technical change more 
broadly. As the focus of this research is on the interactions between complex 
actor networks and processes of policy development at local and national 
scales, a discursive institutional approach to the development of heat networks 
is adopted. The research presents a conceptual framework which combined 
literatures related to transitions, ideas and institutions, and applies it empirically. 
 
In this research a series of six case study locations are explored in the two 
country contexts of England and Germany. The specific research questions 
explored are: 
 
 How are heat networks developing in England and Germany? 
- Which public and private actors are engaging in this scale of energy 
provision and why? 
- What storylines and discourses are being adopted by actors in the 
development of heat networks? 
- What discourses are dominant in the different contexts? 
 
 How are heat networks engaging with, and potentially influencing, wider 
national and international transition processes? 
- How do wider governance structures (rules, incentives and norms) 
influence the development of heat networks in different contexts? 
- How do city-scale heat network projects interact with national policy 
and institutions? 
 
 What role do city-scale actors play in shaping the ideational and 
institutional framework for heat networks in England and Germany? 
 
1.5 Key findings 
An overarching finding of this research is that there is a growing narrative at the 
local scale of the need for local governments to adopt more direct forms of 
governance in order to secure wider public good benefits of energy 
infrastructure, at least in the case of heat networks. This was evident in both 
country contexts and across cases. In developing heat networks all locations 
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were adopting multiple roles but there was increased focus on ensuring modes 
of governing. Drawing on the work of Bulkeley and Kern (2006), these findings 
both (1) provide an empirical demonstration of the multiple modes of governing 
adopted by local governments in relation to energy transitions, and (2) 
challenge Bulkeley and Kern's (2006, p. 2240) assertion that the UK and 
Germany are converging on a more partnership based ‘ensuring’ model of 
climate change governance. While an ‘ensuring’ discourse was more explicit in 
the case study locations of Bristol, Frankfurt and Hamburg (as the three cases 
adopting municipal ownership of heat supply) it was also evident in a more 
muted form in the other three cases (Rhein Hünsruck, Sheffield and 
Birmingham) in the form of increased debate regarding control of networks and 
the balance between local benefits and risks. 
 
Currently much discursive institutional literature presents ideas as influencing 
policy outcomes only when fully formed (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016; 
Gillard, 2016), however, this research suggests that emerging, chaotic and 
conflicting ideas can also be powerful. Ideas relating to an ensuring state and 
‘remunicipalisation’ were being used in a variety of contexts (electricity 
generation, energy supply, power networks, heat networks) to illuminate 
broader trends regarding the localisation of energy systems and the potential 
role of local authorities in delivering multiple local benefits. However, despite 
these local ideational shifts, institutional norms and wider governance traditions 
persisted which were limiting the ability of local governments to enact a more 
central role in energy systems. Specifically a lack of institutional structures to 
include local authorities in energy policy debates and a national norm of 
‘enabling’ modes of urban climate governance (particularly in England) acted to 
limit the ability of local authorities to translate the ideational power they were 
exercising within their organisation and with peers (power through ideas) into 
influence on national policy. This highlights the ability of ‘power in ideas’, 
exercised through national norms and policy making processes, to constrain 
other types of ideational power – particularly those that originating from local 
actors.  
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Although local and national historical factors are revealed to be important the 
findings highlight that historical institutional accounts of the development of heat 
networks in England and Germany are not sufficient. The two countries have 
very different histories (in terms of heat network growth, institutional links 
between local and national scales and the strength of devolution and austerity 
discourses) but similar discourses were evident in relation to an ensuring role 
for local government, increased interest in direct ownership and the need to 
deliver multiple objectives. This incremental framing highlights the importance of 
‘background’ discursive processes and frames processes of change as 
incremental and dynamic. In England in particular interlinked economic, 
political, technical decentralisation trends were, together, creating the discursive 
space for local authorities to re-evaluate their role in relation to energy. 
 
Finally, in relation to MLP literatures this study indicates that applying an DI 
approach to Geels et al.’s (2016) characterisation of shifts between transition 
pathways can provide a more detailed understanding of the role of endogenous 
(urban regime) processes in system change and illuminate the potential for 
differing transition pathways to be dominant at different scales at various points. 
In particular the national heat network pathway in England can be understood to 
align more with a transform pathway with the drive to develop new heat 
decarbonisation strategies allowing incumbent actors to argue for incremental 
policies which support financial de-risking and regulate heat networks in line 
with existing energy networks (layering). At the local level pathways aligns more 
closely to reconfiguration with a range of changes to ideas within the urban 
energy regime combining to allow (some) local authorities to transform their 
local approach (displacement), albeit with little change to the national system 
architecture. Applying a DI approach to understanding ideational power and 
bricolage allows for the examination of the processes by which competing 
discourses and ideas, at different scales, can influence transition pathways. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
Following this introduction chapter 2 reviews the history, current status and 
likely future development of heat networks in England and Germany. This 
includes an overview of the role of local governments in energy systems in the 
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two countries and an assessment of the core challenges in further developing 
heat networks. The key barriers identified relate to the co-ordination of complex 
actor networks at a city scale, the development of appropriate financing, 
ownership and governance structures, lack of integration of district heating into 
the current energy system structures and energy system governance that does 
not support district heating.  
 
Chapter 2 also establishes that policy relating to heat networks is in a period of 
flux in both countries and receiving increased policy attention. A range of actors 
are involved in development and there are a number of possible future 
governance routes, with local authorities likely to play a significant role in most 
networks. This central but uncertain role for local authorities, together with the 
complex barriers identified, suggests that the development of heat networks is 
likely to be a highly contested process with a number of actors and interests 
seeking to influence the direction of development. To further contextualise heat 
networks in the energy system, chapter 2 also includes a short overview of heat 
networks across Europe. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework which is adopted in the research. 
The study seeks to examine the role of the city-scale in processes of change in 
socio-technical systems and it is argued that there is a particular gap in the 
transitions literature relating to the conceptualisation of regime politics at sub-
national scales. This has resulted in limited consideration of the role of different 
actors at the city scale, process of negotiation and development, and the 
interplay between local-scale projects (such as heat networks) and wider 
national and international regimes. A discursive institutional approach to the 
development of heat networks is therefore proposed to explore these issues 
and the research presents a conceptual framework which combined literatures 
related to transitions, ideas and institutions, and applies it empirically. This 
approach is likely to be particularly appropriate in light of the findings of chapter 
2 that many of the obstacles to heat networks relate to the institutions, 
regulation and structure of the energy system.  
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The overall methodological approach involved three main stages: (1) a review 
of national heat network policy and discourses in England and Germany; (2) a 
review of the development of heat networks and associated discourses in three 
case study location in England and three case studies in Germany; and, (3) a 
series of in-depth interviews with a range of local, national and international 
actors involved in heat network development and delivery. Chapter 4 presents 
the detailed methodology and analytical approach adopted in the research. This 
consists of analysing national contexts and city case studies in relation to the 
three levels of ideas identified by Vivian Schmidt (2010); policy ideas, 
programmatic ideas, and philosophical principles. In order to explore the 
relationships between ideas and institutions, the work of Hajer (2006) is drawn 
upon to structure the analytical stages and identifies key discourses, actor 
networks/coalitions, and the institutional practices in which discourses are 
produced.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 present and analyse the results of the empirical research 
carried out in England and Germany respectively. This includes exploration of 
discourses and actor networks, discourse structuration and institutionalisation. 
Both chapters start with a summary of heat network development in the case 
study locations of Bristol, Birmingham, Sheffield in England; Hamburg, Frankfurt 
and Rhein Hünsruck in Germany. The chapters then analyse problem definition 
discourses, key established and emerging storylines, coalitions and discourse 
structuration and interactions between discourses and institutional structures.  
 
Chapter 7 integrates the findings of chapters 5 and 6 and examines the 
ideational framing of the key discourses identified in terms of policy, 
programmatic and philosophical ideas. In order to explore how ideas become 
influential and shape institutions processes of ideational power (power over, in 
and throuh ideas) are discussed with ideational bricolage revealed to be an 
important process in allowing local actors to reconceptualise their role in energy 
system change and resist national institutional norms. 
 
The final chapter presents responses to the six research questions that are the 
focus on the research and clarifies the contribution of the work to debates of 
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energy system change with specific contributions identified in relation to urban 
governance literatures and the application of discursive institutionalist 
approaches. The utility of applying a DI approach to explore regime interactions 
within the MLP is also discussed. The chapter concludes by discussing the 
policy implications of the findings, highlighting some limitations of the research 
and making some recommendations for future work in this area.  
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Chapter 2: Heat networks in England and Germany: overview and policy 
context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the history and development of heat network policy in 
England and Germany, the role of local authorities in developing networks and 
the barriers to deployment. Changes in the governance framework for local 
authorities are outlined, together with the potential relevance of this for heat 
networks. A number of core challenges in further developing heat networks are 
identified relating to the co-ordination of complex actor networks at a city scale, 
the development of appropriate financing, ownership and governance 
structures, lack of integration of heat networks into the current energy system 
structures and energy system governance that does not support heat networks. 
This chapter establishes that heat network policy is receiving increased policy 
attention as part of decarbonisation strategies in both countries, with policies in 
particular flux in England. Heat networks generally involve a wide range of 
actors, which may be brought together under a variety of governance 
structures, with local authorities likely to play a significant role in most networks.  
 
Section 2.2 starts by giving a summary of heat networks in Europe. Section 2.3-
2.5 then presents an overview of heat policy and heat network development in 
England. This includes the role of local authorities together with how changes to 
local governance structures might be relevant to heat network development. 
Section 2.6 presents a similar outline of heat network development in Germany 
and the role of municipalities. Section 2.7 reviews the literature on the key 
barriers to heat network growth and section 2.8 concludes and links the findings 
of the chapter to the focus of this research.  
 
2.2 Heat Networks in Europe 
Heat networks are widely used across many European countries4 with 
                                                          
4 In addition to considerable recent growth in other countries. China and Russia have the 
world’s largest networks, although they often have lower efficiencies and higher emissions than 
European networks, and China has the fastest growing networks with heat network sales 
increasing by 25% between 2007 and 2011. The United States has the greatest reported district 
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250GWth of installed heat network capacity meeting 9% of heat demand across 
the European Union (EU) and supplying approximately 13% of the EU 
population (Euroheat and Power, 2013; Heat Roadmap Europe 2050, 2017b). 
As illustrated in figure 2, the level of deployment of heat networks varies 
considerably across Europe, however approximately 6,000 systems are in 
operation across the EU member states (Connolly et al., 2014) 
 
Heat networks are particularly well established in many of the Northern 
European countries where, for example, heat networks account for 63% of the 
heat market in Denmark, 50% in Finland and 24% in Austria (Energy 
Technologies Institute, 2012; Committee on Climate Change, 2014; Euroheat 
and Power, 2015). 
 
Figure 2: District Heat Networks in EU member states. 
 
(Euroheat and Power, 2013) 
 
                                                          
cooling sales and district cooling capacity tripled in South Korea between 2009 and 2011 
(International Energy Agency, 2014; Euroheat and Power, 2013). 
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Historically, beyond energy efficiency, there has been little focus on heat 
decarbonisation policy at the European level (International Energy Agency, 
2014), however more recently there has been renewed focus on both the need 
to decarbonise heat and the potential role of heat networks. The 2016 European 
Commission strategy on heating and cooling included a joint focus on 
renewables and heat networks and a number of studies have highlighted the 
need to link the heat and electricity systems (European Commission, 2016; 
Riahi, 2016). This includes several European studies which indicate that the 
lifetime costs of CHP heat networks are competitive with alternative heating 
systems (Oñate, 2013; International Energy Agency, 2014) and that increasing 
the penetration of heating and cooling networks to 30% by 2030 and to 50% by 
2050 across the EU is essential to achieve decarbonisation and cost goals 
(Connolly, Nielsen and Persson, 2013).  
 
Similarly the United Nations Environment Programme suggest that heat 
networks are undergoing a resurgence due to their ability to integrate high 
penetrations of variable renewable energy sources and thermal storage (UNEP, 
2015). This focus on an important role for heat networks in decarbonisation is 
echoed by the International Energy Agency who describe heat networks as 
‘fundamental for decarbonisation’ and able to ‘serve as a backbone to facilitate 
the diffusion of low-carbon technologies, and provide co-benefits to the rest of 
the energy system’ (International Energy Agency, 2012: 175-6).  
 
Although this increased profile for heat networks in EU energy policy is a recent 
development the EU has aimed to increased CHP capacity for many years, 
recognising the efficiency and greenhouse gas emission benefits of the 
technology. In the early 2000’s the European Commission set a goal to double 
CHP electricity production from 9% to 18% of total EU electricity production by 
2010. The target of 18% CHP production was missed and the current share is 
about 12% (Eurelectric, 2014). More recently the 2012 EU Energy Efficiency 
Directive included provisions to promote CHP such as the requirement that 
each EU country carries out a comprehensive assessment of the national 
potential of cogeneration and district heating and cooling. Between 2003 and 
2013 the European Commission’s Intelligent Energy Europe (IEE) programme, 
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which aimed to support EU energy efficiency and renewable energy targets, 
supported a number of heat network projects, this included capacity building, 
policy support and technical support in developing bankable heat network 
schemes (Intelligent Energy Europe Programme, 2014). Similar support is 
currently available through the Horizon 2020 funding programme. Beyond this 
heat networks and CHP are largely promoted through national energy, climate, 
environmental and fiscal policies including support via feed-in systems, 
investment support, tax breaks and grants. For example in Denmark a feed-in-
tariff has been paid to decentralised CHP plants since 1992, in Sweden a 
combination of carbon taxes, subsidies and low-cost loans are utilised to 
support heat networks, and in the Netherlands there is a feed-in-tariff for CHP 
electricity (Frontier Economics, 2015). 
 
Heat networks also operate under a wide range of governance and ownership 
structures across Europe, including ‘centralised state provision, through 
ministries and state-owned companies, local municipalities and private 
provision’ (Helm, 2010). However, in much of Europe local authorities have 
usually played a crucial role in establishing heat networks and the dominant 
governance model for heat networks has been via locally-owned energy 
companies with the municipal authority as a significant shareholder or owner 
(Hawkey & Webb, 2012; Ericsson, 2009). Likewise differing regulatory styles 
across Europe have led to heat networks being regulated in widely different 
ways. For example, in much of Eastern Europe there is an expectation that 
CHP operators will use revenues from electricity sales to lower heat prices. In 
some countries this includes ex-ante price regulation of heat prices and returns, 
such as in Latvia, Romania and Poland (Eurelectric, 2014). 
 
2.3 Heat Policy in England 
In the UK5, heat energy currently makes up 45% of final energy consumption, 
accounting for 38% of carbon emissions, see figure 3 (BEIS, 2016a, 2017b). 
Meeting the UK’s ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target(s), of 
                                                          
5 The focus of this thesis is on the development of heat networks in England and Germany. However 
much of the policy analysis and data relating to heat networks relates to the UK as a whole rather than 
England specifically. Where this is the case UK wide information is used and clearly referred to as UK 
data. 
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reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 against a 1990 baseline, 
will therefore require very significant cuts in emissions from heat. This is 
particularly the case as the Government has indicated that, in line with Paris 
Agreement commitments, it intends to set a UK target for reducing domestic 
emissions to net zero in the future (Committee on Climate Change, 2016b). 
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from heating can be achieved both by 
reducing heat use through energy efficiency, and by reducing the emissions 
intensity of heating through the adoption of low and zero carbon heat 
technologies (NERA and AEA, 2010).  
 
Figure 3: Energy consumption for heat, non-heat and transport, 2016 
 
 
Source: (BEIS, 2017b) 
 
To date there has been a low penetration of renewable heat in the UK 
compared with much of the rest of Europe, as outlined in figure 4. Instead 
heating in the UK is dominated by gas, with building-level gas boilers 
accounting for 68% of heating systems in the UK (see figure 5). The dominance 
of gas boilers in the UK results from a number of historical factors, including the 
UK’s access to cheap North Sea gas, the development of a national gas grid, 
and comparatively low access to other indigenous heat sources, such as 
biomass or geothermal. Heat can, however, be delivered to customers via a 
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variety of alternative low carbon methods including; an individual heating 
system fuelled by renewable gas (biomethane or hydrogen), an individual 
heating system not connected to a networked fuel supply (such as a biomass 
boiler or solar thermal), electric heating (including heat pumps) and heat 
networks that supply heat through pipework carrying hot water or steam6. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of heating and cooling from renewable resources as a 
percentage of total energy used for that purpose – EU28, 2004-2015. 
 
Source: (Eurostat, 2017) 
 
                                                          
6 Heat networks are a heat supply, rather than generation, technology and therefore their 
carbon emissions depend on the emissions of the associated heat generation technology. 
However it is possible to substantially or completely reduce carbon emissions from heat through 
the use of renewably-fuelled heat networks. 
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Figure 5: Breakdown of heating systems across all UK buildings, 2016 
 
Source: (BEIS, 2017b) 
 
To date UK Government scenarios have suggested that heat will largely be 
decarbonised through widespread electrification of heating systems, principally 
with the use of heat pumps, leading to a policy focus on measures to 
decarbonise electricity (DECC, 2013b). However reliance on the electrification 
of heat poses a number of problems, including the likelihood that much of the 
existing gas infrastructure will cease to be used and the need for major change 
in consumer practice and heating installer supply chains (Hoggett, Ward and 
Mitchell, 2011). Significantly, a large scale transition to heat pumps could also 
require approximately 40GW of additional electricity generation capacity in 
order to meet peak heating demands (Eyre & Baruah, 2014). 
 
Increasingly government and industry experts have been recognising that a 
diverse portfolio of technologies are likely to be important to the decarbonisation 
of heat; including energy efficiency, heat networks, electrification and 
decarbonised gas networks, although the relative role of each technology is still 
subject to much debate (Chaudry et al., 2014). This uncertainty regarding 
deployment levels of low-carbon heat technologies, together with analysis which 
suggests that progress in decarbonising heat is not sufficient to meet future 
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carbon budgets (Committee on Climate Change7, 2014; Connect, 2015; Verco, 
2014), have added to a growing recognition amongst policymakers that policy to 
decarbonise heat requires more attention. This has led to a recent resurgence 
of interest in heat policy in the UK and recognition that alternatives to 
electrification, including heat networks, are likely to play an important role. 
Indeed recent analysis has highlighted that 56 per cent of GB building heat 
demand is concentrated within only four per cent of the geographical area, 
indicating that there is significant potential for heat networks in relation to a 
large proportion of heat demand (AECOM and ETI, 2017). 
 
2.4 Heat networks in England 
Heat networks remain uncommon in the UK, accounting for approximately 2% 
of total heat demand (DECC, 2013a; ADE, 2018a), although there is some 
variation in estimates due to a lack of robust datasets collating information on all 
networks. The Government has estimated that there are around 2000 networks 
serving approximately 210,000 dwellings and 1700 commercial and public 
buildings (DECC, 2015a), whereas the Association for Decentralised Energy 
(ADE) has more recently estimated that there are 17,000 heat networks8 with 
over 490,000 connections9 (ADE, 2017b).  
 
Despite their low penetration, heat networks have a long history in the UK and 
their development can be characterised as progressing through four broad 
phases, as detailed in figure 6. Initially, first generation schemes were 
developed in the UK in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s (Kelly & Pollitt, 2010) 
often with municipal authorities taking a role in their development and operation 
(Hall, 2003). Second generation schemes were developed in the inter- and 
post-war period between 1930 – 1980 and third generation plants, which more 
commonly incorporate renewable sources of heat, are currently under 
development. Over these three phases the structure of the UK energy system 
has also changed significantly including the reorganisation of municipal energy 
                                                          
7 The CCC particularly highlight that progress on energy efficiency, low-carbon heat and 
electric vehicle deployment is insufficient to meet carbon targets. 
8 Of which around 91% are located in England, 6% in Scotland and 3% in Wales. 
9 Including 446,517 domestic customers, 33,273 commercial customers, 4,670 retail customers, 
320 light industrial customers, 1,456 universities and school and a further 4,865 mixed use 
networks. 
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companies into central and regional boards in the 1920s, the renationalisation 
of energy generation and supply following World War II and the liberalisation 
and privatisation of the energy system through the 1980s and 1990s (Russell, 
1986). Fourth generation heat networks which utilise lower temperatures, 
renewables and integrate with the smart electricity grid are expected to develop 
from 2020.  
 
In the UK and across Europe, heat networks were first used in urban areas. In 
the UK there was also considerable growth in the use of heat networks when 
high-rise housing developments were built in the 1960s and 1970s, and many of 
the schemes in operation today in the UK originate from this period. Following 
this period of growth heat networks fell out of favour for a number of reasons, 
including the waning popularity of high-rise housing developments during the 
1980s and 1990s. Additionally as Chaudry et al. (2014) highlight the poor 
design, construction and economic performance of some 1st and 2nd generation 
plants in the UK may have impacted on perceptions of current (3rd generation) 
heat network projects. Often these poorly maintained schemes were based on 
large council housing estates and focussed on heating domestic, social 
housing.  
 
Over these extensive phases of development there was periodic interest in 
whether heat networks (and CHP) would emerge as a significant technology in 
the UK energy system with proponents pointing out the increased efficiency and 
energy security benefits of such systems10. Despite this intermittent interest 
Russell (2010) argues that a number of factors have limited the development of 
heat networks. Firstly, the period following World War II saw a focus on 
providing increasing quantities of energy, at low prices, to feed economic 
growth (Rydin et al.,  2013). Centralised provision, economies of scale and the 
development of the national transmission system were seen as the most 
effective way to do this leading to a policy focus on large scale electricity 
systems and a marginalisation of more locally based heat networks. During this 
phase, when energy generation, distribution and supply were nationalised in the 
UK, there was a focus on centralised producer interests and limited local 
                                                          
10 Particularly following the oil shocks of the 1970’s  
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authority power in the energy sector which further dis-incentivised expansion of 
heat networks (Russell, 1993). 
 
Secondly, from the 1980’s onwards successive UK governments focussed on a 
neo-liberal approach to economic governance which treated privatisation of 
public assets as a means to improve cost efficiencies, reduce public 
expenditure and stimulate growth (Helm, 2010). This led to the privatisation and 
liberalisation of the energy system in the 1980’s and 1990’s and the introduction 
of a new market logic focussed on short-term returns that has not supported the 
development of heat networks due to their long paybacks and high capital 
requirements. The emphasis of the liberalised energy system on competition 
and consumer choice also means the long-term energy contracts essential for 
most heat network viability are unusual, particularly in the domestic sector. 
Thirdly, in the 1990’s, as climate change concerns started to influence policy, 
Kelly & Pollitt (2010) highlight how policy developments, such as the failure to 
establish a market for heat (as was the case for electricity), the exclusion of 
CHP from the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) and the withdrawal of the 
obligation for industry to explore CHP potential, further limited the potential of 
CHP heat networks to expand. 
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Figure 6: Evolution of district heating networks 
 
(Adapted from Chaudry et al., 2014; Lund et al., 2014)  
 
2.4.1 Heat network growth scenarios 
A number of studies have assessed the potential role for heat networks in the 
decarbonisation of the UK energy system. These studies generally took a 
scenario approach based on the techno-economic feasibility of heat networks 
across the country, and resulted in estimates of between 3%-43% of space and 
hot water demand potentially being able to be met by heat networks, as outlined 
in table 2.  
 
Table 2: UK heat network feasibility studies 
Organisation Year Potential identified 
Poyry Energy and Faber 
Maunsell (on behalf of 
2009 Potential to connect 3 to 8 million 
homes and 15 to 26 million metre² 
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DECC) of commercial and public buildings. 
Concluded that up to 14% of heat 
demand could be met through heat 
networks by 2050. 
Delta EE 2012 34% of homes adopt heat networks 
under the ‘Electrification and heat 
networks’ scenario. 27% of homes 
adopt heat networks in the ‘Balance 
Transition’ Scenario. 
Energy Technologies 
Institute 
2013 Suggests that 43% of the current 
British building heat market can be 
economically connected to macro 
district energy schemes. 
 
 
In addition to these specific heat network feasibilities most whole system energy 
models identify a role for heat networks in UK energy system decarbonisation. 
The outputs from these models vary greatly, ranging from scenarios where heat 
networks increase only marginally to growth in line with the higher end of the 
ranges indicated in the feasibility assessments in table 2 (40%+ of building 
heat). The role identified for heat networks in these models in 2030 and 2050 is 
summarised in figure 7.  
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Figure 7: Heat output met by district heat across a range of models. 
 
Source: (Carbon Connect, 2014) 
 
As table 2 and figure 7 indicate there is considerable variation in projections of 
the future role of heat networks in the UK energy system. This is partly 
accounted for by differences in methodology and scope but is also a factor of 
the difficulty in representing heat networks in system models which tend to lack 
a geographic dimension. In particular the studies differ in terms of the level of 
spatial detail, timeframes and underlying assumptions, including the role of gas 
in heat networks, what heat densities make heat networks cost-effective and 
how costs relating to gas, renewable technologies and heat network pipes 
Key: Figure 7 refers to the following models: 
CCC DH = Committee on Climate Change. Fourth Carbon Budget Scenarios; High district heat variant 
CCC = Committee on Climate Change. 4 Carbon Budget Scenarios; stretch scenario for heat for 
buildings 
DECC = Department of Energy and Climate Change. Partial energy system model. 
ETI = Energy Technologies Institute. Energy system model, 2013. 
NG = National Grid, Future Energy Scenarios, ‘Gone Green’ scenario 
UKERC = UK Energy Research Centre, Phase two scenarios: ‘Low Carbon’ 2013 
DEE = Delta EE for Energy Networks Association. ‘Balanced Transition’ scenario, 2012. 
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change over time (DECC, 2013b).  
 
Energy system models have historically focussed on national electricity and gas 
supply and energy efficiency with little recognition of the potential for local heat 
distribution in decarbonisation scenarios (Connolly et al., 2014; Persson et al., 
2014). For example the Europe Commission’s Energy Roadmap 2050 report 
focusses on electrification of heating and energy efficiency measures and none 
of the six scenarios involve the large-scale implementation of heat networks 
(European Commission, 2012). However, energy system modelling by Connolly 
et al. (2014) suggest that a new ‘district heat plus heat savings’ scenario should 
be considered and that this approach could achieve the same reductions in 
primary energy supply and GHG emissions but at a lower cost than 
electrification and energy efficiency alternatives. Under a ‘district heat plus heat 
saving’ scenario 2050 heat decarbonisation targets are achieved through a 
combination of heat networks in cities (50% penetration), heat pumps in rural 
areas (50% penetration) and 30-50% total energy reduction, resulting in 
€100billion/year lower costs than the European Commission’s deep energy 
efficiency scenario. 
 
2.4.2 The developing policy landscape for heat networks 
Over the last 30 years various financial incentives and support schemes have 
been developed to drive deployment low-carbon energy technologies in the UK. 
Whilst few of these have been specifically aimed at heat networks a number of 
them, such as the Climate Change Levy, Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) and 
Enhanced Capital Allowances interact with heat networks (Connor et al., 2015). 
These past policy measures are outlined in appendix 1 and this section details 
the current policy landscape for heat networks in England. The policy approach 
discussed in this section is then further analysed in chapter 5. 
 
Over the past decade, as gas prices have risen and the need to concurrently 
address carbon reduction and fuel poverty concerns has increased, the case for 
heat networks has strengthened (DECC, 2013b). There is increasing interest 
from UK policymakers and analysts in their potential role in decarbonisation, 
most clearly with the 2012 publication of a ‘Strategic Framework for Heat’, 
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followed a year later by more detailed analysis in the ‘Future of Heating’ (DECC, 
2012; 2013a). These documents set out high level priorities across the heat 
sector and projected a significant increase in the (urban) role of heat networks 
to 2050, as illustrated in figure 8. The 2013 strategy suggested that, provided 
they can be used to distribute heat from low carbon sources, heat networks can 
be core to the UK’s heat strategy and have the potential to play a ‘critical role’ in 
decarbonising both domestic and industrial heat supply to 2050. This aligns with 
a range of literature that that suggests that heat networks are likely to become 
increasingly important in the energy system (Bolton, 2011; International Energy 
Agency, 2014).  
 
Figure 8: Indicative heat decarbonisation pathway in the UK 
 
Source: DECC, 2013a 
 
 
In England these broad commitments have translated into some new policy 
support for heat networks consisting of the development of the Heat Network 
Delivery Unit (HNDU) and, more recently, the launch of the Heat Network 
Investment Project (HNIP). Additionally a number of industry led measures have 
been developed. 
 
The HNDU was established in 2013 to provide financial and technical support to 
local authorities in the development of heat networks. The Unit has operated 
eight rounds of funding support since 2013 and has allocated £19million of 
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grant funding to over 200 heat network projects across 140 local authorities in 
England and Wales (BEIS, 2019). Under the HNDU programme local authorities 
can apply for funding to support 67% of the external costs of heat mapping, 
master planning, developing technical proposals, financial evaluations, 
developing governance processes, project management and any other agreed 
works to allow the preparation of heat network investment documents, business 
plans and financial models. The HNDU team provide some direct support and 
advice to local authorities developing heat networks however the majority of 
support is in the form of funding to enable the appointment of consultants to 
compete feasibility assessments. 
 
In the 2015 Spending Review the Government announced it will provide over 
£300m of funding for heat networks over the next five years (DECC, 2015d) in 
order to unlock up to £2bn of private investment and support heat networks 
which will heat over 400,000 homes. This funding was finalised as £320 million 
in 2016 (BEIS, 2016c) and a pilot stage Heat Networks Investment Project 
(HNIP) initiated. The pilot scheme launched in October 2016 and allocated 
£24.21m of funding to nine Local Authorities to develop or build heat networks. 
The funding was focussed on the commercialisation phase of development and 
grants and loans are available to support projects that have not been able to 
attract investment or where the internal rate of return is not sufficient to meet 
investor hurdle rates. New build networks, expansions, refurbishments and 
interconnections are all eligible for the funding and networks must generate 
heat from 75% gas CHP or from 50% renewable, recovered heat or a 
combination. Loan terms align closely to the ‘project life’, up to a maximum of 
40 years and a low interest rate applies11. Only local authorities and other public 
bodies were eligible for the pilot stage funding, although these organisations 
can ‘on-invest’ in public or private heat networks (BEIS, 2017d). The main 
phase of the programme opened to applications in February 2019 and eligibility 
to apply for grants and loans expanded to include any public, private or third 
sector a wider set of heat network sponsors and/or owner-operators (BEIS, 
2018b). 
 
                                                          
11 Below Public Works Loan Board rates. 
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The HNIP builds on the government’s Energy Networks report which it 
estimated that the heat network capital investment opportunity is between £400 
– 800 million12, based on 25 – 50% of the projects receiving HNDU support 
being built out (DECC, 2015c). This figure is based on England and Wales and 
excludes non-HNDU projects13. The Heat in the City project suggests 
incorporating these additional schemes could increase total investment to 
£1,000m by 2025 (Heat and the City Project, 2015). Broader government 
assessments suggest a total pipeline of in the region of 280 projects and 
suggest this will require up to £2 billion of capital investment over the next 10 
years and will represent £3.2 to 6.4 billion of operations and maintenance 
contracts across the 40 year lifetime of the infrastructure (DECC, 2015f). The 
HNIP aims to provide some of this required capital investment in order to unlock 
sufficient equity investment to establish a self-sustaining industry.  
 
Notwithstanding the development of the HNDU and the HNIP, heat networks 
operate in a relatively weak institutional environment in the UK as they are 
unregulated, with the exception of metering and billing regulations introduced as 
a result of the EU Energy Efficiency Directive. A number of industry led 
initiatives have been developed in the last five years including the Heat Trust 
consumer protection scheme, the CIBSE/ADE technical code of practice and 
the development of a District Energy Procurement Agency.  
 
Additionally Heat Network (Metering and Billing) Regulations 2014 came into 
force in December 2014 which implement the requirements of the EU Energy 
Efficiency Directive in relation to the supply of distributed heat, cooling, and hot 
water. The regulations aim to increase the accuracy of heat metering and billing 
in order to protect consumers and support further development of the market.  
 
The Heat Trust independent voluntary consumer protection scheme 
The Heat Trust was launched in November 2015 and enables consumers to 
access an independent process for settling disputes via the Energy 
Ombudsman and ensures minimum consumer standards (Heat Trust, 2015). To 
become a Heat Trust ‘member’, a supplier must agree to the terms of the 
                                                          
12 At the time this was based on 122 projects supported by the HNDU in 91 local authorities. 
13 Such as schemes led by housing associations and private developers. 
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scheme and pay a joining fee, as well as a fee per connection. Members also 
sign up to protecting customers through not disconnecting vulnerable customers 
during the winter and guaranteeing service payments to customers when the 
supplier fails to meet performance standards (Which?, 2015). BEIS provided 
start-up funding for the Heat Trust which was developed by the Association for 
Decentralised Energy (ADE). 
 
Technical Code of Practice 
Recognising the need to develop consistent technical standards the Chartered 
Institution of Building Services Engineers (CIBSE) and the ADE developed a 
technical code of practice for heat networks which was launched in July 2015. 
The code sets out minimum technical standards to ensure the quality and 
efficiency of networks, covering initial design, construction, commissioning, 
operation and maintenance (CIBSE and ADE, 2015). BEIS supported the 
development of the code. 
 
District Energy Procurement Agency (DEPA) 
The District Energy Procurement Agency (DEPA) is a municipal not-for-profit 
procurement cooperative specialising in goods and services in the district 
energy market. It is modelled on, and is being developed in collaboration with, 
VÄRMEK a similar existing organisation in Sweden. DEPA aims to reduce heat 
networks project costs in the UK through joint procurement and is being 
developed by Manchester City Council with a grant from BEIS (Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority, 2017). UK heat network project costs are 
estimated to be 20% higher than the European average, largely due to the small 
size of the industry in the UK, limited supply chains and a lack of large scale 
procurement (Poyry Energy and Faber Maunsell, 2009). 
 
This section has outlined the policy framework for heat networks in England. 
Much of this policy activity has focussed on the techno-economic dimensions of 
developing heat networks, such as difficulties in financing heat networks, the 
need for common standards and the lack of sector skills, however, the 
development of heat networks also involves complex actor networks and 
interrelates with existing policy, institutional and social factors. The next section 
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therefore examines these factors through discussing the role of local authorities 
in heat network development. The final section in this chapter also discussed 
the various barriers to further heat networks in both country contexts.  
 
2.5 The role of local authorities and cities 
Local authorities are widely acknowledged as playing a unique role in 
coordinating and developing heat networks due to the long-term perspective 
they are able to take in relation to investment, their role in incorporating social 
and environmental objectives, their ability to coordinate multiple local (and 
beyond) actors, their capacity as planners and operators of significant heat 
loads and their ability to lever in low cost finance and grant funding (Hawkey 
and Webb, 2012; UNEP, 2015). Despite this, there is a wide variety of roles 
local government can take in relation to heat networks, with potentially 
significant implications for financing, objectives and delivery. In addition there 
have been significant changes to the role, powers and financing of local 
government over recent years. The following section outlines these 
developments and reviews the (changing) role for local governance in the 
England, together with consideration of the role of local authorities in the energy 
system and heat networks specifically. 
 
2.5.1 Changes to local government role and powers 
The UK is well established as an example of a particularly centralised state, 
based on Parliamentary sovereignty, a government centred on London and 
subordinate regional and local government (Wilson and Game, 2002; Bulkeley 
and Kern, 2006). However the development of more dispersed and complex 
forms of governance in recent decades have seen changes not only in the 
distribution of competencies and powers between local, regional, national and 
supranational public institutions but also increased involvement by non-state 
actors and public-private partnerships (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Bache and 
Flinders, 2004). Since 1997 this has included a process of devolution for 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales which led to the establishment of a 
national Parliament in Scotland, a national Assembly in Wales and a national 
Assembly in Northern Ireland. 
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Additionally there has been a long-term trend since the 1980’s towards a more 
enabling state with a move away from hierarchical, direct service provision to a 
focus on the outsourcing and privatisation of services and more complex 
partnership based governance structures (Giddens, 2003; Bache and Flinders, 
2004; Rhodes, 2007; Le Gales and Scott, 2010). In this context the state’s role 
is to enable outcomes rather than to directly provide services and a similar shift 
towards an ‘enabling’ role for local authorities has been well documented 
(Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; Monstadt, 2007; Schönberger, 2013). This has been 
realised through the increasingly managerial approach of local public 
administration, the move to local governance structures that delegate tasks to 
the private sector, and a focus on more networked modes of governance 
(Bohne, 2011).  
 
In England, devolved Parliaments or regional governments do not exist outside 
of London, although there have been various experiments with sub-national 
governance and delivery structures, including Regional Assemblies14, Regional 
Development Agencies, Government Offices for the English Regions, Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and directly elected city (or city region) Mayors 
(Garnett and Lynch, 2009). Despite these experiments local governance in the 
UK has historically been dominated by limited devolution of funding and powers, 
a limited relationship between local and central government and the supremacy 
of the ‘ultra vires’ principle which permits local government to only undertake 
statutory functions (Wilson and Game, 2002). More recently successive 
governments have pursued a ‘localism agenda’ including the development of a 
General Power of Wellbeing in the 2000 Local Government Act which amended 
the ultra vires principle and allowed local authorities to undertake any activities 
which contributed to the wellbeing of their residents. However this power was 
not widely used and there were uncertainties regarding the ability it conferred 
on local authorities to establish commercial undertakings (Department of 
Communities and Local Government, 2008; Mountfield, 2012). Recognising this 
the Localism Act 2011 aimed to further devolve power to local areas and 
replaced the Wellbeing Power with a General Power of Competence which 
                                                          
14 Regional Assemblies existed in the 9 English regions between 1998 and 2010. The London 
Assembly was established via separate legislation and continues to exist. 
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enables English local authorities15 to undertake ‘anything that an individual can 
do’ (HM Government, 2011, p. 4; Sandford, 2014, p. 1), specifically empowering 
them to do anything not prohibited by legislation or outside of public law.  
 
While the scope of the General Power of Competence and the extent to which 
the Localism Act actually devolved power are both disputed16 (Jones and 
Stewart, 2012; Mountfield, 2012) they do represent an overarching commitment 
to new forms of local interaction, investment and partnerships. Most recently 
processes of local government devolution in England have included the 
development of ‘devolution deals’ which establish an agreement between local 
areas and central government regarding the passing of some power to local 
areas. To date, ten devolution deals have been agreed and a number of others 
are under development17 (Local Government Association, 2018; Sandford, 
2016). This is supported by the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 
2016 which allows for the devolution of powers from the UK government to 
some of England's towns, cities and counties through the introduction of 
directly-elected mayors to combined authorities and the devolution of housing, 
transport, planning and policing powers. It also sets the framework for further 
devolution deals to be agreed with government. 
 
Notwithstanding these processes of devolution English local authorities still 
have relatively limited autonomy, particularly in comparison with other countries 
in the European Union, and only restricted funding and powers have been 
devolved to date (Centre for Cities, 2016; Wilson, Crews and Mirza, 2017). A 
range of measures, such as the proportion of revenue raised by sub-national 
government compared to the G8 or the rest of Europe, the proportion of total 
government spending undertaken by sub-national government, and the number 
of statutory obligations that local government is required by Parliament to fulfil, 
all suggest that governance in England remains significantly centralised (Booth, 
2015).  
 
                                                          
15 The power does not extend to Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. 
16 For example the general power of competence does not permit local authorities to raise new 
taxes. 
17 An additional three were initially agreed but subsequently collapsed. 
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In respect of energy, local authorities have a very limited statutory role with 
energy policy and regulation delivered nationally and the local governance of 
energy infrastructure restricted to planning powers for projects up to 50MW, 
with projects over this scale dealt with by central government (Barton et al., 
2015; Cowell, Ellis and Strachan, 2017). However, while specific local powers 
relating to energy are limited local authorities have a long history of action on 
climate change, including over 300 local authorities signing the Nottingham 
Declaration on Climate Change in 2000 which committed signatories to 
undertaking local action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and preparing 
their communities for the impacts of climate change (Friends of the Earth, 2011; 
Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013; Fudge, Peters and Woodman, 2016).  
 
Government policy has recognised a significant role for local government in 
emission reduction with climate and energy policy documents consistently 
highlighting an important local role. However this has tended to focus on the 
potential for carbon reductions from the public sector estate or the role of local 
government in land-use and transport planning (HM Government, 2007; DECC, 
2009b, 2011). In the past the expectation from national government that local 
governments will act on emission reduction was formalised through the 
inclusion of a number of climate change targets in national performance targets 
for local government. These targets were removed in 2010 and policy 
documents since this date have tended to highlight an important but unspecific 
role for local authorities in decarbonisation (DECC, 2011; Fudge, Peters and 
Wade, 2012). This lack of a mandate from central government for local action 
on climate change may have contributed to a great deal of variation in local 
government response to climate change, with recent research suggesting that 
there is wide variation in the engagement of local authorities in the energy 
system (Tingey, Webb and Hawkey, 2017).  
 
In summary, in recent decades, local governments in the UK have largely taken 
a peripheral role in the direct ownership of energy infrastructure and there has 
been little discussion to date regarding whether the energy transition will prompt 
or require sub-national governments to take new and/or different roles in the 
energy system. The next two sections therefore summarise the historic and 
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changing role of local authorities in the energy system in England together with 
the roles commonly played by local authorities in heat networks.  
 
2.5.2 The historic and changing role of local government in energy 
Local government historically played a much more significant role in the energy 
system in England.  Many of the first public supplies of (town) gas were 
municipally owned (DTI, 2004) and local authorities were closely involved in the 
establishment of networked energy infrastructures in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth Centuries. During this time it was common for municipal enterprises to 
develop and operate local electricity, (town) gas and water boards and, up to 
the 1940’s, well over 300 publically owned electricity suppliers were in operation 
in the UK (Hannon and Bolton, 2015). Following World War II municipally- and 
privately-owned energy generation and supply undertakings were nationalised 
in the UK, driven by a focus on the economies of scale of operating networks on 
a national basis, the need to standardise operations to enable rapid economic 
growth, and the desire to provide universal access to energy services 
(Kuzemko, 2013a). These energy system nationalisations largely removed local 
government involvement in energy infrastructure and led to the development of 
a system based on national grids and centralised generation of power 
(Wollmann, 2004; Hawkey and Webb, 2012). This peripheral role for the sub-
national state was then further embedded as liberalisation progressed in the 
1990s and early 2000s. 
 
Although local authorities have largely played a marginal role in the English 
energy system in recent decades there are also some indications that councils 
in the UK are increasingly interested in taking an active role in the energy 
system (Hetherington, 2013). As discussed local authorities are almost 
invariably important actors in heat network projects, over 130 local authorities 
are progressing heat network projects via the HNDU and an increasing number 
of local authorities are exploring the potential to develop energy supply 
companies which may include heat networks, this includes Nottingham, Bristol, 
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Liverpool, Leeds, Manchester and London exploring municipal energy supply 
options18.  
 
This resurgence of interest in local authority involvement in the energy system 
is driven by a range of factors. Firstly, a dramatic reduction in the local 
government funding settlement is driving some to consider alternative routes to 
raising revenue (Lowndes and Mccaughie, 2013; Travers, 2013). Secondly, the 
devolution agenda discussed above has introduced or amended a number of 
powers to allow local authorities to undertake activities outside of their statutory 
responsibilities and be more commercial (Sandford, 2014; Communities and 
Local Government, 2009). These new powers, together with a 2010 removal of 
the ban on local authorities selling electricity they generate, make it easier for 
local authorities to engage directly in energy generation and supply activities. 
 
2.5.3 Heat networks and local authorities 
The current liberalised structure of the UK energy system means that a heat 
network could, in principle, be delivered by any organisation (Hawkey, 2009). 
However, although the previous section has outlined that local authorities have 
played a limited role in the energy system in England for many decades, they 
have tended to play an important role in the development of heat networks. This 
has been for a number of reason. Firstly heat networks are inherently local, with 
costs and heat losses necessitating a localised scale of heat generation and 
distribution. Secondly, the need to concurrently develop heat generation, 
distribution and a range of heat customers requires actors to work together to 
develop a system, this often includes the local authority playing a brokerage 
and coordination role. Thirdly, local authorities are able to commit to the long-
term strategic planning required to develop heat network projects and are likely 
to own and/or operate significant heat loads. Finally, local authority drivers to 
address multiple social, economic and environmental objectives may mean they 
are well placed to act as the coordinating organisation for heat network projects. 
BEIS summarises this as local authorities playing an ‘important role’ in setting 
the strategic context for and initiating the development of new district heating 
                                                          
18 To date Nottingham and Bristol have established municipal supply undertakings and Leeds 
and Liverpool have developed a municipal White Label arrangement in partnership with 
Nottingham’s Robin Hood Energy. 
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networks (DECC, 2012, p. 72) with their ‘local knowledge, capacity for 
organisation, and key functions as planning authorities and service providers’ 
putting them in a unique position to drive new schemes (BRE et al., 2013).  
 
Despite these key roles engaging in heat network projects has not been straight 
forward for many local authorities. This is partly due to historic local authority 
accounting procedures, which aimed to prevent cross-subsidy between local 
authority activities but effectively required that heat network schemes were 
appraised on commercial terms rather than against social objectives (Russell, 
2010). In contrast, European district heat systems have often been cross 
subsidised by other local government investments, justified by reference to 
social objectives such as energy savings, affordable heating, regeneration and 
employment opportunities (Hawkey, 2013). However, local authorities can play 
a wide range of role(s) relating to heat network schemes and experience to date 
in the UK has been characterised by significant local experimentation with each 
area developing their own contractual and organisational forms. Similarly other 
local actors can plan important roles including Housing Associations, the NHS, 
Universities, Housing Developers and commercial heat network developers 
(Heat and the City Project, 2011).  
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2.6 Heat networks in Germany 
 
The previous sections outlined the development of heat networks in England, 
together with the historic and changing role of local authorities. This section 
outlines the current status of heat networks in Germany and the role of 
municipalities. It begins by summarising the structure and governance of the 
German energy system, the status of heat networks and policy support. 
Emerging processes of energy infrastructure remunicipalisation are then 
reviewed and a number of conclusions made regarding the significance of these 
developments. The chapter ends by discussing barriers to heat network growth 
in England and Germany.  
 
2.6.1 The German Energy System 
The German energy sector is currently in a major transition towards a low 
carbon system and, in 2010, the Federal Government adopted the ‘Energy 
Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply’ 
defining the future German energy system until the year 2050 (BMU and BMWI, 
2010). The Energy Concept built on the 2007 Integrated Energy and Climate 
Programme but adopted more ambitious goals, committing Germany to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% to 95% by 2050, and to producing 
80% of the country's electricity from renewable sources by the same date 
(Richter, 2013)19.  
 
Initially the Energy Concept included a proposal to extend the operating life of 
the German nuclear power fleet by 12 years (postponing the nuclear phase out 
agreed by the previous government). However, following the 
2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident a decision was made, with 
widespread public support, to accelerate the phase‐out of Germany’s nuclear 
fleet to 2022 with the immediate closure of the eight oldest plants. This had a 
major impact on Germany energy policy resulting in a second document 
announcing the  transformation of the energy system (known as the 
                                                          
19 The GHG reduction targets are to reduce emissions by 40% by 2020, 55% by 2030, 70% by 
2040 and 80% to 95% by 2050, each relative to 1990. 
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'Energiewende') which aims to speed up the energy concept to compensate for 
the nuclear phase out (Schmidt, Jäger, & Karl, 2012; International Energy 
Agency, 2013). 
 
Heating and cooling accounts for 56% of final energy demand in Germany, of 
which approximately 55% is used for space heating, 32% for process heat, 9% 
for domestic hot water and the remaining 4% split across process cooling and 
other sources of heat (Heat Roadmap Europe 2050, 2017a). There is increasing 
focus on the need to decarbonise heat in the Energiewende, partly driven by 
evidence that the German residential heating sector is not on track to meet 
decarbonisation targets. Delta-EE research suggests that Germany will miss 
their 2025 residential emissions reduction targets by approximately 20% based 
on current trends in policy, techno-economics, energy efficiency and customer 
behaviour (Hardy, 2015). Heat networks are likely to play an important role in 
decarbonisation and the German government has put a strong emphasis on 
expanding both heat networks and CHP, including setting a target to increase 
the market share of electricity from cogeneration to 25%. There is also 
widespread recognition that, as the Energiewende progresses, CHP and heat 
networks are likely to become increasingly important as a source of ‘controllable 
power’ to complement intermittent renewables and provide opportunities for 
heat storage (Agora Energiewende, 2013: 10).  
  
2.6.1.1 Energiewende governance 
In total six federal ministries have relevant jurisdictions concerning the 
Energiewende, although the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy 
(BMWi) and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety (BMU) are the most significant actors.  
 
The BMWi is responsible for the energy market, supply (with the Federal Cartel 
Office/ Bundeskartellamt), energy efficiency and the grid (with the Federal 
Network Office/Bundesnetzagentur). They also have a range of subordinate 
offices such as Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (Bafa) and the 
German Energy Agency (DENA)20. The BMU is responsible for renewable 
                                                          
20 DENA is a public-private partnership. 
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energies (apart from bioenergy), environmental protection, and nuclear safety. 
Under the BMU the Federal Environmental Agency 
 (UBA) is responsible for the EUETS in Germany. The German Renewable 
Energy Agency is also affiliated to the BMU with some overlap in responsibilities 
with DENA (Kemfert and Horne, 2013). 
 
The BMWi is responsible for a range of policies to support heat networks and 
CHP (as described in section 2.6.1) and the Federal Office of Economics and 
Export Control (Bafa) has responsibility for implementing the CHP law. The 
Federal Network office regulates the gas and electricity grids, but does not 
regulate heat networks which are overseen by the Federal Cartel Office. The 
governance of the Energiewende is also complicated by the federal governance 
structure in Germany where the sixteen Länder, and beneath that numerous 
municipalities, have significant autonomy particularly in relation to land use 
planning and heat. For example, in 2008 the state of Baden-Württemberg was 
the first to establish a Renewable Heat Law making the installation of a 
percentage of renewable energy for heating compulsory in any renovation of 
existing residential buildings (Jörgensen, 2012). 
 
2.6.1.2 History of energy system development 
There is a long history of diverse ownership in the German energy system. 
Unlike in the UK a national energy generation and supply monopoly was never 
established in Germany and prior to liberalisation in 1998 a mix of (often 
vertically integrated) public and privately-owned suppliers operated under a 
regime of regional supply monopolies which were not subject to competition 
(Danwitz, 2006). From the 1980’s Germany pursued a programme of 
liberalisations, however the process in Germany was rather more ‘creeping’ 
than the rapid process in the UK and Germany only progressed liberalisation 
and unbundling when directed to do so by the EU21 (Heddenhausen 2007: 15). 
Initially, this involved the Federal state selling its stakes in the energy 
companies VEBA AG and VIAG AG in the 1980’s. However, these privatisations 
were restricted to the Federal level and the regions (Länder) kept their 
investments, as did municipalities. This was partly due to the structuring of 
                                                          
21 Specifically 96/92/EC. 
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federalism in Germany where natural resource and water rights had historically 
been held by states and had been used to develop Land electricity companies, 
and partly due to ongoing political support for a coexistence of private, mixed-
economy, and public companies (Heddenhausen, 2007). 
 
It was not until 1998, when the EU Electricity Directive was transposed into 
national law, that regional monopolies were banned and  electricity suppliers 
were forced to separate generation, transmission and distribution (Moss, Becker 
and Naumann, 2014). At this time a small but significant number of municipal 
energy companies remained in operation, partly supported by an exemption 
from unbundling rules which enabled them to continue to operate generation, 
distribution and supply22. However, liberalisation led to a high number of 
acquisitions and mergers and the gradual dominance of the German ‘Big 4’ 
(E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall) who, by the mid-2000s, generated over 
90% of electricity and controlled over 70% of the retail market. At this stage the 
Big 4 also owned the transmission grids (but have since been forced to 
unbundle by the EU) and distribution networks were run partly by local public 
utilities and partly by the Big 4, sometimes through jointly-owned companies 
(Hall, Lobina, & Terhorst, 2013a). During this period the number of publicly 
owned (municipal) utilities reduced as many cities faced funding shortfalls and 
sold undertakings to raise money, often to the ‘Big 4’. The Big 4 also 
increasingly held minority shares in local public utilities (Heddenhausen, 2007). 
 
Today, in the context of increasing penetration of renewable generation23, 
ownership of energy provision in Germany is ‘highly diverse, involving the 
complex interplay of actors operating on multiple scales’ (Moss et al., 2014: 9). 
This includes over 1000 electricity supply companies, with the average 
householder choosing from 72 suppliers. Although they still own the majority of 
generation infrastructure, the ‘Big 4’ control less than 50% of the domestic retail 
market and there are almost 900 distribution grid operators – 812 of which have 
fewer than 100,000 customers (Julian, 2014). Individual and co-operative 
                                                          
22 2005 EC Acceleration Directive 2003/54 was transposed to German law (through amendment 
to the Federal Energy Act) with an exemption for energy companies with less than 100,000 
consumer households. 
23 In 2016 renewable sources accounted for 31.2% of electricity consumption 
(Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskertellamt, 2017). 
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ownership of renewable energy infrastructure has also developed rapidly in 
Germany and from 2004 to 2014 over 800 energy co-ops were founded in 
Germany (Yildiz et al., 2014). 
 
These changes to ownership structures in the German energy system are 
relevant to the development of heat networks as the majority of heat networks 
are (at least partly) owned by municipalities so development has therefore been 
closely linked to the changing role of municipal energy companies. These 
issues are discussed further in section 2.6.3. The following sections first outline 
the current extent of heat networks in Germany and policy support measures. 
 
2.6.2 Heat policy in Germany 
2.6.2.1 Heat networks in Germany 
In Germany approximately 12% of heat demand is met through heat networks, 
however, due to its population size, Germany has the second largest24 total 
installed heat network capacity at 49,691MWth and the largest heat market, as 
illustrated in figure 9 (Energy Technologies Institute, 2012; Euroheat and 
Power, 2013; Committee on Climate Change, 2014). 
 
Figure 9: Heat sales to customers via heat networks in Europe 
 
(DECC, 2013b) 
 
 
                                                          
24 After Poland. 
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Similar to the UK, the development of heat networks in Germany started in the 
late 19th Century with the first modern scheme (based on CHP) established in 
Hamburg in 1893. Several networks were developed in the early 1900s, often 
with city utilities playing an important role, but further development was set back 
by World War II. The growth of heat networks recovered in West Germany 
shortly after the war and was boosted in the 1970’s by the global oil crises 
(Lutsch and Orita, 2009). Following the reunification of East and West Germany 
there was investment and refurbishment of many existing heat networks in the 
eastern part of Germany.  
 
As discussed, and in contrast to the UK, France and Italy, Germany did not 
experience a period of post-war nationalisation of the energy sector. A range of 
municipally owned utilities were therefore still in place at the time of energy 
market liberalisation, often owning heat network infrastructure and supply. 
Liberalisation of the German electricity market had a significant effect on the 
development of CHP-heat networks as it resulted in a substantial decline in 
electricity prices. This particularly effected CHP as although the combined 
efficiency of electricity and heat production is far higher than conventional 
generation the cost of generating electricity is higher than large-scale electricity 
only power plants so the economics of CHP was less attractive than large-scale 
power generation.  
 
Currently approximately 12% of heat demand is met by heat networks in 
Germany; 46% of heat network customers are private homes, 36% public 
buildings, commercial and trade sector, and 18% industry (Huther, 2010; 
Euroheat and Power, 2015). In recent years, in the context of the 
Energiewende, the German government has put a strong emphasis on heat 
networks and CHP and analysis suggests that approximately 56% of residential 
and administrative buildings are suitable for district heating supply (Lutsch, 
2014). Currently approximately 40% of heat networks in Germany are fuelled by 
coal (Hamburg Institut Research GmbH, 2015), however the use of fossil fuels 
in heat networks is forecast to decrease significantly by 2050 in government 
scenarios. Across the reference, energy efficiency and renewable energy 
scenarios considered by the BMWi, heat network emissions decrease by 
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between 30-38% by 2020 (compared to 2008) and between 60-75% by 2050 
(BMWi, 2015a). This will involve significant changes to existing heat network 
generating technologies including switching to gas-CHP and renewably fuelled 
networks. The Federal Government has recognised the need for existing grids 
to transition to low carbon supply with the Energy Efficiency Strategy for 
Buildings highlighting the importance of developing low temperature heat grids 
in order to utilise geothermal and other renewable sources of heat, as well as 
stored heat25 (BMWi, 2015a). 
 
The four major German utilities all have commercial interests in CHP and heat 
networks, however the involvement of Eon and Vattenfall has mainly been 
though connecting conventional power plant to heat networks and RWE and 
EnBW have focussed on industrial applications. In contrast a high number of 
municipalities (stadtwerke) have developed CHP and heat network 
infrastructure.  
 
2.6.2.2 German heat network policies 
In addition to the policy commitments set out in the Energy Concept, a number 
of legislative measures and programmes have been adopted to support the 
growth of heat networks and CHP as outlined in this section. These measures 
have been widely welcomed by the sector as progressive (Huther, 2010) and in 
their assessment of CHP and heat network policy in 2008 the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2010; IEA, 2009: 11) scored Germany 4 out of 5 stars (the 
UK scored 2.5 stars). The rating system aims to reflect: 
 The effectiveness of policies in developing the CHP and heat network 
market; 
 Statements and commitments of intent in respect of future CHP and heat 
network policy, for example through the creation of national growth 
targets; and 
 The existence of meaningful policy incentives that are causing significant 
market growth or that are likely to do so in the near future. 
 
                                                          
25 Such systems are referred to as 4th generation district heating. 
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The IEA have not repeated the assessment since 2008. However German 
policies have been extended or improved rather than scaled back since 2008 
(see 2.6.2.2) so it is likely that German CHP/heat network policy has retained or 
improved its 4-star rating. Although the heat network sector largely welcomes 
the support for CHP and heat networks there is some criticism that provisions 
are not sufficient to promote the transformation to renewable energies in heat 
network supply (Hamburg Institut Research GmbH, 2015). 
 
To date supportive policy for heat networks has been underpinned by the 2009 
Renewable Heat Act and the Combined Heat and Power Act. The Renewable 
Heat Act aims to increase the share of renewable heat to 14% by 2020 and sets 
a requirement on new building owners to source a proportion of their heat from 
renewable energy systems or heat networks26. The German CHP Act (KWKG) 
has provided financial incentives for CHP since 2001 and has undergone 
several amendments. The early law supported existing CHP plants through 
paying a bonus for electricity exported to the grid. This was extended in 2002 to 
include  new cogeneration installations up to 2MWe and modernisation 
investments in cogeneration plants with higher capacity (Golbach, 2012). 
 
In 2009 an updated CHP Law introduced the aim of 25% of electricity 
production from CHP but did not stipulate a timescale.  At this stage support for 
heat networks was also specifically introduced, providing up to 20% of 
investment costs27. The total budget for the KWK was set at a maximum of 
€750 million per year, including a maximum of €150 million for new or 
expanding heat networks. The support is funded by consumers through a levy 
on the grid operators and if the €750 million limit is exceeded then installations 
over 10 MWe get proportionally less (Golbach, 2012). 
 
In 2012 the KWKG was again amended to improve the incentives for 
investments in cogeneration plants and introduce a target of 25% of electricity 
from CHP by 2020. This target relates to cogenerated electricity only and there 
                                                          
26 The minimum percentage depends on the renewable energy technology used. 
27 Grants of up to 20% of investment costs were available if a network is supplied with at least 
60% of heat from cogeneration and is in operation by 31 December 2020, up to a maximum of 
€5 million per project. 
 
59 
 
are no targets relating to the share of cogeneration in the heating market, 
however the electricity target implies a corresponding increase in heat networks 
to approximately 18%–22% of the heat market in 2020 (CODE2 Cogeneration 
Observatory and Dissemination Europe, 2013; BMWi, 2015b). 
 
In 2016, during the period over which this research was conducted, new 
amendments were introduced to the CHP law. This involved increases to the 
gas-fired CHP surcharge, the removal of coal-fired CHP plants from eligibility 
and a change in the CHP target. The 25% CHP target has effectively been 
reduced with the definition changed from CHP providing 25% of electricity by 
2020 to CHP providing 25% of non-renewable electricity by 2020. Support is 
now also available for district cooling grids and thermal storage used in 
conjunction with CHP plants (CODE2 Cogeneration Observatory and 
Dissemination Europe, 2013; BMWi, 2015b). The overall cap for support 
remains at €750 million per year (€150 million for heat networks and storage). 
This is relatively inexpensive compared, for instance, to the support for 
renewable electricity which costs approximately 40 times more. For the average 
householder CHP support measures are likely to increase energy bills by €4.6 
per annum (Orita, 2013). 
 
Additional support for heat networks is also available directly to municipalities 
through a range of Federal Government programmes. This includes the ‘Energy 
Efficient Cities’ (EnEff:Stadt) and ‘Energy Efficient District Heating and Cooling 
Supply’ (EnEff:Wärme) programmes which support planning, research and pilot 
projects at an urban level, including heat networks (BMWi, 2014). The German 
government owned development bank, KfW, also supports municipalities 
through the ‘Energetische Stadtquartiere’ (Energetic Neighbourhoods) 
programme. The scheme provides low cost loans to municipalities to plan, 
organize, and implement district-wide retrofit schemes and to implement heat 
networks (Morris and Pehnt, 2012; Bröer, 2013). 
 
2.6.2.3 Heat network regulation in Germany 
Heat networks in Germany are governed by the ‘Ordinance on general 
conditions for the supply of district heating’ (AV BFernwärmeV), which sets 
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standard business conditions for the supply of heat network customers and 
requires network operators to meet certain technical and customer service 
standards (Orita, 2013) 
 
Heat network pricing is regulated by the Federal Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt) who monitor the industry and carry out random checks on 
heat network operators to analyses prices. These enquiries are carried out on 
an ex-post basis and only undertaken when concerns are raised by consumer 
or other interested groups. Those identified as charging unnecessarily high 
prices, in comparison with other networks, are subject to legal proceedings 
and/or fines. In addition, in 2012, due to concerns regarding the intrinsic 
monopolistic28 structure of heat networks, the Federal Cartel Office carried out a 
sector inquiry to establish the impact of heat network monopoly supply on 
competitive behaviour and market outcomes.  
 
The inquiry examined the profits of thirty companies including many municipal 
utilities and the four most important privately owned utilities E.ON AG, RWE 
AG, EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg AG and Vattenfall Europe AG. Based 
on price data from 2007 and 2008 the Cartel Office found sufficient reason to 
suspect some prices were inflated, with some companies charging prices over 
the average. The inquiry investigated heat network operator revenue and did 
not find heat network prices, overall, to be excessive when compared to other 
heating technologies. They did, however, find great variation between networks 
with larger networks (>100km network length) considerably cheaper (average 
revenue of 7.0cent/kWh) than small (1-10km, 10.1cent/kWh) and medium (10-
100km, 8.9 cent/kWh) networks (Bundeskartellamt, 2012).  
 
Following the inquiry the Bundeskartellamt determined to continue to monitor 
district heat revenues but did not consider it advisable to unbundle and regulate 
district heating networks due to the closed system nature of heat networks and 
associated difficulties in transporting heat between systems. Additionally, 
                                                          
28 The inquiry highlighted that once a customer connects to a heat network they are, in effect, limited to 
one monopoly supplier. In addition in some areas connection to and the use of the municipal district 
heating system may be compulsory, providing the district heating supplier with legally protected 
monopoly position. 
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customer surveys have suggested that heat networks have the highest overall 
customer satisfaction when compared to gas, oil and other forms of heating 
(Euroheat and Power, 2013). 
 
The German Cartel Office again investigated heat network prices in 2013. 
Following the 2012 investigation this specifically focussed on seven utilities in 
30 supply areas where there were concerns regarding prices. The review 
investigated the prices charged by the companies between 2010 and 2012 and 
compared them to eight competitors with comparatively low revenue and prices. 
The review was complex, accounting for the impact of the vertically integrated 
nature of heat networks and the impact of varying generation and grid 
structures on prices, but led to Stadtwerke Leipzig GmbH agreeing with the 
Bundeskartellamt to lower its district heating prices by €8million per year over a 
period of five years (Bundeskartellamt, 2015). 
 
2.6.3 German governance and stadtwerke 
The principle of local self-government is embedded in the constitution of 
Germany (the Grundgesetz or Basic Law) with Article 28 suggesting that local 
authorities ‘regulate all local affairs on their own responsibility’ through their own 
service provision entities (Schönberger, 2013, p. 10). However Libbe (2008) 
suggests that significant changes to the structures and functions of German 
local authorities over recent decades have resulted in more complex local 
governance arrangements. This includes the outsourcing of services and the 
use of public-private partnerships with services delivered directly by 
municipalities, by semi-autonomous municipal agencies and by a wide range of 
privatised organisational forms.  
 
These developments have been particularly relevant for German municipalities 
due to ongoing financial crises caused by significant reductions in municipal 
revenue due to reforms by the red–green government in the early 2000s. 
Bulkeley and Kern (2006) suggest this eroded the principle of self-government 
as most local governments were constrained to only deliver statutory services. 
In this context Bulkeley and Kern's (2006, p. 2241) analysis of local climate 
change governance in Germany and the UK  identifies four modes of governing; 
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(1) self-governing, the capacity of local government to govern its own activities; 
(2) governing by provision, the shaping of practice through the delivery of 
particular forms of service and resource; (3) governing by authority, the use of 
traditional forms of authority such as regulation and direction; and (4) governing 
through enabling which relies more on partnerships and delegation. They 
suggest that there is a gradual move towards governing through enabling in 
Germany29 and align this with a dominant trend, since the 1980s, of privatisation 
and outsourcing of public services (See for example Hood, 1995; Bache & 
Flinders, 2004; Le Gales & Scott, 2010). In relation to energy this included 
public monopolies being perceived as inefficient, unresponsive to consumer 
demands and low innovators, as liberalisation progressed in the 1990s and 
early 2000s (Monstadt, 2007). At the same time privatisation was seen as a 
route to achieving better customer outcomes and many municipal utilities were 
part or fully privatised. At this point a number of authors (such as Bulkeley & 
Kern, 2006; Monstadt, 2007) suggested that the importance of municipalities in 
the energy sector waned and would continue to do so in the future.  
 
2.6.3.1 A changing role for municipalities? 
Up until liberalisation the German energy system incorporated a wide mix of 
public and private entities. This commonly included municipalities owning local 
public utilities (or stadtwerke). These ‘local public utilities’ are represented by 
the German Association of Local Utilities (VKU) who define their members as 
companies that 'provide services of general interest in Germany within the 
framework of local self-government‘ (VKU, 2013). Stadtwerke do not primarily 
pursue private commercial objectives but are guided by public welfare 
obligations. There are close to 1500 stadtwerke in Germany30 (Julian, 2014) 
and the VKU suggests that this number is increasing rapidly (Witte, 2012).  
 
Municipalities can establish energy companies on the basis of the regional 
(Länder) Municipal Codes. These codes vary significantly regarding the limits of 
municipal economic activities however a significant number allow municipalities 
to undertake profit-making activities if they serve a public goal and the service 
                                                          
29 And the UK, as discussed. 
30 Although not all are active in energy or district heat. 
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can be fulfilled as effectively as by a private company. Other Municipal Codes 
are more restrictive and demand that the public service can be fulfilled more 
efficiently than by private companies (Schönberger, 2013). 
 
In addition to their ability to establish stadtwerke, municipalities (and Länder) 
have considerable powers over spatial planning in Germany and can introduce 
measures to require new building owners to use CHP for heating or to connect 
to an existing district heating system (Eurelectric, 2014). All regional (Länder) 
Municipal Codes include this option (Schönberger, 2013). Municipalities can 
also identify priority areas for renewables and heat networks in their Preparatory 
land-use plans, although these plans must be compatible with the regional plan.  
 
Despite this diversity the liberalisation of the German electricity market in the 
late 1990’s saw a reduction in municipal ownership of energy infrastructure as a 
high number of mergers and acquisitions resulted in the emergence of the 
German ‘Big Four’31 (Jansen, 2011). Under competition from the Big Four, and 
increasing budgetary pressures, many stadtwerke sold local grids, heat 
networks and generation capacity to the large national suppliers. The number 
and scope of stadtwerke decreased and large municipalities such as Hamburg 
and Stuttgart sold their energy companies to Vattenfall and EnBW respectively 
in the early 2000’s (Wollmann, 2012). Those stadtwerke that remained tended 
to restrict themselves to distribution while generation and supply was dealt with 
by big private companies. During the 1990s, the municipal services came under 
increasing financial pressure as budget constraints limited investment and 
stadtwerke were expected to produce higher returns (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). 
Becker et al. (2017) also suggest that a dominant view of public ownership as 
unaccountable and prone to corruption also legitimised the privatisation of 
stadtwerke. 
 
Whilst all public utilities are partly publicly owned they operate under a variety of 
structures, ranging from full public ownership to less than 50% publically owned 
as illustrated in figure 10. Similarly whilst some stadtwerke are actively 
progressing the transition to renewable energy in Germany others remain 
                                                          
31 E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall 
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conservative with limited integration with national decarbonisation policy (Barton 
et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 10: Stakeholder structure of Local Public Utilities in Germany 
 
(Witte, 2012) 
 
 
Whilst stadtwerke operate a range of energy generation facilities, they are 
particularly active in low carbon generation systems such as CHP-heat 
networks and renewables (which represent over 90% of their generation 
capacity) (VKU, 2013) due to the alignment between these schemes and wider 
municipal carbon reduction targets. These local public utilities are increasingly 
being seen as central to the Energiewende and Deutsche Bank (Auer & 
Heymann, 2012: 1) suggests that the low carbon transition will ‘pave the way for 
municipalities and municipal utilities to enter new spheres of activity in terms of 
energy provision’. 
 
Although there was a significant overall decrease in municipal utilities in 
Germany following liberalisation there is increasing evidence that Germany is 
now seeing a resurgence in the importance of municipal utilities with the 
number and size of stadtwerke increasing and several taking a role in the 
ownership and development of heat networks. The number of German 
municipal companies increased by 22% between 2000 and 2010 and over 70 
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public stadtwerke, incorporating some element of energy provision, have been 
established since 2007 (Becker, Beveridge and Naumann, 2015). 
 
Additionally several consortia of stadtwerke have acquired previously privately 
owned assets and supply companies. This includes Thüga, a former subsidiary 
of E.ON, being bought by a consortium of 100 stadtwerke for €3 billion in 2009 
(Wollmann, 2012). Similarly Stuttgart sold its municipal energy company to 
EnBW in 2003 but repurchased the assets and founded a new stadtwerke in 
2014 to integrate water and energy provision. The government of Baden-
Wuerttemberg also bought back 45% of EnBW for €4.7 billion Euros from the 
French multinational EDF in 2010 (Hall et al., 2013b). VKU now represent more 
than 1400 stadtwerke, with about 800 involved in energy supply and generation 
(VKU, 2013).  
 
There are likely to be a range of reasons for this trend towards the expansion of 
municipal utilities,  including concerns that the private sector has failed to 
reduce costs and increase efficiency, a re-examination of the relationship 
between the State and private sector following the 2008 global recession, and 
an increasingly need for municipal authorities to access revenues from running 
public services (Wollmann, 2012; Friedländer, 2013). At the same time 
municipalities in Germany have been developing skills in operating in liberalised 
markets, are increasing involved in local climate programmes that seek to 
deliver multiple environmental and socio-economic objectives and can access 
finance at generally lower rates than fully commercial organisations. In addition, 
a large number of long-term (25-30 year) distribution concession contracts have 
or are coming to an end, allowing municipalities to repurchase them (Witte, 
2012; Hall, Foxon and Bolton, 2015) 
 
Increasing policy support for CHP and renewables may also have helped to 
support the growth of municipal utilities as technologies such as biogas 
production and waste/biomass CHP work best at a municipal, rather than 
national or individual, scale (McKillip, 2012). Additionally a powerful coalition 
was formed in the early 2000’s between the European Commission, the federal 
government and local authorities which positioned local public energy 
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companies as a key strategy for promoting competition with the ‘Big Four’ 
energy companies (Wollmann et al, 2010). This Federal support included a 
2001 stipulation by the Federal Cartel Office that minority interests of external 
shareholders in stadtwerke must not exceed ten percent, effectively bringing to 
an end the strategy of the four large energy utilities in Germany of buying up 
large shares of stadtwerkes (Buchanan, 2012). Finally, the long history and 
important local economic role of stadtwerke has led many Germans to feel a 
close attachment to their local utility (Yapp, 2012), particularly as they finance 
wider public services such as leisure services and public transport. This strong 
support means they experience lower levels of customer switching than, for 
example, in the UK and also less opposition to energy price increases 
(Utilityweek, 2011). 
 
Despite this trend towards remunicipalisation, it should also be noted that 
stadtwerke are increasingly organised under private company law as limited 
liability companies (designated as ‘GmbH’ in Germany) or joint-stock 
companies. This creates stronger separation between the municipality and the 
stadtwerke as board members are delegated from the local council but council 
members who are not on the board have little access to information. There is 
ongoing debate regarding the implications of this more ‘corporatised’ structure 
for public utilities (see Herzberg, 2013) however studies indicate that stadtwerke 
are more actively investing in CHP and renewables (Ostertag et al., 2007) and 
demonstrate a stronger commitment to environmental protection than fully 
private utilities (Richter, 2013) 
 
This section has outlined a resurgence of interest in heat networks in the 
context of the Energiewende in Germany, with local municipalities playing an 
important role in development. There is also evidence of a trend towards 
increasing municipal ownership of energy and a German transition 
characterised by multiple actors active, and influencing at, multiple scales 
(Moss, Becker and Naumann, 2014). In England, there is  emerging evidence of 
a similar, albeit smaller-scale, resurgence of interest in both heat networks and 
municipal energy companies (see Hall et al., 2014). Table 3 outlines the key 
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targets, regulatory environment and support for heat networks in both Germany 
and England.  
 
Table 3: Heat network environment in England and Germany 
Topic England Germany 
Heat demand 
met by heat 
networks 
~2% ~12% 
Deployment 
targets 
 
No formal target but 
Government documents 
suggest that at least 20% of 
heat could be delivered by heat 
networks by 2030. 
No formal target but a target of 
25% of heat delivered by CHP 
by 2020 is in place. This target 
equates to 18-22% of demand 
met by heat networks by 2020. 
Regulation of 
heat networks 
 
No formal regulation. Voluntary, 
industry-led consumer 
protection and industry 
standards are in place. The 
CMA has recommended formal 
regulation (in 2018). 
Ex-post regulation of prices. 
Technical and customer service 
standards are set out in law 
and jointly developed by the 
government and the AGFW. 
Government 
support for heat 
network 
deployment 
 
HNDU provides funding and 
support for local authorities to 
carry out feasibilities and 
business case development 
(67% of costs). 
HNIP provides financial support 
in the form of grants and loans 
for public and private heat 
network sponsors (£320m 
allocated 2017 – 2021) 
Capital grant funding for heat 
networks has been available for 
short periods in the past.  
The CHP Act provides a tariff 
for CHP electricity and grants 
for heat network pipework and 
storage (30-40% capital costs).  
Up to 60% of heat network 
feasibility costs and 66% of 
staff costs (for 2 years) 
available for municipalities to 
carry out energy planning. 
National and local development 
banks provide low cost loans to 
municipalities to plan, organise, 
and implement heat networks. 
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Dominant 
ownership 
structures 
 
Diverse - historically an 
established role for design, 
build, finance, operate and 
maintain (DBFOM) concession 
contracts. To date primarily 
through Engie (formerly Cofely 
DE) and E.On. Some 
established municipally owned 
networks are in operation in 
large cities. 
Diverse with significant 
municipal ownership. Complex 
ownership structures that 
incorporate public and private 
investment and/or municipal 
consortia are common. The 
four major German utilities all 
have commercial interests in 
heat networks, but these tend 
to be limited to connecting 
conventional power plant or 
industrial applications. 
 
2.7 Barriers to deployment 
Drawing on academic and policy literature in the UK, Germany and more 
widely, this section reviews the barriers to the development of heat networks, 
concluding that many of the barriers to the growth of heat networks are not 
technical. Instead the challenges fall into four broad topics of (1) coordination 
and complexity, (2) finance and the business case, (3) energy market structure 
and, (4) public perceptions. These barriers interact, for example a lack of 
consumer awareness or trust in heat networks may increase demand risk which 
increases the cost of capital. As Frontier Economics (2015, p. 3) highlight, this 
‘suggests that a coordinated policy approach will be required’ and a number of 
analyses suggest that policy intervention will be required to achieve a step 
change in the rollout of heat networks (Committee on Climate Change, 2015).  
 
2.5.1 Co-ordination and complexity 
Developing a heat network necessitates that heat generation, distribution and a 
customer base (demand) are developed at the same time, in a locally 
coordinated manner. Projects are also likely to need to engage with the local 
planning authority, the owner of land through which the heat network is laid and 
multiple heat customers (Hawkey, 2012a). This complicates both business case 
development and the negotiation of actor relationships.  
 
In addition, many of the organisations involved may operate at differing scales 
or with differing levels of involvement in the local scale. For example, while heat 
customers are necessarily local, international companies may be involved in 
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building, financing or operating heat networks with associated challenges of 
local-scale actors interacting with national and transnational companies. These 
local, national and international interests may overlap, presenting particular co-
ordination challenges and complex actor relationships (Andrews et al., 2012). 
 
Similarly, a wide range of skills are required in the development of heat 
networks (including technical, contractual, legal, financial, business 
development and relationship management), which are often not all held within 
a ‘lead’ organisation. In reality, schemes often straddle the competencies of 
many organisations as they differ from most other projects undertaken by 
energy developers, commercial property developers and local authorities.  
 
Access to an appropriate range of skills may be particularly problematic for local 
authorities who do not have in-house energy system skills. This may be 
particularly the case in England due to the limited role local authorities have 
played in the energy sector in recent decades. 
 
2.5.2 Business cases and finance 
Although the operational costs of heat networks are generally low, high upfront 
capital costs and low rates of return (compared to other utility scale 
investments) often make it difficult for schemes to raise capital (International 
Energy Agency, 2014b). Indeed, the findings of the Heat and the City Project32 
(Hawkey & Webb, 2012) suggest that many commercial investors, including 
utilities, often require higher rates of return than district heat schemes can offer. 
This may be due to a lack of experience of heat projects, a lack of standardised 
business models, a high premium being attached to the risk of the project losing 
its heat customer(s), and a lack of internalisation of the cost of carbon 
emissions. Institutional investors who may accept lower rates of return, such as 
sovereign wealth funds and pension schemes, also find it difficult to invest in 
heat networks as individual schemes are below the minimum investment 
thresholds for these investors (DECC, 2013b).  
 
                                                          
32 The Heat and the City Project is a multi-disciplinary research project examining the 
development of low carbon heating in urban areas. See www.heatandthecity.org.uk. 
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Investors are also sensitive to the risk of uncertain returns on the substantial 
capital outlays required for heat networks, particularly as significant investment 
is required prior to connecting customer buildings. To reduce this demand 
uncertainty appropriate long-term heat off-take contracts need to be secured 
and this can complicate project financing and increase the cost of capital 
(UNEP, 2015). In comparison, returns on sunk investments are protected for the 
regulated gas and electricity networks in both England and Germany. UKERC 
(2013) suggests that heat networks are therefore forced to compete with 
regulated assets (such as the gas transmission grid) where there is a 
mechanism to support network investment. 
 
These difficulties in raising finance may be exacerbated by the volatility of gas 
and electricity prices and by the interaction of heat networks with multiple other 
policy areas. For example networks might be impacted by policies as diverse as 
electricity capacity markets or reserves, renewable heat incentives, CHP 
policies, domestic and non-domestic energy taxes and the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme. Changes to any of these policies, together with 
inconsistencies between policies, can therefore impact on project viability. The 
impact of policy uncertainty and policy conflicts is highlighted in studies by 
Frontier Economics (2015) and Element Energy (2015) who suggested that 
heat networks are particularly vulnerable to policy barriers in the form of 
complexity and inconsistencies. 
 
Despite these difficulties heat networks can be financed via a variety of means, 
often informed by the ownership and operation business models. Project 
developers tend to be local authorities or housing developers and finance 
options can be summarised as: 
 Self-financing (where the lead organisation is a public body this financing 
option overlaps with public financing). 
 Loan financing (may be partial or total) 
 Third party financing. These agreements tend to be with an Energy 
Service Company (ESCo) who owns, finances and operates the system. 
This may be for a set period of time or for the life of the project. 
 Joint ventures – joint ventures may reduce risks for individual parties. 
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Each party may fund the project through diverse means. 
 Public financing  
(Adapted from International Energy Agency, 2014). 
 
2.5.3 Energy Market Structures 
In addition to issues regarding finance, the viability of CHP-heat networks is 
often dependent on the sale of electricity to increase revenues and recoup the 
large capital outlay (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). In these circumstances access to 
the electricity market and the ability to realise close to the wholesale value for 
exported electricity are significant issues.  
 
A number of studies have considered the issues related to the relationship 
between CHP-heat networks and the electricity market (see Bolton & Foxon, 
2013b; Hawkey et al., 2013; Kelly & Pollitt, 2010; Toke & Fragaki, 2008) and 
suggest the main issues are the low price of electricity relative to the cost of 
natural gas (the ‘spark-spread’) and high transaction costs for small generators 
interacting with national electricity markets. In relation to the spark-spread, as 
an increasing share of zero marginal cost33 renewable energies are 
incorporated into the energy system wholesale electricity prices are likely to 
decrease further in the future putting more pressure on the financial case for 
CHP. Regarding transaction costs, for small participants these costs are largely 
made up of the costs of trading and balancing position on the electricity market 
and distribution system connection and charging. The existing electricity 
markets in both the UK and Germany are based on bilateral trading with real-
time balance achieved through a balancing mechanism and gate closure 
system which penalises over and under supply (Elexon, 2013; Just, 2015; van 
der Veen and Hakvoort, 2016). This results in high costs for small generators, 
particularly intermittent renewables and heat-led CHP. In addition the credit 
conditions and complexity of balancing mechanisms make it difficult for small 
operators to participate (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). 
 
                                                          
33 Marginal cost is the cost of producing additional units of a good or service, outside of fixed 
costs. As renewable energy sources do not have fuel costs the marginal cost of each unit is 
zero. 
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2.5.4 Governance and regulation 
Building on issues of finance and complex stakeholder interests, a number of 
authors suggest that the wider energy system institutional and regulatory 
structures can act as a barrier to the growth of heat networks. Studies have 
particularly identified these issues in the UK with Hawkey et al. (2013: 29) 
emphasising that heat networks are ‘caught in the squeezed middle ground 
between greater efforts at large-scale national infrastructure investment on the 
supply side, and individual householder incentives on the demand side’. Kelly & 
Pollitt (2010), Toke & Fragaki (2008) and Roelich et al. (2013) support this claim 
and emphasise that the current centralised energy system is not very supportive 
of ‘novel’ approaches such as heat networks due to the centrally based 
structures, rules and incentives of the current system, such as the focus on 
short-term returns and high transaction costs for small generators. 
 
Similarly, Bolton and Foxon (2013, p. 2207) suggest that ‘complex and subtle’ 
market and regulatory mechanisms lock-out heat networks and that energy 
regulation processes, including energy market design, rules and networks, are 
particularly influential in limiting growth. This includes the emphasis on 
consumer switching in retail markets and rules surrounding business separation 
and unbundling. This is particularly the case as regulatory regimes in both 
countries are designed to promote economic efficiency and competition in 
national infrastructure so is mismatched with city-scale heat networks which 
tend to be motivated by a broader set of societal goals that go beyond 
economic efficiency and incorporate social aims (e.g. fuel poverty reduction or 
regeneration) and environmental concerns (e.g. carbon reduction).  
 
2.5.5 Public perceptions 
Heat networks remain uncommon in the UK and there is generally low 
awareness of them as a form of domestic heating. Likewise, although heat 
networks are more common, in Germany the higher penetration on multi-family 
housing blocks where heating services are arranged by housing associations 
means that awareness of heat networks remains low in many areas. Surveys 
also suggest that some consumers lack trust in heat networks as a reliable form 
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of heating, and have a perceptions that connecting to a network is difficult and 
costly (Frontier Economics, 2015).  
 
The locally specific nature of heat networks means that variations in generating 
mix, consumer profile and network costs can potentially result in widely different 
consumer prices which can be difficult to either communicate to consumers or 
effectively regulate. This is particularly the case as assessments of the heat 
network prices cannot simply compare network prices to the average unit price 
of gas as heat delivered by a heat network also includes costs related to heat 
source maintenance and replacement (the equivalent to gas boiler servicing 
and replacement).  
 
2.8 Conclusion and summary of emerging themes 
This section has outlined the history and current development of district heating 
in England and Germany, and the main barriers to further growth. As discussed 
the development of heat networks is characterised by complexity with 
multifarious actor networks and wide-ranging project goals. Additionally the 
growth of heat networks is taking place in a landscape dominated by gas and 
electricity networks, resulting in a great deal of uncertainty regarding how heat 
networks fit within this broader system. This has resulted in substantial 
experimentation in terms of actor networks, business cases and financing. 
 
As discussed in this chapter there are multiple barriers to the growth of heat 
networks in England and Germany. Many of these barriers relate to institutional 
structures, regulation and the broader structures of the energy system and can 
be categorised under four core themes of: 
 The co-ordination of complex actor networks at a city scale 
 The development of appropriate financing, ownership and governance 
structures 
 The lack of integration of district heating into the current energy system 
structures 
 Limited public awareness of heat networks. 
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This chapter has also established that heat network policy is in a period of flux 
and receiving increased policy attention. A range of actors are involved in heat 
networks and there are a number of possible development and governance 
routes, with local authorities likely to play a significant role in most networks. 
This central but uncertain role for local authorities, together with the complex 
barriers identified, suggests that the development of heat networks is likely to 
be a highly contested process with a number of actors and interests seeking to 
influence the direction of development. This is particularly the case in the UK as 
local governance structures are themselves in a period of change. In order to 
explore this complex and contested landscape this research will seek to 
investigate the development and politics of heat networks in England and 
Germany, each taking a different approach to the promotion of heat networks. 
The next chapter outlines the theoretical framework which will be employed in 
this research and develops a research agenda based on integrating socio-
technical transitions and discursive institutional literatures in order to explore the 
interplay of ideas, scale and institutions in energy transitions. 
 
Whilst England and Germany have very different histories and contexts34 a 
number of similarities in relation to a renewed focus on heat networks and 
municipalities raise a number of questions regarding drivers, the role of different 
scales of governance and interactions between actors. This research will seek 
to explore these questions in the UK and Germany; considering how municipal 
heat networks are framed and shaped by various actors and how this relates to 
the wider political struggles related to changes between state and market 
production of services.  
                                                          
34 The UK, and particularly England, has a centralised governance structure dominated by a 
Westminster-model political system which privileges elite and industry knowledge but limits sub-
national government power. In contrast Germany has a tradition of collaborative policy 
formation and a federal state system which gives significant powers to cities and municipalities 
(Geels et al., unpublished; Kuzemko, 2014). 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework which is adopted in the 
research. The study seeks to examine the role of the city-scale in processes of 
change in socio-technical systems and it is argued that there is a particular gap 
in the transitions literature relating to the conceptualisation of regime politics at 
sub-national scales. This has resulted in limited consideration of the role of 
different actors at the city scale, process of negotiation and development, and 
the interplay between local-scale projects (such as heat networks) and wider 
national and international regimes. A discursive institutional approach to the 
development of heat networks is therefore proposed. This approach is likely to 
be particularly appropriate as chapter 2 has already established that many of 
the obstacles relate to the institutions, regulation and structure of the energy 
system.  
 
Discursive institutional approaches are interested in ideas as the substantive 
content of discourse and why some ideas come to dominate while others don’t. 
As outlined later in this section such approaches are particularly suited to 
exploring institutional change, rather than stability. This perspective 
conceptualises discourse and institutions as interlinked, with discourse both 
shaping political action and as a form of agency for political actors. Based on 
the work of Schmidt (2010) three types of ideas can be defined; policy ideas 
which shape the options and solutions discussed in relation to a policy issue, 
programmatic ideas which form the underlying principles of policy including 
problem definition, policy norms and methods, and philosophical ideas which 
embody the world views, values and underlying assumptions in the policy 
process. The analytical approach adopted in this research adopts this 
framework to consider the development of policy and programmes and how 
these factors mesh with the deeper philosophical principles and norms of public 
life. In order to explore these three types of policy ideas, and their relations with 
discourse and institutions, the analytical stages recommended by Hajer (2006) 
are adopted which identifies key discourses, actor networks/coalitions, and the 
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institutional practices in which discourses are produced. Combining these two 
approaches (policy ideas, programmatic ideas, and philosophical principles with 
discourses, actors, and institutional practices) enables the exploration of the 
relationship between ideas, discourses, institutions and networks in relation to 
the development of heat networks.  
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections, the first reviews the literature on 
socio-technical systems and particularly highlights the Multi-Level Perspective 
(MLP) as an organising perspective for exploring change in complex technical 
systems. A number of criticisms of the MLP are identified, relating to the 
treatment of regime politics and scale in energy transitions, and the 
development of heat networks in cities is proposed as a useful example to 
explore these issues. The next section introduces neo-institutional theory and 
outlines how a discursive institutional approach may provide interesting insights 
into interactions between ideas, actors and institutions in processes of energy 
system change. In particular this approach may allow the consideration of how 
actors at different scales utilise, or are constrained in their ability to utilise, ideas 
and discourses to shape policy and institutions. The third section discusses, in 
relation to the previous two sections, the theoretical contribution of this thesis 
and the final section concludes.  
 
3.2 Social-technical systems and innovation  
3.2.1 Socio-technical system transitions 
Globally the energy sector is the largest contributor to greenhouse gas 
emissions (IEA, 2015) and transitioning to a low carbon energy system is widely 
acknowledged as requiring fundamental system changes which go beyond 
‘incremental tinkering with existing systems’ (Hargreaves et al. 2012: 9). 
However complex systems, such as energy, water, transport and food supply, 
are not just collections of provisioning technologies but are also embedded in 
wider social systems and practices (Coenen and Truffer, 2012). So, for 
example, replacing high carbon energy sources with low carbon sources is not 
simply a matter or replacing one technology with another but also requires 
broader changes to norms, practices, and business structures. This recognises 
that technologies and governing systems co-evolve so consideration of 
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institutions, governance and power relations is also central to understanding 
change in large technical systems (Lawhon and Murphy, 2011).  
 
Exploring these complex interactions in socio-technical systems, particularly in 
relation to transitioning to a low carbon energy system, is a rich area for 
research and an extensive literature has emerged which explores processes of 
change. Much of this work is focussed within Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) and builds on insights from evolutionary economics and innovation 
studies (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hughes, 1983; Berkhout, Stirling and Smith, 
2004; Scrase and Smith, 2009; Geels, 2010), although disciplines such as 
political science and sociology also have a long history of studying socio-
political and socio-technical change.  
 
In seeking to understand the relationships between technological systems and 
society, Science and Technology Studies are particularly focussed on 
processes of change and inertia and many approaches draw on Hughes' (1983) 
influential work on technological change in electricity systems between 1880 
and 1930. Hughes presented technical systems as part of complex interrelated 
technical, social and organisational factors and outlined the importance of 
systems builders in initial system development. He also set out how, once 
established, systems are resistant to change due to internal momentum which 
largely insulates components of the system from external factors. An important 
part of this system momentum is the development of institutional and economic 
structures (such as processes of economic appraisal) which favour the current 
system and lock out alternatives. 
 
Development of these structures and norms result in ‘soft determinism’ 
(Woodman, 2002: 31) whereby technologies and systems of governance that 
are perceived as not conforming to broader system ‘logics’ are rejected 
resulting in path dependent trajectories of technical change which tend to 
require external shocks to drive radical change. This focus on external shocks 
as drivers for system change has much in common with the neo-institutional 
literature discussed later in this section as both highlight the role of exogenous 
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change but have less to say on incremental change and internal drivers for 
transformation.  
 
Hughes (1983) provides an example of these processes in his account of the 
‘battle of the currents’ in the early establishment of electricity infrastructures. In 
the late 1800’s, both Edison and Westinghouse introduced early electric 
systems in the United States; Edison’s system was based on direct-current 
(DC) technology and Westinghouse’s was based on alternating-current (AC) 
technology. Both systems had various benefits and disadvantages and there 
was intense competition between the two systems to become the dominant 
design. This competition was not limited to market-based economic competition 
and also included both parties seeking to attack the other and develop support 
with politicians, the general public and academia (Unruh, 2000). As a result of 
political support, the alignment of other technologies with the AC technology, 
and various other factors, the AC system eventually developed as the dominant 
design and ultimately absorbed the DC network. At the time electricity 
generation and use tended to be rather localised with city power stations 
serving the local area, however the properties of the AC system allowed long-
distance transmission and the dominance of the AC technology promoted the 
emergence of large, centralised power stations close to sources of fossil fuels. 
Centralised, fossil fuel power generation then co-developed with energy market 
structures, financing arrangements, system standards, skills and regulation to 
lock out both DC technology and more decentralised, low carbon generation. If 
DC technology had emerged as the dominant design it would have required a 
more decentralised system of generation and distribution and thus would have 
co-developed with supportive wider technical and institutional structures 
(Hughes, 1983; Unruh, 2000). 
 
This co-evolution over time of policies, markets, technologies and social norms 
results in stable configurations which exhibit strong path dependency where 
relationships between different elements act to support incremental change 
along the same technical and institutional paths and lock out alternatives 
(Foxon, 2011). This phenomenon is well established in evolutionary economics 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) and was particularly identified in relation to energy 
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systems by Unruh (2000) who suggested that industrial economies are locked 
into fossil fuel-based energy systems through co-evolutionary processes of 
technical and institutional development which create persistent market and 
policy failures which lock out low carbon alternatives (Maassen, 2012). 
Increasing scale returns mean that firms are incentivised to pursue production 
volumes and market share which tends to result in technological convergence. 
Technological innovation then becomes focussed on specialised refinement of 
the dominant designs and skills, regulation, standards, supply chains, policies 
and user practices develop which further reinforce the dominant regime.  
 
An example of path dependency and system co-evolution in relation to the topic 
of this thesis would be the current UK heat system’s dominance by individual 
gas boilers. This dominance of domestic gas boilers has co-evolved with both 
wider infrastructure systems, such as a national gas distribution network, and a 
broader socio-technical system which includes elements such as retail supply 
competition, the unbundling of distribution and supply and the operation of 
networks under a regulated asset base model. This current socio-technical 
system also developed within the framework of gas transmission and 
distribution networks originally being funded by the state during a period of 
public ownership. The development of heat networks, and other alternatives to 
domestic gas boilers, need to be considered in this context as heat networks 
are essentially monopoly suppliers in their local area and heat distribution 
networks are currently expected to develop on commercial terms35. 
 
Whilst Hughes’ study of electricity systems was very influential in establishing 
the complex interplay of social, institutional and technical factors in system 
change it was also focussed on the development of system stability and slow 
processes of change. Similarly, initially much of the literature on socio-technical 
systems focussed on historic socio-technical transitions which tended to take 
place over several decades and involve largely emergent processes of change, 
such as the transition to piped water in the Netherlands (Geels, 2005) or the 
transition from sailing ships to steam ships (Geels, 2002). In common with 
                                                          
35 Although the UK government is supporting the development of heat networks with grant 
funding, projects are expected to develop commercial investment proposals. 
 
80 
 
earlier STS approaches these studies showed that socio-technical systems 
were largely stable due to path dependency, incumbent advantage and system 
reinforcement between actors with change characterised as taking place 
incrementally under normal circumstances, for example through innovations 
gradually increasing efficiency. However system transitions were demonstrated 
to take place when this general stability was replaced by a relatively short 
period of radical change, before a new equilibrium is established. 
 
Building on this focus on short periods of systemic change a ‘transitions’ 
literature has developed within STS which is specifically interested in examining 
how large-scale shifts from one socio-technical system to another come about. 
A ‘transition’ is considered to have taken place when a major change occurs in 
the way a particular societal function (such as energy) is fulfilled (Geels, 2002; 
Hargreaves, Longhurst and Seyfang, 2012). Much of this work is particularly 
focussed on sustainability transitions where change is both time limited36 and 
purposive37 (Smith, Voß and Grin, 2010), examples include the decarbonisation 
of energy and transport and sustainable food production. These issues 
contrasts with many historic transitions where the relatively slow speed of 
change to some extent minimised system disruption as social, institutional and 
economic changes were able to happen in a gradual manner (Hess, 2014). In 
sustainability transitions the comparatively rapid and directed nature of change 
suggests that business, social and institutional structures will have less time to 
adapt in an evolutionary manner with winners and losers created in the process. 
This highlights the contested nature of sustainability transitions and the 
importance of both the politics and governance of change. 
 
In analysing socio-technical systems one of the most influential conceptual 
frameworks is the multi-level perspective (MLP), originally proposed by Rip and 
Kemp (1998) and subsequently developed by Geels (Geels, 2004, 2012, 2014; 
Verbong and Geels, 2007) and others (such as Smith, Voß and Grin, 2010; 
                                                          
36 In that there is a need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within short time scales to avoid 
climatic tipping points. For example analysis of the IPPC global carbon budgets suggests that if 
emissions continue at the rate seen in 2016 then cumulate global emissions are likely to lead to 
global temperature increases of over 1.5° in 4 years (Carbon Brief, 2017) 
37 In that the aim of the energy transition – to decarbonise – is already known, albeit with much 
debate regarding the speed and detailed nature of these changes. 
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Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). The MLP is one of the key constructivist 
approaches in science and technology studies (STS), together with 
technological innovation systems (TIS) and strategic niche management (SNM) 
(Hansen and Coenen, 2015). The MLP is adopted as a framework in this 
research as both SNM and TIS approaches tend to focus on radical new 
technologies and as such are not well suited to the study of well-established 
technologies such as heat networks. Similarly, although both consider formal 
and informal institutions, they tend not to specifically recognise the politicised 
nature of institutional development and maintenance. The MLP therefore better 
provides for analysis of institutions and actors, and recognises the need to 
incorporate other theoretical insights in order to better integrate politics and 
scale into the framework, as discussed later in this chapter. In the case of this 
thesis the MLP is integrated with a discursive institutional approach. 
 
The MLP builds on earlier transitions studies which recognised that general 
socio-technical system stability is interspersed with relatively short periods of 
radical change. The MLP posits that these periods of change take place through 
the alignment of multiple processes at three levels: niche, regime and 
landscape (Coenen & Truffer, 2012). Transitions are characterised as dynamic, 
non-linear processes with periods of change resulting from exogenous 
sociotechnical landscape pressures (such as climate change or social changes) 
which exert pressure on existing regimes (such as the current energy system). 
Regimes are the locus of established practices and associated rules that 
stabilise existing systems and pressure on these regimes acts to open up 
‘windows of opportunity’ that might be filled by novel innovations developed in 
‘niche’ spaces (such as renewable energy technologies) (Geels, 2011; 
Hargreaves, Longhurst and Seyfang, 2012). The framework acts as a heuristic 
and as a means of structuring complexity, as outlined in Figure 11. 
. 
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Figure 11: The Multi-Level Perspective 
 
Source: Geels & Schot, 2007 
 
Within the MLP change is characterised as coming about through either (1) 
changes at the landscape level resulting in sufficient tensions in the socio-
technical regime (for example climate change awareness putting pressure on 
energy system regimes), or through (2) niche innovations managing to establish 
and grow their networks sufficiently to influence existing regime relationships 
(an example would be developments in PV and battery technologies resulting in 
dramatic cost reductions and significant deployment). The relationship between 
landscape, regimes and niches is however highly complex and recursive with 
innovations only breaking through to change the wider socio-technical system 
when multiple processes, across scales, link up and accumulate. An illustration 
of this is developments in renewable technologies being dependent on both 
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micro-scale niche innovation through R&D as well as landscape factors such as 
awareness of climate change resulting in national and global policies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and a market for low carbon technologies.  
 
Recognising that co-evolutionary processes result in path dependency and 
inertia (Hommels, 2005), the MLP highlights niches as sources of variation 
which provide the seeds of transitions. The potential for individual innovations to 
stabilise and grow depends on both internal niche processes, such as learning 
and efficiency improvements, and the impact of the wider selection environment 
in the form of regime and landscape dynamics (Geels, 2013; Hodson, Geels 
and Mcmeekin, 2017). Technological niches tend to initially have difficulty 
integrating with other elements of the socio-technical system (technologies, 
institutions, norms). So, for example, the development of domestic photovoltaic 
systems has historically faced barriers in relation to the structure of existing 
energy markets, regulatory norms, upfront costs and a lack of consumer 
awareness. The development of a protective environment is then required in 
order to allow niche innovations to develop and mature. In the case of domestic 
PV this included activity such as the development of small-scale feed-in tariffs 
which provide long-term payments for renewable electricity, grant schemes, 
R&D by firms which dramatically reduced technology costs and awareness 
raising activity by NGOs and community groups (KPMG LLP, 2015).  While 
niches are often sites of innovation and change, regimes are characterised by 
stability through alignment between rules and processes in multiple technical, 
user, infrastructure, policy and knowledge regimes.  
 
This focus on exogenous windows of opportunity has much in common with 
neo-institutionalist approaches, as outlined later in this section, however the 
framework also characterises socio-technical change as a web of complex 
multi-actor processes (Geels, 2013), with technological transformation situated 
in relation to wider socio-political-economic systems. This emphasises the role 
of ‘markets, user practices, policy and cultural discourses, and governing 
institutions’ as well as new technologies in system change (Geels et al., 2008: 
524). Although the MLP has been critiqued for lacking a full conceptualisation of 
some of issues of discourse, governance and politics (Meadowcroft, 2009; 
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Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell, 2014) this demonstrates that the importance of 
interactions at this level is acknowledged, if under explored. A discursive 
institutionalist approach might provide a valuable route to exploring these 
interactions and enriching MLP approaches.  
 
3.2.1.1 Refocussing on regimes 
Whilst the MLP is a widely used framework to explore transitions, a number of 
criticisms have been levelled at the approach. Firstly, although socio-technical 
transition theorists originally posited niches as the key unit of analysis given 
their role in innovation and novelty (Rip & Kemp, 1998), there has been 
increasing recognition by transition scholars of a need to focus attention on the 
dynamics of socio-technical regimes (Geels and Schot, 2007). Regimes can be 
defined as the accumulated knowledge, investments, public and private 
infrastructures, values and norms that form established practice (Smith et al, 
2010). The regime level is seen as critical to ‘organize the activities and 
structure the relationships between diverse groups such as public authorities, 
civil society organizations, users, suppliers, producers, financiers, and 
researchers’ (Lawhon & Murphy, 2011: 358). It is here that processes of norms, 
rules, practice and governance can create stability and ‘lock in’ and, in contrast, 
tensions between actors and networks can open up the system to niche 
innovations (Van de Poel, 2000). Recognition of the potential for regime reform 
to produce radical transformations therefore enables exploration of both the role 
of the incumbent regime in innovation (OECD, 2015) and of how actors are 
constrained by and influence existing regimes (Geels 2004: 904). 
 
A focus on regime interactions also highlights the role of governance in 
processes of transition with Kemp and Rotmans (2005) and Loorbach (2007) 
suggesting that governance processes are important in providing shared visions 
and goals for transition experiments, providing arenas for those transition 
experiments and modulating actor network dynamics. It is also important to note 
that regimes do not operate in isolation and instead a patchwork of inter-related, 
overlapping regimes exists. This might include science regimes, policy regimes 
and technology regimes with each regime potentially having differing goals, 
internal uncertainty and conflict (Geels, 2002, 2004). 
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The increased focus in transitions studies on regime interaction is also fuelled 
by arguments that the MLP framework is too functionalist, with regime 
interactions oversimplified and ‘dominated by rational action’ (Smith, Stirling and 
Berkhout, 2005, p. 1492). Smith et al. (2005) and Kuzemko (2013), argue that 
this has partly led to a lack of exploration of (regime) politics and a ‘politics of 
transitions’ literature has developed which seeks to ascribe greater role to 
power dynamics, ideas and interests at the regime level (such as Meadowcroft 
2009; Scrase and Smith 2009; Kern 2012; Smith and Raven 2012; Hess 2014). 
The next section expands on this growing focus on the politics of transitions. 
 
3.2.1.2 The politics of transitions 
The transition to a low carbon, sustainable energy system is widely 
acknowledged to be highly political as shifts in power are central to change from 
one system to another (Loorbach, 2007). So the focus is not just about what 
policies, incentives and practices are in place but why, how and for whose 
benefit (Lawhon and Murphy, 2011; Mitchell, 2014). In this context there is no 
neutral steering of transitions as multiple interests aim to influence and shape 
the future (Smith and Stirling, 2008) and ideas about the ‘right’ approach to 
decarbonisation, both in terms of technologies and wider social and institutional 
changes, are highly contested (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). 
 
This recognition of the ‘messy and complex’ politics of policy processes (Sharp 
& Richardson, 2001: 194) has driven increased interest in the Transitions 
literature38 into how existing institutions and discourses influence processes of 
change.  This work is concerned with how existing rules and norms are created 
or reproduced and the role of argument and persuasion. These themes of 
discourses and institutions have been brought together by Kern (2009) who, 
drawing on the work of Schmidt (2008) and Hajer (1995), takes a discursive 
institutional approach which positions action as taking place within the 
framework of existing institutions (norms, rules, regulation and customs) which 
are influenced by (and influence) discursive interactions.  
                                                          
38 This has also happened across policy studies more generally (see Hay, 2002). 
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In addition to this emerging focus on the politics of transitions a number of 
scholars have suggested that the MLP framework over emphasise technological 
characteristics which results in inadequate conceptualisation of agency and 
actor dynamics (Hargreaves et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2010). Geels (2011: 29) 
counters this, suggesting that the MLP framework is in fact ‘shot through with 
agency’ due to the importance of actors and interactions in trajectories. 
However Geels (2011) (and others such as Meadowcroft, 2009 and Shove & 
Walker, 2007) acknowledge that there is a need to further explore the dynamics 
of both regime politics and actor relations in transition processes.  
 
3.2.1.3 Space and scale in transitions 
An additional significant criticism of the MLP is that the framework lacks a full 
conceptualisation of space and scale (Bridge et al., 2013). As (the city-) scale is 
a central concern of this research this issue is outlined in more detail below. 
This is followed by an overview of how a discursive institutional approach might 
help to illuminate actor dynamics at multiple scales. 
 
Issues of space and scale in socio-technical transitions are starting to generate 
considerable debate across several disciplines (including regional studies, 
economic geography, human geography, and international political economy 
(Raven et al., 2013)), with a range of authors drawing attention to the lack of a 
sufficient conceptualisation of place and scale in the Socio-technical Transitions 
(STS) literature (such as Hodson & Marvin, 2010; Lawhon & Murphy, 2011; 
Smith et al., 2010; Spath & Rohracher,2010; Coenen & Truffer, 2012). 
Historically socio-technical systems have tended to be presented as consisting 
of nested, largely autonomous, spatial scales (Rutherford & Coutard, 2014). 
This criticism has been particularly levelled at the MLP where, although spatial 
scale is ‘not explicitly conceptualised’, the levels of regimes, niches and 
landscapes are often ‘implicitly conflated’ with specific spatial scales (Raven, 
Schot, & Berkhout, 2012:64). Niches tend to be portrayed as local, micro-level 
features, whilst regimes tend to be represented with national attributes and 
landscape factors as international/global. This has led much transitions 
research to privilege the national or supranational scale with cities often 
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characterised as only able to influence niche development and integration. 
Where the importance of cities in transitions is recognised their role tends to be 
black-boxed and characterised as merely the space where ‘change happens to 
happen’ (Rutherford & Coutard, 2014: 1361; Dodson, 2013; Bulkeley & Betsill, 
2005). 
 
Empirical studies have also tended to take a national view of actors and 
institutions which is unclear about the role of sub-national scales39 and how they 
interrelate with wider national and societal transitions (Hodson and Marvin, 
2010). Certainly a relatively small proportion of transitions studies have explicitly 
considered the local scale (Raven, Schot and Berkhout, 2012). More recently 
the literature seeking to explore urban transitions has expanded but there 
remain calls for further empirical analysis and conceptual development, 
particularly in relation to the interface between sub-national government and the 
energy transition (Bulkeley et al., 2016; Cowell, Ellis and Strachan, 2017; 
Hodson, Geels and Mcmeekin, 2017). 
 
This under-exploration of the role of the city-scale in transitions results in the potential 
for cities to play a role in shaping socio-technical regimes being underplayed. This 
limits consideration of the role of different actors at the city-scale, processes of 
negotiation and development, and the interplay between local-scale projects (such as 
heat networks) and wider national and international regimes. 
 
Although this is an under-researched area there is a growing body of research 
which suggests that city-scale initiatives can have an important role in 
transitions. For example, Späth & Rohracher's (2010) study of the development 
of Austrian ‘Energy Regions’ suggests that local actors can mobilise distinct 
‘discursive niches’ which go on to interrelate with broader energy discourses 
and potentially influence wider transitions. Similarly, Carvalho, Mingardo, & 
Haaren (2012), in their study of urban transport and clean-tech innovations, 
suggest that city-level decision making processes and visions can play an 
important role in influencing selection environments for international companies. 
                                                          
39 To date many MLP case studies have focussed on national scale systems, infrastructures and 
institutions. However transitions can also be studied at an international or urban level. 
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These examples demonstrate the gradual increase in focus on the role of 
geography (and cities in particular) in shaping transition processes and 
recognition of the potential for conflicts and tensions between actors and 
institutions embedded at different scales (Hodson and Marvin, 2010; Bolton & 
Foxon, 2013). Despite a slow increase in the number of studies focussing on 
these issues it remains an under–researched area, particularly as most 
scenarios suggest that the global energy system is likely to become more 
decentralised in the future, which suggests that the role of actors embedded at 
different scales may become more important. 
 
Considering the role city actors and networks might play in regime politics may 
also provide broader public policy insights as there is much debate in policy 
literatures regarding the structuration of power within and between various 
configurations of the state (Hill, 2009). As discussed this perspective is 
somewhat neglected in transitions literature. These themes are returned to in 
the results and discussion (chapters 5, 6, 7).  
 
Chapter 2 has already established that heat network projects are likely to be 
focussed at a city-scale, and this section has highlighted that both regime 
politics and the interaction of city-scale activities with the wider energy system 
are under researched areas. The following section elaborates on how analysis 
of discourses and institutions is likely to help to investigate the politics and 
dynamics of city-scale initiatives, in this case the development of city heat 
networks, and sets out a rationale for the adoption of a discursive institutional 
approach. 
 
3.3 (New)-Institutionalism 
Given the limitations of the MLP in accounting for the complex governance and 
politics of transition processes a number of researchers have suggested that an 
institutionalist approach may be able to provide insight into transition politics 
(such as Kern et al. 2014; Kuzemko 2013; Moss et al. 2014). Institutionalist 
approaches, although diverse, have a long history within political science and 
seek to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and 
political outcomes (Hall & Taylor 1996). This section briefly summarises the 
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differences between early institutionalism and neo-institutionalism. The main 
schools of thought with neo-institutionalism are then introduced, followed by a 
discussion of discursive institutionalism. 
 
Up until the 1950’s institutionalist approaches were interested in analysing the 
formal institutions of government and the state and focussed on processes of 
government rather than governance. This early institutionalism came under 
criticism from a range of other schools of thought as lacking conception of the 
social dimensions and informal conventions that shape institutions. Building on 
these criticisms a range of alternative theoretical positions started to dominate 
political science with behaviouralist and rational choice accounts of the role of 
individuals becoming prominent in studies of political institutions (Lowndes, 
2010a). More recently40 neo-institutionalism has refocused on the role of 
institutions, recognising that the organisation of political life was still important 
and, to some extent, bridging the two extremes of traditional institutionalist and 
behaviouralist approaches. Neo-institutionalism takes a broader view of 
institutions as social constructs, considering the interplay of different institutions 
within society and how their dynamics, rules and norms shapes the behaviour 
and actions of individuals (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Within this framework 
institutions are understood to ‘embody values and power relationships’ with 
institutions and individuals interacting dynamically, rather than a one-way 
relationship of (structural) institutional factors influencing individual behaviour 
(agency) (Lowndes 2010: 61).  
 
Neo-institutionalism has been referred to as ‘bringing institutions back in’ to 
explanations of politics and society (Schmidt 2006: 98) with the overarching 
term incorporating a wide range of methodological, epistemological and 
ontological approaches. Additionally, neo-institutionalist scholarship includes a 
wide variety of conceptualisation of the relationship between state, society and 
institutions with many different  positions on the role of rational action, rules, 
norms and change in institutions (Lowndes, 1996). Despite this a number of 
core commonalities distinguish neo-institutionalist approaches from traditional 
institutionalism. Firstly an expansive conception of institutions is adopted, 
                                                          
40 Since the 1980’s 
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generally including formal and informal institutions, rules, norms and values; 
secondly, building on this broad definition of institutions they focus on rules 
rather than organisations and finally institutions are conceived of as dynamic, 
social constructs that influence and are influenced by individuals.  
 
While some authors identify up to seven forms of neo-institutionalism, it is 
generally accepted that four main strands of thought exist consisting of historic 
institutionalism (HI), rational choice institutionalism (RI), sociological 
institutionalism (SI) and discursive institutionalism41 (DI) (Schmidt, 2006; Hay, 
2008). While most neo-institutionalist scholars would site their work in one of 
these schools it is important to note that there are a certain amount of shared 
features between the four strands and no clear boundaries exist between them 
(Andrews-Speed, 2016). There is also a great deal of internal debate within 
each strand and exploration of synthesising the various strands, although the 
practicality or desirability of this is contested (Hall & Taylor 1996; Hay & Wincott 
1998). A brief account of the four schools of thought is given below followed by 
a rationale as to why discursive institutionalism may provide a better account of 
institutional change42 than other forms of institutionalism.  
 
3.3.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Rational Choice Institutionalists (RI) highlight the role of individuals as rational, 
utility-maximising actors in shaping institutions. Here actors are seen to pursue 
their fixed preferences following a ‘logic of calculation’  to maximise their 
preferences (Schmidt 2008b:3). Institutions are conceptualised as setting 
parameters for action through structures of incentives, but not as determining 
them (Schmidt, 2010b; Koelble, 2014).  
 
This emphasis on fixed preferences and the stability of institutions gives limited 
recognition to the role of ideas in shaping political outcomes. As such rational 
choice institutionalism has arguably the least in common with discursive 
institutionalist approaches, although some scholars have sought to integrate RI 
approaches with historical institutionalism in order to better account for 
                                                          
41 Also referred to as ideational or constructivist institutionalism by some authors (Hay, 2008) 
42 Particularly in relation to socio-technical/sustainability transitions 
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endogenous institutional change (Schmidt, 2010b). Despite this RI approaches 
are overtly focussed on the role of individual interests and this might be 
particularly problematic in explorations of transition politics where an individual’s 
interests might not always be easily ‘knowable’ or may be uncertain as new 
technologies or configurations of actors become important. During such periods 
interests and values (and existing institutions) are often in flux and therefore do 
not fully account for system change (Kern, 2009). This does not suggest that 
interests do not matter in transitions but that ideas as well as interests may be 
important. 
 
3.3.2 Sociological institutionalism 
Rejecting the utilitarian, rational choice model of change, sociologists see 
institutions as dependent upon social and cultural variables, and the individual 
as a rather unimportant variable in institutional change (Koelble, 2014). 
Developing this approach Sociological Institutionalism (SI) sees the state as 
socially constituted and emphasises the importance of culture in determining 
institutional structures (Schmidt 2006). A broad conception of institutions is 
adopted that includes values, rules and norms and political agents are 
characterised as acting according to culturally specific ‘logic[s] of 
appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 2008). This results in processes of 
institutional change progressing to ‘enhance the social legitimacy of the 
organisation’ rather than due to efficiency maximisation behaviours (Hall and 
Taylor 1996: 949). Institutions are characterised as resistant to change, with 
change coming about from external shocks or changes to the cultural 
underpinning of institutions.  
 
Schmidt (2010) argues that the focus on norms, frames and meaning in SI 
means that ideas are at the basis of the approach however in reality SI scholars 
vary widely in the extent to which they attribute an explanatory role to ideas with 
many seeing ideas as culturally determined and static. Sociological 
institutionalism has also been criticised as overly focussed on rule-following 
rather than process of rule-creation and also has limited ability to account for 
contention in political processes (Kern, 2009). Additionally, sociological 
approaches are likely to have a particular blind-spot in relation to the role of 
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scale and/or cities in processes of change as they tend assume that ‘closeness 
in social space’ is most important and underrate the role of spatiality (Fuchs & 
Hinderer 2014: 355). 
 
3.3.3 Historic institutionalism 
Of the strands of neo-institutionalism, historical institutionalism (HI) is 
theoretically closest to discursive institutionalism as it is centrally concerned 
with how institutions shape actor behaviour and seeks to integrate institutional 
analysis with the role of ideas (Thelen, 1999). Historical institutionalists adopt a 
relatively broad definition of institutions, including formal and informal rules, 
norms, routines and ideas. Similarly an expansive conceptualisation of the 
relationship between institutions and individual behaviour is assumed which 
sees institutions as both shaping the actions of individuals but also being 
affected by collective and individual choices through power asymmetries 
(Koelble et al. 2016; Schmidt 2006). This definition positions HI as very different 
from rational choice institutional theory as actor preferences are understood to 
be unstable with institutions dynamically interacting with actor preferences 
through ‘struggles that ultimately reflect inequalities of power’ (Lockwood et al., 
2016: 314). Institutions therefore ‘shape political outcomes by facilitating the 
organization of certain groups while actively disarticulating others’ through both 
the formal organisation of actor groups and also influencing how actors 
recognise shared interest (Thelen 1999: 92).   
 
HI’s emphasis on institutional setting and history suggests that choices made 
during the formation of an institution play an important role in determining future 
policy (Kern, 2009) and attributes an important role to unintended 
consequences. This suggests that most political change is ‘incremental and 
path-dependent’  and highlights how institutions are largely stable and tend to 
constrain rather than enable political action (Andrews-Speed 2016: 219, Hall & 
Taylor 1996). Indeed institutional change is characterised by HI theorists as 
requiring exogenous factors to ‘punctuate’ institutional stability, often in the form 
of economic upheaval or political conflict (Blyth, 2006).  
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This emphasis on institutional setting and path dependency does not ascribe a 
detailed role to actors and lacks sufficient focus on the relationships between 
structure (institutions) and agency (behaviour) (Hay and Wincott, 1998). These 
critiques led some HI scholars to pay more attention to the role of ideas in 
structuring the relationship between actors and institutions and how this impacts 
on policy. In this respect Hall's (1993) study of changing political paradigms on 
economic policy in 1970s Britain is used as a prominent example by several 
authors (such as Kern 2009; Lockwood et al. 2016). However, although some 
historical institutionalist thought acknowledges the crucial role that ideas play in 
shaping policy the emphasis is still on institutional continuity with institutions 
developing along incremental, path-dependent trajectories. Abrupt ‘critical 
junctures’ can punctuate this overall stability but processes of institutional and 
ideational change are not fully conceptualised (Hall & Taylor 1996: 942) 
 
3.3.4 Discursive institutionalism  
The term discursive institutionalism covers a relatively broad area of political 
science research ‘which takes ideas and discourse seriously’ (Schmidt 2011, 
683), albeit with often differing emphasis on the two and their analytical function 
(Schmidt, 2010). Within the DI literature institutions are seen to shape 
behaviour ‘through the frames of meaning they embody’ and ideas and 
narratives are used to explain and legitimise political action (Lowndes 2010a: 
77). This highlights the importance of understanding how ideas become codified 
over time and processes of contestation and displacement. Ideas and 
discourses are viewed as influencing institutions through problem definition, the 
inclusion/exclusion of actors in the policy process, identification of solutions, 
and the structuring of which voices are heard. Put simply it is interested in why 
some ideas come to dominate why others don’t and contends that although 
'institutional change is precipitated by agency and influenced by social power 
relations, the aims and content of attempts to change institutions are driven by 
ideas’ (Moss et al 2014: 6).  
 
Discursive institutionalism (DI) developed as a response to various criticisms of 
the other forms of neo-institutionalism, in particular that historical, sociological 
and rational choice institutionalism are all limited in their ability to explain 
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institutional change. It offers an account of how institutional change happens by 
focussing on the dynamics of actor preferences, interactions and the 
development of ideas about ‘what ought to be’ (Schmidt 2008b; Schmidt 
2008a). Within DI the focus is on institutions as embodying values and power 
relations (Gamble, 1995) and thus enabling and constraining political action by 
actors. A broad definition of institutions is adopted, consisting of the formal 
organisations, customs and norms which together set the (formal and informal) 
‘rules of the game’. This draws on elements of the other strands of neo-
institutionalism as policy is acknowledged as socially constructed and 
institutions have an important role to play in establishing political opportunities 
for change. Based on this broad conception of institutions discursive 
institutionalism recognises that institutions and discourses are interlinked. 
Actors are seen as operating within institutional frameworks (norms, rules, 
regulation and customs) which are influence by (and influence) discursive 
interactions. This frames the steering and governing of (energy) systems as a 
series of ‘struggles’ about meaning which are deeply political (Lowndes, 2010; 
Feindt & Oels, 2005: 161). So, for example, discourses regarding the ownership 
of heat networks may influence institutional norms and the choices open to 
actors but, conversely, existing institutions may also limit what can meaningfully 
be said and shape debate of alternatives (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). 
 
Whilst the broad definition of an institution within DI approaches is one of the 
factors which enables the relationship between discourse, ideas and institutions 
to be probed there are also some difficulties in adopting such an expansive 
definition. As Lowndes (2010) highlights taking a wide-ranging definition of 
institutions as the ’rules of the game’ risks a definition that includes everything 
that guides individual behaviour and an inability to distinguish institutional 
factors from other social factors. To address this Hall (1986) suggests the 
adoption of Standard Operating Proceedures (SOP) where the researcher 
seeks to identify agreed rules of behaviour, whether explicit or tacit, to 
distinguish formal and informal institutional rules from personal habits and 'rules 
of thumb'. To illustrate this Lowndes (2010a: 73) uses the example of UK 
Parliamentary Select Committees where the style and form of questions may 
not be set down in writing but is identifiable as a SOP as norms and 'unwritten 
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rules' act to structures behaviour and embodies values and power relationships. 
In contrast the way a Select Committee Member organises their papers is a 
matter of ‘personal habit or routine, and does not qualify as an informal 
institution or SOP’. 
 
Pioneered by Schmidt (2010) DI approaches define three types of ideas; policy 
ideas which shape the options and solutions discussed in relation to a policy 
issue, programmatic ideas which form the underlying principles of policy 
including problem definition, policy norms and methods, and philosophical 
principles which embody the world views, values and underlying assumptions in 
the policy process.  Together these three types of ideas are seen to construct 
institutional structures and processes of change through ‘the interactions of 
actors, talking, arguing, making sense of the world around them’ (Schmidt 2010: 
3). Hay (2008) suggests that the core contribution of DI is its conceptualisation 
of institutions as codified systems of ideas with the focus on the interactive 
processes that generate ideas and how they are communicated and 
disseminated by actors. This highlights not only processes of communication 
but also ‘the institutional context in which and through which ideas are 
communicated via discourse’ (Schmidt 2008a: 3). 
 
In addition to the three levels of ideas (policy, programmatic, philosophical) 
outlined above, Schmidt suggests that ideas can be categorised into two types, 
cognitive43 and normative. These overarching ideas often tie together the three 
levels of policy, programme and philosophy with cognitive ideas concerning 
‘”what is and what to do” whereas normative ideas indicate “what is good or bad 
about what is” in light of “what one ought to do”’ (Schmidt 2008b: 306). 
Cognitive ideas are used by political actors to justify policies and programmes 
and act to define the problems to be solved, the methods to solve those 
problems and how policies can offer solutions to problems (Lorenzoni and 
Benson, 2014). Normative ideas evaluate options for action and help to 
legitimate policies and programmes through reference to how they resonate 
with deeper societal philosophical principles and norms.  
 
                                                          
43 sometimes called causal ideas. 
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3.3.4.1 Discursive institutionalism in relation to other institutionalist 
approaches 
Discursive institutionalist approaches have a number of core similarities to other 
forms of neo-institutionalism including a common interest in investigating the 
relationship between agents and institutions in order to understand institutional 
change (Lowndes, 2010b). In striving to do this all strands of neo-institutional 
theory suggest that institutions are important in shaping actor behaviour and 
action, although they differ in relation to the role they attribute to the relationship 
between institutions and ideas (Bell, 2011). Additionally all suggest that agents 
are constrained by their institutional environment resulting in institutions that are 
path dependent and deterministic. However advocates of DI suggest that 
focussing on the interplay between actor dynamics, ideas and discourse in 
shaping institutions enables DI to better account for how institutional change 
happens. As discussed, explanations of change are often a weak point for neo-
institutionalism due to the characterisation of institutions as stable and path 
dependent (Schmidt, 2010).  
 
Additionally, Van Der Heijden (2010, p. 239)44 suggests that much 
institutionalist thought has tended to take a polarised view on many of the 
issues central to political and social science, for example by studying structure 
or agency, endogenous or exogenous variables, stability or change. Adopting 
one perspective for these issues can ‘limits one’s findings and thereby one’s 
understanding of what is going on’, however this research suggests that DI is 
more nuanced than some of the other forms of neo-institutionalism in that it 
seeks to integrate structure and agency, incremental and punctuated change, 
endogenous and exogenous processes. As discussed the three other neo-
institutionalisms (RI, SI and HI) all see institutions as largely static and resistant 
to change with periods of institutional change tending to proceed from 
exogenous shocks45. In contrast DI highlights how internal ‘background’ 
discursive processes can drive change and frames processes of change as 
incremental and dynamic. The key differences between the four strands of neo-
institutionalism are outlined below in Table 4.
                                                          
44 Van Der Heijden refers to Thelen and Mahoney’s 2010 book ‘Explaining Institutional Change’. 
45 Although some more recent SI, RI and HI work has sought to explore endogenous processes 
of change the focus still tends to be on exogenous shocks in the context of general stability. 
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Table 4: The four new institutionalisms (Source: Schmidt 2010) 
 
(Schmidt, 2010b) 
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Although neo-institutionalist approaches are characterised by extensive debate 
regarding the precise stance of each variant in relation to the meta-theoretical 
issues discussed above, equally their common, broad definition of an institution 
recognises that norms, individual interests, ideas, institutional structures and so 
on are all important and in reality many scholars utilise a mix of approaches and 
seek to take a non-binary method. It is proposed that studying these issues at a 
city-scale may provide new insights into interactions between binary issues 
such as structure/agency or ideas/interests, and the aim of this thesis is to both 
add to the theoretical debate on the relationship between ideas, discourses and 
institutions but also to add to policy-relevant knowledge in relation to urban 
energy transitions.  
 
In summary, a discursive institutionalist conceptualisation of ideas suggests that 
discourse plays an important role in the generation, acceptance, legitimation 
and communication of ideas and proposes that these processes are intimately 
interlinked with the development of new institutional practices and norms46 
(Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014). This advocates that explaining the origins and 
development of political institutions requires an understanding of how ideas 
become codified over time and the conditions under which underlying ideas are 
‘contested, challenged and replaced’ (Hay 2002: 65). The interactions between 
ideas, discourses, interests and institutions as defined in this research is 
illustrated in Figure 12. These relationships are discussed further in chapter 4, 
where the operationalisation of the research approach is outlined. 
 
                                                          
46 And the maintenance of existing structures. 
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Figure 12: Ideas, discourses and institutions 
 
 
The next section outlines the definition of discourse adopted by this research 
and introduces how analysis of discourses will be integrated with exploration of 
processes institutional change. 
 
3.3.4.1 Defining and analysing discourse 
In studying policy processes several authors have highlighted the importance of 
discourse with Fischer (2003: x) describing politics as ‘a struggle for power 
played out in significant part through arguments about the ‘best story’’. 
Numerous studies have also shown that new problem framings or storylines can 
trigger political and policy change (such as Stevenson, 2009; Bulkeley, 2000; 
Dryzek, 2005) reinforcing the idea that ‘discourses are bound up with political 
power’ (Dryzek, 2005: 9).  
 
Although the term ‘discourse’ has multiple meanings, within this research both 
Dryzek and Hajer’s definitions are adopted.  Dryzek (2005: 9) describes a 
discourse as ‘a shared way of apprehending the world. Discourses construct 
meanings and relationships, helping to define common sense and legitimate 
knowledge. Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgments, and contentions 
that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements, and 
disagreements’ (Dryzek, 2005: 9). Similarly Hajer (1995: 44) defines discourse 
‘as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are 
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produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of social practices 
and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’. Both of 
these definitions take a view that discourse is not synonymous with discussion. 
Instead discourse goes beyond the linguistics of grammar and syntax and refers 
to the stories and concepts that structure discussions (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005).  
An additional important commonality between these definitions is that 
discourses have coherence beyond the text and thus the meaning of texts can 
affects outcomes, laws and institutions and become the context in which an 
issue can be discussed. More specifically, in a DI context, discourse is seen as 
‘the interactive process of conveying ideas’ (Schmidt 2008b: 303) and is 
characterised as arising in two forms; the coordinative discourse among policy 
actors and the communicative discourse between political actors and the public. 
Coordinative discourse tends to happen first and acts to generate policy ideas; 
communicative discourse then allows policy to be developed, communicated 
and consulted upon with the public. Problem framing, storylines and actor 
coalitions are important in both stages and discourses need to be cognitively 
and normatively appealing (Lovell and Bulkeley, 2009).  
 
3.3.4.2 Applying a DI approach  
As outlined, within DI three levels of ideas can be defined; specific policy related 
ideas, general assumptions and principles (programmatic ideas) and implicit 
philosophical ideas (Gillard, 2016). This research analyses these levels of ideas 
in relation to heat networks in England and Germany and considers how 
different forms of ideas are manifested and codified through discourses and 
institutional practices. To structure the analytical process the stages 
recommended by Hajer (2006) were adopted which involved identifying key 
discourses, actor networks/coalitions, and the institutional practices in which 
discourses are produced.  
 
The first stage in Hajer's (2006) approach to analysing discourse focusses on 
identifying discourse terms, storylines and coalitions. This involves analysing 
vocabularies, storylines and metaphors as representations of arguments and 
ideas. The next stage involves identifying actor networks and coalitions. A 
shared storyline used by a group of actors can be defined as a discourse 
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coalition and can be identified by the use of the same vocabularies, storylines 
and metaphors over an identifiable period of time ‘in the context of an 
identifiable set of practices’ (Hajer, 2005: 302, italics in original). Although they 
share a storyline in relation to a specific issue, actors in a coalition may never 
have met and may have widely varying interests and world views. For example 
heat network manufacturers and local authorities may share a storyline of the 
benefits of heat networks for regeneration and fuel poverty objectives despite 
having very different motivations for doing so. 
 
It is also necessary to establish if a discourse is dominant, referred to by Hajer 
(2006) as discourse structuration (when discourses are widely used by a 
number of actors) and discourse institutionalisation (when a discourse becomes 
codified in institutional structures). Analysing discourse coalitions can be helpful 
in exploring discourse structuration as they can indicate the location of 
commonalities in storylines between actors and which storylines and discourse 
are most widely used. Discourse institutionalisation refers to how rules, 
structures, norms and practices interact with discourses and these interactions 
might take place through the establishment of new organisations or policies (or 
maintenance of existing ones), or conversely, the failure of an innovation or 
approach (Hajer, 1995). In relation to this study the institutional practices in 
which discourses are produced could include such things as access to decision 
makers, policy paradigms and the processes for adopting new policies. The 
detailed application of this staged analytical approach to discourse analysis in 
the context of the DI conceptual framework is expanded in detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.4 Contribution 
3.4.1 DI and transition studies 
Adopting a DI approach in transition studies, particularly with the objective of 
exploring regime politics, may be useful as it provides a route to explore the 
‘open-ended and dynamic relationship between actors, institutions and 
technologies to explain the obduracy and adaptability of socio-technical 
systems’ (Moss, Becker and Naumann, 2014, p. 5). Transitions studies are also 
specifically interested in processes of change in socio-technical systems and DI 
102 
 
 
is best suited of the neo-institutionalist approaches to understanding emergent 
process of change, where endogenous and exogenous factors combine to form 
new governance systems. Additionally DI scholars such as Lowndes (2005) 
suggests there is ‘creative space’ between institutional stability and volatility 
where entrepreneurs can adapt the rules of the game to address change or to 
protect their interest. This provides scope to integrate DI and MLP approaches 
as both highlight the role of experimentation in institutional change, with change 
resulting from novel combinations of old, new, formal, informal, internal and 
external institutions.  
 
Analysing policy discourses may be particularly helpful in illustrating how 
different ideas and rationalities are used in the policy process to frame the sorts 
of knowledge which ‘count’ as valid statements within the policy process and 
therefore become imbued with power (Stevenson, 2009). This allows 
interrogation of issues of power and politics which can be notoriously difficult to 
explore, partly as power relations are constantly being produced and 
reproduced (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Hajer (1995) suggests that analysis of storylines 
can allow the deduction of various discourse rationalities, such as which 
technologies are most appropriate, together with analysis of how these stories 
are represented by different actor coalitions and to what ends. This counters the 
argument that power and interests matter more than ideas in politics as political 
action is seen to be ‘constituted by discourses…embedded in institutions’ (Kern 
2009: 37) with ideas manifested in institutional structures, political rhetoric and 
practices. Indeed, the policy studies literature attributes an important role to 
narratives, discourses and ideas in processes of policy or institutional change 
(Hajer 1995; Laird 2001; Kern 2011). In these studies narratives are shown to 
be important in attempts to re-shape perspectives in order to change patterns of 
behaviour and achieve institutional reforms. 
 
3.4.2 City-scale transition politics 
As discussed, despite a number of authors (such as Kern, 2009; Hendriks & 
Grin, 2007; Hess, 2014) exploring the politics of regime interactions in 
sustainability transitions there remains limited work which has examined these 
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processes at a local authority or city scale47, and even less has considered the 
interactions between different scales of action. This research seeks to continue 
the focus of several transition researchers on the politics of transitions but to 
apply this in a sub-national context. Heat networks may be particularly 
interesting in this respect as they tend to link local resources and actors with 
national and transnational finance, skills and interests. Examining this co-
production by a web of state, market and civil society interactions may provide 
valuable insight into the role of sub-national networks in sustainability transitions 
(Hawkey and Webb, 2012). 
 
This research starts from a position that (local) initiatives are shaped by multi-
level contexts but are also able to shape these contexts; i.e. that city scale 
activities are important in transitions. Local initiatives are therefore seen to be 
important in shaping transitions but politics, power and discourses are important 
at multiple scales and need to be better understood. Taking this approach 
highlights a number of questions in relation to the development of heat networks 
relating to how complex actor networks are forming, negotiating and engaging 
with other scales; how wider governance structures (the rules, incentives and 
culture of the energy system) influence the development of heat networks in 
different contexts; and, how local heat networks are engaging with, and 
potentially influencing, wider national and international transition processes. All 
of these questions are centrally concerned with both how power is exercised at 
the city-scale in order to influence discourses and outcomes, and with how the 
wider structures of city governance and the energy system facilitate (or not) 
heat networks.  
 
Much of the existing literature presents the drivers and barriers to heat networks 
as apolitical and largely based on techno-economic feasibility and the risk 
appetite of partners. Although the literature recognises that heat network 
development is often constrained by the wider energy system there is little 
analysis of political interactions and the interactions between local/national 
                                                          
47 It is recognised that a number of authors (such as Bale et al., 2012; Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; 
Fudge et al., 2012) have explored the role of cities in climate change action, however there is 
limited work that seeks to explore transition politics at this scale. 
104 
 
 
institutions and discourses. This research posits that the development of heat 
networks is highly political and aims to address the gap in the literature 
regarding both the politics of city-scale initiatives and their interaction with the 
wider (energy) system.  
 
This focus on studying actor networks, institutional arrangements and 
‘discursive dynamics’ at the city-scale is advocated by Rohracher & Spath 
(2013: 14) who suggest that relating the ‘dynamics of urban politics in its 
multilevel governance context to the multilevel perspective of socio-technical 
transitions provides novel conceptual insights’. They suggest this provides the 
potential to offer greater understanding of the role of cities for energy transitions 
as dynamics across the levels of niches, regimes and landscapes can be 
explored, together with wider governance rescaling. Additionally while many 
authors (such as Rhodes, 2007) have discussed the critical role of local 
governments in increasingly networked and pluralistic forms of governance 
there is little analysis of how local actors are developing (or not) these roles in 
the context of the energy transition48. This research will seek to explore these 
issues through considering two countries with differing local governance 
structures. Studying two country contexts also allows the recognition that cities 
are enmeshed more or less strongly in multi-level governance relationships 
where, for example, cultures of centralisation (UK) or federalism (Germany) 
condition the nature of multi-level governance relationships (Hodson and 
Marvin, 2010).  
 
3.5 Summary and research questions 
In summary, the development of heat networks is used as a case study to 
explore regime politics and the role of ideas in transitions from a city-scale 
perspective. Heat network projects are likely to be focussed at a city-scale and 
existing literature has established that many of the obstacles to further 
development relate to the institutions, regulation and structure of the energy 
system. Additionally numerous studies have suggested that the interaction of 
                                                          
48 Although authors such as Rutherford and Coutard (2014), Hodson and Marvin (2016) and 
Cowell et al. (2017) are increasingly working in this area. 
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city-scale activities with the wider energy system is an under researched area.  
This suggests a number of salient research questions: 
 
 How are heat networks developing in England and Germany? 
- Which public and private actors are engaging in this scale of energy 
provision and why? 
- What storylines and discourses are being adopted by actors in the 
development of heat networks? 
- What discourses are dominant in the different contexts? 
 
 How are heat networks engaging with, and potentially influencing, wider 
national and international transition processes? 
- How do wider governance structures (rules, incentives and norms) 
influence the development of heat networks in different contexts? 
- How do city-scale heat network projects interact with national policy 
and institutions? 
 
 What role do city-scale actors play in shaping the ideational and 
institutional framework for heat networks in England and Germany? 
 
The next chapter details the research method that was adopted to explore these 
questions. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis undertakes an exploration of the role of ideas and discourses in city-
scale energy transitions in order to better understand the interaction of regime 
politics at multiple scales. The development of heat networks is used as a case 
study to explore these issues and a range of specific case studies locations are 
analysed. This chapter justifies the research design and outlines the 
methodology adopted in the research, including the process of method 
selection, methodological limitations and the analytical approach. 
 
The overall methodological approach involved three main stages: (1) a review 
of national heat network policy and discourses in England and Germany; (2) a 
review of the development of heat networks and associated discourses in a 
series of case study city locations; (3) a series of in-depth interviews with a 
range of local, national and international actors involved in heat network 
development and delivery. Each of these elements of the research approach is 
discussed in more detail below. The process of analysis is then summarised in 
section 4.4.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, ideas can be understood to interact with the policy 
process at three levels; policy ideas which shape the options and solutions 
discussed in relation to a policy issue, programmatic ideas which form the 
underlying principles of policy including problem definition, policy norms and 
methods, and philosophical principles which embody the world views, values 
and underlying assumptions in the policy process (Schmidt, 2010). In order to 
explore these three types of policy ideas, and their relations with discourse and 
institutions, the analytical stages recommended by Hajer (2006) are adopted 
which identifies key discourses, actor networks/coalitions, and the institutional 
practices in which discourses are produced.  
 
The next section discusses the ontological and epistemological foundations of 
this research in order to contextualise the research approach adopted. 
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Following this the stages of research are outlined in section 4.3, followed by a 
discussion of the analytical stages undertaken (4.4).  Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 
detail the process of country, case and interviewee selection respectively. 
Finally validity and the limitation of the approach are discussed. 
 
4.2 Epistemology and ontology 
In order to clarify the intellectual underpinning of this research this section 
briefly discusses the main ontological and epistemological assumptions made. 
Although it is recognised that this ‘allocation of different research approaches to 
discrete intellectual boxes is an inevitably artificial process fraught with 
subjective bias’ (Jarvis, 1998: 107 in Gofas & Hay 2010a) it is also important to 
clarify the foundations of the research in order to unpack what the research is 
aiming to achieve and to be clear about ‘what we can know about the world and 
how we can know it’ (Marsh & Furlong 2002: 18).  
 
Many authors have debated whether political science and policy studies can 
make positivistic claims of knowledge as per the natural sciences (see for 
example Ayres & Marsh 2013) and there has been increasing recognition of the 
limits of a positivistic epistemology in policy studies and growing support for 
more interpretivist approaches and methods (such as Rhodes 201349). This 
research aligns itself with this shift and does not seek a predictive, law-like 
method as per positivistic approaches. Instead a detailed qualitative research 
approach is favoured in order to unlock meaning. Here the focus is on ‘analysis 
of subjectivity, ambiguity and interpretation’ (Ayres & Marsh 2013:646) in order 
to generate insight into how actors construct and reconstruct the world.  
 
As outlined in chapter 3 this research is interested in how discourses and ideas 
interact at different scales in order to influence institutional change. As such it is 
based in a principally subjective ontology that sees perceptions as shaping 
reality and ‘facts’ as socially, culturally, historically located (O’Gorman and 
MacIntosh, 2015). Similarly a broadly constructivist epistemological position is 
adopted however it is also recognised that such categories are relatively 
                                                          
49 The re-turn to ideas in much of political study can also be seen in this context.  
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arbitrary with a spectrum existing from extreme rationalist, positivist approaches 
to extreme post-modern constructivist approaches where ‘the Earth is flat if you 
say so’ (Osterud 1996:389). Thus, although a constructivist approach is 
adopted the research is interested in the interplay between the discursive and 
the material (policies, institutional structure and so on) so is not sited at the 
extreme end of the constructivist, interpretist spectrum. This position is in 
common with many other discursive institutionalist (DI) scholars as, at its core, 
a DI approach sees structure and agency as intimately interlinked with both 
institutions and ideas highlighted as the basic units of study. Although this does 
not position individuals as the focus of study (as per rational choice 
approaches) individuals are still central to processes of change and stability as 
they are ‘affected, and indeed constituted, by their ideational and institutional 
context’ (Blyth 2002: 307). 
 
At a meta-theoretical level a dualistic approach is adopted more generally. As 
outlined by Gofas & Hay (2010a) a number of persistent dualisms exist in 
political analysis which they argue limit attempts to understand the role of ideas 
in issues of power and politics. They separate these dualisms as ontological 
(structure/agency), epistemological (causal/constitutive logics – or 
explaining/understanding) and methodological (quantitative/qualitative). They go 
on to suggest that these are not actually independent entities or variables and 
instead should be seen as intertwined and interrelated rather than dichotomous. 
So, in relation to this thesis, although a DI stance is adopted it is not suggested 
that only ideas shape outcomes or that material, structural factors (or indeed 
individual interests) are insignificant. Instead, in line with Marsh (2010:213) and 
Gofas and Hay (2010a) a position of  ‘interactive and iterative’ relationships is 
adopted in relation to the meta-theoretical issues of structure/agency and 
material/ideation. This approach is not contentious in DI thinking with Schmidt 
and Radaelli (2004) suggesting that analysis of ideational variables should take 
place in the context of institutional and interest-based variables with a recursive 
relationship existing between ideas, interests and discourse. So, for example, 
although ideas - manifested through discourse - shape the development and 
maintenance of institutional structures, institutional structures can also shape 
what can meaningfully be said and act to reinforce or challenge ideas.  
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Although in much of the debate the terms structure/agency and 
material/ideational are used interchangeably the focus within this study is on the 
material and ideational. This clarifies that the emphasis is on the relationship 
between ideas and material factors such as institutional structures.  This 
dualistic thinking does however raises the question of, if issues such as 
materiality and ideas are intertwined, how is it possible to study just one 
element of the relationship? However it is argued that is it possible to 
distinguish analytically between issues without ontologically distinguishing them. 
Therefore it is possible to see ideas and materiality as mutually constituted but 
focus on one in study (Hay 2002). Specifically this research is analytically 
focussed on ideas but recognises that they are intertwined with interests and 
structure. This is referred to as analytical dualism by Archer (1995).  
 
This focus on ideas (as embodied by discourses) also recognises that the 
alternative of looking at interests is not simple as interests are really about 
perceived interests. This highlights that interests are not materially given so 
there is a process by which actors arrive at different understandings and 
constructions of their interests. This research contends that this is the role of 
ideas, so when ideas change then actor preferences can change. Blyth 
summarises this as ‘ideas generate change through the fundamental alteration 
of agents’ conception of self-interest’ (Blyth 2002: 42) 
 
In practice this approach means that although a complex dialectical relationship 
is conceptualised between ideas, institutions, discourse and interest (as 
outlined in chapter 3 and Figure 13) the analytical process takes discourse as 
the starting point as illustrated in Figure 14. The focus is therefore on analysing 
how ideas are embodied in discursive processes, how discourses influence 
institutions and how institutions enable or constrain what can meaningfully be 
said.  
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Figure 13: Interaction between ideas, discourse, institutions and interests 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Analytical approach 
 
Now that the core underpinnings of this research have been summarised the 
following sections outline the key stages in the research methodology, case 
selection and the analytical approach.  
 
4.3 Research stages 
A two stage approach was adopted in this research of (1) a review of national 
level policy, discourse and actor networks in England and Germany, and (2) a 
series of case studies in both countries, as detailed below. Both stages 
incorporated a range of data sources including: 
 Government heat network policy documentation (policy documents, 
consultations and government position papers); 
 Wider policy community literature (studies, reports, working papers, 
press releases); 
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 Semi-structured interviews. 
 
The research and analytical stages undertaken are summarised in Figure 15 
and further detailed in the rest of this chapter. Interviews were carried out 
between autumn 2014 and spring 2016. 
 
Figure 15: Research and Analytical stages 
 
 
4.3.1 Review of national level policy, discourse and actor networks 
Stage one of the research method involved a detailed review of the 
development of heat networks in England and Germany. This included analysis 
of regulatory structures, city governance, heat network ownership models, and 
wider city-scale (and heat) narratives. This stage aimed to establish the actors 
engaging in heat network development in the two comparator countries, 
together with national discourses and the institutional structures of heat 
networks.  
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This stage of analysis was undertaken based on documents published between 
2007 and 2018 in both countries. This timeframe was selected as 2007 
represented a significant year for both countries in terms of the climate and 
energy policy (with the Integrated Energy and Climate Programme published by 
the German government and the Energy White Paper published by the UK 
Government). Limited specific heat network policy was in place in either country 
prior to this date. Approximately 25-30 documents were reviewed for each 
country with selection based on a review of key publications from the relevant 
government departments, significant policy announcements, industry reports, 
trade association, NGO publications and document searches carried out for 
reference to ‘heat policy’, ‘heat networks’, ‘district heat’, ‘heat decarbonisation’, 
‘cities’, ‘municipalities’ and ‘local authorities’. A summary of this analysis is 
presented in sections 5.3 (England) and 6.3 (Germany) with further analysis 
integrated into the rest of these chapters. In addition to documentary analysis 
54 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out as described in section 
4.7.  
 
4.3.2 Case studies 
In addition to national level mapping of policy, discourse and actor networks in 
England and Germany, a series of case study locations were researched in 
detail. This again involved analysis of documentary evidence and a series of in-
depth interviews in each location. The process for case study location selection 
is outlined in section 4.6 and interviewee selection in section 4.7.  
 
A case study approach was adopted in this research as the study is concerned 
with the process by which heat networks are developing at a city scale, and in 
particular the discourses, politics and interplay between different levels of 
governance. As this involves a range of complex interactions it is likely to be 
particularly suited to a multiple case study approach (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This 
provides the opportunity to explore questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’ and 
development over time (Yin, 2014: 2). Indeed Kern (2011) suggests that case 
studies are especially suited to analysing the politics of policy processes and 
Flyvbjerg (2006) highlights the extensive use of case studies to study power in 
urban environments. 
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Case studies are a widely used technique in studies of local climate change 
governance (Pohlmann, 2011) and Hodson & Marvin (2012: 435) also advocate 
the use of documentary analysis and in-depth interviews to explore the 
intersection of socio-technical transitions and urban political economy due to 
their ability to demonstrate the ‘richness and multi-faceted character of…re-
scaling an energy regime to a city-regional scale within a broader national state 
space’50. 
 
Previous research (such as Hawkey et al., 2013) has already established that 
local circumstances are very significant in the development of heat networks. It 
is therefore difficult to make generalisations based on a small number of cases. 
However there are number of common themes emerging from existing literature 
regarding systems of governance and actors relations in heat networks (see 
section 2.6). The use of a case study approach allows the detailed examination 
of these themes across a number of locations. Additionally one of the main 
strengths of the case study approach is the ability to draw on multiple sources 
of data (Yin, 2014) and this research will also draw on wider analysis of the 
policy context in each of the comparator countries. This aims to develop a broad 
and holistic account of the complex social and political process (Yin, 1994) 
involved in the interplay between actors, institutions and ideas in energy 
systems. 
 
In each of the local case studies the history and discourses of heat networks in 
that location was analysed based on policy documents, meeting minutes and a 
range of interviews with local authorities, private sector parties and other actors 
involved in the development and operation of heat networks. 
 
4.4 Analysis 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed with additional field notes 
transcribed and linked to transcripts at this stage. The interview data was then 
                                                          
50 In their case this involved a detailed case study of low carbon planning in Greater 
Manchester. 
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manually thematically coded and analysed using the qualitative data analysis 
software NVivo. This allowed the systematic identification of themes, including 
recurring storylines, arguments and sources of similarity and difference. Once 
transcripts were initially coded they were revisited in order to refine and extend 
the coding and ensure that core themes were identified. The themes identified 
in the interviews were then be mapped against the documentary analysis of 
policy and discourse to establish commonalities, differences and patterns. The 
analysis tools incorporated into NVivo facilitated the detailed coding and 
mapping process as it is possible to annotate and apply multiple codes to data. 
In addition simple linguistic analysis can be applied, such as word frequencies 
and the mapping of all references to the same phrase(s).  
 
Following this thematic analysis a staged analysis process was then adopted 
based on Hajer's (2006) approach. These stages consisted of: 
a) Identification of discourse terms, storylines and coalitions: national 
b) Identification of discourse terms, storylines and coalitions: case studies 
c) Discourse Mapping and structuration 
d) Analysis of institutional practices 
e) Interpretation. 
 
The operationalisation of these stages in this research are illustrated in Table 5 
and figure 15 and described in more detail below. The stages of analysis are 
labelled as a-e in table 5, figure 15 and sections 4.4.1 – 4.4.4 in order to make 
clear the relationship between the different stages. 
 
Table 5: Research stages, analysis, and lines of enquiry 
Stage  Activity Type of 
information 
Example questions/lines of 
enquiry 
a, b Establish key 
discourses 
Storylines, 
metaphors, 
vocabularies. 
 
What will the role of heat networks 
be in the future? 
What are the benefits/barriers? 
What should be done to promote 
heat networks? 
What ownership and governance 
structures are most appropriate? 
Who should be involved and how? 
a, b Establish 
actor 
Actors involved, 
actors who share 
Who is involved, at what scale? 
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4.4.1 Identifying the terms of the discourses (a, b, c).  
This stage involved analysing the presence of vocabularies, storylines and 
metaphors. Storylines encapsulate a discourse in short-hand form to represent 
complex arguments and concepts. They provide a frame of reference and 
incorporate metaphors, appeals to emotion, analogies and so on (Hewitt, 2009; 
Kern, 2009).  This level of analysis was carried out through close and iterative 
analysis of policy documentation, secondary literature and interview transcripts.  
 
Following this a two-stage process was adopted to establish if a discourse is 
dominant. This approach is widely used in discourse analysis methodologies 
(Hewitt, 2009) and is referred to by Hajer (2006) as discourse structuration 
(when discourses are widely used by a number of actors) and discourse 
networks and 
coalitions 
 
a particular 
storyline, sites of 
agreement and 
disagreement. 
Who agrees/disagrees and how 
are these conflicts playing out? 
How do actor networks form, 
negotiate and engage with other 
scales? 
c Trace 
discourse 
structuration 
Frequency of use 
and range of 
actors adopting.  
Mapping of 
discourses 
against types of 
ideas (policy, 
programme and 
philosophical) 
 
To what extent do (groups of) 
actors share particular storylines? 
Which storylines are most widely 
used and by whom? 
Which discourses and ideas are 
used explicitly and which are 
implicit? 
d Establish the 
institutional 
practices in 
which 
discourses 
are produced 
Trace the links 
between 
discourses/storyli
nes and 
institutions 
 
What changes have taken place 
(or failed to take place) to policy, 
governance structures, regulation, 
practices and norms? 
 
e Interpretation Co-ordination of 
different stages of 
analysis and final 
analysis of links 
between 
discourses, types 
of ideas and 
ideational power 
Link back to main research 
questions. 
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institutionalisation (when a discourse becomes codified in institutional 
structures). 
 
4.4.2 Analysing discourse coalitions and storylines (a, b, c).   
Analysis of discourse structuration was carried out through mapping actor 
networks and analysing the themes and storylines identified in documentary 
and interview data. This functioned to establish commonalities in storylines 
between actors and which storylines and discourse are most widely used. 
Specifically this involved identifying the frequency of use and range of actors 
adopting storylines and the extent to which (groups of) actors shared particular 
storylines. This incorporated consideration of sites of agreement and 
disagreement and the formation and maintenance of actor networks. 
 
This stage of analysis focussed on iteratively reviewing the key storylines and 
actor networks to review the use of narratives to embody policy, programmatic 
and philosophical ideas, as detailed by Schmidt (2008). The identification of 
policy and programmatic ideas in discourses can be operationalised through the 
identification of 1) debates regarding the role and problem solving power of heat 
networks, as well as views on how policy should seek to promote them 
(programmatic ideas) and 2) discussion of solutions and specific policies (policy 
ideas). It is less straightforward to trace the use of philosophical ideas which 
refer to the links between (political) ideology and the development of heat 
networks (Gillard, 2016). This stage therefore focused on both explicit 
narratives and more implicit themes, as well as storylines which some actors 
may seek to exclude. An outline of the coding structure utilised, which highlights 
reference to policy, programmatic and philosophical ideas is include in appendix 
4, however it should be noted that the use of the three levels of ideas overlaps 
considerably and is more fully discussed in the analysis chapters (chapter 5-7). 
 
4.4.3 Analysing the institutional practices in which discourses are 
produced (d) 
This stage involved tracing how rules, structures, norms and practices interact 
with discourses (discourse institutionalisation). These interactions might take 
place through the establishment of new organisations or policies (or 
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maintenance of existing ones), or conversely, the failure of an innovation or 
approach. This analysis was carried out by focussing on references to 
institutions and practices in the data and exploring how discourses are ‘taken up 
in actual practice and what sort of institutional innovations it brought about’ 
(Hajer, 1995: 4).  
 
4.4.4 Interpretation (e) 
The final stage of analysis involved drawing together the findings of the 
previous stages in order to develop an account of the interaction between 
discursive structures and institutions in relation to heat networks. The analytical 
processes provided a staged means by which to analyse actors, discourses, 
frequency of use and contestation and the links between discourse and 
institutions, however this interpretation stage recognises the significance of 
interpretation by the research and as such interpretation sought to be self-
reflexive and incorporate consideration of how the role of the research 
influenced both the empirical data gathered and analysis of the links between 
factors. This was supported by reference back to research notes compiled at 
the time of each interview and an analytical diary compiled in NVivo which 
allowed decisions regarding themes and significance of discourses and ideas to 
be notes and tracked. These issues are returned to in section 4.8. 
 
4.5 Country selection 
Two countries are the focus of study for this research; England and Germany. A 
number of scholars of methods in political research suggest that comparing 
differing systems or examples may provide the opportunity to ‘acquire a greater 
understanding of each’ (Burnham et al. 2008: 69). However it should be noted 
that this study is not a comparative study in the traditional political economy 
sense as these approaches tend to adopt a variant of the positivistic 
‘experimental method’, seeking to compare two cases where a particular 
stimulus of interest is present and absent. In contrast the focus in this study is 
on understanding rather than explaining or establishing causation. 
 
Although not selected as quantitative comparative cases, England and 
Germany have been selected as study countries for this research for a number 
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of reasons. It is not argued that they offer polar examples in relation to heat 
policy and there isn’t an ex ante assumption that discourses in relation to heat 
networks diverge between the two countries. However a number of themes in 
relation to political economy, energy system history and heat network 
development suggest that both cases might provide interesting insights into the 
role of city-scale transition politics.  
 
Firstly, both countries are pursuing ambitious climate change plans and are 
aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80 percent by 2050, 
compared to 1990. Whilst country approaches to energy transitions are 
embedded in unique historical, social, cultural and economic circumstances, 
comparing locations has the potential to illuminate some of the ‘universal 
challenges’ of transitioning to a low carbon society (Beveridge & Kern 2014: 
12). More specifically, reducing greenhouse gas emission in line with both 
countries’ targets will involve the decarbonisation of their energy systems. Both 
countries have recognised that heat decarbonisation is lagging behind electricity 
and there has recently been a resurgence of interest in heat policy in Germany 
and the UK with both governments seeking to expand heat networks (see 
chapters 2 and 3). Despite these similarities there are a number of differences 
in the history, speed, approach and wider governance arrangements between 
the two countries and this research will seek to explore the similarities and 
differences in the development of heat networks between the locations, with a 
focus on the interplay between discourses, ideas and institutions.  
 
Secondly, historically England51 and Germany have taken differing approaches 
to energy system liberalisation and privatisation with the UK acting as a pioneer 
and pursuing early, deep liberalisation while Germany was more reluctant and 
required prompting from the EU in order to commence energy system 
liberalisation and privatisation in the 1990s (Auer and Anatolitis, 2014). 
Additionally, as discussed in chapter 2, prior to privatisation the UK supply 
sector was centralised and dominated by state owned monopolies whereas in 
                                                          
51 Although liberalisation and privatisation progressed across Great Britain this thesis 
specifically focusses on England as heat policy is a devolved policy area in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. The policy measures discussed in chapter 2 apply across England and Wales 
but all the case study locations were in England. 
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Germany there was a co-existence of public, mixed economy and private 
companies which were never completely nationalised or centralised 
(Heddenhausen, 2007).  
 
Finally, from a macro perspective both countries are important examples of 
modern industrial nations but which exhibit a number of key structural 
differences. The UK operates a tax funded welfare system, has a centralised, 
unrestricted political system and is a liberal market economy whereas Germany 
has a social insurance funded welfare system, operates a consensual political 
model and is a co-ordinated market economy52 (Turner and Green, 1998; 
Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). These structural differences indicate that there may 
be some differences between the countries at the level of philosophical ideas 
(as defined by Schmidt 2010), however there is limited existing research 
considering how these different histories, cultures and policy styles interact with 
the ideational and discursive shaping of policies at multiple levels, such as heat 
network policy. 
 
The selection of England and Germany as case study countries does not 
suggest that other country examples are not valuable or interesting but many of 
the countries which are commonly studied in relation to heat networks in Europe 
– such as Denmark, Sweden and Finland – already have a high penetration of 
heat networks and current policy and debates are shaped by this context 
making it difficult to look at institutional or policy change. Despite this a number 
of other countries will be referred to throughout this thesis when discussing 
specific policy approaches. Equally, despite the focus of this thesis on 
comparing the policy approach and discourses adopted in the two study 
countries it is also recognised that there is potentially a great deal of variety in 
approach within each country and the adoption of multiple case studies within 
each country aims to explore the extent to which similar discourses and 
approaches are being pursued in different locations in each country, as well as 
                                                          
52In a CME political actors are more likely to pursue dialogue, compromise and trade-offs to 
achieve unanimous policy decisions. Multiple actors and coalitions therefore have the 
opportunity to influence policy decisions (Kemfert & Horne, 2013).  
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the role of sub-national actors in heat network discourses. The next section 
discusses the process for case study selection in each country.  
 
4.6 Case study selection 
As discussed three case study locations were selected in both England and 
Germany. The rationale behind the case selection was not to choose cases 
which were deemed to be representative of heat network development in each 
country but to simply choose cases which were actively developing or extending 
heat networks (Pettigrew, 1990). In order to explore whether similar discourses 
and ideas were being propagated in a range of locations and to enable the 
examination of interactions between different scales within the energy system 
the cases were also selected based on a number of criteria to ensure a range of 
actors and circumstances were incorporated. The criteria for selecting the case 
studies were based on: 
 
1. A review of locations actively pursuing the development or expansion of 
heat networks53. 
2. A geographic spread of locations (to ensure differing regional styles or 
political alliances were accounted for). 
3. A range of age of heat network or heat network project development. 
Although all locations were currently developing heat network projects 
some had a long history of heat networks whilst others were new to their 
development. 
4. A range of heat network ownership structures were adopted or under 
discussion. This criteria was included as the initial literature review 
suggested that ideas relating to ownership and the role of different actors 
might be important in heat network discourses. 
 
Following a review of the above information the case studies outlined in table 6 
were selected as representing a wide variation in the location, age and type of 
heat networks being developed in England and Germany. 
 
                                                          
53 In England this was based on information from DECC/BEIS, the ADE and the Heat and the 
City Project. In Germany it was based on information from Euroheat and Power and AGFW. 
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Table 6: Case study locations and overview. 
England  
Bristol 
Located in South West England. Some small heat networks have historically been 
developed but ambitious plans are in place to develop new networks as part of 
carbon reduction ambitions and social objectives. Focussing on public sector 
anchor loads and mini-networks. Ownership structures are not yet determined but 
the local authority has recently established a municipal energy supply business.  
Birmingham 
Located in Central England. City centre heat networks have been in operation 
since 2006 through a concession agreement with Engie. The city is currently 
looking to develop a number of new networks and is assessing whether to 
continue with the same model or to develop a new arrangement. Initial networks 
were closely linked to council climate change commitments and regeneration.  
Sheffield 
Large urban area in Yorkshire. The existing network is one of the UK’s oldest and 
largest. Centrally located energy from waste fuelled network. The main network 
has gone through various ownership structures depending on the circumstances 
of the local authority and is currently operated by Veolia. E.On have developed a 
new biomass network. 
 
Germany 
Frankfurt 
Located in Western Germany. The largest city of Hesse State. Long established 
heat networks utilising waste, gas and renewables. The city administration is 
currently pursuing heat network expansion for environmental priorities. Networks 
operated by a range of organisation with the largest operated through a 
stadtwerke (Mainova). A complex ownership structure exists but the city has 
gradually bought back ownership of the stadtwerke. 
Hamburg 
Northern German city-state. Several network are already in operation with the 
plans to expand the largest network. Heat networks serve 19% of the population 
and there is an aim to connect 50,000 addition households by 2020. The City of 
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Hamburg is in the process of buying back the main heat network from Vattenfall 
following a referendum. Prior to this the municipality held a 25.1% stake in the 
heat network (Vattenfall, 2014). 
Rhein-Hünsruck 
Rural district in the middle of Rhineland-Palatinate which has developed small-
scale rural heat networks. Strong environmental focus for pursuing heat networks. 
Range of ownership/operation models, including private, community owned and 
local public utility ownership. 
 
4.7 Interviews 
The theoretical approach of this thesis contends that the cause and effect of 
ideas are very closely intertwined and, as highlighted by Gofas & Hay (2010a), 
this suggests that analysis of elite discourses are likely to be very important. 
Interviews are widely used method to access elite discourses and explore 
complex issues of power and politics (Burnham et al., 2008). Additionally, as 
already established, a complex range of actors are potentially involved in heat 
networks and there is a lack of research addressing actors relations, decision 
making and interactions with the wider energy system. Semi-structured 
interviews are likely to be effective in exploring such complex and subtle 
phenomenon as they allow for the exploration of complex topics and also 
provide flexibility to pursue unforeseen issues as they arise (Flick, et al., 2004; 
Denscombe, 2010). 
 
Interviews were carried out in person, where possible, or over the phone and 
were recorded and transcribed. Two visits were made to Germany in order to 
complete interviews in person. Prior to this communication with key German 
heat network actors such as the German District Heat Association (AGFW) and 
the BDEW were developed in order to develop contacts with relevant 
interviewees and case study locations. Key policy documentation was available 
in English and few issues were encountered interviewing German contacts in 
English.  
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In order to facilitate the collection of reliable, comparable information from 
across multiple interviews a detailed interview topic guide was prepared as 
detailed in appendix 3.  
 
As with all research, a number of ethics and confidentiality issues are raised by 
the research. These particularly relate to interviewee consent, confidentiality 
and the secure retention of records. To address these issues all interviewees 
either signed a consent form which outlined the purpose of the study together 
with data collection terms and use, or these issues were discussed at the 
beginning of each recorded interview. With consent interviews were recorded 
and interviewees consented to being anonymously quoted and identified by 
name in a list of interviewees. In line with this all quotes are identified by 
number and category of interview but not by individual. Interview transcripts 
were stored securely in line with the University of Exeter’s document retention 
guidance. 
 
In relation to confidentiality and anonymization, it is important to note that the 
participants in this study were generally (professional) policy actors and as such 
are not ordinarily conceptualised as ‘vulnerable’ interviewees (Allmark et al., 
2009). The consent form and verbal introduction to the research both made 
clear that the study wished to list interviewees and all interview participants 
consented to be named. However the nature of semi-structured interviews 
means that is not always easy to identify if sensitive topics are going to be 
discussed, therefore to facilitate open discussion of key actors, organisations 
and events the consent form also made clear that the use of the direct quotes 
would be anonymised. In practice, while few participants expressed concern 
over their remarks being attributes a minority stated their preference for 
anonymization of direct quotes and therefore this approach was adopted across 
all interviewees. A challenge in such anonymization is the possibility that the 
quotation or contextual information reveals who said what (Lancaster, 2017). To 
address this participants were offered the opportunity for any identifying 
contextual information to be removed/anonymised and the opportunity to review 
direct quotations. 
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4.7.1 Interviewee selection 
The relatively small size of the heat network industry in both England and 
Germany enabled the main national policy actors relating to heat networks to be 
identified in both countries through a review of the relevant literature and 
engagement with policy networking fora (such as the ADE annual conference 
and membership of the AGFW). As this study in interested in the development 
of ideas and discourses relating to heat networks at both a national and local 
scale a range of interviewees were selected to ensure that organisations 
operating at different scales and with different forms of organisation (such as 
local authorities, private heat network developers and trade associations) were 
represented. This involved categorised interviewees as one of nine categories 
as detailed in table 7. A broadly representative spread of interviewees was then 
sought across these categories. Some categories, such as NGO, were fairly 
broadly defined and included both consumer and environmental NGOs.  
 
Table 7: Categories of interviewee and classification in analysis 
Category 
Abbreviation in 
analysis 
Government G 
Local authority LA 
Consultant C 
Trade Association TA 
Academic/Research A 
DH utility DHU 
Municipal utility MU 
NGO NGO 
Other O 
 
In terms of local case study interviewees, the specific nature of the research 
questions (i.e. heat network development in individual locations) suggested a 
limited range of salient interviewees in each location. Initially these were 
identified through a desk-based review of the history and development of heat 
networks in each location. In all cases this indicated a ‘lead’ organisation in heat 
networks development and provided information regarding key contacts in each 
locality. National sources such as the HNDU, ADE and AGFW were also used 
to identify key contacts in each location. 
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Discussions with these key individuals and a review of the relevant local 
literature then served to map the actor network involved in heat networks in 
each locality and identify additional interviewees. In total fifty four interviews 
were completed, twenty nine in England and twenty three in Germany. Table 8 
outlines the interviewees by category and figures 16 and 17 illustrates the split 
of interviewees in England and Germany respectively. A full list of interviewees 
in included in appendix 2.  
 
Table 8: Interviewees by category (England and Germany) 
Category Number 
Government 7 
Local authority 10 
Consultant 6 
Trade Association 6 
Academic/Research 5 
Heat network utility 5 
Municipal utility 4 
NGO 10 
Other 1 
Total 54 
Total UK interviewees 29 
Total German interviewees 23 
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Figure 16: England interviewees by category 
 
 
Figure 17: Germany interviewees by category 
 
 
4.8 Validity and limitations 
Case studies are a widely used methodology across the social sciences with 
Gerring (2004: 341) defining the method as ‘an intensive study of a single unit 
with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units’. However, both case 
studies and in-depth interviews have been criticised as being unable to provide 
generalizable learning (Boyce and Neale, 2006). While this may be a wider 
Government, 4
Local authority, 5
Consultant, 4
Trade Association, 
3
Academic/Research, 1
HN utility, 4
Municipal utility, 1
NGO, 7
Government, 3
Local authority, 5
Consultant, 2
Trade 
Association, 3Academic/Research, 3
HN utility, 1
Municipal utility, 3
NGO, 3
Other, 1
127 
 
 
issue for a range of methodologies that seek to investigate complex, social 
phenomenon, this research aims to address this criticism by selecting a range 
of different case studies across comparator countries. This allows data to be 
collected regarding a range of different circumstances in order to identify 
themes, commonalities, differences and areas of uncertainty. Yin (2014) 
suggests that multiple case studies are more reliable than single case studies 
and are less prone to criticisms regarding single case study generalizability. In 
addition to a selection of city case studies a number of national and 
international organisations, who are involved in a wide range of heat network 
projects, were interviewed. 
 
Additionally, in line with Yin’s (2010) process of analytical generalisation this 
research also does not purport to provide findings that are generalizable to 
across all locations and instead seeks to generalise from case study to theory in 
order to expand and generalise theory. 
 
An additional criticism of case study approaches relates to the objectivity of 
researchers, particularly in cases where the phenomenon in question relates to 
subjectively constructed objects such as discourse. The semi-structured 
interview method should help to address this issue as interviewees have the 
scope to shape the direction of discussions rather than the researcher overly 
influencing the topics. In addition efforts will be made throughout the research to 
maintain a reflexive approach to, and awareness of, how researcher values and 
knowledge might impact on the findings. In order to facilitate this reflexivity a 
wide range of data sources and analysis techniques (such as the staged 
analysis process described in section 4.4) were adopted. The use of analysis 
tools such as NVivo also allows more detailed analysis of data than purely 
manual forms as multiple manipulations of the data can be carried out.  
 
Whilst the above range of actions were undertaken to recognise the subjective 
nature of studying discourse it is also important to note that this research is 
sited in a research philosophy that recognises that no actor is objective or value 
free and does not look for causal explanations. Instead the analysis is centred 
on subjectivity and interpretation in order to generate insight into how actors 
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construct and reconstruct the world. Indeed, one of the key criticisms of a more 
subjective and constructivist account of the world relates to validity and 
subjectivity: ‘To positivists, the interpretist tradition merely offers opinions of 
subjective judgements about the world. As such, there is no basis on which to 
judge the validity of their knowledge claims. One person’s view of the world, and 
of the relationship between social phenomena within it, is as good as another’s 
view’ (Marsh & Furlong 2002:27). Whilst this criticism is partly dealt with by 
being explicit about the ontological underpinnings of the research a range of 
actions have also been undertaken to recognise and address these 
shortcoming. Firstly the research design seeks to explore specific cases in 
detail rather than to generalise. Secondly, a large number of interviews were 
carried out in order to ensure varied perspectives and discourses were 
collected. Thirdly interview data was triangulated with analysis of policy 
documentation in both countries and case study documentation. Triangulation 
can be defined as ‘is a validity procedure where researchers search for 
convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form 
themes or categories in a study’ (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 126). This 
triangulation involved both multiple sources (interviews, policy documentation, 
industry literature, academic papers and other grey literature) and data from 
multiple scales (international, national, local).  
 
These multiple forms of evidence were systematically analysed to uncover 
common themes and areas of differentiation and to provide a structured 
dissection of the relationship between discourse, ideas and institutions. This 
analytical process required discourses to be both structured (widely used in 
relation to topic) and institutionalised (linked to institutional change or stability) 
in order to be judged to be influential. Additionally the process through which 
ideas and discourses were identified is discussed in detail in the results and 
discussion chapters to ensure that the process is transparent. 
 
Ultimately, however, the limits of the research approach must be acknowledged 
as the findings are largely based on the accounts of participants who inevitably 
present their own version of reality. The author’s own interpretation is also 
central to the findings and it is accepted that there is a degree of subjectivity in 
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the analytical approach. However, reflecting the ontological underpinning of this 
research, a perspective is adopted that all knowledge is to some degree 
subjective so the focus is on the processes by which different versions of reality 
are arrived at rather than suggesting that one version is more ‘true’ than 
another. Additionally, in order to support a reflexive approach to analysis both 
theoretically informed and inductive themes were identified in the analytically 
process. 
 
Finally, as discussed earlier in this chapter this research does not seek to 
resolve longstanding debates regarding the comparative importance of ideas, 
interests and institutions. Instead a more modest aim is adopted to uncover the 
processes by which ideas, discourse and institutions interact in relation to city-
scale infrastructure such as heat networks and how this might have implications 
for energy transitions at multiple scales.  
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Chapter 5: Results and discussion – England 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter presents and analyses the results of the empirical research carried 
out in England. This includes exploration of discourses and actor networks, 
discourse structuration and institutionalisation in line with the analytical stages 
described in chapter 4. It is based on examination of policy documents, industry 
reports and 29 interviews with heat network policy actors in England. The 
chapter is presented as follows; the first section of the chapter summarises the 
current status and development of heat networks in the three English case 
study locations of Bristol, Birmingham and Sheffield. This section aims to 
present a largely factual account of heat networks in each of the case studies 
together with the broad context for development in each location. The main 
body of analysis of both the case studies and the national setting is then 
developed in sections 5.3 – 5.7. Sections 5.3-5.5 outline heat network problem 
definition discourses before discussing the key established and emerging 
storylines. Section 5.6 discusses the importance of coalitions and networks in 
discourse structuration before 5.7 explores how discourses are being 
institutionalised (or not). Section 5.8 concludes. 
 
The following chapter (chapter 6) then undertakes a similar analysis for the 
research conducted in Germany and chapter 7 integrates the findings of the two 
results chapters and discusses how they relate to processes of ideational 
power.  
 
5.2 Case studies 
5.2.1 Case study: Bristol 
Bristol’s current plans to develop and expand heat networks are led by the city 
council and are aligned with the authority’s commitments to a low carbon future. 
Plans have been under preparation since the late 2000’s with activity increasing 
from 2005 when the Council, together with public, private and voluntary sector 
partners adopted a goal to become a European Green Capital (Bristol City 
Council, 2015a). The development of new low-carbon district heating networks 
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were included in the council’s Green Capital application and in 2010 the Council 
adopted a Climate Change and Energy Security Framework which aimed to 
improve Bristol's energy security and reduce the council and city's carbon 
dioxide emissions. This plan included a commitment to develop a range of low 
carbon infrastructure projects and initial heat network mapping work was 
completed. At this time an application was submitted to the European Local 
Energy Assistance Programme (ELENA)54 for funding to support further low 
carbon project development. This application was successful and secured 
£2.5m of grant funding to establish a large scale low carbon investment 
programme, including the implementation of a city-wide heat network. The 
ELENA funding enabled detailed feasibility studies for several sites and for 
consultants to carry out detailed design work on the three most viable projects. 
Following this preparatory work the Council Cabinet approved further 
development work on a number of projects in 2014 (Britton, 2015). 
 
Heat networks are identified as contributing to the council’s ambition to become 
a ‘sustainable, inclusive, low carbon city’ and the council promotes the potential 
for networks to contribute to both climate change and financial objectives 
(Bristol City Council, 2015b, p. iii). This enables heat networks to be framed in 
relation to the city’s ambitious target to become carbon neutral by 2050 and to 
also be identified as an income source for the council, a way of reducing public 
sector energy costs (such as the council and NHS Trust), and a way of reducing 
energy costs for social housing tenants (Bristol City Council, 2016a). The linking 
of projects to both short and long term benefits appears to have supported a 
phased, long-term planning approach to network development with heat 
networks described as ‘multi-decade major infrastructure project[s]’ and a 
‘cornerstone of the city’s journey to becoming carbon neutral by 2050’ (Bristol 
City Council, 2016b).  
 
Although a number of small (social housing) heat networks were already 
operated by the city council and the University of Bristol and the University 
                                                          
54 ELENA is a joint initiative by the European Investment Bank and the European Commission 
under the Horizon 2020 programme. It provides grants for technical assistance focused on 
energy efficiency, distributed renewable energy and transport projects. 
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Hospital Bristol Foundation Trust (UHBFT) had previously been connected to a 
single heat network, prior to the development of the recent schemes there were 
no substantial heat networks in the city. The city therefore decided to focus on 
three main projects in the City Centre (Cabot Ward), Redcliffe & Temple 
(Lawrence Hill Ward) and Rowan (Whitchurch Park Ward) all of which were still 
under development at the time of this research. The total capital value of these 
schemes is over £13 million and a range of sources of finance are being 
considered including several million pounds being secured through Prudential 
Borrowing55 (Bristol City Council, 2015b).  
 
City Centre – Cabot Ward  
Cabot scheme involves Bristol City Council working with the University Hospital 
Bristol Foundation Trust (UHBFT) and the University of Bristol to develop a City 
Centre heat network. The network is centred on the Hospital and University 
buildings due to their large and relatively steady heat demand, existing 
familiarity with heat networks and both organisation’s commitments to carbon 
reduction. The Council allocated £5.0m of capital funding through Prudential 
Borrowing for the installation of this phase of the City Centre heat network. 
Cabot network involves Bristol City Council installing, owning and operating a 
gas-CHP generation plant in the UHBFT’s existing energy centre. The system 
will supply UHBFT, adjacent University buildings and council-owned social 
housing blocks in Dove Street. Connection to Dove Street will replace electrical 
heating using night storage heaters and aims to reduce costs for low-income 
residents, as well as reduce carbon emissions. Once this section of the city 
centre network is complete, it is intended that a wider network will be installed 
(phase 2) which will connect additional University, commercial and council 
owned buildings, including social housing.  
 
Redcliffe & Temple – Lawrence Hill Ward  
The Redcliff and Temple scheme encompasses the new Temple Quarter 
Enterprise Zone (TQEZ), social housing and Bristol City Council’s offices at 100 
                                                          
55 Prudential borrowing refers to the rules governing local authority borrowing in the UK. Since 
2004 debt is no longer capped by an upper limit and instead must conform to the Prudential 
Code with regard to affordability (Bailey, Asenova and Hood, 2012). 
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Temple Street. In March 2016 the first phase on this scheme was completed 
when a 1MW biomass (wood pellet) boiler was installed and connected to 
thirteen social housing blocks. The Temple & Redcliffe Heat Network Phase 1 
will connect this energy centre to the Council’s offices at 100 Temple Street and 
extend into Bristol’s Temple Quarter Enterprise Zone. The network will 
terminate at the new Bristol Arena and is likely to include supplying a new 
University of Bristol ‘Enterprise Campus’ in the TQEZ (University of Bristol, 
2017). The project is being funded by a combination of grant funding and 
Prudential Borrowing and the scheme is accessing Renewable Heat Incentive 
(RHI) payments (Britton, 2015). The installation of the TQEZ district heating 
pipework is also supported by funding from the Department of Culture, Media 
and Sport for General Purpose Service Trench works which also includes 
private wire and superfast broadband ducting. Temple and Redcliffe are areas 
of focus for new build developments and the build out of the heat network is 
being carried out in coordination with other capital projects (such as Metrobus 
and the Arena Bridge) to minimise capital costs and disruption.  
 
Rowan – Whitchurch Park Ward  
In 2015 a wood pellet fuelled heat network was been installed within the Rowan 
House complex and supplies five social housing blocks, consisting of over 300 
flats, in the Hartcliffe area of Bristol. Funding for the Rowan scheme came from 
the council via Housing Revenue Account (HRA) investment56 and through an 
Energy Company Obligation (ECO) contract with an electricity supplier. The 
project also receives income from the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI).  
 
Complex actor networks are involved in the development and delivery of heat 
networks in Bristol, both within the local authority, who is the lead agency, and 
with external public and private sector organisations. In particular the local 
authority, University Hospitals Bristol Foundation Trust and the University of 
Bristol worked together to develop the City Centre scheme. To support this the 
three organisations signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 5th March 
2015 which formalised how the organisations will work together on heat network 
                                                          
56 Funding for the provision of local authority social housing.  
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development and committed to a target of initiating works in 2016 (Bristol City 
Council, 2016a). The city council also emphasised the importance of developing 
heat networks as part of broader strategic energy planning for a locality. In this 
involved both developing planning policy that was supportive of heat networks 
and taking a city-wide approach to energy planning which enables small heat 
networks to be developed with an aim to interconnect them in the long-term.  
 
A number of interactions with central government were necessary to access 
funding and other support, this includes engagement with the HNDU team, the 
heat policy team within BEIS and the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. 
Relationships with wider national and international groups were also developed 
including the Core Cities group and European networks such as ICLEI - Local 
Governments for Sustainability57, Energy Cities58 and ELENA59. Whilst a 
diverse portfolio of funding sources has been utilised to develop heat networks 
the council currently owns and operates the schemes. The development of heat 
networks also took place at the same time as the development of an electricity 
and gas supply company wholly owned by the council; Bristol Energy. The long 
term ambition is to integrate Bristol Energy with local low carbon generation and 
incorporate the operation of heat networks with Bristol Energy, although the 
council has not made any decision about integration as yet.  
 
5.2.2 Case study: Sheffield 
Sheffield has a long history of heat networks and is one of the largest networks 
in the UK with over 50km of pipework supplying over 2,800 homes and 140 
commercial and public sector buildings (Nolan, 2013). The city is seeking to 
expand this network and develop new networks and these plans are being led 
by the city council, although networks are operated under a number of 
commercial models. The council highlight that the development of heat 
networks can help meet multiple objectives including carbon reduction, energy 
security, costs and fuel poverty reduction and opportunities for jobs and growth. 
                                                          
57 ICLEI is a network of sustainable cities and facilitates local government input to United 
Nations (UN), processes such as the UN Framework Conventions on Climate Change and 
Biodiversity.  
58 Energy Cities is the European Association of local authorities in energy transition. 
59 European Local ENergy Assistance Programme 
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The potential for heat networks to enable further democratisation of the energy 
system through reduced dependence on national infrastructure is also 
specifically cited (Nolan, 2013; Almond, 2014). In this context a mini-Stern 
review60 was completed for the City Region in 2012 which highlighted the 
energy spend which flowed out of the Sheffield City Region (Gouldson et al., 
2012). Heat networks are framed as one route to maintain energy spend in the 
region and there is political commitment to develop them further. They are also 
part of a wider ‘Energy – Made in Sheffield’ discourse which positions action on 
energy infrastructure as one way to maintain and develop a vibrant local 
economy.  
 
The first heat network development took place in the city in the 1960s when a 
number of blocks of flats (at Park Hill and Hyde Park) were connected to a 
network based on a central oil fired boiler system. In the 1970s an Energy 
Recovery Facility (ERF) was built at Bernard Road and waste heat was piped 
into the Park Hill and Hyde Park network. This reduced the estate’s reliance on 
oil for heating and, at the time, was framed as part of the cities response to the 
oil crisis with a commitment made to develop a city wide heat network. This led 
to the establishment of a council owned company, Sheffield Heat and Power, in 
1988 who expanded the network and developed the ERF to also generate 
electricity. In the 1990s the network was further extended into the city centre 
and to Weston Park, including the connection of both the city’s Universities and 
a large number of private sector buildings. 
 
In 2001 ownership of the incinerator was transferred from Sheffield City Council 
to Onyx UK (now Veolia Environmental Services) and the original ERF was 
closed down due to environmental concerns. This followed a campaign by 
Greenpeace regarding air pollution that branded the site as the 'worst 
incinerator in England' (BBC News, 2001). A new modern ERF was opened in 
2007 and both the ERF and the network are currently operated by Veolia 
                                                          
60 A mini-Stern review considers the cost and carbon effectiveness of a range of low carbon 
options that could be implemented at a city-scale. Analysis explores the scope for deployment, 
investment needs, financial returns and carbon savings together with the implications for the 
economy and employment. Several English cities have carried out such reviews, broadly based 
on the approach adopted in the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change commission 
by the UK Government in 2006. 
136 
 
 
Environmental Services as part of a 35 year integrated waste management 
contract with the city council. The network delivers heat to a variety of 
customers, including the university, the local authority, hospitals, private and 
public sector offices, and housing. The network serves approximately 3000 
residential properties and 140 other buildings. 
 
In 2010-11, the council, together with a range of partners, led a mapping 
exercise to establish future heat network priorities. This mapping analysed the 
location of existing CHP plant and district energy pipelines, transport 
infrastructure, watercourses, building types and heat sources. The council has 
stressed the importance of this process in establishing priorities and developing 
working relationships between agencies. The process also involved a wide 
range of stakeholders including Sheffield City Council, Sheffield Homes, 
Sheffield International Venues, Sheffield Industrial Museums Trust, Sheffield 
Forgemasters, Veolia Environmental Services and technical consultants. In 
addition to this strategic energy planning approach Sheffield City Council is 
seeking to promote heat networks in new developments through planning 
policy. The Sheffield Development Framework includes Core Policy CS 65 
Renewable Energy and Carbon Reduction which  requires that all61 significant 
new developments provide a minimum of 10% of their predicted energy needs 
from decentralised and renewable or low carbon energy; and also reduce the 
development’s overall predicted carbon dioxide emissions by 20% through low 
carbon energy or design measures (Sheffield City Council, 2011). 
 
In 2013 Sheffield took part in BEIS’ (then DECC) Low Carbon Pioneer Cities 
Heat Networks programme. The project supported five of England's core cities 
to further develop low carbon heat networks. The support comprised grant 
funding to cover the costs of feasibility work to investigate the potential for new 
or expanded heat networks and some access support from experts and policy 
officials. This support allowed strategic planning work to be undertaken 
regarding the role of heat networks in the decentralised energy plans of the city 
                                                          
61 Unless this can be shown not to be viable.  
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and fed into local authority climate change priorities (Sheffield City Council, 
2016). 
 
In 2014 a new biomass CHP plant and heat network, owned and operated by 
E.On, was opened in the Don Valley. This provides 30MW of power generation 
and 25MW of new heat capacity. The project was financed by private sector 
investment and supplies a range of sites with heat including Sheffield 
Forgemasters, iceSheffield, the English Institute of Sport Sheffield and the 
Motorpoint Arena (all part of Sheffield International Venues) as well as 
Attercliffe Police Station. A new 6.5MW waste wood biomass CHP unit is also 
currently under development on Holbrook Industrial Estate. The plant is 
currently being commissioned and once operational will be managed by Veolia 
Energy Services. Holbrook Community Renewable CHP plant will generate 6.5 
MW of renewable electricity and supply heat to around 6,700 homes and 
commercial properties. The project is being developed by Sheffield-based firm 
UYE Ltd and financed by infrastructure investment company Equitix with 
additional funding from the Green Investment Bank.  
 
Heat networks are part of a decentralised energy vision for Sheffield and the 
wider City Region. As part of this vision the council aspires to expand, 
decarbonise and add resilience to the existing network and develop new 
networks (Almond, 2014). Heat network development was included in Sheffield 
City Region Investment Fund (SCRIF) proposals62 so there is opportunity to 
allocate capital funding to the development of new schemes or the expansion of 
existing schemes. As part of the city’s development plans six new priority areas 
for heat network have been identified with the ‘Lower’ Don Valley, ‘Upper’ Don 
Valley and extension of the City Centre scheme prioritised. 
 
The development of heat networks in Sheffield, although coordinated by the 
City Council, is dependent on the investment decisions of commercial heat 
network operators. This has led the local authority to develop long-term and 
                                                          
62 The Sheffield City Region Investment Fund (SCRIF) is the City Region’s major capital 
investment fund, made up of devolved Government funding and contributions from local 
authorities and private sector partners. 
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detailed relationships with heat sources, network operators, potential heat loads 
and consultancies in order to ensure that a sufficient evidence base is 
established to drive growth of the networks. The City council acts as a 
coordinator to a network of involved organisations including Vital Energy, 
Veolia, E.On, UYE Ltd, a large range of public and private sector heat 
customers, the wider city region local authorities and the local universities and 
technical consultancies. This role includes exploring technical issues in relation 
to pipe routes and brokering initial relationships with anchor loads. The council 
has also sought to make a strategic commitment to further developing heat 
networks in order to give heat network developers certainty regarding the 
ongoing priorities of the council.  
 
5.2.3 Case study: Birmingham 
Heat networks have been developed in Birmingham since the mid-2000s63 . The 
city council has led this development but delivery and operation has been in 
partnership with Cofely District Energy (DE) (GDF Suez and Cofely have since 
rebranded as Engie in 2016). In the early 2000s the council was actively 
developing its work on climate change, including participating in the Carbon 
Trust’s Local Authority Carbon Management Programme which facilitated the 
council to develop a long-term energy strategy and assess opportunities for low 
and zero carbon energy sources on its own estate. This included the completion 
of a decentralised energy feasibility study in the city centre, which took place as 
city centre regeneration plans were being developed (Hawkey, Webb and 
Winskel, 2013). The feasibility study focused on large organisations that could 
act as heat loads and identified the Broad Street and Eastside areas as 
potential locations for heat networks. The Broad Street area includes many 
large central buildings such as the International Conference Centre, the 
National Indoor Arena, the Town Hall, the Council House, Hyatt Regency Hotel, 
the Rep Theatre, Paradise Circus leisure and retail area and New Birmingham 
                                                          
63 Following successful legal challenges from tenants in the 1980s the council was forced to 
improve building insulation and heating in a number of multi-storey blocks. As part of the 
council’s response a small CHP heat network was installed but the majority of blocks were 
refurbished with electric heating. Building engineers within the council started to advocate heat 
networks from this point (Hawkey, Webb and Winskel, 2013). 
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Library, and the Eastside area includes Birmingham Children’s Hospital, Aston 
University, Council buildings and the Eastside Regeneration Area.  
 
Workshops were then held with key organisations to discuss the potential for 
heat networks and the council decided to develop the Broad Street and 
Eastside schemes (Sustainability West Midlands, 2014). To deliver the first 
scheme Birmingham City Council, Aston University & Birmingham Children’s 
hospital undertook a joint procurement process which resulted in the formation 
of Birmingham District Energy Company (BDEC) in 2006 after Engie (then 
Utilicom64) emerged as the preferred bidder for the 25 year contract to operate 
the schemes. The first 25 year energy supply agreement was signed in 
December 2006 for the Broad Street Scheme, which was operational in 2007. 
The agreement for the Eastside scheme was signed in spring 2008 and became 
operational in two phases in 2009 (Aston University scheme) and 2010 
(Birmingham Children’s Hospital scheme). 
 
BDEC operates as an Energy Services Company (ESCo) designing, building, 
financing, owning and operating heat networks across Birmingham. BDEC is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Engie and the company directors are employees of 
Engie. Large subscribers, including the council, sit on the partnership board but 
do not exercise formal control over the company (Webb, 2012).  Engie receives 
the first 5% of BDEC’s profits to cover their costs and remaining profits are split 
with 50% going to Engie and 50% going to the partnership board members as 
an energy rebate (Hawkey et al., 2013). Contractual arrangements include 
provisions for penalties against BDEC for non-performance. The contract also 
includes a ‘joint cooperation agreement’ which outlines that the council will 
actively promote the development of the schemes within the city but that 
commercial decisions regarding expansion will be made by Engie. The main 
strategic relationships between BDEC and partners are outlined in figure 18. A 
number of additional commercial relationships are incorporated into this 
overarching structure, for instance, in the Broad Street scheme the council 
directly contracts with BDEC for energy supply, but other public buildings on the 
                                                          
64 Utilicom was acquired by GDF-Suez in 2010 and its district energy concerns are operated 
under their subsidiary Cofely. GDF Suez and Cofely were rebranded as Engie in 2016.  
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Eastside scheme procure energy from BDEC via an energy supply contract with 
the council in order to reduce complex public procurement costs (Bolton and 
Hannon, 2016).  
 
The BDEC model of heat network delivery in Birmingham means that project 
risks are owned by BDEC together with responsibility for existing assets, 
operational efficiency and new investments. The model was selected as the 
council adopted a risk-averse approach to the development of decentralised 
energy in Birmingham. The council highlighted that they had little experience of 
heat networks prior to the Broad Street scheme and wanted to outsource the 
risk of developing such schemes to a third party. The council also visited the 
Southampton district energy scheme that was run by Engie prior to starting the 
procurement process as this was one of the few large networks in operation in 
England at the time so were familiar with the contractual structures used by 
Engie. 
 
Finance for the schemes was secured through equity finance from Cofely and a 
grant awarded to the council through the government’s Community Energy 
Programme. More recently a number of multi-storey council housing blocks 
have been connected, part funded by a Low Carbon Infrastructure Fund from 
the Homes and Communities Agency and the Council has received HNDU 
funding to developed further schemes. 
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Figure 18: BDEC strategic relationships 
 
(Smith, 2012) 
 
The City Council has a strong commitment to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and aims to cut CO2 emissions by 60% by 2026 (on a 1990 baseline) 
(Birmingham City Council, 2007, 2010). The council suggests that the 
development of district heating is central to their decarbonisation plans and 
recognises that potential for heat networks to contribute to fuel poverty and 
regeneration objectives. Indeed fuel poverty and regeneration were central 
factors in the development of the Broad Street and Eastside schemes.  
 
Engie suggest that there is a long term aim is to expand and eventually interlink 
the BDEC schemes subject to commercial criteria (Forsyth, 2014). The Broad 
Street scheme has already been expanded by BDEC to incorporate heat 
sources and/or supply a range of other sites in the city centre, such as the New 
Street Station and John Lewis store. There is also an aspiration to develop 
biomass, anaerobic digestion and pyrolysis plants to supply heat.  
 
Outside of the BDEC arrangement Birmingham City Council has received 
funding and support from the HNDU team to identify further opportunities to 
expand or develop new heat networks. This support has included city energy 
mapping and energy master planning for the most promising sites. Further 
feasibility work has also been approved for the Tyseley Environmental 
Enterprise District where the council want to explore capturing waste heat from 
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the Energy from Waste (EfW) facility. The Tyseley EfW plant is owned by the 
City Council but operated and maintained by Veolia Environmental Services. 
The current contract expires in 2019 and the council is considering taking 
operation in-house (Birmingham City Council, 2014). Several of these potential 
district heating networks could cross local authority boundaries and Birmingham 
City Council are liaising with the other local authorities in the Greater 
Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership (Forsyth, 2014). 
5.3 Policy Discourse evolution 
As policy to decarbonise heat has risen up the agenda, discussion of heat 
networks has developed in policy and advisory documents. This development of 
policy discourses is mapped from 2007 to 2018 in table 9. As this table 
illustrates there has been a gradual increase in the profile of heat networks in 
decarbonisation policy with a narrative shift from ‘encouraging’ heat networks 
and CHP (HM Government, 2007; DECC, 2009a) to defining them as ‘essential’ 
and ‘cost effective’(DECC, 2013b; BEIS, 2016c). The government discourse 
has included both the articulation of a stronger role for heat networks in 
decarbonisation and recognition that growth will require the development of 
further policy and support measures. This has included discussion including the 
lack of consumer protection arrangements, variation in pricing structures and 
the need to develop financing, business model development and procurement 
processes as well as skills and common standards.  
 
A stronger government discourse on both the need to address heat 
decarbonisation and the role of heat networks is mirrored by a number of 
reports by NGOs and other analysts which have highlighted the need for greater 
focus on, and clarity in, heat policy (Carbon Connect, 2014, 2015; Verco, 2014). 
In particular a report by Verco for WWF (2014) suggests that the Government 
should adopt specific targets for each low carbon heat technology and proposed 
a target of heat networks supplying 1m households by 2020. They suggest that 
this involves 32 fold increase in the deployment rate of heat networks with 
25,000 homes being connected to heat networks over the past 13 years and a 
need for 800,000 new connections over next 15 years. The also propose similar 
scale increases in energy efficiency measures and heat pumps.  
 
143 
 
 
Carbon Connect (2014: 10), an independent, cross-party forum on sustainable 
energy, carried out a review of heat decarbonisation and suggested that 
although there is no one solution for cutting heat emissions the government 
should set heat as a priority area for the next 10 years and highlight heat 
networks as the ‘biggest piece of the jigsaw missing from the puzzle of future 
heat for buildings’. They suggest that the Future of Heating relies too much on 
the RHI to drive deployment and doesn’t do enough to recognise the ‘mutually 
exclusive’ nature of low carbon heat technologies, so in those areas which are 
targeted for heat networks there needs to be limited investment in alternative 
building-integrated low carbon heat technologies such as heat pumps. In their 
analysis of heat decarbonisation Carbon Connect (2014) suggest that there is a 
lack of an adequate governance structure for heat network development and 
advocate that more development funding, guidance on governance and 
ownership structures, low cost finance and regulations to require connection are 
required to drive growth.  
 
There is growing recognition in policy documents that heat networks may play 
an important role in decarbonisation, albeit with large potential ranges reflecting 
the level of uncertainty regarding the penetration of individual technologies. For 
example the 2011 Carbon Plan suggested that between 10–38 TWh of low 
carbon heat would be delivered through heat networks by 2030 (DECC, 2011). 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 4th Carbon Budget recommendations 
initially reflected the low end of this range with an estimate of heat network 
expansion to 10TWh to 2027, however in late 2013 the CCC published an 
update to the 4th Carbon Budget recommendations which revised heat sector 
estimates and increased targets for heat networks from 10TWh to 30TWh and 
reduced heat pumps from 160TWh to 82TWh (Committee on Climate Change, 
2013). Further modelling for the Committee on Climate Change to inform the 5th 
Carbon Budget implies a contribution from heat networks at the top end of the 
Carbon Plan range at around 33TWh in 2030 with potential for cost-effective 
heat networks to account for 10% of heating demand in 2030 and 20% in 2050 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2015b; Element Energy, 2015; Committee on 
Climate Change, 2016a). BEIS however indicates that heat networks may in 
fact supply up to 20% of heat demand by 2020 (DECC, 2013b). Whilst these 
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policy documents and analyses vary in the decarbonisation role assigned to 
heat networks there is consensus that they will play a more important role in the 
energy system in the future and that there is a need for a new policy framework 
to deliver a step-change in heat network deployment.  
 
Table 9: Heat networks policy discourses in England 
Year Policy document Heat network reference 
2007 2007 Energy White 
Paper (HM 
Government, 2007) 
 
Contained 5 pages on decarbonising heat 
within a 300+ page document. One reference 
to heat networks was made and measures to 
encourage deployment of combined heat and 
power were highlighted. This included 
exemption from the Climate Change Levy, 
improved treatment under Phase II of the EU 
ETS, and planning guidance. 
2008 Heat call for 
evidence (BERR, 
Defra and DCLG, 
2008)  
The call for evidence discussed many issues 
around heat network regulation, finance and 
consumer protection which have informed 
subsequent developments (such as the Heat 
Trust and CIBSE Code of Practice). However 
many of the issues discussed have not been 
progressed or have been established as 
voluntary standards. 
2009 Heat and Energy 
Saving Strategy 
consultation (DECC, 
2009a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Executive Summary to this document 
highlighted a ‘new focus on district heating in 
suitable communities, and removing barriers to 
their development’. Although CHP was to be 
‘encouraged’ the focus in was largely on 
energy efficiency and building regulations. It 
was suggested that a ‘Summit on Community 
Energy and Heating’ would be convened with 
local government leaders to facilitate the 
development of heat networks and a Heat 
Markets Forum established to ‘ensure an 
appropriate market framework is in place’ 
however neither happened due to the 2010 
election. Chapter 6 on heat networks 
highlighted that ‘district heating is not currently 
attractive in the present commercial and 
regulatory environment’ (DECC, 2009a: 3, 9) 
and recognises that heat network development 
is constrained by a number of regulatory, 
financial and commercial barriers. The 
document also includes a section on working 
with local and regional government and 
suggests these levels of governance will play 
a key role in heat decarbonisation, with the 
planning process and Local Area Agreements 
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2009 Transition Plan 
(DECC, 2009b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The potential and 
costs of district 
heating networks: 
Report to DECC 
(Poyry Energy and 
Faber Maunsell, 
2009) 
highlighted two routes through which local 
government can promote heat decarbonisation 
and energy efficiency (although the voluntary 
nature of local government action is stressed).  
 
This document included 2.5 pages on 
community scale energy in a 200+ page 
document. The language relating to heat 
networks was rather unclear referring to 
‘community heating’ but suggesting that its 
role could increase from 2% to up to 14%. The 
Transition Plan established the LCIF grant 
funding programme which funded the 
development of several heat networks. 
 
This report highlighted a ‘crucial’ role for local 
authorities in ‘enabling developers to construct 
low-risk district heating business models’ and 
suggested that further initiatives were required 
to incentivise more active engagement across 
local authorities. However few of the 
recommendations in the report were taken 
forward before the 2010 election. 
2010 Change in Government from Labour to Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition 
2011 Carbon Plan (DECC, 
2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heat Directorate 
created in DECC 
The Carbon Plan recognises that the low 
carbon heat transition will be a gradual 
process over many decades and suggests that 
after 2020, heat pumps start expanding at 
scale, and heat networks expand form urban 
areas to compete with individual building-level 
technologies. The plan implies that these 
technologies would dominate in different 
contexts (urban and suburban/rural) but does 
not make reference to the mutually exclusive 
nature of many low carbon heat 
technologies65. The plan suggests that 21-45% 
of UK heat supply should be low carbon by 
2030, with 83-165 TWh from building-level 
technologies and 10-38 TWh from heat 
networks. Heat networks are seen as ‘viable’ 
in up to half of heat demand but face a range 
of barriers relating to financing, regulation, 
ownership and charging structures.  
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2012 Heat Technology 
Innovation Needs 
Assessment (TINA) 
(Low Carbon 
Innovation 
Coordination Group, 
2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Framework 
for Heat (DECC, 
2012) 
The TINA focused on heat pumps, heat 
networks and heat storage as three key heat 
technologies that could play a role in meeting 
UK and global heat demand in an emissions 
constrained future. It highlighted the 
importance of public sector activity in 
unlocking the development of heat 
technologies, both in terms of national policy 
certainty and local government, as publically 
coordinated infrastructure development is 
required. 
 
Suggested that heat networks ‘may be an 
effective means of providing low carbon heat 
to buildings’ (DECC, 2012: 34, 69, 72) and 
‘have the potential to play a significant role in 
the UK energy mix, subject to the caveats and 
conditions’. Local authorities are characterised 
as having a ‘pivotal role’ in enabling the 
development, deployment and expansion of 
heat networks, ‘combined with private sector 
participation and investment’, although this is 
largely framed as a brokerage role. 
2013 Future of Heating, 
DECC 2013 (DECC, 
2013a). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heat Network 
Delivery Unit 
(HNDU) created 
within DECC 
The strategy document contained four core 
chapters on heat in industry, heat networks, 
heating and cooling in buildings (considering 
building level heating technologies and energy 
efficiency) and grids and infrastructure. The 
‘Future of Heating' document highlighted the 
significance of local authorities in developing 
heat networks. Local authorities were 
described as having a ‘critical’ and  ‘unique’ 
role due to their ability to carry out energy 
master-planning of areas suitable for heat 
networks, coordinate multiple partners and 
broker deals, and their likely ownership of 
significant loads66 (DECC, 2013a:50).  
 
HNDU was created with a budget of £9m to 
2015 to support local authorities in the 
development of heat network feasibility 
studies. Creation framed as a response to the 
lack of skills and resources for local authorities 
to carry out early project development for heat 
network projects. 
2014 HNDU second 
funding round: 
The Minister for Energy and Climate Change 
Greg Barker describes heat networks as ‘a 
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successful 
applicants 
announced 
defining part of our smarter, cleaner energy 
future’ (DECC, 2014b).  
 
2015 Change in 
Government from 
Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition 
to Conservative 
majority. 
 
DECC Call for 
Evidence: Tackling 
Non-Financial 
Barriers to Gas 
CHP, 2015(DECC, 
2015b).  
 
Delivering UK 
Energy Investment: 
Networks, DECC, 
2015 (DECC, 2015c: 
34).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heat Networks Code 
of Practice 
 
Heat Trust launched  
 
 
 
Spending Review 
(DECC, 2015d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This document sought evidence on whether 
the most significant barriers to gas CHP had 
been addressed and on their proposed 
measures67 to address remaining barriers to 
CHP (DECC, 2015b).  
 
 
This document provided a detailed focus on 
the investment undertaken in networks, the 
challenges and opportunities on offer and a 
vision for what future integrated networks 
might look like. There is a whole chapter 
devoted to heat with highlights the need to 
rapidly decarbonise heat and an important role 
for heat networks. ‘The portfolio of HNDU 
projects alone could represent between £400 
million to £800 million of capital investment 
opportunity over the next 10 years (on an 
assumption of 25% to 50% of current projects 
coming to fruition)’. 
 
Technical code of practice and standards 
launched by the ADE and CIBSE in July 2015. 
 
Heat Trust independent consumer protection 
scheme launched by ADE and the Energy 
Ombudsman in November 2015. 
 
Government announces that it will allocate 
£300m to support the development of up to 
200 heat networks over the next 5 years 
(DECC, 2015d). 
2016 Consultation on 
ensuring regulation 
encourages 
innovation (DECC 
2016) 
Suggests that heat networks ‘offer a cost-
effective route to decarbonising heat in dense 
urban areas, with the potential to supply 
between 14% and 43% of total UK heat 
demand from buildings by 2050’…government 
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Heat Networks 
Investment Project 
Consultation (HNIP) 
 
HNIP Consultation - 
Government 
Response, (BEIS, 
2016: 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National 
Infrastructure 
Delivery Plan 2016–
2021 
is therefore ‘supporting the wider deployment 
of heat networks as an important part of our 
transition to a secure and affordable low 
carbon future’ (DECC, 2016: 10). Supports 
industry-led initiatives rather than formal 
regulation 
 
BEIS consult on the development of the HNIP. 
 
 
 
Launched October 2016 the government 
consultation response described heat 
networks as ‘an essential part of our future 
clean energy infrastructure’ and ‘one of the 
most cost-effective ways of reducing carbon 
emissions’. Heat networks are described as 
benefiting multiple priorities including carbon 
reduction, reducing consumer bills, providing 
whole system benefits and acting as a 
‘catalyst for local growth’. 
 
Energy was included as one of the core 
sectors in the Infrastructure Delivery Plan. This 
included reference to the £300m of investment 
support for up to 200 heat networks. 
Suggesting this will generate enough heat to 
support the equivalent of over 400,000 homes 
and leverage up to £2 billion of private and 
local capital investment (Infrastructure and 
Projects Authority, 2016) 
 
2017 Clean Growth Plan The Plan includes a commitment to ‘build and 
extend heat networks across the country, 
underpinned with public funding (allocated in 
the Spending Review 2015) out to 2021’ (HM 
Government, 2017). This aims to support the 
development a sustainable heat network 
market by the early to mid-2020s with further 
work to be undertaken in 2018-2019 examine 
the measures necessary to create an effective 
long-term market framework for the sector 
beyond 2020. In each of the Strategy’s 
illustrative pathways to 2050, heat networks 
are projected to meet 17% of heat demand in 
homes and up to 24% of heat demand in 
commercial and public sector buildings. 
 
 CMA Heat network 
market study 
The market study will review how well the heat 
network market is working and if consumers 
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launched 
 
are getting a good deal. It is due to report in 
December 2018. 
 
 BEIS Heat Networks 
Consumer Survey. 
A survey of heat network and non-heat 
network consumers was carried out which 
concluded that overall, heat network 
consumers were just as satisfied with their 
heating systems as non-heat network 
consumers. Nearly three-quarters in both 
populations said they were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very 
satisfied’. Among heat network consumers, the 
key drivers of satisfaction were: the reported 
reliability of system, the perceived fairness of 
price, satisfaction with the level of information 
provided about their system, experience of 
under-heating, experience of over-heating, 
and satisfaction with handling of complaints’ 
(BEIS, 2017c, p. 3). 
2018 ADE publish 
recommendations of 
the Heat Network 
Taskforce on Post-
2020 Heat Network 
Arrangements 
 
The taskforce recommends the introduction of 
a regulatory Demand Assurance framework 
(ADE, 2018b) which would reduce investment 
risk by under-writing demand risk.  
 Heat Networks 
Investment Project 
(HNIP) scheme 
summary 
The first phase of the HNIP scheduled for 
Autumn 2018 with the first funding decisions to 
be made in early 2019. The scheme will offer 
grants and loans to both public and private 
sectors in England and Wales (BEIS, 2018c). 
 CMA Heat Networks 
market study final 
report 
The CMA study concluded that the sector 
should be regulated by a public-sector body 
which has statutory powers to set regulation, 
monitor compliance, and enforce regulatory 
standards. The scope of regulation should 
include price, quality of service, transparency 
and minimum technical standards and the 
regulator should be given formal powers to 
introduce regulation in these areas, and to 
monitor and enforce compliance with 
regulations (Competition and Markets 
Authority, 2018). 
 
 
The need for a range of competencies at various stages of project development 
means that specific parts of the project are often contracted to external 
consultants. However obtaining funding to carry out feasibility studies may be 
increasingly difficult for local authorities in the current constrained financial 
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situation and HNDU funding has been instrumental in enabling many local 
authorities to progress projects (DECC, 2015e). 
 
Heat networks are represented by two industry bodies in the UK; the UK District 
Energy Association (UKDEA) and the Association for Decentralised Energy 
(ADE). Whilst both aim to provide guidance to the industry, develop best 
practice and engage with government on policy development they have different 
membership profiles. The UKDEA has 18 full members and was founded by the 
heat network developer Engie and their local authority partners. Engie provides 
secretariat to the association. ADE is a larger network of industry and local 
authorities (75 heat network members) and seeks to advocate for its members 
across CHP, heat networks and energy services. Whilst both partly aim to 
support learning and skills sharing in the sector this is limited to some extent by 
the small size of the industry and the often multiple roles fulfilled by local 
authority lead personnel (Poyry Energy and Faber Maunsell, 2009). More 
recently, the sporadic, short-term nature of national grant programmes has 
limited the growth of district heat skills and supply chains in the UK (Poyry 
Energy and Faber Maunsell, 2009). 
 
In addition, heat currently operates under a comparatively (to electricity) weak 
regulatory landscape. There is no specific heat regulator with regulation relating 
to heat generally focussing on generating fuels such as natural gas. Regulatory 
requirements that do relate to heat supply generally fall under consumer 
protection rules (Bolton & Foxon, 2013b; Hawkey, 2012). However the industry 
and Government has recognised the need for further consumer protection 
requirements through the development of the Heat Trust but has not made a 
commitment to formally regulate the market.  
 
This increasing focus on the future regulation of heat networks included a CMA 
market study which determined that the sector should be regulated by a public-
sector body which has statutory powers to set regulation, monitor compliance, 
and enforce regulatory standards (Competition and Markets Authority, 2018). In 
late 2018 the Government issued a report which welcomed the CMA’s findings, 
set out their support for sector regulation and consulted on high level principles 
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for future market arrangements (UK government, 2018). A more detailed 
consultation and policy options are expected late in 2019. 
 
The report also emphasised that Government policy is seeking to develop a 
more supportive framework for heat networks through offering developmental 
support through the HNDU and investment support through the HNIP. However 
longer-term governance and regulatory structures remain unclear. Hawkey and 
Webb (2012: 19) suggest that current governance is ‘governance under 
uncertainty’ as each project largely develops its own governance approach. 
They argue that this uncertain governance is unlikely to result in fast expansion 
of heat networks in the UK due to persistent risks, uncertainty and costs. 
Instead ad-hoc local innovation is likely to continue with local authorities taking 
an important role in coordination and risk reduction.  
 
More recently various policy analysts and think-tanks have supported this 
assertion and suggested that distributed technologies challenge the ‘logic’ of the 
UK energy system (Platt et al., 2014: 3; Julian, 2014). The IPPR’s report on city 
energy (Platt et al., 2014: 5), although largely focussed on the changes needed 
in the electricity market, cites a ‘prevailing bias’ across energy regulation and 
policy towards a large-scale utility business model which does not facilitate 
alternative models (such as heat networks and CHP) which might be more 
appropriate at a small to medium scale. It can also be argued that heat 
networks have not been supported by the broader neo-liberal paradigm that has 
dominated governance in several countries (notably the UK) which has framed 
the priorities of energy policy as about increasing efficiency and reducing state 
involvement. Both Kuzemko (2013) and Meadowcroft (2009: 492) suggest that 
this context influences how institutions develop and the policy options open to 
them, resulting in a focus on technologies that ‘slot easily into the existing large 
and centralised system’ and a lack of trust in the ability of government, including 
local government, to manage sectors of the economy such as energy. 
 
5.4 Problem definition and the role of heat networks 
This section discusses how problem definition discourses have been utilised in 
relation to heat networks in England, as well as how debate of policy options 
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has developed. Shaping the definition of a problem and its possible solutions is 
widely acknowledged as a technique utilised by actors to shape policy 
responses in the discursive institutionalist literature (Carstensen and Schmidt, 
2016)68. This sees problem definition, and the selection of solutions, as an 
expression of different ideas, interests and power relations rather than as a 
consensual process based on rational arguments (Habermas, 1987). A number 
of key problem definition storylines were evident in the  shaping of the 
discursive space for heat networks in England, these storylines can be 
summarised as ‘heat policy neglect’, ‘limitations of an all-electric future’, 
‘delivering multiple priorities’ and ‘barriers to heat networks’, as discussed 
below.  
 
5.4.1 ‘Heat policy neglect’ and ‘limitations of an all-electric future’ 
As discussed in chapter 2 there has been a gradual recognition across policy 
and industry literature of the need to focus on the decarbonisation of heat in 
order to meet carbon reduction targets. This identification of a policy problem in 
the form of the slow rate of heat decarbonisation has been an important wider 
context for an increased focus on the role of heat networks and was highlighted 
consistently by heat network actors across the local, national and international 
scale (interviews 3-NGO, 23-C, 27-G, 17-LA, 29-TA; International Energy 
Agency, 2004; DECC, 2012; Carbon Connect, 2014). Additionally this 
recognition of the relative neglect of heat decarbonisation policy was aligned, by 
both heat network and wider heat policy actors, with a second storyline relating 
to the limitations of an all-electric future as a route to decarbonise heat. This 
marks a departure from the focus in the late 2000’s on the electrification of heat, 
based on growing evidence that very extensive electrification of heating would 
require significant reinforcement of electricity networks and present problems in 
terms of system balancing during peak demand (Eyre and Baruah, 2014; 
Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2016).  
 
                                                          
68 As well as in policy studies literature more widely (such as Kingdon, 1995; Voß and 
Bornemann, 2011; Béland, 2017). 
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Until the publication of The Future of Heating strategy document in 2012 
(DECC, 2012) Government policy69 was largely focussed on electricity 
decarbonisation with the Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011) suggesting that the focus 
should be on decarbonising electricity generation, through renewables and gas, 
until the 2020s. Likewise the Committee on Climate Change’s 4th carbon budget 
review suggested that electrification would dominate heat decarbonisation in 
residential and commercial properties but highlighted a ‘limited role for district 
heating, reflecting uncertainties around technical and economic aspects of this 
option, with the possibility of deeper penetration as uncertainties are resolved’ 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2010, p. 24). More recently the Committee on 
Climate Change has highlighted the slow rate of heat decarbonisation and 
suggested that the abatement potential of heat pumps may be limited by low 
take up, necessitating greater penetration of alternative low carbon heating 
systems such as heat networks (Committee on Climate Change, 2013).   
 
Interviews across all categories emphasised how growing recognition of the 
difficulties associated with the large scale electrification of heating, both from 
the perspective of increased electricity demand and the practical implications of 
installing heat pumps in existing low efficiency housing70, was leading to more 
focus on heat networks as an alternative route to decarbonising heat, 
particularly in urban settings. As one interviewee put it ‘as there’s been more 
research into scenarios there’s been a realisation that yes heat networks are 
expensive but electrification is also expensive so heat networks now get a fair 
crack too’ (interview 26-NGO). 
 
Focus on the electrification of heat in the late 2000s and early 2010s was linked 
by interviewees (interviews 3-NGO, 5-NGO, 13-C, 14-C, 27-G, 28-A, 29-TA) to 
the appointment of David MacKay as Chief Scientific Advisor within DECC in 
2009. MacKay was appointed following the publication of an influential book, 
‘Sustainable Energy - without the hot air’, in which he describes CHP as ‘a bad 
                                                          
69 Such as such the 2007 Energy White Paper (HM Government, 2007) and the Carbon Plan 
(DECC, 2011). 
70 Heat pumps are most efficient when producing low temperature heat in well insulated 
properties, ideally through underfloor heating systems or warm air heating rather than radiator-
based systems (Energy Saving Trust, 2017). 
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idea, because there’s a better technology for heating, called heat pumps’ 
(Mackay, 2009, p. 144). MacKay was Chief Scientific Advisor until October 2014 
and although the increase in government focus on heat networks from 2010 
onwards largely happened while MacKay was still in post interviewees 
suggested that MacKay’s well known ‘dislike’ for heat networks and CHP, 
together with a lack of support from senior management within BEIS, had 
created a culture where heat networks were marginalised. As one interview 
suggest ‘there in the heart of DECC was an individual that had a very set view 
about how Britain could decarbonise which was to move to an all-electric future 
and the industry basically lost 4 years while MacKay was there’ (interview 27-
G). 
 
MacKay was publically more supportive of heat networks in the Future of 
Heating document where he suggested that CHP can be viewed as ‘virtual heat 
pumps’ (DECC, 2012, p. 8) and interviewees suggested that BEIS have now 
‘realised that in all these pathways district heating comes up as an investment 
you won’t regret and I’ve heard really interesting arguments in favour of district 
heating recently where it is essential to the electrification of heat’ (interview 3-
NGO). However the shift to a broader acceptance that heat networks may play 
a role in decarbonisation was framed by interviewees as happening despite an 
ongoing lack of support from senior levels within BEIS and these changes were 
attributed as resulting from greater analysis of the implications of different heat 
decarbonisation pathways and recognition that a portfolio of technologies would 
be required (interviews 4-G, 16-LA). This illustrates how heat network 
advocates have sought to emphasise the cognitive appeal of heat networks 
framing them as a logical technology once the limitations of electrifying heat are 
acknowledged, particularly due to their ability to integrate multiple heat sources 
including the use of gas in the short to medium term. One interviewee 
suggested that; 
 
‘people started to move away from a sort of single silver bullet idea 
and began to think sensibly about that you actually need to look at 
each individual area and think about what the best solutions are for 
that particular heat demand profile but also in addition the sources 
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of heat supply that are in that area. So the debate just became a 
bit more sophisticated I think and the size of the challenge was 
clearly articulated’ (interview 4-G). 
 
Both the storylines of ‘heat policy neglect’ and ‘limitations of an all-electric 
future’ appear to have been helpful in positioning heat networks within a 
broader policy focus on heat due to the interpretive flexibility of these 
discourses, where advocates of different policy approaches or technologies can 
all adopt the same storyline(s) in order to promote their objectives although they 
may promote different solutions to the problem. For example, storylines of ‘heat 
policy neglect’ and ‘alternatives to an all-electric future’ can be utilised by 
interests such as biomass companies, hydrogen injection companies and heat 
network companies but the policy solutions they seek to promote are likely to be 
very different. This adoption of twinned storylines which exhibit interpretive 
flexibility fits well with the policy approach of the UK Government which tends to 
make broad policy statements (such as the need for greater focus on the 
decarbonisation of heat) in the context of a philosophy of not ‘picking winners’. 
This leads to extensive policy debate and positioning by various interests in the 
relevant sector in order to secure governmental support for their priorities. 
 
In terms of the role of heat networks in addressing these policy problems, both 
national and local interviewees highlighted that there had been increasing 
political interest in heat networks over the last 5-8 years, although this has 
taken place from a very low base. This was evident in policy documentation with 
heat networks occupying a more prominent position in recent years (see the 
chronology of heat network policy in chapter 2 and DECC, 2012, 2013a; HNDU, 
2015). Given that a range of interests utilise the storylines of ‘heat policy 
neglect’ and ‘limitations of an all-electric future’ interviewees suggested that 
there were a number of additional factors which had driven this increased focus 
on heat networks. Partly this was seen as a result of ongoing debate regarding 
the options to decarbonise heat with heat networks framed as future proofed 
infrastructure due their ability to incorporate different generating technologies 
over time. This was reflected in the Future of Heating (DECC, 2013b) which 
highlighted their benefits of heat networks in terms of generation flexibility. 
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Additionally recognition of the potential role of heat networks in decarbonising 
heat also resonates with a number of other energy policy priorities including 
greater consideration of the future role of gas71 (see DECC, 2013b; Carbon 
Connect, 2015), unlocking finance for infrastructure investment (HM Treasury, 
2013; Green Investment Bank, 2015), and the need to integrate heat and 
electricity and maximise system flexibility (interviews 5-NGO, 17-LA). Heat 
networks were also seen by a number of interviewees as receiving more 
attention due to the limited number of other options available to decarbonise 
heat in urban areas which have high heat demand density. 
 
In terms of differences between problem identification at the local and national 
level, although the storyline of heat policy neglect was present in local 
discourses it was less pronounced and local actors tended to frame heat 
network development in relation to wider energy system priorities such as heat 
and electricity integration and flexibility, as an extension of existing efficiency 
programmes and as part of wider social and economic priorities (interviews 1-
NGO, 8-LA, 14-C, 17-LA, 25LA). Both Sheffield and Birmingham have been 
developing heat networks for over 15 years and non-climate drivers were 
significant objectives in initial development. All three case studies identified 
climate change as a central driver for current network development and framed 
the development of heat networks as the natural progression of wider climate 
change objectives. They also highlighted the long lead in time for heat network 
projects with current projects in each of the three cities generally in 
development prior to central government’s increased focus on heat networks. 
 
5.4.2 Delivering multiple priorities 
As discussed, heat networks were identified as potentially delivering multiple 
priorities by both national and local actors. Although there was a degree of 
consensus regarding the range of issues that heat networks could address 
there were a number of opportunities that were highlighted more strongly at a 
local level. In particular city actors placed greater focus on the potential for heat 
                                                          
71 Given that most heat networks in England are currently based on gas CHP. 
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networks to deliver non-climate objectives, such as addressing fuel poverty and 
supporting regeneration (interviews 11-MU, 16-LA, 19-LA, 23-C). An 
interviewee who works with multiple local authorities on heat networks 
suggested that ‘the people that are driving this, in the local authorities, are just 
not motivated by the energy, it’s the big picture. It’s about climate change, it’s 
about fuel poverty, it’s about economic regeneration, it’s about resilience of 
infrastructure in those cities’ (interview 14-C). Other studies have established 
that local authorities often pursue heat networks to deliver a range of complex 
social, environmental and economic objectives which go ‘beyond the traditional 
economic drivers of market actors’ (such as Bale et al., 2014, p. 66; Hawkey 
and Webb, 2014) and it is not uncommon for local projects to develop based on 
‘acceptance that the primary return on investment would be in relation to local 
well-being and economic benefit, rather than the rate of return on finance’72 
(Webb, 2015, p. 270). 
 
Interviews and policy documents suggest that national discourses are beginning 
to refer to the wider benefits of heat networks with, for example, the Future of 
Heating strategy document (DECC, 2012, p. 59) recognising that heat networks 
can be integrated with ‘local authority plans for urban growth and regeneration 
aimed at tackling social deprivation and environmental issues such as air 
quality’. However national debate tends to go into little further detail regarding 
the integration or valuation of these multiple objectives. For example the aims of 
the Heat Network Investment Project funding is to increase the volume of heat 
networks built, deliver carbon savings and help to develop a self-sustaining heat 
network market. Although reference is made to ensuring networks operate with 
no customer detriment in comparison with alternatives this focusses on 
ensuring cost comparisons are made between heat networks and alternative 
heating options. Guidance on assessing wider social costs and benefits is 
limited with the HNIP application guidance suggesting that an assessment of 
social net present value (NPV) should take place in line with Treasury Green 
Book guidance. In theory social NPV assessments take into account all costs 
and benefits to society, however the guidance only identifies carbon emission 
                                                          
72 Webb is referring here specifically to the development of Aberdeen Heat and Power.  
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costs and air quality costs as elements of the social NPV calculus (as well as 
capital, operational and maintenance costs) so does not include consideration 
of potential fuel poverty or regeneration benefits (BEIS, 2016d).  
 
In comparison at the sub-national level both local authorities and other actors 
such as housing associations and NGOs increasingly recognise that heat 
networks can deliver complex multiple objectives and that delivering these 
various objectives is likely to involve contestation and negotiation between 
multiple public, quasi-public and private actors (Hansen and Coenen, 2015, 
interviews 16-LA, 17-LA, 23-C). This was evident in the complex actor networks 
in the case study cities where the local authorities were seen by both public 
sector and industry actors as the agency with responsibility for negotiating 
competing interests in heat network development and balancing social, 
environmental and financial objectives. For example interviewees in Sheffield 
suggested that the City Council acts to coordinate a network of public and 
private organisations around a range of priorities such as carbon emissions, 
waste management priorities, local industrial strategy and fuel poverty. This has 
not been dispute free and the local authority’s strategy of working with 
commercial partners to deliver heat networks adds complexity to the strategic 
planning work it is attempting to develop (interviews 8-LA, 23-C). This has 
included difficulty in oversizing plant to allow for new development or developing 
new pipelines when investment decisions are made by commercial interests, 
particularly in relation to Veolia whose primarily interest relates to the Energy 
from Waste (EfW) plant. 
 
Bale et al. (2014) highlight similar difficulties in planning for long-term heat 
network growth under the current UK market based model as oversizing 
networks to allow for future growth, what they term ‘passive provision’, is 
influenced by a number of uncertainties relating to future network scale, heat 
sources, customers and how different outcomes (such as social, economic and 
environmental) will be valued. The difficulty in delivering passive provision in 
order to support long-term objectives was recognised across all the city cases 
but in a variety of ways. In Bristol there was recognition that there was a need to 
take a ‘strategic approach, but at the same time we need to recognise that if we 
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say you ought to put in a great big pipe here, it’s probably not going to happen 
so we need to think of different ways of being able to deliver that same future 
capability’ (interview 23-C). To partly avoid the need to build in extensive 
passive provision the council is developing a number of small networks with the 
potential to expand and connect in future and suggested that the retention of 
ownership was helping them to balance multiple objectives as non-financial 
objectives could be better integrated (see section 5.5.3 for more discussion of 
ownership). Birmingham also recognised the complexity of negotiating multiple 
priorities, suggesting that the structure of BDEC did not always support the 
integration of a range of objective; ‘The BDEC scheme is owned and operated 
by Cofely which removes the risk from the Council, but also the potential benefit 
– both to Birmingham City Council and to some extent, consumers, if 
Birmingham City Council would be willing to reduce tariffs to ensure 
connections for the fuel poor communities, for example’ (interview 25-LA).  
 
This evidence of heat networks connecting multiple local actors with complex 
objectives aligns with Webb's (2015, p. 270) case study of Aberdeen Heat and 
Power which suggests that the heat networks can act as a ‘a hinge connecting 
multiple local interest’ where ‘local knowledge about non-monetarized costs and 
organizational structures’ is emphasised over traditional techno-economic 
rationality. While the cases studied in this research all suggested that values 
outside of financial rate of return can be significant drivers for heat network 
development all the cases also demonstrated the difficulty in aligning complex 
priorities, particularly when different actors may have different priorities or be 
seeking to realise their objectives over different timescale. In Bristol this has 
included complexity in aligning investment timescales of the Council, University 
Hospital Bristol Foundation Trust and the University of Bristol. Additionally, 
although the council is evaluating ownership and operation models on a 
network by network basis they suggest that delivering these networks with a 
private-sector partner via an Energy Services Company is not the preferred 
approach due to the loss of strategic control and the perceived increase in 
difficulty in delivering multiple objectives. In Birmingham, although the BDEC 
model is widely seen as successful it is also framed as resulting in difficulty in 
addressing multiple priorities such as carbon reduction and fuel poverty as 
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these priorities are seen as ‘having high costs and low returns’ (interviews 17, 
25; Webb and Hawkey, 2012, p. 16). 
 
Similarly, in Sheffield multiple priorities were highlighted as driving heat network 
development, however financial objectives were more strongly emphasised in 
this case. This involved heat networks being linked to local economic growth 
(via the ‘Made in Sheffield’ storyline) and the council’s financial position. Initially, 
in 2001, the council sold the Bernards Road incinerator to Veolia partly as it 
could not afford to upgrade the plant to meet air quality requirements. More 
recently the council have initiated a review of the Veolia contract, which was not 
due to expire until 2036, in order to try to reduce the cost of the £1.3 billion 
contract (Lets Recycle, 2017). The council is also considering setting up a 
municipal energy supply company and both the future of the Veolia contract and 
the potential development of a municipal utility were linked to the financial 
situation of the authority and the need to develop projects that simultaneously 
deliver on financial, social and environmental benefits (interviews 8-LA, 23-C).  
 
Navigating these multiple priorities and interests is a complex role for local 
authorities and, although HNDU support can include detailed project 
development and some stages of commercialisation the focus is largely on 
funding consultancy support to carry out mapping, master planning, feasibility 
studies and technical project development. Although all these stages are clearly 
essential to the successful development of heat network projects they 
emphasise techno-economic rationalities rather than the challenges relating to 
governing complex, multi- actor and multi-objective projects. In particular 
interviewees emphasised the lack of skills within local authorities to govern the 
development of energy infrastructures where the growth of the network, long-
term customer base and future generation plant may all be uncertain. The issue 
of skills is returned to in the next section (5.4.3). 
  
Notwithstanding these differences between the local and national problem 
framings, heat network storylines were being aligned by all actors with a range 
of other storylines (heat policy neglect, alternatives to an all-electric future, 
future role of gas, integration of heat and electricity). This demonstrates how 
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actors at multiple scales are constructing heat networks as part of the ‘solution’ 
to a range of problems in order to develop support for increased policy 
intervention. Whilst there was substantial consensus across policy 
documentation and interviewees relating to the problems that heat networks 
could help to address, there was significantly more variation in identification of 
the most significant barriers and policy priorities, as discussed in the next 
section. 
 
5.4.3 Barriers to heat networks 
A generalised storyline of heat networks facing multiple barriers was adopted by 
interviewees across all actors groups and was strongly represented in 
government and industry documents (such as DECC, 2012, 2013a; BRE, 
University of Edinburgh and Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2013; Association 
of Decentralised Energy, 2015; Frontier Economics, 2015). This included the 
recognition of a number of shared high level barriers as discussed in section 
2.6. These common barriers and can be summarised as (1) financial, (2) 
governance and regulatory, (3) complexity and the locally bespoke nature of 
projects, (4) energy market design, rules and processes and, (5) public 
perceptions. Despite general consensus on these broad categories across 
interviewees and studies (such as Russell, 1986; Hawkey, 2009; DECC, 2012; 
BRE, University of Edinburgh and Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2013; Bolton 
and Foxon, 2014; Frontier Economics, 2015) closer examination of the 
prominence assigned to the various detailed barriers reveals a range of different 
positions in relation to how heat networks should be best promoted. This 
demonstrates how simple overarching storylines, such as heat networks facing 
multiple barriers, can be widely adopted in order to raise a policy area up the 
agenda and create a rationale for action. However, this simplification of 
storylines can also conceal differing views on the most significant barriers and 
dispute regarding priorities for action.  
 
In this respect government discourses tended to focus on financial and 
consumer barriers whereas other organisations such as the Committee on 
Climate Change (2015) and Frontier Economics (2015) also emphasised the 
importance of policy uncertainty and policy conflicts in slowing the growth of 
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heat networks. The impact of policy certainty and policy conflicts was also 
highlighted by industry, local authorities, consultant and NGOs interviewees 
(interviews 2-C, 17-LA, 22-DHU, 23-C) with one interviewee suggesting that ‘the 
biggest barrier to heat networks in this country is the policy because its non-
comital, short-term, non-existent’ (interview 13-C).  
 
Heat networks may be particularly susceptible to policy uncertainty due to the 
capital intensive and long-lived nature of the infrastructure (Frontier Economics, 
2015) and interviewees described the policy environment for heat networks as 
based on short term support which tends to be extended on a year by year 
basis. For example the initial HNDU funding was allocated for two years from 
2013 to 2015 and has since been extended several times. The HNIP project 
aims to allocate capital funding between 2017 and 2021 and some 
organisations have already called for this funding to be extended to 2030 due to 
the long development timescales of heat network projects (Emden, Aldridge and 
Orme, 2017). Prior to the launch of the HNIP the money allocated to the HNDU 
was described by interviewees as ‘pennies really’ (interview 29-TA) and 
interviewees also identified broader uncertainties within government which had 
slowed progress on heat networks, including General Elections in 2010 and 
2015, the 2015 spending review and the restructuring of DECC into BEIS in 
2016 (interviews 9-NGO, 26-NGO, 28-A). 
 
In addition to policy uncertainty a number of policy conflicts or changes were 
identified by interviewees as undermining progress on heat networks. This 
included the intermittent nature of grant support (such as CSEP and HNDU), 
the scrapping of the Zero Carbon Homes policy, the structure of the RHI, 
changes to Renewables Obligation biomass grandfathering which impacted on 
some biomass CHP networks and barriers to CHP participating in the Capacity 
Market (ADE, 2017b; interviews 23-C, 28-A). One local authority interviewee 
summarised it as ‘We just want some clarity about what this government wants 
going forward and not chopping and changing and cutting this then that’. They 
also highlighted that both the structure and the risk of changes to the RHI were 
a barrier to heat network development; ‘if we’re connecting some buildings now 
on the biomass network we can put in an RHI application but if in 12 months we 
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say we want to connect X or Y we might have to reapply and if the RHI is 
dropped it affects the whole scheme so there’s no point in doing it. The RHI 
needs to change if it’s going to reflect how heat networks expand gradually. We 
don’t even know what’s going to happen to the RHI next year’ (interview 17-LA).  
  
An additional significant difference in the framing of barriers relates to financing 
heat networks. There was a strong narrative in government and industry 
discourses that financial barriers were the most significant barriers to heat 
network development. While sub-national interviewees did not dispute that 
financial barriers were very significant in developing heat networks these 
interviewees also stressed the importance of a lack of policy framework and the 
need to develop skills (interviews 2-C, 3-NGO, 8-LA, 17-LA, 23-C). National 
actors tended not to emphasis the scale of the skills that are likely to need to be 
developed within local networks, and particularly within local authorities, to 
facilitate heat network development. As discussed later in this chapter (section 
5.5.2), although there is broad consensus that local government will need to 
play a central role in heat network development, emphasis tends to be put on 
business models being locally contingent according to specific priorities, 
historical contexts and actor networks. This backgrounds the commonality that 
local authorities are likely to be key governing organisations in all business 
models with the requirement for a number of core competencies to be 
developed in relation to negotiating with complex actor networks and managing 
long-term contracts.  
 
The need to develop new skill sets within the council was particularly raised in 
Bristol. It took several years to develop the in-house skills required and there 
was considerable reliance on consultancy support during this time. Additionally 
the complexity of actor networks, both within the council and externally, required 
a great deal of negotiation and relationship management, particularly as 
organisational priorities and/or timescales do not always align.  
 
Although Birmingham and Sheffield both have a longer history of heat network 
development and more established skills sets within key local organisations, 
internal capacity for project management was cited as ‘one of the main barriers 
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for local authorities in developing new networks...Whilst adequate levels of 
funding support is being made available to local authorities, in a time of further 
cuts and pressures it is becoming increasingly difficult to see how some of the 
schemes will come to fruition. This isn’t necessarily a DECC problem, but a 
central government issue. There is no mandated role for local authorities to 
support the government in its delivery of energy policy’ (interview 25-LA). 
 
Sub-national actors also acknowledged that local authorities are approaching 
heat network projects in very different ways with differing competencies to 
manage projects well. For example local authorities which are integrating heat 
networks into broader priorities relating to economic development, regeneration, 
as well as carbon reduction, were described as having ‘much clearer political 
support’ with heat networks embedded into long-term plans (interview 19-LA). 
 
5.5 Established and emerging discourses  
A number of established discourses were important in shaping the development 
of approaches to heat networks. Equally emerging storylines, referred to as 
‘storylines in the making’ by Bosman et al. (2014, p. 48), can put pressure on 
dominant storylines and can ‘point towards future developments’. This section 
explores the interplay between significant established and emerging discourses 
and how they have interacted with the direction of policy. 
 
5.5.1 Financing 
Within government and industry debates accessing third party finance was a 
significant theme based on evidence that heat networks are currently generally 
financed on balance sheet, either by a local authority or a commercial network 
developer, with limited instances of third party project finance. Government 
interviewees suggested that the sector was experiencing a significant increase 
in interest from a range of third party investors including insurance, construction 
and energy companies (interviews 4-G, 21-C). Access to these sources of 
funding was described as a route to enabling more rapid delivery of projects as 
local government sources of finance were portrayed as limited. This theme of 
unlocking finance was also promoted by industry, with the ADE suggesting that 
‘all other UK energy network infrastructure has a clear policy framework that 
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has been successful at securing investment from institutional investors keeping 
down the costs’ (ADE, 2016, p. 2).  
 
While the majority of interviewees accentuated the importance of access to 
finance a minority of interviewees – representing NGOs, local authorities and 
community heat networks (interviews 2-C, 5-NGO, 13-C, 14-C) – suggested 
that the focus on reducing investment costs and attracting commercial finance 
was incorrect as there were alternative sources of low cost capital. As one 
interviewee put it: 
 
‘there’s this conception that it’s going to be done through the 
private sector and I don’t think that it will…the Infrastructure 
Investment report, it talks about the Green Investment Bank yet 
again but then it actually says that some local authorities may 
wish to actually own these entities in which case they can go to 
the Public Loans Board so they’re beginning to concede at 
Whitehall level that there may be possible other options for doing 
it’ (interview 14-C). 
 
These actors suggested that local authorities can source large amounts of 
funding for capital projects from the Public Loans Work Board without central 
government consent, provided they can afford the borrowing costs73. However, 
as identified by several interviewees, this source of capital is highly competed 
as local authorities have a wide range of other projects competing to access this 
funding. As one interviewee suggested, the issue for local authorities is 
‘prioritising it [heat networks] and believing that it might be a worthwhile income 
stream for them’ (interview 4-G). This frames the challenge as partly about 
prioritising the benefits of heat networks locally rather than necessarily about 
attracting low cost international finance.  
                                                          
73 As highlighted in chapter 2 the PWLB issues loans to local authorities for capital projects, 
drawn from the HM Government’s main borrowing and lending account, the National Loans 
Fund. PWLB interest rates are at historic lows and in 2016/17 the PWLB advanced 622 new 
loans to local authorities with a value of £3,634 million (UK Debt Management Office, 2017). 
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While the Sheffield and Birmingham cases had a history of securing private 
investment in heat networks both highlighted that they were also considering 
local authority investment in future growth. Similarly in Bristol there was a focus 
on public investment in heat networks with the authority indicating that ‘at the 
moment while we’ve got opportunities like Prudential Borrowing, quite low 
interest rates, we’re quite happy to have lower rates of return’ (interview 17-LA). 
 
Emerging evidence from the HNIP pilot phase indicates that, of nine projects 
supported, seven were accessing public sector sources of finance, one was a 
public-private partnership and one was financed by the private sector. Clearly 
this is a small sample size but suggests that local authorities are increasingly 
exploring utilising public financing routes rather than private finance to develop 
heat networks (BEIS, 2017d). Similarly a range of (non-industry and central 
government) interviewees suggested that utilising public sector finance may be 
desirable as ‘the big energy companies, Cofely, E-On people like that, are 
seeking a hurdle rate of 12% and above whereas at the other end we’ve got 
municipal energy companies where’re you’re doing it through the Public Works 
Loan Board where they can borrow capital at 3.5% so they can actually do it at 
around 6 or 7%’ (interview 21-C). Additionally some more radical voices in the 
interviewees suggested that the focus should move on from accessing capital to 
addressing other barriers to heat networks and that public money should be 
used to finance heat networks on the understanding that a ‘third energy 
network’ was being constructed and should therefore be publically funded in line 
with other energy networks in the UK (interviews 2-C, 3-NGO). This storyline 
emphasises that the initial development of other energy networks (gas and 
electricity transmission and distribution) were funded by the public purse and 
challenges the narrative adopted by ADE that all other UK energy network 
infrastructure has been ‘successful at securing investment from institutional 
investors’ (ADE, 2016, p. 2). 
 
Whilst this financing storyline was utilised across a range of organisations to 
highlight how the different properties of heat networks resulted in a higher cost 
of capital, a range of other actors suggested that there was insufficient 
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discussion of how addressing non-financial barriers could also reduce project 
risk and the cost of capital. In fact there are multiple ways in which the risks 
relating to heat network development could be reduced including paying a tariff 
based incentive to heat networks (or other methods of underwriting project risk 
such as loan guarantees), the development of consumer protection measures 
such as formal price oversight and licensing, and the provision of dedicated 
local heat zones within which connection to heat networks can be mandated. 
Several of these measures were suggested by the Committee on Climate 
Change in a report on enabling deployment of heat networks (Element Energy, 
2015) and are currently under consideration by the Scottish Government in their 
consultation on the regulation of district heating (Scottish Government, 2017). 
Indeed recent government and industry initiatives such as the HNDU, the HNIP, 
the Heat Trust and the Heat Networks Code of Practice all aim to ultimately 
reduce the cost of capital as more standardised approaches to project 
development, customer service and technical standards increases investor 
confidence.  
 
5.5.2 The role of local authorities 
This section explores how an emerging storyline in relation to the role of local 
authorities is presented by different actors and acts as a site of argumentation 
and contestation. In particular it discusses the consensus of an important role 
for local government in brokering local actor networks and the more contested 
narratives relating to local authority ownership and operation of heat networks.  
 
5.5.2.1 A changing local government agenda 
As discussed in section 5.4.2.2 a theme of local authorities taking a central role 
in heat networks was evident. Local authority interviewees, and those working 
with local authorities, connected this to a range of broader changes to the local 
governance environment. Firstly, a dramatic reduction in the local government 
funding settlement was framed as driving some to consider alternative routes to 
raising revenue, albeit in the context of heat network returns tending to be 
relatively low and long-term. Several interviewees described a need for a more 
commercial approach due to reduced local authority budgets (interview 17-LA, 
15-NGO, 25-LA, 27-G) with one interviewee suggesting that;  
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‘there does seem to have been, particularly since the downturn in 
the last 5 years, a much more commercially focussed approach – 
I meet many more people in local authorities who now actually 
understand to some extent how business works and have a view 
of how they could bring a business plan together to deliver 
something which is going to generate some revenue’ (interview 
23-C). 
 
Secondly, as discussed in 2.5.1, the comparatively limited powers of local 
authorities in the UK have been extended somewhat with a number of powers74 
introduced or amended to allow local authorities to undertake activities outside 
of their statutory responsibilities, raise revenue and carry out commercial 
trading through arms-length companies (Sandford, 2014; Communities and 
Local Government, 2009). These new powers make it easier for local authorities 
to engage directly in energy generation and supply activities, although this 
broader decentralisation trend has been contested with the English devolution 
process75 described as opaque with decision making situated with central 
government (Randall and Casebourne, 2016). Likewise some interviewees 
suggested that the relaxation of local government borrowing rules was 
‘unleashing them [local authorities] a little bit’ (interview 23-C) whereas others 
were sceptical regarding the extent of local devolution suggesting that ‘it hasn’t 
happened, the opposite has happened’ (interview 28-A). There was also a 
perspective that although local authorities now had more freedoms and 
flexibilities from central government they had not generally had skills and 
competencies in energy since the 1950’s so were finding it difficult to re-engage 
with the system. This was at a practical level in terms of having suitably 
qualified and experienced people but also in relation to legal and financial 
personnel being uncomfortable pursuing energy infrastructure projects due to a 
lack of professional norms or experience. 
 
                                                          
74 Notably the Wellbeing Power in the 2000 Local Government Act and the General Power of 
Competence provided for in the Localism Act 2011. 
75 Provided for in the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. 
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Thirdly, local authorities linked their involvement with heat networks with a 
desire (and need) to deliver on complex multiple priorities with local authority 
heat network advocates described as ‘not just motivated by energy, it’s the big 
picture, it’s about climate change, it’s about fuel poverty, it’s about economic 
regeneration, it’s about resilience of infrastructure in those cities’ (interview 14-
C). Finally, local interviewees alluded to a re-examination of the relationship 
between the State and private sector following the 2008 global recession amidst 
concerns that the private sector has failed to reduce costs and increase 
efficiency (Wollmann, 2012). Local government and industry representative 
interviewees both referred to a perceived failure of the current energy 
incumbents to deliver a low carbon, affordable energy system and one 
interviewees suggested it was;  
 
‘about challenging how our society is organised…where people 
are actually controlling what the energy company does and 
saying we want it to take a certain set of renewables, we want it 
to send a pipeline in this direction even though it doesn’t 
necessarily make commercial sense at this particular moment 
but we believe it will do in the future’ (interview 14-C).  
 
This included Bristol’s municipal supply company suggesting that they offer a 
‘simple, fair and transparent alternative to the Big Six, in a market that is often 
perceived as broken and unfair to loyal customers’, emphasising that they are a 
‘force for social good…championing social equality, local renewables and 
stronger communities’ (Bristol Energy, 2017). 
 
5.4.2.2 Enabling or ensuring? 
Notwithstanding the changing local government role identified by many local 
actors, an established consensus storyline was evident relating to an important 
brokerage role for local authorities. Government policy documentation and 
interviews with civil servants and industry emphasised this brokerage role and 
framed this in terms of setting local planning requirements, ownership of key 
anchor loads and the ability of local authorities to coordinate a range of public 
and private sector actors at the local level (interviews 12-TA, 14-C; DECC, 
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2009a, 2013a, 2015c; Combined Heat and Power Association, 2013; Ricardo 
Energy and Environment, 2015). While this brokerage role doesn’t preclude 
local authorities taking a more central role in heat network development, 
operation or ownership it does imply their role is limited to getting the right 
people working together to enable commercial organisations to deliver projects. 
At a national level heat networks were framed as essentially apolitical 
undertakings with decisions based on techno-economic feasibility and the risk 
appetite of partners. In this context local governments are seen as important 
facilitators, but ownership structures are to be determined by traditional cost-
benefit analyses. 
 
This storyline resonates well with a wider institutional norm of an ‘enabling’ role 
for local government which frames contemporary local governance as setting 
the parameters for action but not being directly involved in delivery (see chapter 
2). This widespread use of a ‘local authorities as brokers’ storyline by industry 
and policymakers demonstrates how discourses can be used to position actors 
and establish a conception of the ‘right’ role for certain actors. However the 
ambiguity related to the language used, referring to the role of local authorities 
as ‘brokers’, ‘crucial’ and ‘central’ also allows different actors to interpret their 
own understanding of the appropriate role for local government. This 
interpretive flexibility can be helpful for discourse success as actors can fit the 
storyline to their own interests (Schmidt, 2006).  
 
In contrast to this equivocal role identified for local authorities the focus of 
recent policy, in the shape of the HNDU and HNIP, has placed strong emphasis 
on the role of local authorities. Whilst initially these policies appear to centre the 
role of local government in the development and operation of heat networks 
closer analysis reveals ongoing flexibility in the characterisation of their role. 
Although local authorities are exclusively eligible to apply for support through 
the HNDU a key objective of the funding is to develop ‘investment ready’ 
projects and attract commercial partners. Additionally although the initial round 
of HNIP funding was focussed on local authorities and other public sector 
organisations as the conduits for funding it was possible for monies to be on-
invested in private sector organisations (BEIS, 2016d). HNDU support does 
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include advice on assessing ownership and operation options, including local 
government ownership, however wider government and policy discourses frame 
the operation of energy networks as not a role for local government, as 
discussed in the next section. This suggests that an ‘enabling’ role for local 
governments is still embedded in central government thinking in relation to heat 
networks, despite recognition of their important coordination role.  
 
Local actors presented a more consistently central role for local government 
suggesting that ‘local authorities are the lynchpin for developing heat networks’ 
(interview 17-LA). This resulted in extensive local discussion of the relative 
benefits of different commercial and governance arrangements which was 
largely absent from central government discourses. For example Bristol, 
Sheffield and Birmingham are all exploring the opportunities and risks of 
different ownership and operation models despite each of the cities having very 
different experiences, and types, of heat networks. The importance of local 
authority involvement in order to retain a degree of local control and to deliver 
complex, multiple objectives was however emphasised across the cases, 
despite their different approaches with an interviewee who had worked with all 
three cities suggesting that  
 
‘a lot of people [local authorities] are saying actually we want to be 
in control of this because then we get some kind of grip on getting 
the project to go forward...So the control thing for local authorities 
does seem to be the one common thread’ (interview 23-C). 
 
Despite this wide recognition that local authorities play an important role in 
negotiating multiple objectives a number of tensions were also identified. For 
instance while ‘councils have to really take a leadership role because they’re 
the only organisations that really have got that wider view whether that’s 
regeneration, economic development, fuel poverty’ (interview 19-LA) they will 
have varying capabilities to achieve these multiple outcomes. Smaller 
authorities are likely to find it difficult to resource and develop the competencies 
required to effectively deliver complex heat network projects or to accept the 
higher levels of risk associated with taking a more central role in ownership and 
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operation (interviews 15-NGO, 25-LA, 28-A). As one interview suggested ‘some 
authorities don’t have that big thinking about what heat networks can offer them 
and that certainly goes for a lot of the smaller authorities that haven’t got the 
capacity and where an investment decision for a few million pound heat network 
is quite a big deal’ (interview 17-LA). 
 
Similarly the history, politics, and range of other priorities in each local authority 
are likely play an important role in shaping local approaches. In Sheffield the 
history of a strong industrial sector and ongoing variation in the financial 
position of the local authority had resulted in an emphasis on the economic 
benefits of developing heat networks. There was also considerable familiarity of 
working with multiple partners and an openness to a range of delivery models 
simultaneously being used in the city, including potentially a revival of public 
ownership.  
 
In Birmingham the successes of the BDEC arrangement in delivering a large 
and complex network were acknowledged. However this arrangement was also 
seen as limiting the ambition of the local authority due to the difficulty in 
incorporating fuel poverty objectives. Like Sheffield this resulted in a view that it 
was likely that networks would be operated under a range of models in the city 
but that the local authority potentially had a more significant role to play in the 
future.  
 
Bristol developed their heat network projects during a particularly ambitious 
period in the local authority in relation to climate leadership76 and the lack of 
established governance structures for heat network development appears to 
have enabled the city to have greater debate regarding the role of the local 
authority. In particular the development of a municipal utility was influential in 
promoting the authority to pursue council ownership of networks. The 
development of the municipal utility was driven by both frustration in the city at 
the difficulty in working with mainstream energy suppliers and a desire to 
integrate council activity on fuel poverty and sustainable energy. 
                                                          
76 Including being awarded European Green Capital, securing ELENA funding and attending the 
Paris climate change negotiations in 2015. 
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5.5.3 Ownership and (re)municipalisation 
Interlinked with the ‘role of local government’ storyline an emerging theme 
regarding the ‘(re)municipalisation’ of energy infrastructure and services was 
evident from a range of sources. As commonly the case for emerging storylines 
this narrative was relatively unstructured compared to the coherence of more 
established storylines (Bosman et al., 2014). However heat networks appear to 
be one fora within which wider debates regarding the relative role of state and 
market are being played out. As one interviewee framed it; 
 
‘there is genuinely a populist feeling of we should do something 
different, we should use the resources we’ve got in the city to do 
things better. We’ve always had a very individualistic approach to 
things…we want the local authority in our way as little as possible in 
Britain, that has changed to some extent and the local authorities 
have to some extent been trying to get that ‘we will be your 
champions’ mantle. Big government’s not working, central 
governments not listening to us, we’ll do it locally’ (interview 17-LA). 
 
The (re)municipalisation storyline was evident in a range of local authority, NGO 
and consultancy interviewees actively discussing the relative benefits of different 
forms of local state, community and private ownership (interviews 3-NGO, 15-
NGO, 17-LA, 19-LA, 23-C). This included municipal energy companies being 
presented by some local actors as able to; 
 
‘reflect what the community want. Its democracy in action. It’s 
not some private company that’s only interested in profit. How 
it’s owned influences the decision-making and I think that’s 
right. If the council wants to push revenue because that’s what 
the residents want then that’s what we’d do. As long as there’s 
long-term development and planning I think that’s ok’ 
(interview 17-LA). 
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This is not to say that local authorities were presenting their decisions on heat 
network ownership models as exclusively political debates, as traditional 
business case assessments of the risks and benefits of different models were 
central to decision-making. Local decision-making on ownership and operation, 
although highly complex and locational specific, tended to be significantly driven 
by the overall objectives of the project and the attitude of the local authority to 
the balance between an acceptable level of risk and the desire for control. This 
process is well established in the heat policy literature (Heat and the City 
Project, 2017; Rao et al., 2017) but the findings of the interviews suggests that 
many local authorities may be increasingly focussed on the benefits of local 
control in order to deliver a broad set of benefits, such as regeneration, fuel 
poverty, economic growth and carbon emissions.  
 
Although it is too early to empirically assess whether this has translated into a 
significant increase in local authorities adopting publically controlled ownership 
models77 certainly interviewees in all three cases, and beyond, were indicating 
that their interest in local ownership models had increased. For example Bristol 
indicated that they  
‘want the control basically and don’t want to give it away to E.On 
or Cofely….If we get a third party to invest they’re generally going 
to want to see a higher return than we would and that’s got to 
come from somewhere and it either comes from us charging 
more or from less revenue going back to the city’ (interview 17-
LA). 
 
Publically owned or controlled schemes were described as tending to have 
fewer consumers issues, lower prices for the fuel poor and an ability to have 
‘priorities that go beyond profit’ as well as ‘local accountability’ (interviews 9-
NGO, 21-C). Additionally the focus by many local authorities on ‘prices, fuel 
poverty or having some sort of situation that encourages regeneration through 
cheaper bills, income generation’ was described as ‘pushing you towards a 
cheaper borrowing, public sector approach because you can lever in that 
                                                          
77 The majority of projects, including the three case study cites, are still developing their 
commercialisation and delivery plans. 
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cheaper cost of capital and therefore give you the margins to be able to fulfil 
some of those other objectives’ (interview 21-C). This finding echoes the work 
of Hannon and Bolton (2015) and Webb (2015) in their analysis of Energy 
Service Company (ESCo) models and Aberdeen Heat and Power respectively 
which emphasised how municipal involvement can be framed as a route to 
securing wider social and environmental benefits.  
 
Increasing interest in municipal control was also framed in relation to the 
financial cuts that local authorities have by subject to since 2010. Developments 
in Bristol resonated with this with Bristol Energy indicating that ‘In a time of 
government cuts for local councils, including the end of the revenue support 
grant from central government in 2020, we exist to provide a strong and 
consistent revenue stream for Bristol – an investment that will benefit the city 
and its communities’ (Bristol Energy, 2015). An interviewee that works with a 
wide range of local authorities also suggested that devolution and the ability for 
council to raise capital has been influential in changing local authorities 
approach to heat network ownership; 
 
‘I was looking back at some old reports about how we can fund this 
stuff and it was ‘we can’t, we haven’t got any money’, and now it’s 
‘well we can get money if there’s a case for it’. That relaxation of 
the borrowing rules has unleashed them a little bit…If they have a 
business case they’re quite happy to borrow against it in a large 
number of cases...So I guess actually if you’re trying to put your 
finger on a change that is it. The view that they can obtain their 
financing if they want to and they just have to be able to ensure 
themselves that they can pay it back and get some benefit out of it 
– against one their requirements or return on investment or 
probably a bit of both’ (interview 23-C). 
 
Although the three cases studies in this research were pursuing different 
ownership and operation models they all highlighted how the process of 
determining these choices was value laden and political and went beyond 
simplified characterisations of differing local circumstances. Several local actors 
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also suggested that (some) cities were better able to engage actively in energy 
activities where effective mayors and other political leadership was in place. 
This included an interviewee suggesting that ‘some city mayors are more 
advanced in their thinking that national government and national government is 
a very slow moving body compared to more dynamic cities’ (interview 16-LA). 
The theme of political leadership was particularly referred to in relation to 
Bristol, Manchester and London, which all have high profile climate change 
strategies backed by elected mayors. Of the case study cities political buy-in 
was highlighted as significant in setting a stable strategic framework and 
securing resources in both Birmingham and Bristol. In Bristol both the previous 
mayor, George Ferguson, and the current Mayor Marvin Rees78 promoted the 
role of heat networks as part of the city’s journey to becoming carbon neutral. 
However, despite this political buy-in, the development of heat networks tended 
not to be a high profile issue in the city’s climate change plans and whilst 
residents of social housing connected to the networks have been engaged in 
network development there is limited wider community engagement or 
awareness of the heat network projects. 
 
In Birmingham, when the Broad Street and Eastside schemes were developed, 
the Deputy Leader of the council, Councillor Paul Tilsley, promoted the 
development of heat networks and recruited officer champions from various 
council departments. Elected member support was described as instrumental in 
developing support for the city to take a leadership role in sustainable energy 
and develop heat networks (Sustainability West Midlands, 2014; Climate KIC, 
2015).  
 
In Bristol the development of heat network plans took place at the same time as 
the development of the Bristol City Council energy supply company (Bristol 
Energy). This introduced a storyline of local authority (re)engagement in the 
energy system to senior management and elected representatives which 
appears to have been helpful in supporting the development of council owned 
heat networks. It also increased senior management willingness to engage in 
                                                          
78 Ferguson was the first elected mayor of Bristol between 2012 and 2016. He was an 
independent candidate. Rees was elected in 2016 and is a Labour politician. 
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‘novel’ energy activities. In this context income generation potential and 
concerns regarding the loss of strategic control were repeated highlighted as 
key in evaluating heat network business models (Bristol City Council, 2016a). 
 
Both Sheffield and Birmingham have a history of delivering heat networks via 
commercial partnerships but indicated, that although they may continue to 
deliver some networks via such partnerships they are also exploring the 
potential for a more central council role in future networks, acknowledging the 
potential for revenue raising and greater control. An interviewee involved in 
Birmingham suggested that the city is;  
‘one where the city council felt most let down by the fact that they 
[Cofely] delivered these little bits and then it just stopped and the 
barriers in terms of the required financial returns to make 
anything else happen were so high so they could see nothing 
was going to happen so Birmingham have gone out and been 
actively looking at different ways of doing things’ (interview 23-C). 
 
This resurgence of interest in the role of local government in the energy sector 
was also adopted at a national level by the Association of Public Service 
Excellence (APSE), the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) and the Core 
Cities Group79. The core message of these organisations tended to relate to the 
potential benefits of increased public sector involvement and ownership across 
the energy sector (Platt et al., 2014; Core Cities Group, 2013; APSE, 2013) but 
heat networks were used as a prominent example of an opportunity for public 
ownership. APSE in particular identify a growing role for local government in the 
energy sector and refer to increased interest from local government as a move 
from an ‘enabling’ to an ‘ensuring’ role (Bramah, 2014). This is detailed in their 
2013 publication ‘Manifesto for the Ensuring Council’ which suggests that the 
‘enabling’ model of local government as commissioners rather than providers of 
services may be being challenged by an alternative ‘ensuring council’ model. 
The report highlights the democratic legitimacy of local authorities and their role 
in placing politics and public value before reliance on competitive markets. They 
                                                          
79 The Core Cities group represents England’s eight largest city economies outside London as 
well as Glasgow and Cardiff. 
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also launched ‘APSE Energy’ in 2014 which aims to support local authorities to 
collaborate to ‘enable and facilitate the local municipalisation of energy service’ 
(APSE, 2013: 1). APSE Energy provides knowledge sharing between local 
authorities, legal and procurement advice and support, and runs events and 
workshops. 
 
Similarly IPPR published a report on city energy in 2014 that suggested that 
cities could ‘transform’ efforts to decarbonise the energy system and offer an 
alternative to the established utility companies (Platt et al., 2014: 1). This 
followed the Core Cities publication of ‘Power Up the Cities’ which suggested 
that the group ‘will use their combined strengthen to establish energy 
companies’ and that heat network deployment is ‘often limited in the commercial 
sector by short-term single company commercial reward and risk criteria. Local 
authorities can take a more strategic and long-term view’ (Core Cities Group, 
2013, pp. 1–2). 
 
There is some recognition in industry that a stronger role for local authorities is 
likely in relation to heat network ownership with an industry interviewee stating 
that the  
‘reality for retrofit is that it’s not attractive for the private sector, 
there isn’t any money in it, let alone enough…If you want to reduce 
fuel poverty only the public sector can provide that sort of service 
because of the lower return requirements they have and the 
availability of cheaper finance’ (interview 22-DHU).  
 
The suggestion that joint ventures with local authorities are likely to become 
more frequent while design, build, finance, operate and maintain (DBFOM) 
concession contracts80 are likely to become less common was supported by 
Engie’s announcement in 2016 that they will move away from their established 
DBFOM concession model to focus on providing management, operation and 
maintenance services rather than asset ownership (King, 2016; interviews 18-
DHU, 20-DHU, 22-DHU). 
                                                          
80 Such as the arrangement in Birmingham. 
179 
 
 
 
A number of local government and NGO interviewees highlighted the limited 
opportunities to engaging in productive debates regarding the role of the local 
state in the ownership of the energy system, due in part to the strength of the 
market liberal paradigm in the UK (interviews 14-C, 19-LA). So while many local 
authoritiess are opening up new discussions regarding their role in energy 
infrastructures there is very little parallel debate at the national level, outside of 
framing local government’s role as one of brokerage.  This also demonstrates 
that the roles local government can take in the energy system are to some 
extent contingent upon domestic political institutions with the UK’s political and 
institutional regime historically leaving little space for local government 
involvement in the energy system. Certainly there was an awareness in local 
authorities of their limited capacity to engage in policy debates due to capacity 
issues (interviews 8-LA, 11-MU, 17-LA). This suggests that a number of 
conflicting storylines might be interacting at the scale of heat networks with a 
range of broader governance trends (relating to decentralisation of powers, the 
need to raise revenues and disappointment in contracting out services) driving 
local authorities to reassess their role in infrastructure development. However, 
at the same time the  ability of local government to engage with energy 
infrastructure planning and delivery is limited by the existing governance 
framework where local government has limited local powers and energy system 
norms do not recognise a central role for local government (Webb, 2015; 
Hodson, Marvin and Bulkeley, 2013). 
 
There is growing recognition in academic literatures that the transition to a low 
carbon energy system is likely to create new spaces of agency at the local level 
(Bulkeley et al 2011, Hodson and Marvin, 2010). Hall, Foxon and Bolton (2014) 
illustrate how the range of actors involved in the energy system is diversifying 
as decarbonisation progresses, both to include a wider range of private 
companies and investors, and municipalities, communities and citizen-investors. 
They focus on the emergence of municipal energy companies, regional energy 
planning, community energy schemes and citizen investment models and term 
180 
 
 
this the 'civic energy sector'81. Together with Barton et al. (2015) they suggest 
that this sector could become a substantial element of the UK energy system. 
This suggests that alternative – and specifically municipal and community – 
models of ownership may be growing in importance across the energy sector. 
Given that this may be particularly the case for heat networks it is somewhat 
surprising that this discourse is not reflected to any significant degree in national 
heat network policy debates.  
 
Overall this section indicates the ideational basis upon which some local actors 
were forming storylines relating to heat networks with the local government role 
positioned as part of a wider movement to ‘remunicipalise’ elements of the 
energy system. Indeed as Cumbers and McMaster (2012, p. 165) argue, 
‘debates on re-municipalisation often reach far beyond questions of legal and 
material ownership to include issues of local community control, distributional 
justice, environmental sustainability and justice and enhanced participation – 
collectively termed ideational ownership’. This highlights how ideas about the 
role of the local state, control and equity are embedded in these discussions. 
 
5.5.4 Regulation and Consumer Protection 
To date the approach towards regulation and consumer protection in England 
has been focussed on industry-led, voluntary standard in the form of the Heat 
Trust and the CIBSE Code of Practice. These developments were welcomed 
across interviewee groups and described as a common sense route to 
addressing some consumer protection issues and increasing consumer trust. 
Voluntary standards were framed as ‘quick wins’ that could be pursued 
regardless of other policy action (or inaction) and industry interviews suggested 
that ‘at this embryonic stage of development it’s much more important to self-
regulate than fully regulate’ (interview 22-DHU).  
 
The 2013 Heat Strategy (DECC, 2013b, p. 38) echoed this concern regarding 
over regulating a small industry and ruled out the regulation for heat networks in 
the short-term, announcing that Government ‘will seek to endorse an industry-
                                                          
81 Barton et al. (2015) also refers to the Civic Energy sector. 
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led consumer protection scheme’. This was supported by several industry 
representatives based on the belief that the Code of Practice and the Heat Trust 
‘will increase confidence in the sector and the [financing] gap will gradually 
diminish whilst attracting a secondary market of longer term – and lower cost – 
institutional investors’ (King, 2015). However, several interviewees suggested 
that these measures were having limited impact to date due to the relatively low 
membership of the Heat Trust;  
 
‘our biggest concern around the Heat Trust is that not enough 
people will sign up and I think that’s broadly been proven to be 
true as, as ADE will tell you, there’s been lots of people who’ve 
said ‘we’re interested’ but unfortunately it’s not had a huge 
number taking it up. I think the only people who’ve signed up so 
far are E.On and GDF Suez/Cofely, so the two biggest 
operators in the market who you would expect have the 
processes and resources in place to be compliant anyway…In 
our conversations with local councils they said ‘we’d love to sign 
up to a consumer protection scheme but we’re worried about the 
cost’ (interview 24-NGO). 
 
In a similar vein there was acknowledgment from many policy and industry 
actors that industry standards and consumer protection measures are likely to 
need to be formalised in future to ensure minimum levels of consumer 
protection as more people are connected to heat networks (interviews 7-DHU, 
22-DHU). A number of interviewees pointed out that central government funding 
or local government concession contracts could effectively make existing 
voluntary standards mandatory by requiring membership of and compliance 
with the Heat Trust and the Code of Practice as a condition of funding or 
contracts. Indeed the Heat Networks Investment Project application guidance 
requires that eligible networks are a member of Heat Trust or equivalent. 
However these discourses, based on a perceived ‘sensible’ and ‘step by step’ 
approach, are generally focussed on the short-term development of a heat 
network industry in England and there was a theme from NGOs and local 
authorities that this approach was limiting debate of alternatives and long-term 
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regulatory certainty. Heat networks were described as operating in a ‘regulatory 
vacuum’ which was undermining existing support and increasing the cost of 
capital (interview 15-NGO). Discussion of longer-term routes to ensuring 
consumer protection and industry quality such as mandatory industry standards, 
network operator licensing, heat price oversight or regulation, access to an 
ombudsman or the zoning of heat network areas was very limited with the 
government focussed on establishing an industry before ‘burdening’ them with 
regulation. 
 
Consumer protection groups, unsurprisingly, suggested that more attention 
needs to be paid to consumer issues particularly as it was suggested that there 
was limited incentive for existing poorly performing schemes to join the Heat 
Trust as they already have a captive customer base so do not need to join the 
scheme in order to attract new customers (interview 9-NGO). Likewise several 
interviewees suggested that membership of the Heat Trust favoured established 
players who were involved in the development of the scheme and were likely to 
be better able to afford membership fees than smaller, particularly local 
authority or community owned, schemes.   
 
5.6 Key events and windows of opportunity 
Hajer's (1995, p. 271) seminal analysis of environmental policy-making in 
relation to acid rain highlights how ‘sensory experiences’ – including meetings, 
events and excursions82 – could be both employed to influence policy and come 
into conflict with other institutional norms such as the need to provide scientific 
evidence of a phenomenon.  
 
In relation to heat network development in England a number of events and 
face-to-face interactions were revealed as important by interviewees. These 
events tend not to be referred to in policy documentation as an important role 
for individuals and events does not tend to fit well within perceptions of the 
policy process as rational and evidence led. Despite this a number of 
interviewees highlighted the appointment of David MacKay as Chief Scientific 
                                                          
82 Hajer specifically referred to the role of parliamentary excursions to sites of dying trees as 
well as meetings and events. 
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Advisor within BEIS in 2009 as part of the reason why heat networks were not 
initially given a prominent role in decarbonisation policy83. Although the 
influence of MacKay was highlighted by several interviewees it seems that 
reference to Mackay was used as a shorthand to represent the problems 
related to relying on an all-electric future as interviewees also identified that the 
technology preferences of a number of other individuals were key in side-lining 
heat networks, including various Secretaries of State and senior DECC/BEIS 
staff (interviews 3-NGO, 14-C, 27-G, 28-A). One interviewee suggested that 
BEIS ‘don’t really like district heat at all, there’s something within, particularly 
the higher officers within DECC, that doesn’t like it and I’ve never really quite 
understood why’ (interview 27-G). 
 
Face to face interactions between ADE and BEIS, in the form of regular formal 
and informal policy discussions and events, appear to have been significant in 
developing rapport and trust between policymakers and the industry body. Both 
organisations benefitted from this cooperative process as the policy advice and 
numerous working groups that ADE coordinated were an important source of 
industry information and informal consultation, in what interviewees described 
as an overstretched heat network team within BEIS. One interview specifically 
suggested that ADE played a role in providing evidence to BEIS to support 
officers with the department to ‘win the arguments internally’ on heat networks 
(interview 27-G). Likewise ADE benefited from a close relationship with BEIS as 
they could demonstrate that they were representing their member’s interests in 
the policy development process.  
 
A study tour to Denmark which ADE organised was highlighted as particularly 
significant in developing support for heat networks across BEIS. This was 
presented as ‘We needed to get David Wagstaff [Head of the Heat Directorate 
in BEIS] out to see heat networks in their context…within a month or so of his 
appointment we took him to Copenhagen and Malmo…That led David to take 
the initiative and then more people got it and now we have a heat industry 
directorate and all of a sudden heat has risen up the agenda. And that really 
                                                          
83 See section 5.4.1 for further discussion of MacKay and an ‘all electric future’. 
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was the seed of it’ (interview 29-TA). The study tour acted to embed personal 
connections between individuals within the government department and ADE 
and to consolidate working relationships on future policy development. 
Interestingly the study tour does not appear to have translated into extensive 
debate of ownership and regulatory models although the Danish system 
operates under a not-for-profit model where networks are either municipally or 
community owned and municipalities often act as guarantor to district energy 
companies84. Instead the feedback from interviewees was that this trip 
impressed on attendees the feasibility of high penetrations of heat networks and 
the role they could potentially play in delivering wider energy system services 
such as flexibility, grid balancing and storage. This demonstrates how 
institutional norms can strongly shape the discursive space open to discuss 
policy options as the Danish model was described by several attendees as not 
replicable in the UK due to the different histories85, energy system 
requirements86 and policymaking cultures of the countries (interviews 14-C, 22-
DHU, 28-A).  
 
At a local level there was a storyline held between several local authorities and 
a number of advisory organisations relating to a number of early Cofely 
schemes in England in shaping current perceptions of concession models. This 
storyline focussed on perceived problems encountered by local authorities 
involved in Cofely concession contracts in achieving the desired level of control 
in network development and not receiving the expected level of profit share. 
Additionally difficulties in liaising with some key Cofely staff were reported. 
These issues were presented as spreading across local authorities interested in 
heat networks in a ‘word of mouth’ manner and some local government 
interviewees suggested it influenced their reluctance to pursue an ESCo 
concession model (interviews 14-C, 25-LA, 27-G). As one local authority 
interviewee put it ‘if you go too early with an investment company that know 
                                                          
84 KommuneKredit, a credit union for Danish cities, lends out more than DKK1 billion (€135 
million) annually to district energy companies where municipalities act as guarantor (UNEP, 
2015). 
85 The initial policy focus on heat networks in Denmark took place in the wake of the 1979 oil 
shock when the UK was starting to exploit indigenous gas reserves.  
86 Denmark has a relatively low population, concentrated in a small number of cities and 
extensive biomass resources. 
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what they’re doing they’re going to probably tie you up into a contract that is not 
in the best interests for you as a city. The Birminghams, Southamptons they 
couldn’t be more annoyed about how things were set up and we don’t want to 
go there’ (interview 17-LA).  
 
These examples of key events also demonstrate the importance of individuals 
in heat network policy development in the UK. The Danish visit, the appointment 
of MacKay and the poor performance of some Cofely scheme were all related to 
the role of key individuals. Likewise all three English case studies were shaped 
by ‘wilful individuals’ with Mayors, Councillors, Senior Management sponsors 
and committed project staff referred to as pivotal in all three cases. The 
importance of individuals in shaping infrastructure systems has been 
recognised since Hughes' (1983) work on electricity infrastructure which 
stressed the importance of motivated and entrepreneurial system builders in 
overcoming both technical and non-technical barriers. This reliance on 
individuals has been identified as particularly important in relation to heat 
networks ‘due to the lack of an overarching regulatory and policy framework’ 
(Bolton, 2011, p. 210). Bolton goes on to suggests that the ‘political nature of 
councils means that there are a number of tiers of decision making within a 
centralized and hierarchical structure which makes individuals or technical and 
political champions particularly important agents of change within this highly 
structured environment’ (Bolton, 2011, p. 211). However this importance of 
individuals should be seen in the context of an equally important role for 
complex actor networks. In her study of the development of a district heating 
scheme in Sweden, Jane Summerton highlights the importance of what she 
terms a ‘multi-organisation’ or an ‘invisible grid’ where actors ‘functionally 
interact to achieve a shared purpose, performing different roles in support of the 
system (…) this may be centred around a central body or focal organisation that 
has specific planning, coordinative and decision-making functions’ (Summerton, 
1992: p.79). These ‘multi-organisations‘, which bring coherence to a sometimes 
fragmented set of energy institutions and technologies at the local level, are 
unique to each of the schemes involving different relationships between public 
and private actors and different approaches to the planning and operation of the 
energy systems themselves.  
186 
 
 
 
The case study cities also demonstrated the importance of both historical 
context and windows of opportunity in heat network development. Due to the 
long-term and complex nature of heat network development successful projects 
require the alignment of multiple interests and, the case studies suggest, 
require a range of external factors to align to create a compelling case for the 
commitment of key actors to long-term and potentially risky projects. Specifically 
wider momentum relating to the cities commitments to carbon reduction were 
significant in creating an arena in which heat networks could be aligned with 
decarbonisation plans. In Bristol the opportunity to apply for ELENA funding, the 
achievement of European Green Capital and the appointment of a City Mayor 
with an interest in environmental issues all served to focus local actors on 
decarbonisation, allowing heat network projects to be incorporated into long-
term energy planning. Likewise in Birmingham the regeneration of areas of the 
city centre presented the opportunity to develop masterplans for central 
Birmingham at the same time as the council was developing climate change 
projects.  
 
As discussed in section 5.5.2 regarding the role of local authorities in heat 
networks, twin themes were identified in relation to both (1) constrained local 
authority finances and (2) local governance devolution opening space for local 
government to reconsider their role in various sectors. This was framed by a 
number of subnational interviewees as creating a ‘window of opportunity’ for the 
role of cities in the energy transition to be re-examined. Although this 
opportunity was identified in some interviews, and in a number of published 
documents, it was far from a consensus storyline with many interviewees 
focussing on market based models of heat network delivery. This illustrates how 
although windows of opportunity can be important routes to allowing a storyline 
to begin to be shared by groups of actors the persistence of powerful 
institutional discourses can still act to block new storylines. 
 
5.7 Coalitions and actor networks 
The presence of shared storylines in relation to a specific policy arena can be 
identified as a discourse coalition and Hajer (2006) suggests that the 
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dominance of a discourse can be partly determined by reference to both the 
extent of its use and its use by identifiable discourse coalitions. Analysing 
discourse coalitions can be helpful in exploring discourse structuration as they 
can indicate the location of commonalities in storylines between actors and 
which storylines and discourse are most widely used. This section explores how 
heat network discourses are being structured in England through their use by 
formal and informal coalitions and how various key groups are acting to 
coordinate storylines.  
 
5.7.1 BEIS and the HNDU 
The existence of the HNDU since 2013 was consistently emphasised as a key 
development and was characterised as providing valuable resources and 
support to local authorities. However the HNDU, and the Heat Directorate in 
BEIS more broadly, were also described as overstretched and side-lined with 
several local authorities and consultants questioning whether the approach of 
funding many feasibilities, instead of supporting a smaller number of key 
schemes through to delivery, was the most effective route to developing heat 
networks. This included a concern that many feasibilities would be ‘just sat on 
the shelf’ (interviews 4-G, 13-C, 17-LA, 19-LA, 23-C, 28-A). It should be noted 
here that the interviews that form part of the basis for this research were carried 
out before the announcement of £320m of commercialisation funding through 
the HNIP. However, it is too early to assess the proportion of projects that were 
funded by the HNDU that progress to delivery and/or are supported by the 
HNIP.  
 
In terms of the wider actor networks liaising with the HNDU local interviewees 
indicated that local authorities had a ‘voice’ in the HNDU but questioned 
whether that feeds through to policy development (interview 15-NGO). In 
particular there was respect for the experience and commitment of individuals 
within HNDU but the perception that they had limited influence on policy 
development as the unit is focussed on delivery. Many of the individuals within 
the HNDU had a local authority background and were generally operating on a 
peripatetic basis so it is somewhat unclear the extent to which they are 
integrated into the wider civil service culture or influenced the policy direction in 
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BEIS. Certainly local authorities and other industry commentators framed the 
HNDU team and other members of the heat directorate as part of the same 
coalition at themselves and suggested that the ‘the border line not between us 
and them but between them and other people in the department’ (interview 14-
C). 
 
While the HNDU has clearly been an important factor in accelerating local 
authority activity on heat networks the department’s own evaluation of the Unit 
suggested that most local authorities had already been progressing heat 
network projects before the HNDU team supported them and had (and were) 
accessing other forms of support. This included from universities, the Homes 
and Communities Agency (HCA), the Vanguard Network, APSE Energy, 
European funding (e.g. ELENA), and a variety of regional/sub- regional entities 
including LEPs, Core Cities and the GLA (DECC, 2015e; BEIS, 2018a). This 
indicates the importance of coalitions and networks to local authorities. In the 
Bristol this included engagement with the Carbon Trust, the Centre for 
Sustainable Energy and other local authorities in the city region, as well as 
European networks. In Sheffield this took the form of long-term relationships 
with local industries and heat network partners and in Birmingham is spanned 
both partnerships with local public and private sector organisations and co-
ordination with other local authorities in the Greater Birmingham and Solihull 
Local Enterprise Partnership area (interviews 8-LA, 17-LA, 25-LA). 
 
5.7.2 The role of the Association for Decentralised Energy 87 
As discussed, the ADE was widely identified as a central actor in shaping heat 
network debates due to their strong links to both the industry and the 
Government, and to a lesser extent local authorities. There was a high level of 
respect for their analysis and industry knowledge amongst interviewees 
however sub-national interviewees highlighted that, although local authorities 
and consumer groups are represented on some ADE working groups in general 
there is limited local authority or community energy representation within the 
                                                          
87 Formerly the Combined Heat and Power Association (CHPA) but referred to throughout this 
thesis as the ADE for consistency. 
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organisation (interviews 2-C, 3-NGO, 4-G). This is supported by analysis of their 
membership base with only 10 local authorities as heat network members, from 
a total of 68 organisations.  
 
Similarly the ADE coordinated the development of the Heat Trust which several 
local authorities highlighted was difficult for smaller organisations and local 
authorities to join due to costs and membership requirements that favoured 
large organisations, such as the requirement to have a 24 hour 
enquiry/emergency call centre. To date there are no local authority Heat Trust 
members with membership limited to six commercial companies who operate 
41 networks in London and 10 networks outside of London. 
 
The approach of the ADE was also framed by a range of actors as initially 
focussing on areas of uncontentious policy agreement in order to establish a 
coalition of support which gave them a mandate to work closely with BEIS and 
established their key advisory role. These ‘easy win’ policy areas included the 
development of a consumer protection scheme and industry standards (in the 
form of the Heat Trust and Code of Practice).  
 
The ADE appears to have established itself as a focal point for dominant 
narratives with the government’s approach to supporting heat networks, from 
2012 onwards, closely reflecting the advice of the ADE. For example ADE 
launched the ‘Big Offer’ in November 2012 which advocated seven key actions 
to promote the growth of heat networks (ADE, 2012). This included a 
commitment from ADE to establish a customer protection scheme (now the 
Heat Trust) and a request for government to provide short-term support to heat 
network development (which became the HNDU). Table 10 illustrates the 
elements of the Big Ask and the status of each point, with only the development 
of loan guarantees not yet delivered.   
 
Table 10: ADE Big Offer elements and current status 
Big Offer elements (November 
2012) 
Current status 
District heating database of 
opportunity 
Delivered - Heat Map has been 
developed for England and Wales 
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District heating development support 
agency 
Delivered - HNDU launched in 
September 2013 and ongoing. 
District heating development fund for 
local authorities 
Delivered - HNDU administers grant 
support for local authorities to support 
Heat mapping, Energy master 
planning, Feasibility studies, Detailed 
project development, 
Commercialisation. 
 
District heating contract framework Partially delivered - The District 
Energy Procurement Agency (DEPA) 
has been developed with financial 
support from BEIS. DEPA is a 
municipal not-for-profit procurement 
cooperative specialising in goods and 
services in the district energy market 
which aims to reduce heat networks 
project costs in the UK through joint 
procurement. 
Loan guarantees for district heating Not yet agreed but the HNIP has 
made £320million of heat network 
capital funding available to unlock 
finance. 
Customer protection scheme Delivered - Heat Trust consumer 
protection scheme launched in 2015. 
Industry support for Government 
policy making on district heating 
Delivered - Various working groups 
convened. ADE has established a 
‘Post-2020 Heat Network 
Arrangements’ to advise government. 
 
The ADE have also been a strong voice advocating for the prioritisation of 
access to finance and promoting the adoption of mainstream financial 
terminology in policy discussions. In their response to the Energy and Climate 
Change Select Committee on Heat in 2013 (CHPA, 2013) they welcomed the 
establishment of the HNDU but suggested that support to attract long-term 
investment funding and bespoke financial support were areas that required 
more focus88.  
 
This theme has continued in their interactions with the Scottish Government on 
heat networks where they responded to the consultation on the regulation of 
heat networks by arguing that clear commercial contracts and concession 
agreements will enable the delivery of a wide range of outcomes ‘akin to 
                                                          
88 They also highlighted the need to maintain planning requirements that support heat networks. 
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regulation’ (ADE, 2017a). They also highlight their taskforce on ‘Post-2020 Heat 
Network Arrangements’ which is focussed on how to reduce investment risk for 
heat networks to a comparable level with new gas, waste and power network 
investments. They cite the need to ‘completely or near-completely de-risk heat 
network revenues’ and highlight how the Scottish government could guarantee 
set heat revenues to network concession holders, citing similar current 
arrangements in PFI contracts. In the consultation response they go on to 
indicate that it is important that concessions remain under the control of local 
authorities but that local authorities may be conflicted when issuing or enforcing 
concessions held by companies in which they are involved. They suggest that 
concessions should be ‘viewed as a local authority procurement exercise, 
where the local authority is contracting with the best private sector provider to 
deliver a set of social, environmental and consumer outcomes, there is arguably 
a more transparent commercial relationship between the local authority 
procuring the service and the commercial body delivering it’ (ADE, 2017a, p. 7). 
 
In summary the ADE have promoted two core storylines – both of which have 
developed considerable purchase with government – of promoting an industry 
led approach to regulation and advocating that government policy focusses on 
addressing financial barriers to heat networks. While these two issues are likely 
to be helpful to supporting heat network developments, ADE have co-opted 
actors onto these priority storylines through their close relationship with the heat 
team in BEIS and their extensive industry presence. This has somewhat limited 
the ability of competing discourses to have influence, including those of local 
governance, regulation and consumer protection.  
 
5.7.3 Local authority discourse coalitions 
As discussed in section 5.4.2 an emerging narrative was evident amongst sub-
national actors regarding the benefits of local government control of heat 
networks and the remunicipalisation of energy infrastructure. Although shared 
by a range of local authorities and local governance organisations this emerging 
storyline was by no means universally held by all local authorities and even 
when used tended to be interpreted in a range of ways. For example some 
actors framed a more central local authority role as a practical measure to 
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ensure networks were developed with the potential to expand in the future 
whilst others saw it as an ideological challenge to the diminished role of local 
governance. This ambiguity can be helpful, allowing actors to fit a storyline to 
their own interest (Schmidt, 2006) and acting to recruit a wider coalition. 
However it also demonstrates the difficulties faced by emerging narratives in 
establishing a coherent message and recruiting coalition members who 
advocate for similar ideas. Regardless of these different interpretations of the 
‘local authority ownership’ storyline there was a high degree of consensus 
relating to the ability of a strong local authority role to ensure that wider energy 
system, social and local economy benefits of heat networks are realised. 
Additionally a significant number of sub-national interviewees were linking 
debates regarding the role of local authorities in heat networks to wider, 
ideological debates relating to the role of the sub-national state in the delivery of 
social goods. 
 
Bristol and Birmingham provide contrasting approaches in this respect. In 
Bristol there was a strong emphasis on local authority control and heat networks 
were being developed in the context of the council launching a municipal energy 
supply company aimed at providing ‘social goods’. Birmingham, in comparison, 
has a history of partnership delivery in order to reduce risk and, although now 
interested in the potential for a stronger role for the council in future, sees this in 
the context of a continued diversity of delivery models. 
 
Notwithstanding the complexity evident in the ‘local authority ownership’ 
discourse coalition a range of local governance networks were engaged in this 
storyline and influential in promoting and adding credibility to this discourse. For 
instance the Core Cities Group, APSE, District Energy Vanguard Network and a 
range of other local authority networks89 all promoted either a storyline of 
energy remunicipalisation or of the role of local government in realising the 
wider benefits of heat networks. Whilst this helped to establish the storyline 
within a sub-national actor network it has had limited resonance with national 
discourses.  
                                                          
89 Such as the South West Local Authority District Energy Network. 
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5.8 Institutionalisation 
As discussed in chapter 3 this research aims to explore the processes by which 
heat network actors are both constrained by institutional frameworks and 
influence these frameworks through discursive interactions. This section 
explores this relationship through scrutiny of the institutional practices in which 
discourses are produced including change and maintenance of existing 
structures and the failure of efforts at institutional change. Chapter 7 explores 
how different types and levels of ideas interact with discourse and institutions, 
and the concluding chapter relates the findings of this research to the research 
questions and makes a number of conclusions regarding how an examination of 
heat networks in England and Germany through a DI lens contributes to our 
understanding of urban transitions. 
 
This section outlines that multiple storylines and ideas are being embedded into 
heat network institutional structures in England. This complexity, and the 
sometimes contradictory storylines being embedded at different scales, reflects 
the limited nature of current governance structures for heat networks and the 
complex range of actors, interests and ideas involved in energy transitions, 
particularly in an ‘embryonic’ industry like heat networks in England. In 
particular informal institutional structures were revealed to be particularly 
significant as there are currently limited formal institutions governing heat 
networks with no independent agency responsible for regulation, licensing or 
standards and little direct government policy outside of the formation of the 
HNDU team. Engagement with a range of broader networks was revealed to be 
important in constructing a case within local authorities to pursue heat network 
projects. In Bristol this included engagement with informal European networks, 
such as such as ICLEI90, Energy Cities91 and ELENA, which helped the local 
authority to integrate heat networks into its wider ambitions to be an 
internationally leading city on climate change action. However city networks, 
outside of commercial agreements, tended not to be formalised with complex 
                                                          
90 ICLEI: Local Governments for Sustainability is a network of sustainable cities and facilitates 
local government input to United Nations (UN) processes such as the UN Framework 
Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity.  
91 Energy Cities is the European Association of local authorities in energy transition. 
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actor constellations engaging in heat network developments in each of the 
locations.  
 
Informal institutional norms were particularly significant in shaping debate and 
the formation of policy options. As discussed in section 5.3 an established 
storyline of the need to fit heat network business cases into investment ‘norms’ 
and attract finance through de-risking projects (currently largely through HNIP 
funding and HNDU support) was promoted by industry actors and strongly 
evident in Government debates. The reinforcement of these ‘norms’ through 
storylines adopted by key policy actors such as the ADE and BEIS highlights 
that argumentation is not as simple as explicit debate and includes more subtle 
processes such as blackboxing issues by making them appear as ‘fixed, 
natural, or essential’ (Hajer, 1995a, p. 272). The focus on fitting heat network 
projects to investment norms therefore positions the need for private investment 
to be levered into heat networks as undisputable and beyond doubt and acts to 
marginalise alternative priorities, for example debate of alternative methods of 
de-risking networks or the implications for financing if a large proportion of 
networks are local authority owned and financed.  
 
As discussed in section 5.7 much of the current approach to heat network 
development is based on industry-led consumer protection and self-regulation. 
The construction of heat networks in England as an ‘emerging’ industry and 
therefore the importance of not over-regulating at this stage, together with the 
central role of ADE in influencing debates, appears to have been influential in 
shaping the government’s approach to regulation. This has led to industry-led 
regulation being, to some extent, institutionalised through the development of 
the HNIP as funding requires schemes to specify that developments are part of 
the Heat Trust and meet the Code of Practice. However interviewees from 
across sectors emphasised that the future of heat network regulation is likely to 
be revisited as the number of consumers connected to networks grows and 
there was a broad consensus that it is likely that some formal regulatory 
framework would be developed in the future. There was debate amongst 
interviewees regarding when it might be most beneficial to develop a formal 
regulatory framework with NGOs suggesting that this should implemented as 
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soon as possible whereas industry and local authority representatives tended to 
suggest that this should be at an unspecified future date once the industry was 
established. Industry interviewees acknowledged that this institutionalisation of 
industry-led consumer protection and regulation may be temporary however 
current arrangements are also likely to influence the development of future 
regulation and appear to be one route through which industry groups are 
attempting to shape the future evolution of heat network regulation.  
 
One of the key storylines identified in this research relates to the role of local 
authorities in heat network development and operation. As discussed this was 
an area of both consensus and contestation which was also reflected in the 
processes of institutionalisation of these discourses. Consensus regarding the 
importance of local authorities in coordinating heat network projects resulted in 
a central role for local authorities in heat network support schemes such as the 
HNDU and the HNIP. However, although local authorities are the core 
coordination organisations in these schemes and the conduit for funding, the 
HNDU and HNIP are somewhat ambiguous regarding their role beyond 
coordination. Additionally strong institutional discourses relating to the need for 
heat networks to fit within existing energy system structures and the need to 
attract international finance have acted to block detailed consideration of the 
unique characteristics of heat networks and the importance of wider social, 
environmental and economic benefits. Although there was consensus that one 
of the key benefits of a central local authority role in heat networks was their 
ability to balance multiple priorities, existing heat network governance structures 
do not provide a framework to value non-financial benefits and balance a 
complex range of local and wider energy system benefits. This is further 
embedded by a lack of institutional structures to engage and represent local 
governance interests in energy policy. So although a discourse coalition was 
evident in relation to local authority ownership it had little opportunity to engage 
with national policy in a coordinated manner.  
 
Outside of specific debates regarding heat networks there was a gradual 
institutionalisation of a more significant role for local authorities through the 
development of devolved governance structures which ascribe greater 
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autonomy to local authorities. Although the extent to which this devolution is 
giving new powers to local governments is contested, this storyline together 
with a need for local government to identify sources of new revenue, is leading 
to a wider discursive context that is prompting local authorities to reconsider 
their role in a range of sectors, particularly in relation to the delivery of 
infrastructure. However this institutionalisation is taking place within broader 
governance structures, such as devolution deals and through new powers to be 
more commercial, rather than in energy specifically.  
 
Increased engagement in the energy system by local authorities is not 
necessarily easy and an interviewee working with numerous local authorities 
suggested that while 
‘there is nothing to stop councils in terms of the energy transition we 
keep coming up against the barrier that is the energy industry and 
how its structured in the UK. What’s starting to happen therefore is 
that councils are saying actually we need control of the network, we 
need access, we need to maximise the value to communities and 
local economies, to do that we need to be in supply, we need to have 
more control over the distribution network’ (interview 19-LA).  
 
This theme of wider energy system structures and institutions not supporting 
municipal action on decarbonisations is supported by a report from the Energy 
Research Partnership (ERP) on the role of cities in the UK energy agenda 
which suggesting that ‘City Authorities have no clear mandate to engage in 
development of the UK energy system and the ability for Local Authorities to 
take on more fiscal responsibility and engage in energy development is limited 
given their renewed focus on core services due to austerity measures. 
However, City or Local Authorities are best placed to enable this co-ordination 
given the complex socio-technical and socio-economic requirements…There is 
a tension, therefore, in that central government policies especially around 
energy are placing a greater need for the involvement of Local Authorities at a 
time when the capacity for them to engage is being reduced’ (Workman, 2015, 
p. 7). 
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Notwithstanding the similarities and differences between national contexts 
discussed, all the cases studied also revealed the importance of locally 
contingent networks and historic contexts in shaping network development and 
governance structures. For example in Sheffield a strong local narrative relating 
sustainable energy to economic competitiveness and the ‘green economy’ was 
important in creating political momentum for expanding heat networks, as was 
the cities long history of operating heat networks. The local authority’s familiarity 
in coordinating action between public and private sector agencies was 
significant in the development of multiple heat network delivery models but a 
more recent focus on opportunities for the local authority to develop revenue 
raising projects appeared to be influencing its approach to future network 
development. In contrast, in Bristol, a strong narrative of being a leading city on 
climate change, together with political support for energy projects and a history 
of local public sector partners working together allowed heat networks to be 
positioned as an important part of the cities long-term climate objectives. The 
wider context of the city establishing a municipal electricity and gas supply 
company, as well as the flexibility provided by a lack of historical delivery 
models, also prompted the city to reject commercial ownership or financing of 
the networks. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the key themes in the English case studies and 
national discourses. It suggests that although local history and context are 
revealed to be significant in shaping heat network trajectories there was greater 
divergence between national and local discourses than between case study 
locations. 
 
In particular local actors highlighted how a changing local governance agenda, 
both in terms of devolution and a constrained financial situation, was interacting 
with many local authority’s approach to energy, including heat networks. There 
was little reference to this theme at the national level although there was 
increasing acknowledgement of the critical local coordination role local 
government tends to play in heat networks.  
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Local authorities across the cases identified that they played a unique role 
locally in mediating the delivery of complex, multiple priorities via heat networks. 
The cases all identified values outside of financial rate of return as significant 
drivers for heat network development but also highlighted the difficulty in 
aligning complex priorities across long timescale and diverse actor groups. In 
this respect the  
 
Informal institutional structures, such as norms regarding the role of local 
authorities and financial appraisal practices, were revealed to be particularly 
significant as there are currently limited formal institutions governing heat 
networks with no independent agency responsible for regulation, licensing or 
standards and little direct government policy outside of the formation of the 
HNDU team. Institutional norms relating to financial appraisal were also 
identified as playing an important role in constraining the ability of alternative 
narratives to establish, with strong traditions of competition and private capital 
embedded in policy discourses. Additionally a lack of institutional structures to 
engage sub-national actors in energy policy was evident.  
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Chapter 6: Germany results and discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines and explores the findings of the empirical research carried 
out in Germany. This includes exploration of discourses and actor networks, 
discourse structuration and institutionalisation. It is based on examination of 
policy documents, industry reports and 24 interviews with heat network policy 
actors in Germany. The chapter is presented as follows; the first section of the 
chapter describes the current status and development of heat networks in the 
three German case study locations of Hamburg, Frankfurt am Main and Rhein 
Hünsruck. The following sections then discuss the development of problem 
definitions, discourses and actor networks, drawing on both the case studies 
and analysis of national discourses. The institutionalisation of discourses and 
policy approaches is then reviewed in section 6.7. 
 
This chapter indicates that in Germany there is a strong focus on the potential 
for heat networks to support decarbonisation and energy system flexibility and 
less focus on other social or economic objectives than in England. In light of this 
the policy focus largely was on the need to support gas-CHP, reflecting the 
political importance of reducing coal use in Germany.  
 
It is argued that there is a broad acceptance in Germany that a range of actors 
and ownership structures should be involved in the energy system, and 
institutional structures exist which cement an influential role for municipalities in 
energy governance. Despite this the context for cities in the energy system is 
undergoing some change with increasing focus on remunicipalisation and the 
potential for city utilities to contribute to rapid energy system decarbonisation.  
 
There is less evidence of key events being significant in shaping heat network 
development than in England and more discursive similarities between the local 
and national scale. Despite this there were considerable differences in the 
politicisation of heat networks at the local and national level. Nationally heat 
networks were presented as unproblematic and largely a question of providing 
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the right financial support, whereas locally all three cases linked decisions 
regarding heat network development and municipal ownership to wider political 
changes and other local conflicts. 
 
6.2 Case studies 
In the following section the history and key framings of the three German case 
study locations are outlined. Detailed analysis of these cases is then 
incorporated into the rest of the chapter.  
 
6.2.1 Frankfurt-am-Main 
Frankfurt am Main is the fifth largest city in Germany and has adopted strong 
climate protection goals since the 1990s. In 1989 the city established an 
‘Energiereferat’ (Municipal Energy Agency) and, in 1991, developed a climate 
change strategy which set targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50% 
by 2030. This led to the development of an ‘energy concept’ for Frankfurt with 
three pillars of energy efficiency, renewable energy and combined heat and 
power. In line with these ambitious goals a strong narrative of being a ‘leading’ 
city on climate change action was evident in policy documents and interviews, 
with several references to the city’s climate change targets exceeding national 
plans and the city’s role in founding the ‘Climate Alliance of European Cities’, a 
group of municipalities in Europe formed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(Friedel, 2010, interviews 31-LA, 34-MU). 
 
A focus on decentralized co-generation was established in the city from the 
early 1990s and from 1992 the City Council, working with the local utility, 
incentivised CHP through various incentives and subsidies. In 2000, following 
electricity market liberalization, the utility was required to stop subsidising CHP 
(Friedel, 2010), however by this point the main heat networks in the city had 
been established. More recently the Sustainable Energy Action Plan set a target 
for the city to be 100% renewable by 2050 and heat networks are highlighted as 
important in achieving the city’s carbon reduction aims (Energiereferat Stadt 
Frankfurt am Main, 2008).  
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There are currently three large heat networks in the city which, together with 
industrial CHP networks, account for approximately 47% of heat demand in the 
city, incorporating 12% of households, 57% of commercial buildings and 65% of 
industry (Steinkrüger, 2014). The three main heat networks are owned and 
operated by the local utility, Mainova, which is majority owned (>75%) by the 
city of Frankfurt. Of the three main networks two are fuelled by fossil fuels (coal 
and gas) and one by waste. The city plans to extend and interconnect the three 
networks by 2020 and increase the share of renewable heat to 15%, it also 
plans to modernise the coal station to increase efficiency (Steinkrüger, 2014). 
 
In framing its energy policy the city outlines six roles for local authorities; as an 
energy consumer, city planner, property developer, energy provider, facilitator 
and educator (Fay, 2013). To bring these roles together the local authority takes 
responsibility for developing a city-wide energy strategy, integrating this with 
urban development and providing various coordination services, including the 
development of various tools for the technical, economic and environmental 
evaluation of CHP and heat network projects. This included detailed modelling 
of options for delivering the 100% renewable target by 205092 which identified 
renewable heat networks as an important part of the city’s strategy. More 
specifically the Energiereferat produces ‘energy concepts’ for individual urban 
districts and development areas which determines whether an area will be 
connected to the heat network (Friedel, 2010). Connection can then be required 
via a local statute, although this is rarely implemented.  
 
As discussed the main heat networks in Frankfurt are owned and operated by 
the local utility Mainova. Although majority owned by the municipality, Mainova 
operates under a complex ownership structure which has undergone several 
changes since the 1990s. Initially Mainova was fully municipally owned but in 
1996 it was partly-privatised with 24.5% sold to Thüga, a subsidiary of E.On. In 
2009 Frankfurt, together with a consortium of municipalities93 seeking to extend 
                                                          
92 Produced by the Fraunhofer Institute in Stuttgart 
93 The consortium is called Integra/KOM9. Integra consists of a consortia of Enercity 
(Stadtwerke Hannover AG), Mainova (Frankfurt), and N-ERGIE (Nuremberg) with each 
acquiring 20.75% of Thüga shares. The KOM9 consortium is made up of 45 German municipal 
utilities and acquired 37.75% Thüga shares. 
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their energy investments, bought back Thüga resulting in Frankfurt owning over 
20% of Thüga. So although the utility is not entirely owned by the city 
government they directly and indirectly hold over 75% of shares, as outlined in 
figure 19. Following the purchase of Thüga the city merged Mainova with other 
municipal services to create a multi-utility which sold electricity, heating, natural 
gas, water and energy services. Part of the rationale for this merger was to 
avoid various elements of the local utility competing for customers, for example 
between gas supply and connection to the heat network.  
 
Figure 19: Ownership structure of Mainova 
 
(Fürniß, 2012) 
 
The focus on heat network development in Frankfurt is on expanding and 
interconnecting existing networks and reducing the carbon intensity of heat, 
rather than the development of new networks. This involves both the 
development of renewable heat projects which feed into the heat grid and 
improvements to the coal and gas plant to reduce emissions. Although Mainova 
are responsible for the development and operation of the heat networks the 
municipality supports this through the Municipal Energy Agency working with 
spatial planning team to phase development of the network with new 
developments and areas of regeneration. 
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6.2.2 Hamburg 
Hamburg is Germany’s second biggest city and one of three city-states94. It is 
an industrialised and densely populated city which also has a high profile for 
environmental action, including being awarded European Green Capital in 
2011. Climate protection projects have been in place since the 1990s and in 
1997 the city implemented a local ‘Klimaschutzgesetz’ (climate protection law) 
which requires certain levels of energy efficiency in buildings, set standards for 
new buildings and banned electric heating (Walberg, 2010). In 2007 the city 
government developed a Climate Action Plan and in 2010 it adopted a Climate 
Protection Masterplan to 2050 which included an ambitious target to reduce 
carbon emissions by 40% by 2020, compared to 1990 levels (City of Hamburg, 
2011).  
 
Historically the city of Hamburg owned a local public utility called Hamburger 
Electricity-Werke (HEW) but following liberalisation HEW was privatised in the 
early 2000s and sold to Vattenfall. Privatisation took place under a SDP-led 
local government and the process was not without controversy with the former 
CDU mayor Ole von Beust suggesting in 2007 that the sale was a mistake and 
that the state monopoly had been replaced by a ‘quasi-monopoly on the private 
side’ (Speigel Online, 2007). Under a new coalition government a new 
municipal energy company called Hamburg Energie was established in 2009 in 
order to advance the city’s climate protection objectives. Hamburg Energie is a 
relatively small company95 and is a subsidiary of the existing municipal water 
company, Hamburg Wasser. It operates a small number of heat networks and is 
involved in several projects that seek to integrate heat networks with renewable 
energy and storage (interviews 35-NGO, 47-MU). This includes the ‘Energy 
Bunker’ project where a former air raid shelter that has been converted into a 
renewable power plant, with a large heat reservoir. The bunker utilises solar 
energy, biogas, wood chips, and waste heat from a nearby industrial plant to 
heat most of the Reiherstieg district and feed renewable power into the 
electricity grid. Hamburg Energie is governed by a 20 member board consisting 
                                                          
94 Together with Berlin and Bremen. There is no additional Land-level government in these 
states. 
95 With approximately 40 staff and 120,000 customers across electricity, gas and heat at the 
time of interview. 
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of 10 private clients and 10 community representatives and associations, such 
as the Tenants’ Association and the Chamber of Commerce. However, Becker, 
Naumann and Moss (2017) in their study of energy provision in Berlin and 
Hamburg suggest that the board has limited influence over the actual business 
practices of the utility. 
 
Heat networks in Hamburg currently account for 20% of heat supply. A number 
of organisations operate heat networks in the city, including Hamburg Energie, 
E.On, Orbana, RWE and Spie. The largest network, accounting for over 80% of 
heat supplied, is owned by Vattenfall and is in the process of being transferred 
back to the municipality following the referendum described below (Walberg, 
2010). 
 
In September 2013 a city-wide referendum took place regarding the 
remunicipalisation of the distribution grids for electricity, gas and heat operated 
by Vattenfall. The remunicipalisation campaign narrowly won with 50.9% of the 
vote. The campaign in favour of remunicipalisation was led by a diverse range 
of civil society organisations and was framed by interviewees as the culmination 
of a ‘long history of energy-related conflicts in the city’ (Becker et al. 2017, p.68, 
interviews 32-A, 35-NGO) which led new networks of actors to involve 
themselves in the politics of energy infrastructure in the city. In particular two 
significant energy conflicts have been pivotal in shaping the discursive 
environment for energy in Hamburg; the development of the Moorburg and 
Wedel power plants.  
 
Firstly, in the early 2000s, after having purchased HEW, Vattenfall initiated 
plans to develop a new coal fired power station at Moorburg. At the time the 
CDU controlled city government supported these plans as they were seeking to 
expand the heat network and to shut down the inefficient, old coal-fired power 
plant in Wedel. As the profile of climate change issues increased nationally and 
internationally in the 2000s the development of a new coal power station 
become increasingly controversial with the Green Party and environmental 
groups opposing the Moorburg plans under the slogan ‘Coal Kills the Climate’ 
(interview 46-C). Vattenfall was given a preliminary construction permit in 2007 
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but following the 2008 state elections the Green Party formed a coalition 
government with the CDU and initiated a review of the Moorburg power plant’s 
environmental permits. The Green Party also began to push for the 
development of Hamburg Energie, in order to ensure the city had more control 
over future energy developments (interviews 46-C, 47-MU). This review 
imposed increased environmental protection requirements on Moorburg which 
Vattenfall contested via legal action against the city-state's Office for Urban 
Development and the Environment. This dispute was settled in 2011 with 
Vattenfall winning a new water permit with significantly lower the environmental 
standards that originally imposed (Provost and Kennard, 2015). Moorburg is 
currently operational as an electricity only plant and is not connected to the heat 
network96. 
 
Secondly, Wedel was a coal fired power plant owned by Vattenfall with the city 
government holding a 25.1% share. It was originally developed in the early 
1960’s and feeds heat into the heat network. At the time that this research was 
carried out the future of the plant was subject to extensive debate as it neared 
the end of its operating life and a decision regarding its future was required 
before the transfer of the heat network to Vattenfall in 2019. The Hamburg 
senate were negotiating with Vattenfall to replace the turbine with a gas-fired 
system however both organisations were awaiting the outcome of the review of 
the Federal CHP Law (KWK) which was expected to further incentivise 
Vattenfall to develop gas-CHP at Wedel. Following the confirmation of the CHP 
Law amendments Vattenfall announced in 2016 that it will invest €83.5m to 
upgrade Wedel and replace the coal plant with gas fired CHP (Vattenfall, 2016).  
 
The remunicipalisation campaign started in 2008 when it became apparent that 
concession contracts to operate grid infrastructure were due for renegotiation. A 
number of environmental groups, led by BUND (German Friends of the Earth) 
developed the ‘Unser Netz, Unser Hamburg - Our Hamburg, Our Networks’ 
campaign and tried to engage the city senate in the remunicipalisation proposal. 
BUND, Robin Wood (an environmental NGO), church groups, Attac (an anti-
                                                          
96 Ironically Vattenfall sold its German coal operations and several coal fired power stations in 
Germany in 2016 as part of its strategy to shift towards renewable energy. 
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globalisation NGO) and the local consumer advice centre (Verbraucherzentrale) 
then worked together to mobilise support for the campaign, which was backed 
by the Greens in government. The Chamber of Commerce (including Vattenfall) 
developed a counter-campaign and the Senate initially opposed the buy-back 
on the grounds that it would be a poor financial investment.  
 
In 2010 the Unser Netz, Unser Hamburg campaign approached the Senate with 
a petition requesting a referendum but the Senate requested a more extensive 
three step process to reach a referendum. This involved collecting 10,000 
signatures within 6 months, then collecting 60,000 signatures within an 
additional 3 weeks, followed by the referendum in 2012 (interview 35-NGO). 
The final referendum in 2012 consisted of just two sentences demanding ‘the 
transition of the city’s grids into public ownership’ and to develop ‘socially just, 
climate compatible and democratically controlled energy provision from 
renewable sources’ and passed by a narrow margin with 50.9% of votes for 
remunicipalisation (Becker, Naumann and Moss, 2016).  
 
6.2.3 Rhein Hünsruck 
Rhine Hunsrück is a largely rural district with 102,000 inhabitants and the 
district has been working on energy issues for several years, starting with the 
development of energy efficiency programmes in 1999. Following this an 
Energy Concept was developed for the area in 2006 and an extensive number 
of renewable energy projects have been implemented since this date. The 
region generates more renewable electricity than it consumes with renewable 
electricity production in the region accounting for 177% of energy consumption 
(Fleck, 2015). 
 
Local climate change discourses adopted a number of storylines relating to the 
environmental, economic and employment benefits of developing energy 
projects. In particular, financial and energy independence storylines were 
strongly represented in the local authority’s narratives which emphasises the 
potential to develop low carbon energy projects in order to retain energy spend 
in the local area (Fleck, 2015, interview 34-LA). In order to gain credibility for 
this argument a review of energy spend and flows within and outside of the 
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region was commissioned which suggested that the region spent €280million 
per year on energy but that €250 million of this annual figure was spent on 
energy imports and left the region. 
 
In the last ten years the district has developed several small heat networks in 
rural communities, most of which are fuelled by biomass. The initial impetus for 
the development of these networks was based around the regions 120 wood 
waste centres which provided the opportunity to source large quantities of wood 
chips at a low price. This led to the development of a number of schemes 
providing heat to a range of residential, commercial and public sector buildings. 
Additionally a number of small, village networks have been developed with 10 
biomass heat networks in operation and seven in development in 2015 (Fleck, 
2015). These village schemes tended to be driven by local residents and village 
mayors and operate as a mix of privatly owned co-operatives and schemes 
operated by the local utility, Energieversorgung Region Simmern. 
Energieversorgung Region Simmern is municipally owned subsidiary of the 
municipal water and sewage company and supports community heat networks 
schemes that request help. The local utility operates these schemes on a not-
for-profit basis and develops different pricing structures for each village due to 
the different profile of each scheme (interview 33-LA).  
 
Finance for heat networks has come from a variety of sources with direct 
contributions from communities via local cooperatives accounting for a 
significant proportion. Income from historic wind developments in the area was 
also important, particularly as the region was an early developer of community 
owned wind projects97 so income built up from schemes could be used to fund 
heat networks and other energy schemes. An interviewee suggested that some 
villages have ‘5 or 10 wind turbines so 10x€30,000, they have €300,000 per 
year more than before so they say, ok let’s build a kindergarten for the school 
and we will build a heating grid – they have the money’ (interview 43-LA). This 
strong community ownership of wind turbines in the region differs from some 
other areas of Germany where a higher proportion of wind farms are owned by 
                                                          
97 95% of wind turbines are community owned in Rhine-Hünsruck (interviewee). 
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large landowners and farmers. A number of projects also received low cost 
loans from the KfW bank and the economics of projects was helped by most 
domestic properties being previously heated by oil.  
 
The local authority presented their role as one of coordination and support and 
suggested that the presence of a small number of ‘pioneer’ villages had inspired 
other communities. This had led the local authority to develop processes for 
local knowledge sharing and mentoring, such as inviting village mayors to meet 
with villages with existing heat networks to hear their experiences of project 
development and operation. They also highlighted that momentum to 
decarbonise local energy systems had built up in many villages with several 
pursuing multiple sustainable energy projects, such as PV, biomass heat 
networks and thermal storage. 
 
The relationship between the local authority and local communities was framed 
as a long-term partnership on multiple low carbon projects, which had enabled 
considerable trust to develop between actors. Although the city authority 
operated a local utility it expressed a preference for community ownership and 
only pursued projects via the local utility if a community expressed an interest in 
a scheme but did not have the capacity to develop it themselves. The local 
authority also aimed to take on a coordination role with other infrastructure, 
such as synchronising the installation of heat network pipes with superfast 
broadband and the undergrounding of electricity wires in some areas.  
 
6.3 Policy discourse evolution 
Although there has been some support for CHP and heat networks in German 
energy policy since the early 2000’s (see 2.6.2) until recently this was relatively 
limited and policy commitments have been largely focussed on electricity 
decarbonisation and efficiency. Additionally in a 2005 report commissioned by 
the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (BMWA) suggested that final 
energy consumption from heat networks would not increase to 2030 (EWI and 
Prognos, 2005). Notwithstanding this, since the adoption of the Integrated 
Energy and Climate Programme in 2007 successive German governments have 
put strong emphasis on heat networks and CHP. Indeed by 2011 the Federal 
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Ministry of Economics and Technology (now part of BMWi) were highlighting the 
importance of urban heat networks, suggesting that ‘municipal energy supply 
systems must be transformed into decentralised systems with a high level of 
combined heat and power generation and the flexibility to adapt to changing 
demand’ (BMWi, 2011: 29). 
 
There is limited discussion of the barriers to heat networks in German energy 
policy documents, partly due to the established nature of many of the support 
schemes and the view that much heat network growth would take place in 
existing networks. In the past there had been recognition of financial barriers to 
networks but the development of pipework grants were seen to largely address 
this, particularly as grants have also more recently been made available through 
the CHP law for heat network storage systems. The limited references to 
barriers tended to focus on similar issues to in England, relating particularly to 
finance, complexity and regulation (Agora Energiewende, 2015b; Hamburg 
Institut Research GmbH, 2015).  
 
Heat network policy does not have a high political profile nationally and there 
was an overwhelming focus on CHP policy. In particular a lack of awareness of 
the benefits of cogeneration was seen to impede more rapid growth in CHP-
heat networks and changing energy system economics were making it more 
difficult to invest in large CHP-heat networks (CODE2 Cogeneration 
Observatory and Dissemination Europe, 2013). In this context barriers to growth 
focussed more on the need to move away from coal (and eventually gas) 
generation in order to contribute to the energy transition.  
 
In common with England there was a recognition in policy that the development 
of heat networks would require long-term planning and oversizing of networks 
but the existing presence of many municipal utilities in either running networks 
or developing local energy concepts (spatial plans) was seen to limit this barrier.  
 
Discussion of heat network regulation was not high profile, outside of specific 
enquiries by the Bundeskartellamt, although there were limited concerns 
regarding the lack of transparency of network pricing structures from some 
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NGOs and consultancies (Bundeskartellamt, 2012; Hamburg Institut Research 
GmbH, 2015). Table 11 outlines the key policy documents relating to heat 
networks in Germany from 2007 to 2017.  
 
Table 11: Heat network policy and discourses in Germany 
Year Policy document Heat network reference or wider 
narrative 
2007 2007 Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme 
Aims to cut greenhouse emissions by 40 
per cent to 2020 compared with 1990 
levels. The programme focuses on 
energy efficiency and includes provision 
to further support CHP. 
2008 Baden-Württemberg is the 
first state to establish a 
Renewable Heat Law making 
the installation of a 
percentage of renewable 
energy for heating 
compulsory in any renovation 
of existing residential 
buildings (Jörgensen, 2012). 
No specifically heat network focussed but 
created precedent for state rules 
promoting low carbon heat 
2009 Renewable Heat Act passed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hamburg government 
establish Hamburg Energie 
Target to increase the share of 
renewable heat to 14% by 2020. New 
building owners are required to source a 
proportion of heat from renewable energy 
systems98. Those who do not wish to use 
renewables can connect to a heat 
network, provided the heat is sourced 
from renewables, at least 50% CHP or 
waste heat (Energy Transition, 2012). 
The Act only applies to new buildings but 
make provision for individual German 
states to enact similar policies for the 
existing building stock (Schönberger and 
Reiche, 2016). 
 
                                                          
98 The minimum percentage depends on the renewable energy technology used. 
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Amended CHP law (KWK) 
A Conservative-Green government in 
Hamburg decreed the establishment of a 
municipal utility (Hamburg Energie). 
(Becker, 2017) 
 
Includes an aim of 25% of electricity 
production from CHP (but no timescale 
stipulated). Subsidy support is available 
for all sizes of CHP and for both 
modernisation and new installations. 
Specific support for heat networks is also 
introduced, providing up to 20% of 
investment costs99. The total budget for 
the KWK was set at a maximum of €750 
million per year, including a maximum of 
€150 million for new or expanding heat 
networks. The support is funded by 
consumers through a levy on the grid 
operators and if the €750 million limit is 
exceeded then installations over 10 MWe 
get proportionally less (Golbach, 2012). 
 
2010 Government publishes 
‘Energy Concept for an 
Environmentally Sound, 
Reliable and Affordable 
Energy Supply’  
The document defines the future German 
energy system until the year 2050 (BMU 
and BMWI, 2010), committing Germany 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
by 80% to 95% by 2050, and to 
producing 80% of the country's electricity 
from renewable sources by the same 
date (Richter, 2013)100. 
2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear ac
cident and a decision to 
accelerate the phase‐out of 
Germany’s nuclear fleet to 
2022 with the immediate 
closure of the eight oldest 
plants. 
 
Whilst the main Energiewende 
decarbonisation commitments were 
made in 2010 the commitment to phase 
out nuclear had a major impact on 
energy policy. The Energiewende 
(energy transformation) was announced 
which aims to speed up the ‘Energy 
Concept’ to compensate for the nuclear 
                                                          
99 Grants of up to 20% of investment costs were available if a network is supplied with at least 
60% of heat from cogeneration and is in operation by 31 December 2020, up to a maximum of 
€5 million per project. 
100 The GHG reduction targets are to reduce emissions by 40% by 2020, 55% by 2030, 70% by 
2040 and 80% to 95% by 2050, each relative to 1990. 
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Research for an 
environmentally sound, 
reliable and affordable energy 
supply. 6th Energy Research 
Programme of the Federal 
Government (BMWi) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHP law review 
phase out (Schmidt, Jäger, & Karl, 2012; 
International Energy Agency, 2013) 
 
Highlights the importance of urban heat 
networks, suggesting that ‘municipal 
energy supply systems must be 
transformed into decentralised systems 
with a high level of combined heat and 
power generation and the flexibility to 
adapt to changing demand’ (BMWi, 
2011: 29). Emphasises supporting 
‘municipalities, urban areas and 
communities to be carbon neutral by 
2020’ (BMWi, 2011, p. 97). Develops 
‘Energy Efficient Cities’ (EnEff:Stadt) and 
‘Energy Efficient District Heating and 
Cooling Supply’ (EnEff:Wärme)  
programmes to support urban projects 
including heat networks (BMWi, 2014). 
 
The CHP law review indicated that 
further policy support would be required 
to meet the target of 25% of electricity 
from cogeneration. 
 
2012 CHP law amendment 
(KWKG) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KWKG amended to improve the 
incentives for investments in 
cogeneration plants and introduce a 
target of 25% of electricity from CHP by 
2020. (CODE2 Cogeneration 
Observatory and Dissemination Europe, 
2013; BMWi, 2015b) 
 
The scheme provides low cost loans to 
municipalities to plan, organize, and 
implement district-wide retrofit schemes 
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German development bank, 
KfW, launch ‘Energetische 
Stadtquartiere’ (Energetic 
Neighbourhoods) 
 
 
Federal Cartel Office carried 
out a sector inquiry into het 
networks (Bundeskartellamt, 
2012). 
 
 
and to implement heat networks (Morris 
and Pehnt, 2012). 
 
Concerns expressed regarding the 
‘intrinsic monopolistic’101 structure of heat 
networks and local pricing. The inquiry 
Cartel Office found sufficient reason to 
suspect some prices were inflated, with 
some companies over charging. 
2013 Hamburg energy 
remunicipalisation 
referendum successful 
 
 
Federal Cartel Office heat 
network investigation  
 
 
 
The buy-back campaign was successful 
with a narrow majority of 50.9 per cent 
(Becker, 2017), adopting a slogan of ‘Our 
Hamburg, Our Networks’. 
 
The German Cartel Office further 
investigated heat network prices 
focussed on seven utilities where there 
were concerns regarding prices. The 
review was complex, accounting for the 
impact of varying generation and grid 
structures on prices, but led to 
Stadtwerke Leipzig GmbH agreeing with 
the Bundeskartellamt to lower its district 
heating prices by €8million per year over 
five years (Bundeskartellamt, 2015). 
2015 Energy Efficiency Strategy for 
Buildings. 
 
 
All scenarios indicate heat network 
emissions decrease by between 30-38% 
by 2020 (compared to 2008) and 
between 60-75% by 2050 (BMWi, 
2015a). The Federal Government 
recognises the need for existing grids to 
transition to low carbon supply, 
highlighting the importance of developing 
                                                          
101 The inquiry highlighted that once a customer connects to a heat network they are, in effect, limited 
to one monopoly supplier. In addition in some areas connection to and the use of the municipal district 
heating system may be compulsory, providing the district heating supplier with legally protected 
monopoly position. 
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low temperature heat grids in order to 
utilise geothermal and other renewable 
sources of heat, as well as stored heat. 
2016 CHP law amendment (BMWi, 
2015b). 
 
 
Amendments involved increases to the 
gas-fired CHP surcharge, the removal of 
coal-fired CHP plants from eligibility and 
a change in the CHP target. Heat 
network pipework eligible costs 
increased from 20% to 30% (for pipe 
diameters of over 100 mm) or 40% (for 
pipe diameters below 100 mm). Support 
is now also available for district cooling 
grids and thermal storage used in 
conjunction with CHP plants. 
Recognising the importance of heat 
networks and CHP in grid balancing, 
CHP electricity which is not fed into a 
public grid will no longer receive 
support102 (CODE2 Cogeneration 
Observatory and Dissemination Europe, 
2013; BMWi, 2015b). 
2017 ‘District Heating Pilot Projects 
4.0’ launched (BMWi) 
 
Support and funding launched for 
networks based on renewable energy. 
Under the pilot project funding is 
available not just for individual 
technologies or components, but for 
overall systems that rely on renewables 
for at least of 50% of the heat or cooling 
energy they deliver. Initially funding is 
available for feasibility studies (for up to 
60% of costs). At a later stage there will 
also be capital funding for 4th generation 
heating network system (30 to 50 per 
cent of cost of the project). 
 
 
                                                          
102 Exceptions apply to CHP plants below 50kW and CHP plants used in energy-intensive 
industries. 
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6.4 Problem definition and the role of heat networks 
As discussed in chapter 5, problem definition discourses play an important role 
in shaping policy responses and the wider environment for action. In relation to 
heat networks in Germany the significant problem definition storylines can be 
summarised as ‘heat policy neglect’, ‘multiple priorities and system flexibility’ 
and the ‘role of CHP’. This section discusses the development of these 
storylines and their role in shaping the discursive space for heat network policy 
development based on national and local interviews and analysis of 
documentary evidence. 
 
6.4.1 Decarbonisation and heat policy neglect 
Similar to the UK context, the decarbonisation of heat has tended to be a 
relatively neglected element of decarbonisation policy in Germany, with the 
Energiewende largely focussed on processes of electricity transition (Gailing 
and Röhring, no date). The German Energy Concept is explicitly based on twin 
core strategies of expanding renewable electricity and increasing energy 
efficiency and this has tended to limited space for debate of heat 
decarbonisation (BMU and BMWI, 2010). Recent progress has indicated that 
German policies to promote renewable electricity have been relatively 
successful103 but that progress on energy efficiency is slow with primary energy 
consumption reducing by 7.6% between 2008 and 2015, against a target of a 
20% reduction by 2020 (BMWi, 2015b). This has led to increased focus in policy 
documentation on measures to increase energy efficiency, for example through 
the publication of a National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency in 2014, an 
Energy Efficiency Strategy for Buildings in 2015 and a Green Paper on Energy 
Efficiency in 2016 (Federal Minstry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2014; 
BMWi, 2015a, 2016) 
 
Whilst there has been increasing focus on energy efficiency relatively limited 
attention has been paid to heat decarbonisation, partly as the expansion of 
renewable heating is perceived to be relatively successful with renewable heat 
accounting for 13.1% of final energy consumption for heating and cooling in 
                                                          
103 Renewables accounted for 31.6% of gross electricity consumption in 2015 with a target of at 
least 35% by 2020 (BMWi, 2015b). 
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2015, against a target of 14% renewable heat by 2020. Government forecasts 
suggest that renewable energies are likely to account for 16.3% of energy 
consumption for heating and cooling by 2020 (BMWi, 2015b). 
 
Despite the limited prominence given to heat in policy debates there is evidence 
that heat is slowly moving up the policy agenda, with increased reference to the 
need to decarbonise heat in policy documentation (BMUB, 2014), by industry 
and NGO actors (Deutsch Umwelthilfe, 2017) and from interviewees (interviews 
30-TA, 32-A, 45-NGO, 46-C). This increased focus on heat decarbonisation 
was framed by interviewees as (1) a logical progression of decarbonisation 
policy as the focus moves on to more complex decarbonisation areas such as 
heat and transport, and (2) party driven by an increasing number of 
organisations becoming interested in low carbon heat due to reduced returns 
from renewable electricity projects following reforms to the EEG in 2014 and 
2016 (interviews 30-TA, 32-A, 45-NGO). 
 
This increasing focus on heat decarbonisation includes particular emphasis 
being put on the need to integrate the heat and electricity sectors104 in order to 
promote system flexibility and integrate high shares of variable renewable 
electricity. In this respect heat networks105 are receiving increased attention due 
to their ability to facilitate flexibility through the use of large scale heat pumps 
and storage (Agora Energiewende, 2015a; BMWi, 2016). In the shorter term 
gas-CHP heat networks were framed by a range of policy actors as able to 
‘make an important contribution to reaching German climate goals’ (Agora 
Energiewende, 2015a; BMWi, 2015b). The role of CHP policy discourses is 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter (sections 6.4.3 and 6.5.1).  
 
Despite some increase in the policy profile of heat decarbonisation interviewees 
suggested that the political and policy focus was on high profile electricity 
system issues such as the need to reduce coal use and address the costs of 
renewable electricity policies. Although there is some local experimentation with 
                                                          
104 Referred to as ‘sector coupling’ by the BMWi. 
105 Heat networks are generally referred to as district heating or heating grids in German policy 
and industry literature but for consistency they are referred to as heat networks throughout this 
document. 
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low carbon heat one interviewee suggests that ‘other than that the heat issue is 
not on the agenda really in Germany, everyone is dealing with lignite coal and 
heating so far is disregarded’ (interview 46-C). In this context new policies 
interrelating with heat tend to be focussed on reducing heat demand (through 
energy efficiency) or electricity (such as CHP or the electrification of heating). 
The policy debates relating to heat networks specifically tended to focus on the 
decarbonisation of existing networks, facilitating their role in system flexibility106 
and increasing connection density in areas of existing networks, rather than on 
extensive development of new networks (Prognos 2015; BMWi 2015a, 
interviews 32-A, 38-TA, 45-NGO).  
 
Interviewees also suggested that it was difficult to develop heat policy, and 
particularly heat network policy, due to the configuration of German institutional 
structures. Heat networks were described as not having a focus within the 
organisation structure of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 
particularly as there were staff focussed on both CHP and renewables but ‘no 
district heating people’ (interview 36-G). This was corroborated by another 
interviewee who suggested that 
‘at the Ministry it [heat network policy] is a little bit everywhere 
and nowhere at the same time. It overlaps with the CHP 
people and the renewable people but I don’t think there are 
heat network people’ (interview 46-C).  
 
6.4.2 Multiple priorities and system flexibility 
As discussed in chapter 5 there was a strong theme in policy debates in 
England relating to the ability of heat networks to meet multiple priorities, 
including fuel poverty concerns, economic regeneration and carbon emissions. 
Although there was some reference to the ability of heat networks to meet 
multiple priorities by German interviewees (interviews 31-LA, 39-TA, 45-NGO) 
this tended to focus on carbon reduction and local economy priorities with little 
reference to energy poverty. This is likely to be partly due to the lower political 
and public profile of energy poverty in Germany (Becker, Kouschil and 
                                                          
106 For example through heat stores. 
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Naumann, 2014). However energy costs are becoming increasingly politicised 
in Germany due to rising domestic energy costs being linked to the 
Energiewende and specifically subsidies for renewables, with annual EEG 
surcharge costs of €23bn in 2014 (Kuzemko et al., 2017). There has already 
been a policy response to this issue with reforms to the KWKG in 2014 and 
2016 which set a framework for fewer exemptions from EEG surcharges and 
measures to slow down the growth of renewables107. 
 
In contrast significant focus was put on the ability of heat networks to contribute 
to a range of energy system objectives. This was a common theme across 
interviewees and policy documentation with both emphasising the changing 
structure and economics of the energy sector and the potential for heat 
networks to contribute to challenges relating to electricity and heat coupling and 
system flexibility (interviews 31-LA, 34-MU, 45-NGO). As one interviewee 
stated: 
 
‘We don’t have a problem in the electricity sector, we will have 
an electricity sector with above 100% renewables at some hours 
so we rather have a problem of consuming electricity at the right 
time and district heating networks could provide that flexibility’ 
(interview 41-C). 
 
This framing of heat networks as playing an important role in long-term 
decarbonisation and system flexibility did not however translate into calls for 
more support for heat networks specifically. Both national and local 
interviewees tended to instead focus on the need to support gas-CHP and the 
integration of renewables into existing heat networks. This was reflected in 
government reports which give limited profile the development of new heat 
networks but forecast extensive switching to gas-CHP and renewable heat in 
existing networks (BMWi, 2015a). This includes a focus on the importance of 
                                                          
107 Including the introduction of auction rules for new medium and large-scale renewable 
generation. 
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low temperature heat grids108 in the future in order to utilise heat from 
geothermal and other renewable sources as well as stored heat.  
 
In Frankfurt heat network narratives in the city emphasised how heat networks 
can support ambitious climate targets and the development of a ‘local’ and 
‘flexible’ energy mix (interviews 31-LA, 35-NGO, 53-MU). This tended to 
background the role of fossil fuels in the city’s current networks, although coal 
and gas account for a significant proportion of heat generation. Instead the 
wider system benefits of heat networks were emphasised, highlighting the 
potential for heat networks to facilitate interactions between the electricity and 
heat systems. This was exemplified by recent projects which include the 
installation of a power to heat system which shifts from electricity production to 
directly supplying heat to the network at times of low electricity prices and a 
power to gas109 pilot, although this is not yet directly connected to the heat 
network.  
 
While both Hamburg and Rhine Hunsrück placed strong emphasis on the need 
to develop low carbon networks they made less reference to their ability to 
support wider energy system flexibility, although both were developing storage 
projects to enable better integration of the heat and electricity sectors. Instead, 
in Hamburg, the problem framing relating to heat networks was dominated by 
the need to remunicipalise the heat networks in order to more rapidly move 
away from coal generation. Similarly in Rhine Hunsrück, there was a joint focus 
on heat networks reducing carbon emissions and enabling the retention of 
energy spend in the local area (Fleck, 2015, interview 43-LA). This led to a 
storyline of taking action on sustainable energy in order to localise benefits from 
energy spend and create ‘regional added value’ in the form of jobs and 
economic activity. 
 
                                                          
108 These systems are referred to as 4th generation district heating. 
109 The pilot uses cheap electricity to generate hydrogen which is directly fed into the natural 
gas grid. The hydrogen could also be used to fuel the gas CHP plant on the heat network. 
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6.4.3 The role of CHP 
In addition to a gradual increase in focus on heat decarbonisation, energy policy 
discourses in Germany are assigning a prominent role to CHP with the 2014 
Climate Action Programme suggesting that electricity emissions will be reduced 
through a combination of the expansion of renewable energy, the modernisation 
of existing fossil fuel power stations and the development of combined heat and 
power (BMUB, 2014). CHP is described as able to play a role in climate 
protection, supply security and efficiency in the electricity sector (Agora 
Energiewende, 2015b). The benefits of CHP are, however, largely framed in 
terms of electricity sector benefits - such as the integration of high shares of 
renewable electricity, system flexibility and efficiency - rather than specifically 
their potential to decarbonise heat, although the majority of CHP is integrated 
with heat networks (BMWi, 2015b). 
 
In relation to heat network policy the need to support CHP tended to dominate 
debate (interviews 35-NGO, 39-TA, 40-LA, 46-C, 38-TA, 52-G, 53-MU). The 
most common reasons identified for this were the need to replace current coal-
fired CHP plants and the poor economics of gas-CHP with interviewees 
suggesting that ‘right now it’s just not economically viable to build CHP plants’ 
(interview 30-TA). This was mainly attributed to increasing penetrations of 
renewable electricity reducing wholesale electricity costs and therefore reducing 
the revenues made from the electricity generation element of CHP, which is 
where schemes tend to make the majority of their profits. CHP is therefore 
framed as both a useful tool in decarbonisation and a ‘victim’ of the success of 
electricity system decarbonisation to date.  
 
The characterisation of CHP as playing a role of the Energiewende was well 
established in policy with the CHP Act explicitly formulating ‘the heating sector 
and CHP as a climate protection technology’ (interview 30-TA). Additionally 
gas-CHP was framed as an important route to replace coal generation and 
developments to the CHP Act (KWK) were highlighted as partly in response to 
the desire to phase out coal-fired heat networks.  
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However the role of CHP is also contested with some analysts and NGOs 
suggesting that support should prioritise low and zero carbon energy sources 
which are compatible with heat networks (such as geothermal, solar thermal, 
industrial waste heat) rather than gas-CHP (interviews 41-C, 46-C). Other 
interviewees suggested that the role of gas-CHP heat networks in system 
flexibility is complex as CHP plants need to run in winter to deliver heat, and this 
would result in electricity also being generated at the same time as periods of 
high renewable electricity generation from wind farms. Although some of these 
issues could be dealt with through storing electricity and heat this is likely to still 
be problematic (interview 52-G).  
 
Notwithstanding some local contestation of the role of fossil-fuelled CHP, the 
construction of gas-CHP as an essential area for policy support in order to 
facilitate longer-term decarbonisation appears to have been relatively successful. 
This includes an industry representative suggested that they  
‘had to explain [to policymakers] why we feel CHP has to play 
a role in any kind of decarbonisation because they didn’t really 
know or didn’t have a focus but we’re step by step moving 
forward in the discussion’ (interview 30-TA).  
 
This was reinforced by policy actors in Government suggesting that ‘given the 
life of infrastructure there’s room for one generation of CHP at least’ (interviews 
36-G). Although they highlight that the ‘real problems with system integration 
are still to come’.  
 
This section highlights how problem discourses relating to heat networks have 
largely been framed as about the need to support gas-CHP systems in the 
short-term however the options to support CHP was an area of significant 
debate and is returned to in the following section on emerging and established 
discourses.  
  
6.4.4 Regulation and heat prices 
An additional policy area which some actors were attempting to present as an 
important problem in relation to heat networks related to heat pricing. This was 
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an area of significant divergence between actor groups with consumer groups 
and NGOs highlighting issues relating to heat network pricing while industry, 
local authorities and government made limited reference to the issue.  
 
One interviewee suggested that heat pricing was not transparent and varied a 
great deal across the country as 
‘the heat companies don’t publish necessarily their prices, 
they basically say if you want to have district heat give us a 
call and we’ll make you an offer. It’s totally intransparent…is 
that the price they offer to everyone, do they make a special 
deal with certain customers, does it depend on how good you 
bargain with them?’ (interview 46-C). 
 
Additionally heat tariffs in stadtwerke were described as a ‘political issue’ with 
some local authorities seeking to influence the stadtwerke to set low heat prices 
while other municipalities with established networks with cheap coal generation, 
were described as using heat networks as a ‘cash cow’ (interview 46-C). State-
based Consumer Associations, which are funded by both the Federal 
government and the Länder to provide advice, information, political 
representation and lead legal challenges on the behalf of consumers, are 
increasingly active in this area with the Hamburg Consumer Association both 
supporting the energy remunicipalisation campaign and successfully filing a 
collective legal challenge against Vattenfall in relation to the transparency of 
their pricing structures. Hamburg Consumer Association highlighted that they 
had to develop new competencies in the area of heat networks which due to the 
high political and public profile of energy issues in Hamburg they were able to 
resource. However they also suggested that it is unlikely that many other local 
consumer associations would be able to engage in local energy issues to the 
same degree (interview 50-NGO). 
 
These concerns were also articulated by some consumer groups and NGOs in 
relation to current arrangements for national price oversight. As discussed in 
chapter 2 there is currently ex-post regulation of heat networks prices in the 
form of oversight by the Anti-Trust Authority (Bundeskartellamt). This means 
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that the Bundeskartellamt periodically reviews pricing structures in the areas of 
highest prices and can instruct network companies to reduce prices. A number 
of interviewees expressed concern that this is an ineffective method of price 
oversight as it only addresses the areas with the very highest prices and there 
are difficulties in comparing prices across regions due to differing infrastructure 
costs and historic factors leading to widely differing costs to operate networks 
(interviews 30-TA, 46-C, 49-G). Additionally the role of the Bundeskartellamt 
was described as ‘very weak because they carry the burden of proof and they 
have to prove the prices of the utilities are too high which is very hard’ (interview 
46). There is the potential for local Anti-Trust Agencies (Landeskartellbehörden) 
to carry out enquiries into heat network prices but interviewees suggested that 
Landeskartellbehörden tend not to have the resources or staff to carry out these 
detailed investigations. 
 
The issue of variation in heat pricing was not adopted as a key problem at the 
national level with very limited reference to heat prices in policy documents or 
by policy actors. Instead industry actors highlighted that the Government 
requires various heat pricing standards in the ‘Regulations on General 
Conditions for the Supply of District Heating (VBFernwärmeV)’ and through the 
extensive technical standards and codes of practice developed by the AGFW. 
An interviewee also noted that the Bundeskartellamt had evaluated the poential 
to adopt ex-ante approval of heat network prices but had determined that this 
would increase consumer costs (interview 39-TA).  
 
In general the theme of consumer protection, both in terms of monopoly supply 
and pricing, while promoted by a number of consumer and NGO actors, was not 
successful in establishing as a significant ‘problem’ in relation to heat networks. 
There was little reference to heat pricing in the case studies, although it was 
raised by consumer groups and NGOs in Hamburg. This is likely to be due to 
the increased engagement of consumer groups and NGOs in energy issues 
over the course of the Hamburg remunicipalisation which appears to have both 
upskilled these groups in order to engage in debates on energy policy more 
fully.  
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The low profile of heat network pricing debates may also relate to trends in 
housing tenure in Germany. Multiple occupancy housing (i.e. small apartment 
blocks) are common in Germany cities and are often owned by housing 
companies who negotiate heating supply and pricing directly with energy 
companies and include energy costs in rents. This gives little visibility of heating 
costs to householders. Some interviewees argued that this arrangement 
enables the housing companies to achieve better prices as they are familiar 
with negotiating contracts, however another interview suggested that ‘housing 
associations don’t care about energy costs as it’s only a small part of the total 
rental cost they charge’ (interviews 32-A, 46-C).  
 
6.5 Established and emerging discourses 
This section presents the key established and emerging discourses evident in 
analysis of policy documents and interviews at the national and local level. It 
suggests that while discourses relating to the need to support CHP and the role 
of municipalities in heat networks are well established there is a more contested 
storyline in relation to the remunicipalisation of energy services.  
 
6.5.1 Supporting CHP 
As discussed in section 6.4.3, a storyline regarding the need for short-term 
support for gas-CHP as (1) a route to minimising coal generation and (2) to 
enable the longer-term integration of low and zero carbon technologies, 
successfully resonated with the current policy and political climate in Germany. 
This relates particularly to discourses regarding the need to further progress the 
Energiewende whilst minimising costs to consumers as the cost of the 
Combined Heat and Power Act (KWK) was widely described as ‘insignificant 
when compared with the cost of renewables’ (interview 39-TA). Additionally 
CHP was partly framed as a ‘victim’ of the Energiewende as the growth of zero 
marginal cost renewables have resulted in low wholesale electricity prices and 
reduced profits from CHP plants, which are largely dependent on revenue from 
electricity sales. This led to far more focus on interlinkages between electricity 
and heat and the identification of other ways to utilise electricity during period of 
excess supply. These uses include power to heat applications which 
incorporate heat pumps (particularly with storage), low temperature heat 
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generation through deployment of industrial electric boilers and the 
development of CHP-heat networks systems which cost effectively switch 
between heat only, electricity only and CHP production (Lehr, Kondziella and 
Bruckner, 2014; Hers et al., 2015).  
 
Although not all interviewees agreed that there should be more support for CHP 
there was acceptance that ‘the whole business model is falling apart for CHP’ 
and that ‘the viability of gas-CHP is entirely based on electricity propping up 
heat and there’s not much thinking about how the model works when you don’t 
want the electricity’ (interview 41-C).  
 
Interviewees consistently suggested that the comparatively low cost of support 
for CHP, combined with emphasis on the role of CHP in minimising emissions in 
the short-term had resulted in widespread support for the extension of the KWK. 
Even proponents of prioritising renewable heat and storage over gas-CHP 
acknowledged that this is a ‘non-mainstream’ position (interview 46-C) and that 
the need to support gas-CHP had largely been accepted by the policy 
community. Indeed the BMWi highlights that ‘CHP plants – particularly those 
using low-carbon fuels – make an important contribution to reaching German 
climate goals’ and suggests that the amendment to the KWK in 2015 ‘sets the 
stage in many important areas’ providing ‘incentive for investment in highly 
efficient, flexible, low-carbon CHP plants’ largely replacing coal plants (BMWi, 
2015b). Data indicates that the 2015 amendments are having a positive effect 
on CHP deployment with an increase in electricity generated from CHP 
between 2015 and 2016 (Federal Environment Office, 2017). 
 
Whilst these debates made reference to the links between gas-CHP and heat 
networks the focus was particularly on supporting CHP rather than on the need 
for further policy support for network infrastructure (pipework) or storage as 
support for these elements of heat networks was largely deemed to be 
sufficient. This resulted in limited active policy development in relation to heat 
networks, over the maintenance of existing grants and the extension of the 
KWK. However there was clear rhetoric from government regarding the 
importance of heat networks in long-term system transition and support for CHP 
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was contextualised as time-limited as the Energiewende progressed (interview 
36-G). More broadly the national CHP target, which has been in place since 
2009, was seen as clear Government support to grow CHP-heat networks 
(interviews 35-NGO, 39-TA, 40-LA, 46-C). Conversely the amendment to this 
target in 2016, which effectively made the 2020 target easier to achieve (see 
chapter 2), was not described by interviewees as a roll back on support for CHP 
or heat networks and instead tended to be framed as a practical measure to 
recognise that growth of CHP is likely to take place at a ‘moderate pace’ (BMWi, 
2015b). 
 
Interviewees in both Hamburg and Frankfurt highlighted the importance of 
further support for gas CHP in their heat network development plans and 
framed gas-CHP as a transitional arrangements to enable their networks to 
move away from coal generation, with a longer-term focus on low and zero 
carbon forms of heat generation such as geothermal, heat pumps and waste. In 
contrast Rhein Hünsruck were focussed exclusively on renewably fuelled heat 
networks and did not refer to support schemes for gas-CHP. Instead they 
emphasised the importance of policy to support biomass and storage. 
 
Overall interviewees tended to suggest that the policy framework for heat 
networks, in the form of pipework grants, storage grants and support for 
municipal energy planning, was fairly strong but that increased focus was 
needed on the economics of gas-CHP and longer term integration issues 
(interviews 43-LA, 45-NGO, 46-C, 41-C, 53-MU). An interviewee summarised it 
as; 
 
‘we’ve got a system in Germany that supports CHP but we need 
to improve that…but for heat networks, not CHP but heat 
networks, I don’t think there’s much need for improvement…you 
get support and you can get up to €5million for a project now. 
€100 per metre for smaller pipes less than 100mm, 40% of the 
costs. So it’s already not that bad. The only thing is that there is 
a cap at €5 million for each project so we are advocating for that 
cap to be raised up to €10 million’ (interview 30-TA). 
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The cost of the CHP tariff, together with grants for heat network pipework and 
storage was also described as ‘very small compared with the cost of 
renewables, heat networks is something like €6-7 per year [on consumer bills], 
almost nothing’ (interview 39-TA). As such these support schemes were 
described as quite ‘safe’ from political change (interview 47-MU). 
 
This approach of highlighting the long-term benefits of heat networks (and CHP) 
for both heat and electricity decarbonisation and the relatively low costs of 
current support measures illustrates how advocates are adopting storylines with 
strong cognitive appeal for policymakers. In relation to problem definitions, 
despite the framing of heat networks as an enabler of system flexibility, there 
was also evidence of heat networks as sites of conflict and contestation in 
relation to the Energiewende. In particular the reliance of many heat networks 
on fossil fuels110, and particularly coal, was framed by some interviewees as 
putting heat networks in opposition to the Energiewende (interviews 32-A, 46-C, 
53-MU). For example, although government policy recognises the need for heat 
networks to transition away from coal, the shift to gas-CHP was largely framed 
as a ‘solution’ to this, at least in the short- to medium-term (interviews 36).  
 
6.5.2 The role of municipalities 
In terms of established, and generally uncontested, narratives there was 
widespread characterisation of local authorities as established actors in the 
energy system, and particularly heat networks. As well as in the practical sense 
that local government own and operate substantial energy undertakings this 
was also framed as an influencing role with local government playing important 
role in raising heat networks (and CHP) up the national government’s agenda 
(interview 30-TA). Although both industry actors and local authorities suggested 
that they had been closely involved in consultation on the amendments to the 
CHP Act the BMWi and industry associations suggested that stadtwerke were 
particularly influential as they tend to have close links to policymakers due to 
                                                          
110 A policy interviewee suggested that currently approximately 60% of networks are fuelled by 
gas and 15% by coal (interview 36). 
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the historically close relationship between the Social Democratic Party and 
some municipal governments (interview 36-G). 
 
A strong role for municipalities in energy governance was also reflected in 
national policy documents  with cities and municipalities often referred to as key 
agents in system transformation (BMU and BMWI, 2010; BMUB, 2014). The 
BMWi (2011, p.29) also suggest that ‘municipal energy supply systems must be 
transformed into decentralised systems with a high level of combined heat and 
power generation and the flexibility to adapt to changing demand’. The 
complexity of urban energy transitions is recognised and the Government 
highlights that they are characterised by ‘diverse energy supply structures, 
multi-dimensional ownership structures and the associated and various 
interests of numerous decision-makers and stakeholders’ (BMWi, 2011, p. 29). 
As discussed in chapter 2 the importance of local governments in the energy 
transition was also embedded through a number of research and grant 
programmes such as ‘Energy Efficient Cities’ and ‘Energy Efficient District 
Heating and Cooling Supply’. 
 
Whilst these examples illustrate an established role for municipalities in the 
energy transition, a number of emerging storylines were evident which suggest 
that conceptualisations of the role of municipalities are complex and still 
developing. Firstly, there was a strong storyline relating to the ‘professionalism’ 
of stadtwerke. Several interviewees recognised that historically stadtwerke had 
not been seen to be efficient organisations as there had been a tendency for 
them to be inefficient and ‘politically dominated’ with local politicians nearing 
retirement often being appointed to senior positions (interview 30-TA, 45-NGO). 
However;  
‘there have been changes in managerial culture and they have 
professionalised a lot and now some of the local utilities are 
really working better than many private companies and they 
have very good management’ (interview 30-TA). 
 
In Frankfurt, Mainova had a clear identity as separate from, but influenced by, 
the local authority and was considered to be both professional and successful. 
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In contrast Hamburg Energie and the public entity being established to manage 
the remunicipalised heat network were portrayed as a break from mainstream 
energy actors (interviews 32-A, 40-LA). Whilst they again were described as 
professional and effective, framing them as a ‘new’ way of managing energy 
locally resonated with the considerable distrust that had developed in relation to 
Vattenfall and other traditional energy actors.  
 
In Frankfurt interactions between the local authority and Mainova were largely 
presented as unproblematic by local authority actors, however the stadtwerke 
highlighted the difficulties in managing tensions between multiple local authority 
aspirations (interviews 31-LA, 39-TA, 53-MU). Potential conflicts between 
municipalities and their stadtwerke were also cited by some national 
organisations who referred to examples where local governments had high 
profile commitments to carbon reduction but also operated profitable coal-fired 
generation plants through their stadtwerke. Another interviewee suggested that 
many municipalities rely ‘on the dividends from their companies so have an 
interest acting for the common good in the operational working of the company 
but other the hand they want to maximise profits as well, so it’s an inner conflict 
of public ownership’ (Interview 30-TA). Similarly another stadtwerke interviewee 
suggested that they ‘are not driven by the city and their climate aims. We are 
driven by the market, so it’s nice to see the aims and discuss them but the 
decision is made by the company’ (interview 53-MU).  
 
These conflicts demonstrated the importance of local politics in shaping the 
environment for heat network development with the political make-up of city 
governments identified as an important enabler for a long-term commitment to 
low carbon heat networks in both Hamburg and Frankfurt. Interviewees 
suggested that in many of the large cities people connected to the Green Party 
are promoting energy remunicipalisations but that the CDU is also popularising 
remunicipalisations with more conservative groups on the basis that it is good 
for regional economies (interview 45-NGO). Additionally broader local politics 
was also revealed to be important in Hamburg where a history of engagement 
in energy-based conflicts meant a wide coalition of actors was willing to engage 
in debates relating to remunicipalisation and the development of heat networks. 
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In Rhein Hünsruck the history of the region as a relatively self-sufficient rural 
district meant that a storyline of energy independence resonated particularly 
well.  
 
Municipal involvement was also framed as important in enabling investment in 
heat networks as ‘municipalities are considered as very good lenders. Very low 
risk lenders. Traditionally they can’t really collapse, there is no bankruptcy law 
for municipalities so whenever there is an economic problem there will be a 
solution, mostly at the Federal state level’ (interview 32-A). This was seen to 
support municipal energy companies as they can ‘get very good rates because 
it’s basically state guaranteed so you have an advantage as a municipal 
company, a clear advantage over big private companies. Interest rates are 
simply lower’ (interview 30-TA). In addition both Frankfurt and Rhein Hünsruck 
referred to the importance of low cost loans from the KfW state bank. 
 
6.5.3 Remunicipalisation 
Notwithstanding the tensions identified in the municipal utility role in the 
previous section there was also a significant storyline relating to an increase in 
local authorities buying back infrastructure and grids and/or setting up new 
public utilities. Energy system remunicipalisation was linked to a number of 
practical investment factors such as local authorities being able to accept low 
rates of return, invest in long-term projects, and access cheaper finance111 
(interviews 31-LA, 34-MU, 39-TA, 46-C). However there was also repeated 
reference to a perceived failure of privatisation to deliver expected efficiencies 
and customer service. As one interview put it; ‘there is now some disillusion in 
the hopes of privatisation. It was always talked about as being more efficient, a 
better service, and people now realise that that’s not the case’ (interview 30-
TA).  
 
In this context heat, electricity and gas networks, already commonly publically 
owned in Germany, were referred to as ‘monopolies used for the public good’ 
(interview 50-NGO). This was particularly strong in relation to heat network 
                                                          
111 Several interviewees referenced to the importance of KfW programmes that support local 
government and stadtwerke investment in sustainable energy. 
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development as local public utilities were characterised as more likely to have 
strong consumer protection arrangements and be able to take a long-term 
development view (interviews 30-TA, 34-MU, 41-C, 50-NGO). Other 
interviewees highlighted the generally good reputation of public utilities 
suggesting ‘they are just closer to the customer and regarded as very 
trustworthy’ and emphasised the importance of democratic control (interviews 
30-TA, 35-NGO). Others suggested that the growth of stadtwerke coincided 
with a broader public sentiment that energy system ‘profits should be reinvested 
in Germany and city ownership allows this’ (interview 30-TA). 
 
An additional storyline linked municipal ownership of heat networks to a wider 
move towards more collective forms of energy provision in Germany. The scale 
of cooperative ownership of renewable energy in Germany has been well 
documented (Nolden, 2013) but a small number of interviewees suggested the 
collective, monopoly nature of heat networks made it particularly suitable to 
public ownership and position it as part of a wider trend towards more collective 
forms of provision, including the growth in the ‘sharing economy’ (interviews 43-
LA, 45-NGO, 50-NGO). 
 
Although the diverse nature of public utilities was acknowledged several 
interviewees suggested that they all operate with a common commitment to the 
public good; so while there are 
‘utilities that have got 10 people working for them, and then you’ve 
got the Stadtwerke in Munich which has a turn-over of some €8 
billion per year. It’s a huge company and so obviously they are 
different but they still have got something in common, it’s public 
ownership and working for the public good, and that links together 
companies of very different sizes. It’s really interesting to see’ 
(interview 30-TA).  
 
These themes of the failure of privatisation and the need to maintain 
accountability in the provision of monopoly  infrastructure (specifically energy 
networks) resonate with the work of Becker et al. (2017, p.78) who, in their 
study of energy provision in Berlin and Hamburg, suggest that energy 
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remunicipalisations can challenging ‘the character of private infrastructure 
provision’ through the transformation of energy provision from a commodity to a 
public good, thereby providing an alternative to neoliberal urbanism. Similarly 
Fuchs & Hinderer (2014) link the resurgence of the role of local governments in 
energy, and other sectors, to a broader roll-back of ‘New Public Management’ 
approaches to governance. This suggests that long-term debates relating to 
governance more broadly can be influential in shaping local approaches to 
energy. 
 
However a minority of interviews contested the public good objectives of 
municipalities with one interviewee suggesting that ‘we’ve seen so many 
municipal companies ripping off their customers that I’m a little bit disillusioned 
about the idea that they want to do anything good for the customers. They have 
shareholders, which is the city, and the city wants to have the money and they 
want to do whatever the political preferences of the city are. If you have a city 
that has a political preference on the environment then they might say to the 
utility then invest this money in enlarging the heat network system and invest in 
renewable energies, but if you have a political majority that wants to build more 
kindergartens and schools then they’ll just take the money and will not make the 
environment or the heat network customers benefit from it’ (interview 46-C).  
 
The case studies supported this complex local relationship between 
municipalities and the energy system. In Frankfurt the local authority tended to 
present the relationship between the city administration and the local utility as 
unproblematic with the city using its political influence to shape the priorities of 
the utility, for instance by encouraging Mainova to change their pricing structure 
to reduce the heat network standing charge in order to promote energy 
efficiency. However, despite owning over 75% of the company the city 
government suggested that their influence is ‘minor’ and only enacted through a 
limited number of seats on the Board of Directors. As one interviewee put it ‘we 
can give them ideas but whether they follow these ideas or not is up to them’ 
(interview 31-LA). Mainova supported this portrayal of the influence of the city 
as limited but suggested that this was due to the need for the company to 
operate independently in order to generate profits for the city. The financial 
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dimension of the relationship between the city and the utility tended to be 
backgrounded by the city but foregrounded by Mainova who emphasised the 
difficulty in balancing financial and non-financial objectives.  
 
In Hamburg ongoing and multifaceted energy conflicts were deeply linked to 
different political and economic interests with the remunicipalisation campaign, 
across electricity, gas and heat, framed as a route to address long-term 
disaffection with energy system incumbents and the use of coal in the city. 
 
6.5.3.1 (Re)politicisation 
While there is a long history of municipal involvement in the energy system in 
Germany there was also evidence of a repoliticisation of energy with the 
remunicipalisation agenda being utilised by a range of political interests. As 
discussed in 6.5.2, interviewees suggested that both the Green Party and the 
CDU were promoting remunicipalisation in some cities, albeit for differing 
environmental and regional economy rationales (interview 45-NGO). The 
political make-up in both Hamburg and Frankfurt was highlighted as important in 
facilitating a stronger role for the municipalities in heat networks, with the Green 
Party being influential in both cases. In Frankfurt the Green Party played an 
important role in governing coalitions for many years and interviewees 
suggested that this helped to embed a long-term focus on sustainable energy 
planning and create a supportive environment for low carbon heat networks 
(interviews 31-LA, 34-MU).  
 
In Hamburg the Moorburg plant was initially approved when the CDU was in 
power but the subsequent inclusion of the Green Party in a coalition 
government influenced the local authority’s later position on the plant. 
Additionally, when the SDP was in overall control, the city bought back a 25.1% 
stake in the heat network but did not want a referendum. The SDP party, 
although supportive of the Energiewende, also have a strong political base in 
the former industrial areas in North Rhine Westphalia and close links with the 
Big 4 utilities, leading them to support the energy transition but at the same time 
try to protect their support base in the ‘old system’ (interviewees 32-A, 37-A). In 
Hamburg this included the Mayor of Hamburg, Olaf Scholz opposing the 
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referendum campaign on the basis that it would add to the city’s debts and 
several interviewees suggesting that Vattenfall had a close relationship with city 
elites which resulted in the city initially resisting the civil society campaign to 
remunicipalise. One interviewee suggested that ‘Vattenfall and the Hamburg 
state, under Social Democratic rule, were so intertwined that the city just 
accepted the conditions [relating to Moorburg] and Vattenfall was smart in 
getting things through’ (interview 41-C). In contrast the Green Party had close 
links to a range of civil society groups which then became involved in the 
remunicipalisation campaign. There was also a history of civil society groups 
coming into conflict with Vattenfall through both the development of Moorburg 
and heat network pricing (interview 50-NGO).  
 
As Fuchs & Hinderer (2014) suggest if ‘local authorities want to buy back the 
[grid] concessions, cancel the concessions, or revoke them, they usually face 
heavy resistance from the incumbent actors…The network operators, very 
often, are linked to specific political actors in the community, which immediately 
politicizes the conflict’. In Hamburg the remunicipalisation campaign also 
developed in the context of historic energy-related conflicts which had already 
engaged a wide range of environmental, social and religious organisations in 
relation to energy issues. This resulted in the use of a local referendum as a 
political tool to further mobilise a range of actors in energy infrastructure. 
Overall, these factors indicate the extent to which questions of energy 
infrastructure and supply have been politicised in the city. 
 
The engagement of the community groups and civil society does not however 
suggest that the citizen’s movement is never in opposition to the municipal 
movement and some NGO interviewees saw energy remunicipalisations as just 
another route to cities and states gaining more power instead of decentralising 
power to citizens. The Rhein Hünsruck case was an interesting opposition to 
this where interviewees consistently saw the municipality and cooperative 
movement as supporting each other in the Energiewende (interviews 33-LA, 43-
LA). 
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6.5.4 Rural heat networks  
An emerging discourse that was evident amongst NGOs and in Rhein 
Hünsruck, but not extensively in national debates, relates to the role of 
community-owned and rural heat networks. Much national policy rhetoric 
focussed on the likely growth in heat networks being in urban areas (BMWi, 
2015a) and there was little reference by industry associations to rural networks. 
However a minority of interviewees suggested that there interest from rural 
communities in developing small, community owned and renewable heat 
networks was increasing (interviews 43-LA, 44-LA, 45-NGO, 46-C). 
 
The importance of rural heat networks was linked to the growth of ‘bioenergy 
villages’ in Germany112 where increasing numbers of rural settlements are 
seeking to meet their entire demand for electricity and heat from local 
renewable energy sources, particularly biomass and biogas (Jenssen, König 
and Eltrop, 2014). The first bio-energy village was Jühnde in 2006 and there are 
now over 212 bio-energy villages in Germany (Eichler, 2016). Although the 
Federal government has become increasingly interested in the concept, funding 
some projects and launching a national bio-energy villages awards scheme in 
2012, this activity is led by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture with benefits 
largely linked to supporting rural economies. The national policy actors 
interviewed did not refer to the role of rural heat networks and discussions 
focussed instead on the growth of existing networks in urban areas. This 
suggests that the joint discourses of a need to support gas-CHP and the 
importance of stadtwerke have dominated heat network discourses and, 
whether overtly or indirectly, marginalised rural heat network discourses. 
 
6.6 Key events and windows of opportunity 
In contrast to England where a number of events and face-to-face interactions 
were important in developing relationships between actors and creating 
common understandings of issues, there were limited reference to the role of 
events and windows of opportunity in shaping heat network development in 
Germany. To some extent this may reflect the more developed nature of heat 
networks in Germany where local actor groups have more agency to develop 
                                                          
112 And beyond, in Austria for example. 
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networks or to initiate pilot projects. Additionally, as discussed, the 
Energiewende was from the outset framed as a societal project which would 
require the involvement of a wide range of actors and technologies at different 
scales, resulting in a policy environment that supports a wide range of 
decarbonisation activity. 
 
An exception to this was the current expiry of many grid concession agreements 
relating to heat, gas and electricity networks. In Germany grid concessions are 
given for around 20 years and following liberalisation in the 1990s many are 
now due for the first time since liberalisation (32-A, 35-NGO, 45-NGO). The 
expiry of grid concessions, together with an increase in distrust of privatised 
energy infrastructure models was described as creating a window of 
opportunity; 
 
‘Following the liberalisation in the 1990’s 20 years on we’ve now 
got the expiring concession agreements and there is a general, a 
lot of people, mistrust the big private companies, especially the 
energy companies so that explains why people are thinking maybe 
it’s not a bad thing to have the grids back in municipal hands’ 
(interview 35-NGO). 
 
Regardless of whether these concessions are renegotiated or remunicipalised 
the politicised nature of energy system development means that these contracts 
tend to be areas of negotiation and potential conflict as multiple interests seek 
to influence the future of energy infrastructure in a local area (Becker, Naumann 
and Moss, 2016). Clearly incumbent actors tend to resist efforts to 
remunicipalise networks. This is exemplified by the Hamburg case where 
Vattenfall sought to mobilise a coalition of economic and political actors to 
oppose the referendum and also, according to interviewees on the opposing 
side, withheld data and controlled information regarding the costs of the buy 
back. The expiry of concession contracts for heat networks therefore represents 
both a window of opportunity for consideration of public ownership structures 
and a politicisation of the provision of city infrastructure.  
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6.7 Coalitions and actor networks 
This section explores how heat network discourses are being structured in 
Germany through their use by formal and informal coalitions and how various 
key groups are acting to coordinate storylines. It identifies three important 
themes relating to (1) the diversity and range of actors involved, (2) the type 
and role of industry associations and (3) the relative lack of emphasis put on the 
role of individuals in heat networks in Germany.  
 
6.7.1 Diverse actors and civil society 
As discussed in chapter 5 diverse actor networks tend to be involved in heat 
network projects due to the locally distinctive nature of each project and the 
need to involve a range of generation owners, heat customers, technical 
experts, investors and local decision makers. This was also the case in 
Germany however there was more evidence of a wide range of actors being 
involved through a diversity of ownership structures, and of better integration of 
a range of subnational actors into energy policy debates. This included 
interviewees suggesting that ‘political influence is high for municipalities’ and 
that diverse interests were represented by the main industry associations 
(AGFW, VKU and BDEW), as discussed in the next section (interview 36-G). 
Despite this influence on national policy was also described as dominated by 
large private utilities, stadtwerke and industry associations, with limited 
influence for civil society and community groups (interviews 30-TA, 43-LA, 45-
NGO).  
 
In contrast, at the local scale, civil society actors tended to play an important 
role in shaping approaches to heat networks, and decarbonisation more 
generally. In Hamburg in particular environmental, social and faith based groups 
worked together on the remunicipalisation campaign and were seen to play a 
long-term role in negotiating energy based conflicts in the city. Similarly in Rhein 
Hünsruck local community groups, largely based in individual villages, worked 
collaboratively with the local authority and stadtwerke to develop heat networks 
with a strong focus on local control of infrastructure. More broadly interviews 
characterised the agency and membership of local actor groups as shaped by 
historic institutional structures such as the relationships between the municipal 
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authority, private sector, citizens and interest groups. For example, in Frankfurt 
the municipal authority had a long established energy department which had 
developed various advisory and planning functions which enabled it to act as a 
coordination body between the city’s climate aspirations, private developers and 
housing corporations. Likewise in Hamburg the long history of a range of civil 
society actors engaging in energy debates meant they were well-placed to work 
together on energy network remunicipalisation (interviews 31-LA, 32-A, 45-
NGO, 46-C). 
 
Several city actors also made reference to the importance of transnational 
municipal networks (TMNs)113 in supporting the development of low carbon heat 
networks, making reference to membership of the Climate Alliance of European 
Cities, the Covenant of Mayors, Energy Cities and the German Association of 
Cities and Towns. In Frankfurt the city highlighting the importance of these 
networks for sharing knowledge in relation to cutting edge low carbon pilot 
projects. Membership of these networks was also presented as ‘evidence’ of 
Frankfurt’s leading role in climate action demonstrating the political importance 
the city places on being perceived as a leading, international city on green 
issues. In Rhine-Hünsruck TMNs were also recognised as important to the 
development of local energy programmes with the area participating in a 
national networking programme called 100ee regions and a number of 
international networks and programmes, including the European Commission’s 
‘Intelligent Energy Europe’ programme. 
 
In Hamburg there was evidence of civil society actor networks coming together 
in new ways as a result of private actors decisions on energy investments. This 
included development at the Moorburg plant, and to a lesser degree at Wedel, 
creating a strong narrative against Vattenfall and a popular movement to ‘keep 
Vattenfall out of Hamburg’ (interview 35-NGO). As Becker, Naumann and Moss 
(2017) suggest this mobilised a wide range of established civil society actors to 
                                                          
113 Kern and Bulkeley (2009, pp. 309–10) outline three defining characteristics of TMNs; ‘First, 
member cities are autonomous and free to join or leave. Second, because they appear to be 
non-hierarchical, horizontal and polycentric, such networks are often characterized as a form of 
self-governance. Third, decisions taken within the network are directly implemented by its 
members’. 
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come together in novel constellations in order to successfully challenge urban 
energy governance norms in the city. This resulted in a narrative of democratic 
control - to ‘have it in your hand’ as the referendum motto put it - together with a 
characterisation of Vattenfall as part of the ‘old, dirty system’, which 
successfully motivated sufficient residents to vote for remunicipalisation. 
Despite this the close result of the referendum indicates the polarised nature of 
the debate and the likelihood that contested views on energy system 
governance remain.  
 
6.7.2 Industry Associations 
While a diverse range of actors were engaged in heat networks at a local level 
interviewees suggested that industry associations, the Big 4 utilities and 
stadtwerke were particularly influential in shaping the policy environment. In 
particular the industry associations VKU, AGFW and BDEW were described as 
influential, although they represent very different memberships. The VKU is the 
association for local public utilities and represents approximately 1500 
municipal companies working in the fields of energy supply, water supply and 
sewage, waste management, municipal cleaning and telecommunication (VKU, 
2016). The AGFW is the Association for District Heating, Cooling and CHP and 
has approximately 400 members, including district heating utilities, industrial 
companies, manufacturers and research institutes. BDEW is the 
German Association of Energy and Water Industries representing 1,800 
companies across natural gas, electricity, district heat, water and wastewater 
(BDEW, 2015). Clearly all three associations have an interest in promoting heat 
networks however interviewees characterised BDEW as largely representing 
the large power companies, particularly in relation to gas generation, whilst 
AGFW and VKU were seen as the representatives of stadtwerke. Regardless of 
these differences in membership all three were united in lobbying for extensions 
to the support for gas-CHP and were perceived as working together effectively 
in relation to the KWK amendments (interviewees 30-TA, 38-TA, 39-TA, 53-
MU).  
 
Relationships between and within industry associations were not however 
characterised as conflict free with VKU representing both municipalities with 
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progressive decarbonisation plans and those invested in coal generation. This 
was described as generating some internal tensions in the lobbying position of 
the organisation (32, 45). Despite this the VKU was regarded as closely linked 
to the Federal government through both the senior management of the 
association and established links between municipal, regional and national 
politicians. 
 
The AGFW represents the interests of approximately 90% of the total 
connected district heating load in Germany and was framed as the national 
expert organisation in relation to technical standards for heat networks. 
Although their membership includes a wide range of heat network organisations 
they have a strong representation of stadtwerke on their Board (including 
Mainova in Frankfurt) which they suggest means that the perspective of 
municipalities is particularly influential in their activities (interview 39-TA). 
Additionally, although they are involved with a number of projects relating to 
renewable heat networks a number of interviewees saw the organisation as 
particularly focussed on CHP based heat networks and therefore lobbying 
strongly for gas-CHP support measures. 
 
These differences in the membership and priorities of the industry associations 
demonstrates how very different interests can be mobilised around common 
issues, in this case extensions to the support for CHP, although in the longer-
term they may have very different conceptions of the future of heat networks. 
 
6.7.3 Importance of individuals 
In England individuals were important in shaping heat network debates at both 
a local and national level. In contrast the role of individuals tended not to be 
framed as significant in shaping heat network policy in Germany. This may be 
partly due to the more established nature and larger size of the heat network 
industry in Germany resulting in a wider pool of actors engaging in the policy 
space and therefore less opportunity for specific individuals (or organisations) to 
dominate the agenda. Additionally the more decentralised governance 
structures of Germany, with a less elite-based focus on the Federal level, may 
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result in a wider range of non-government actors perceiving themselves to have 
greater agency in shaping heat networks and energy policy.  
 
An exception to this was the rural case study of Rhein Hünsruck where a strong 
role was ascribed to local individuals, including district and village mayors and 
local skilled individuals. For example village cooperative projects were often led 
by residents with financial or technical skills. Involvement in such projects was 
framed as an ‘honour’ and ‘not for money but just for ideals’ with the local 
authority acting in a facilitation role to bring communities wishing to develop low 
carbon heat networks together to share skills and knowledge (interviews 43-LA, 
44-LA, 45-NGO). Strong community commitment and an ethos of working 
together was repeatedly highlighted and many residents gave skills for free. For 
example in the village of Fronhofhen a biomass plant is based on a local 
farmer’s land and he acts as the ‘first call’ engineer on a voluntary basis 
(interviews 33-LA, 43-LA, 44-LA).  
 
Whilst the role of individuals tended not to be forefronted outside of the Rhein 
Hünsruck case study a common theme across interviews referred to the 
importance of local actor constellations and historic relationships between the 
municipal authority, energy companies, civil society, community groups and 
local politicians (interviews 30-TA, 43-LA). The complexity of actors involved in 
heat network projects often led to local authorities being highlighted as key 
organisations in coordinating development however there was also 
acknowledgement that local authorities are not neutral actors and may seek to 
shape heat network development through linking it to remunicipalisation 
debates (as already discussed in section 6.4.3).  
 
6.8 Institutionalisation  
The more decentralised nature of governance in Germany, together with an 
institutional history that has maintained a level of energy system competence in 
local government, has resulted in far greater diffusion of influence in the energy 
system across multiple levels. While interaction between these levels (national, 
state, municipality, community) in not conflict free, for example with greater 
focus on community heat networks at a local level, there are established 
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institutional structures to facilitate interaction and coordination across levels. 
This includes influential industry associations representing heat networks and 
CHP (AGFW), municipal utilities (VKU) and gas generation (BDEW). 
Additionally a number of institutions function to link local and national objectives 
such as the KfW, BMWi city-based programmes and the political influence of 
state politicians at the Federal level.  
 
There are also fewer institutional norms acting to exclude local governments in 
the energy system, with an interviewee highlighting that there is a ‘very long 
history of a municipal role in Germany. It’s established throughout governance 
structures and institutions’ (interview 37-A). This resulted in municipal utilities 
being framed as having an ability to meet multiple priorities, operate within 
competitive markets and deliver public good objectives. This integration of a 
local government role into energy system norms included the government 
advocating municipalities taking ‘a holistic approach that considers energy 
strategy as integral to a development strategy for the city as a whole’ (BMWi, 
2011, p. 30). Another interviewee supported the link between broader 
decentralisation and a municipal energy role, suggesting that  
 
‘Germany is a very decentralised country and politicians have 
their bases set up in a decentralised way. So we find it fairly easy 
to organise support. If there’s an issue that’s really very important 
for us we can ask our members to address their members of 
Parliament and that usually works quite well because that’s the 
advantage of being locally based as our companies are. It makes 
it easy to connect to politicians and then they obviously then put 
pressure upwards to the government’ (interview 30-TA).   
 
At a practical level, institutional structures also exist which enable municipalities 
to develop local ‘climate protection laws’ which can include supportive 
measures for heat networks such as banning electric heat and the ability to 
require connection to a network. 
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Notwithstanding these institutional structures that support a municipal role in 
energy, the case studies indicated that heat networks operate in Germany 
under complex ownership structures and that these structures may shift 
between (various degrees of) state and market ownership at different points in 
time. Both the Frankfurt and Hamburg cases demonstrated shifts in local 
government involvement in heat networks over the last 30 years and suggested 
that the current trend towards municipal ownership of heat networks was 
politicised and closely linked to local ambitions to contribute to the 
Energiewende.  
 
Additionally the Hamburg and Rhein Hünsruck cases demonstrated the 
complexity of public, private and civil society interactions, suggesting that 
energy initiatives at the municipal level can ‘transcend simplistic notions of 
public or private ownership’ (Becker, Naumann and Moss, 2016). In both cases 
social movements and civil society were important. The involvement of these 
groups in energy discourses and decision-making tended not to be formally 
institutionalised, although there was evidence of their involvement becoming 
more structured. For example in Hamburg the local authority indicated that it is 
establishing a board, referred to as a ‘Political Chair’, to inform and influence 
the remunicipalised grid companies with an expectation that civil society 
organisations would be represented (interview 35-NGO).  Additionally the strong 
role of civil society in the Energiewende, initially arising from opposition to 
nuclear power then later focussed on decentralized energy and local 
involvement in the energy system, appears to have supported the involvement 
of civil society in remunicipalisation campaigns. As Fuchs & Hinderer (2016) 
identify there is a long history of ‘regions, cities and villages experimenting with 
socio-technical innovations’ and developing ‘governance structures under high 
uncertainty’ based on local actor constellations and socio-political contexts. 
These combination of factors have resulted in a diverse actor networks being 
involved in energy policy, investment and operation, with local areas often 
having some familiarity in navigating energy related conflict.  
 
More broadly the involvement of a wide range of actors is supported by energy 
system norms in Germany. The German approach to energy transition is 
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generally described as inclusive of community, individual and municipal actors 
(Fuchs and Hinderer, 2016; Kuzemko et al., 2017) and German policymakers 
have historically placed strong focus on the sustainability benefits of a 
decentralised energy system (BMWi, 2010). Additionally the principle of diverse 
ownership models is well established through both the widespread presence of 
stadtwerke and a high proportion of renewable generation ownership by 
individual citizens.  
 
As discussed low carbon city networks were revealed to be important in all 
three cases for sharing best practice and creating momentum. There was also a 
norm of collaboration by local energy system actors which was realised 
differently in the cases. In Frankfurt the involvement of a consortium of 
municipalities was an important element in the buy-back of Thüga in 2009 and 
in Rhein Hünsruck community groups, several villages, the local authority and 
the municipal energy company were presented as collaborating to undertake 
local energy planning. 
 
The presence of financial institutions that support local investment in energy 
infrastructure were cited as important by two of the case studies and several 
national actors. This is supported by research by Hall et al. (2016) and Barton et 
al. (2015) which both indicated that access to finance from co-operative, state-
owned, and local banks is important in the development of municipal and 
community energy projects. 
 
Additionally there was much less reference to financial pressure on German 
local authorities than in the England cases with some areas, including 
Hamburg, being described as being in a ‘comfortable financial situation…and 
that gives space to experiment with energy system innovations’ (interview 32-
A). It is likely that the presence of decentralised institutional structures that 
support municipal involvement in energy, together with a local ability to 
experiment in transition arenas is supporting German municipalities to engage 
closely with local energy transitions and see their role as going beyond setting 
an enabling environment for decarbonisation. 
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The significance of local context and history in influencing the creation or 
maintenance of discourses was evident in Germany where the long history of 
energy based conflict in Hamburg resulted in a wide range of civil society 
organisations being mobilised to engage in heat network ownership debates 
and a willingness of the municipality to consider novel approaches to energy 
system change (albeit in the context of some local actors seeking to maintain 
the status quo).  
 
When historical institutionalist theories try to explain change, they most often 
point to external shocks or critical junctures that determine a change of policy 
path, leading yet again to stability (Streeck and Thelen, 2005;  Schmidt, 2008). 
Notwithstanding the importance of historical factors the findings of this research 
highlight that historical institutional accounts of the development of heat 
networks in England and Germany are not sufficient. The two countries have 
very different histories (in terms of heat network growth, institutional links 
between local and national scales and the strength of devolution and austerity 
discourses) but similar discourses were evident in relation to an ensuring role 
for local government, increased interest in direct ownership and the need to 
deliver multiple objectives in both countries, albeit with debate limited in 
England due to dominance of market liberal ideas at national level.  
 
The research also suggests that, although asymmetrical national-local 
governance relations limit the scope for local experimentation to shape wider 
institutional structures, local historical, cultural and political dynamics remain 
central in shaping trajectories of change. The interplay between local dynamics 
and the conditioning of local priorities was evident in the fact that although 
debate of the relative benefits of different ownership structures was current in all 
locations, these debates achieved more traction and were more able to 
translate into material change in some locations. Specifically, in Bristol and 
Hamburg, a combination of a history of politicisation of energy issues, a 
relatively benign environment in terms of local authority finances and staff 
numbers, and a window of opportunity to reconsider ownership issues (in Bristol 
the development of new networks without much historical precedent for 
particular ownership structures; in Hamburg the end of grid concession 
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contracts), had led to the development of heat network delivery models centred 
on the local authority.  
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how a range of organisations interested in heat 
networks (and beyond) have converged on a storyline regarding the need 
enhancing support for gas-CHP networks. In general there was support for 
existing heat network policy with existing support schemes seen as sufficient.  
 
A norm of varied actor groups being involved in the energy system, the long 
history of municipal utilities and the presence of various institutions that support 
the integration of local interest in national energy policy appear to have 
supporting a strong role for municipalities in heat networks. In particular as 
considerable local energy system skills have been developed in many cities.  
 
This chapter has also demonstrated the importance of historical context and 
political culture in shaping the environment for heat networks locally. In 
Hamburg heat network developments were dominated by the remunicipalisation 
campaign and framed as an ‘ideological debate’ focussed on wanting to get rid 
of Vattenfall. The campaign was high profile with the Chamber of Commerce, 
energy companies and some of the city government on one side and civil 
society and others in the government on the other. Specific windows of 
opportunity relating to developments at Moorburg, Wedel and the grid 
concessions were highlighted as significant in mobilising a wide range of actors 
in (re)shaping the energy system in Hamburg. 
 
In Frankfurt there was much less evidence of contestation. There was 
considerable focus on transitioning the existing networks to renewable sources 
of heat with a clear mandate from the city government. Mainova did however 
suggest that balancing multiple priorities whilst continuing to be economic was 
challenging. The city framed themselves as a transition manager with public 
ownership of the heat networks as a route to accelerate change, although this 
did also include the backgrounding of the still significant role of coal in the city. 
In Rhein Hünsruck there was a strong focus on delivering low carbon networks 
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with municipal and community approaches described as integrated and 
complementary. The local authority was framed as providing a supporting role 
and community based individuals were revealed to play an important role.  
Despite very different histories and ownership structures there was consensus 
of a resurgence nationally in the role of municipal energy in supporting the 
delivery of the Energiewende. The role of local government was not seen to be 
under any particular challenges, compared to the high profile of devolution 
processes and the financial pressures on local authorities in England.  
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Chapter 7: Integrating the findings and identifying ideational power 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the six cases, across two countries, 
presented in chapters 5 and 6 and review how they inform explanations of 
ideational and institutional change from a city-scale perspective. It brings 
together the analysis of discourse, actors and ideas to aim to uncover the 
mechanisms by which discourses shape and are shaped by actor strategies 
and institutional structures.  
 
In terms of the discursive institutional literature the following sections explore 
how a DI approach can facilitate a more detailed understanding of institutional 
change and maintenance across scales. Specifically, while there were many 
overlapping or mirroring discourses at the national and local scale in both 
countries (such as the role of heat networks in decarbonisation and the 
importance of local authorities playing a role in deployment) there was also a 
disjunct between programmatic and philosophical discourses underpinning 
national and local approaches, particularly in England. While there was debate 
of the multiple priorities heat networks can deliver at both national and local 
levels, there was more critical engagement in what this means for governance 
and delivery at the local scale. Additionally, English local authorities were seen 
to be linking discourses from within and outside of energy to reframe 
philosophical ideas relating to their role in energy system change. In Germany 
local actors were less tightly constrained by norms and problem definitions, 
supported by greater historical embedding of the importance of multiple state 
and market actors in energy systems. Despite this greater openness to ideas of 
the ‘ensuring state’ the extent of local authority engagement in energy was 
being further politicised through debate of remunicipalisation and a refocusing 
on the role of municipalities in driving rapid decarbonisation. 
 
The previous two chapters applied Hajer’s (1995a) structured process for 
discourse analysis, incorporating the identification of problem definitions, 
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emerging and established discourses, discourse coalitions and 
institutionalisation. This chapter expands on how discourses constructed, 
contested and maintained a range of philosophical, programmatic, policy ideas 
and operationalised the various types of ideational power (power through, over 
and in ideas) outlined by Schmidt (2008) and Carstensen and Schmidt (2016).  
 
As outlined by Schmidt (2008; 2010), discursive institutional approaches 
organise ideas at three levels - policy, programmatic and philosophical ideas. 
Policy ideas shape the options and solutions discussed in relation to an issue, 
programmatic ideas form the underlying principles of policy including problem 
definition, policy norms and methods, and philosophical ideas embody the world 
views, values and underlying assumptions in the policy process. Philosophical 
ideas are the most deep-seated ideas and tend to occur as background, 
underlying assumptions which are rarely discussed and contested, except in 
times of crisis. Philosophical ideas do, however, underpin programmes, which in 
turn underpin policies (Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014), with ideas at these levels 
more ‘foregrounded’ and openly discussed (Gillard, 2016). The following section 
therefore explores the key discourses and ideas evident in the cases and 
relates them to the dynamics of ideational type or level. As the levels of 
philosophical, programmatic and policy ideas are inter-related and constructed 
the analysis is structured by key discourse with ideational types analyses within 
this. The following section then relates this analysis to realisations of ideational 
power and institutional change. 
 
7.2 Key discourses and ideational framing 
7.2.1 Limits to an all-electric future 
As discussed in chapters 5 and 6 there was a common storyline across 
countries, cases and actor types of the limitations of all-electric approaches to 
heat decarbonisation, and by extension the importance of heat networks. This 
storyline tended to be presented based on the cognitive idea that complete heat 
decarbonisation via electrification would be very technically and economically 
difficult, and therefore policy should be developed to support heat network 
deployment. However a variety of programmatic and philosophical ideas were 
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evident to underpin this storyline and ultimately resulted in different approaches 
to policy.  
 
At a programmatic level in Germany the ‘problem’ of heat decarbonisation was 
widely (particularly by national actors) framed as the need to integrate heat and 
power in order to achieve sufficient overall system flexibility to completely 
decarbonise. This is often referred to as ‘sector coupling’ in German debates 
and situates heat networks as a fairly central part of overall decarbonisation. 
This can be seen as both 1) a pragmatic recognition that heat, power and 
transport systems are likely to become increasingly integrated as 
decarbonisation progresses, and 2) a means to maintain gas-CHP in the 
medium-term whilst Germany focusses on the highly politicised issue of phasing 
out coal power.  
 
In contrast national policy actors in England tended to present a story whereby 
heat networks were only now being supported as analysis was increasingly 
indicating that other options were not viable to the extent previous assumed. 
This relative ‘reluctance’ to support the technology can be linked to 
philosophical ideational themes in UK energy policy in terms of a focus on 
centralised, marketised models. This framing promotes a focus on trying to 
ensure technologies conform to norms of competition and techno-economic 
rationalities (programmatic ideas) and was identified as a constraining factor by 
several interviewees (such as 54-C, 55-G, 57-LA, 60-C). This diverged with 
more local conceptions of heat networks as a multi-dimensional issue which 
emphasised the variety of local issues that heat networks could contribute to, 
such as fuel poverty, system flexibility, local revenue and regeneration. In part 
this resulted in both differing conceptions of the ‘problem’ heat networks were 
trying to solve (i.e. decarbonisation vs decarbonisation plus social objectives) 
and differing conceptions of the most appropriate action to support deployment 
(de-risking commercial investment vs a strong role for the local authority and a 
long-term perspective on network development). 
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7.2.2 Multiple priorities 
As discussed, at the national level in England there was a somewhat uncritical 
approach to multiple priorities and ‘co-benefits’. Although key policy documents 
and interviewees made reference to the potential for heat networks to deliver 
multiple benefits this did not tend to be a central issue in the policy options put 
forward. 
 
While there was some discussion of the multiple benefits heat networks can 
deliver in Germany the three city case studies in England tended to 
problematize the achievement of multiple priorities to a greater degree than 
either their German counterparts or national actors in the UK. This local debate 
of the difficulties in balancing social, environmental and economic priorities 
reflects that all three cases were actively examining local governance structures 
for heat networks and considering the benefits and risks of various models. In 
Bristol there was little experience of developing heat networks so there was a 
lack of a local governance ‘template’ for local actors to adopt which, in some 
ways, gave greater scope to consider a full range of options. In this context heat 
networks were positioned as contributing to climate change and fuel poverty 
priorities, with public ownership framed as better able to contribute to these 
objectives. In Sheffield and Birmingham the debate of multiple objectives and 
governance structures was taking place in the context of existing partnership-
based heat network governance frameworks which involved a range of public 
and private actors. However these existing governance structures were referred 
to as under review due to changing local government priorities, increasing 
knowledge regarding heat network operation and broader questions regarding 
the extent to which multiple objectives can be delivered via existing governance 
arrangements.  
 
In Germany, whilst the potential to contribute to multiple objectives was 
recognised, all three cases emphasised carbon reduction objectives over other 
priorities. This partly reflects the lower profile of fuel poverty concerns in 
Germany and the more secure financial position of many local authorities. 
However this may also indicate the greater degree to which some local 
authorities are engaged in contributing to decarbonisation in Germany.  
252 
 
 
 
The connection of a topic to multiple storylines and agendas can be a 
successful technique to make a new storyline more acceptable to a range of 
actors groups, partly through interpretive flexibility aiding coalition building and 
partly through fitting arguments to cognitive and institutional norms (Hajer, 
1995). At a high-level linking heat networks to the need to address fuel poverty, 
decarbonise heat and integrate electricity, heat and transport acted to connect 
this well-established technology to positive cognitive frames and was 
unproblematic for a wide range of actors to adopt. This particularly appealed in 
England due to the ability of heat networks to integrate a range of generation 
technologies, thereby resonating with the ‘technology neutrality’ norm of UK 
energy policymaking. However the difficulties in balancing complex, potentially 
conflicting, priorities was not widely debated at the national level but a much 
more current (cognitive and normative) debate at the local level. The interplay of 
these issues with shifts in philosophical ideas regarding the role of the state are 
discussed later in this chapter in section 7.2.5. 
 
7.2.3 Unlocking finance 
In both countries a very significant proportion of the policy debate at the national 
level was focussed on issues of financing networks, although the focus of these 
debates, as well as the underlying ideational themes differed. 
 
In Germany the focus of national policy debates was on the need to ensure that 
gas-CHP networks remained viable. Here narratives emphasised the countries 
leadership role in climate action and the need to ensure that coal was phased 
out rapidly, with gas acting as a ‘bridge’ to decarbonisation. Whilst some issues, 
such as the coal phase-out are highly politicised the topic of extending subsidy 
support for gas-CHP (including many heat networks) was framed as a 
pragmatic step, particularly given that costs are small when compared to 
existing costs of renewable electricity subsidies. Additionally, at a practical level, 
networks had already been developed in many of the key cities so the focus 
was on ensuring continued viability and expansion.  
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Exiting coal in Germany is highly politicised, largely due to the significant role 
still played by coal mining in some regional economies, the reliance of some 
industries on cheap coal power and the importance of the coal unions both 
culturally and politically. The politicised nature of exiting coal, together with 
particularly challenging economics for gas-CHP, therefore provided an 
opportunity for heat networks to be positioned as part of the ‘solution’ to the 
problem of coal. The paradox of heat networks being both closely linked to 
decarbonisation debates in Germany whilst still incorporating a significant level 
of coal generation was highlighted by some consultants and NGOs in Germany 
but Government actors framed gas-CHP as a bridge to a decarbonised system. 
This illustrates how storylines can position issues with CHP positioned as a 
‘victim’ of electricity decarbonisation at the same time as being important to 
long-term system flexibility. This appeared to be successful in mobilising 
multiple actors, including industry, trade bodies, stadtwerke and national 
government, around the storyline of the need to support gas-CHP and led to 
change in national policy in the form of the CHP Act amendments. In Hamburg 
and Frankfurt, whilst there was a commitment to developing renewable heat 
networks both cities were also actively developing gas-CHP networks to replace 
coal networks and did not see the use of gas as in conflict with their climate 
goals in the short-term. 
 
In England the emphasis at the national level was on attracting third party 
finance to build new schemes. This was leading to a focus on ways to reduce 
large-scale investor risk, for example through the HNIP which aims to provide 
capital contributions and loans to heat network projects in order to increase the 
internal rate of return for equity investors (BEIS, 2016d). Whilst funding was 
also being made available to support local authority feasibilities the overarching 
message was that this was to develop projects towards commercial 
investability. 
 
Discussion of financial barriers and an energy sector norm of the need to 
‘attract mobile international finance’ were enthusiastically adopted by industry 
participants to focus debate on the need to make heat networks projects 
investable. Energy sector norms relating to financing are highlighted by Bolton 
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(2011) and Hawkey and Webb (2012, p.4) who suggest that the emphasis of 
successive UK governments on privatised energy markets has established an 
energy infrastructure investment culture based on controlling risk in order to 
attract global finance with reliable rates of return. The centrality of programmatic 
ideas which framed heat networks as a techno-economic problem and a 
technology which needed to be shaped to fit within existing energy system 
norms reflects the embedded nature of normative ideas regarding the benefits 
of a centralised, competitive and economically regulated energy system. These 
themes are returned to below in section 7.2.5 and 7.3. 
 
7.2.4 Regulation and consumer costs 
As discussed, in England the presence of deeply embedded norms regarding 
competition, financing and regulation acted to shape the policy environment for 
heat networks around the need for them to be shaped to be ‘more like’ other 
part of the energy system, notably other supply arrangements. However, the 
locally specific nature of heat networks means that variations in generating mix, 
consumer profile and network costs can potentially result in widely different 
consumer prices which can be difficult to either communicate to consumers or 
effectively regulate. This is particularly the case as assessments of the heat 
network prices cannot simply compare network prices to the average unit price 
of gas as heat delivered by a heat network also includes costs related to heat 
source maintenance and replacement (the equivalent to gas boiler servicing 
and replacement).  
 
A number of studies have indicated that in the UK heat network costs, on 
average, tend to be comparable with gas heating (and generally cheaper than 
direct electric heating) (Which?, 2015; Competition and Markets Authority, 
2018), and heat network consumers are as satisfied with their heating systems 
as non-heat network consumers (BEIS, 2017c). Despite this there has been 
growing attention paid to instances of poorly performing heat networks which 
has led to some organisations to call for more structured regulation (ADE, 2015; 
Which?, 2015; Citizens Advice, 2016). The CMA’s review concluded that the 
sector should be regulated by a public-sector body which has statutory powers 
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to set regulation, monitor compliance, and enforce regulatory standards 
(Competition and Markets Authority, 2018).  
 
To date the Government has not issued details of how it envisages regulation 
operating, however the framing by both government and the CMA has been that 
a regulator will introduce consumer protection for all heat network customers in 
line with those received by gas and electricity customers in relation to price, 
quality of service, transparency and minimum technical standards. Given the 
comments above outlining the difficulty in comparing heat network prices this 
illustrates the extent to which normative assessments of how the energy system 
needs to operate is shaping the heat network policy environment. This can also 
be seen in the exclusion of alternative discourses relating to other ways to 
protect consumers and regulate networks. For example in Denmark networks 
are operated by municipalities or cooperatives on a not-for-profit basis with 
prices benchmarked publically annually and the Danish Energy Regulatory 
Authority overseeing the sector (Danish Energy Agency, 2017). Similarly in 
Germany there was an acceptance within regulatory debates that the structure, 
customer base and pricing of networks is likely to be very different in different 
locations and that the most appropriate way to deal with this was through the 
Federal Cartel Office’s (Bundeskartellamt) ongoing random checks and sector 
enquiries.  
 
7.2.5 Enabling to ensuring state 
As discussed in section 7.2.2 ad 7.2.3, in England there was a significant 
disconnect between discourses at the national and local scale in relation to both 
the framing of the policy issues that need to be addressed in order to deploy 
heat networks, and the wider role of heat networks in the energy system and 
beyond.  
 
At their root these differing policy and programmatic approaches were informed 
by a divergence in ideas relating to the role of the local state, particularly in 
relation to energy system change. This is referred to here as difference between 
‘enabling’ and ‘ensuring’ state worldviews, and is perhaps the most central 
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theme of the ideational analysis carried out in this research. It was evident, in 
different forms, in both countries albeit more strongly in the English cases and is 
explored in the rest of this section. 
 
As detailed in chapter 2, there are significant difference between local 
governance structures in England and Germany, including a long established 
norm in Germany of multiple forms of energy ownership, including municipal 
ownership (Cox, 2010).  However a number of authors have also charted how 
market liberal principles have been embedded into the operation of the local 
state across much of Europe (Hood, 1995; Griffiths and Kippin, 2017). This 
involved a ‘reorientation of urban governance away from the local provision of 
welfare and services to a more outward-orientated stance designed to foster 
and encourage local growth and economic development’ (Hall and Hubbard, 
1996, p. 153). These changes led Bulkeley and Kern (2006) to suggest that 
local government reforms in the UK and Germany over the past 25 years have, 
to an extent, ‘eroded some of the historical differences’ with both countries 
converging on a more partnership based ‘enabling’ model of governance and 
engaging less in ensuring, direct delivery modes of governing (termed 
Governing by provision in their typology), particularly in relation to urban climate 
governance.  
 
This claim was, however, contested by a range of local governance, NGOs and 
consultant interviewees in both countries who suggested that this ‘enabling’ role 
for local government was being reconsidered to some extent. In England, all 
three case studies referred to an increased appetite to consider investing in 
large infrastructure projects and highlighted the benefits of more local authority 
involvement in terms of long-term planning and multiple objectives. At the 
national level there was an accepted narrative in both countries that local 
authorities play an important coordination and brokerage role in relation to heat 
networks. However in England, at the national level, debate regarding the local 
authority role tended to focus on the benefits of early stage involvement in 
terms of feasibility, identifying anchor loads and de-risking involvement for 
commercial partners and did not enter into much critical debate regarding the 
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implications of local authorities taking a more central ownership and operation 
role.  
 
Table 12 outlines the modes of governing proposed by Bulkeley and Kern 
(2006) together with examples of local government use of each mode. The table 
also includes examples of the multiple modes adopted across the case studies 
examined in this research.  
 
 
Table 12: Modes of local governing 
Mode of 
governing 
Examples from Bulkeley and 
Kern, (2006) 
Examples from this 
research 
Self-governing 
- the capacity 
of local 
government 
to govern its 
own 
activities 
 Energy efficiency 
schemes within 
municipal buildings (such 
as schools) 
 Use of CHP within 
municipal buildings 
 Purchasing green energy 
 Connection of 
municipal buildings to 
heat network, 
particularly as anchor 
load (all cases) 
Governing by 
authority 
- the shaping 
of practice 
through the 
delivery of 
particular 
forms of 
service and 
resource 
 Supplementary planning 
guidance on energy 
efficiency, renewables 
and CHP 
 Guaranteed connection 
to CHP or renewables 
 Local option of 
requiring connection to 
heat networks (but 
rarely used) (Hamburg, 
Frankfurt) 
 Local planning 
guidance to support 
connection to heat 
networks (all cases) 
Governing by 
provision 
- the use of 
traditional 
forms of 
authority 
such as 
regulation 
and 
direction 
 Energy efficiency 
measures in council 
housing 
 Energy Service Provider 
 Connection of social 
housing to heat 
networks in conjunction 
with other efficiency 
improvements in order 
to reduce bills for 
residents (Bristol, 
Birmingham, Sheffield) 
 Establishment of 
municipal supply 
company (Hamburg, 
Frankfurt, Bristol).  
Governing through 
enabling 
- Governing 
through 
advice, 
 Campaigns for energy 
efficiency 
 Provision of advice, 
grants and loans for 
 Partnership based heat 
network delivery 
models (Sheffield, 
Birmingham, Rhein 
Hünsruck). 
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partnerships 
and 
delegation. 
energy efficiency or 
renewables 
 Coordination and 
facilitation of heat 
network development 
with public and private 
partners (all cases) 
 
 
At the local level in England there was much more local exploration of the 
various roles local authorities could take in terms of ownership, control and risk 
and the implications of that across a range of financial, social and 
environmental outcomes. Birmingham, Sheffield and Bristol, whilst having very 
different experiences and delivery models for heat networks, were all examining 
different delivery models for the future and considering a stronger local authority 
role. This represents a break with the local government approach in the past as 
initially there was an emphasis in the Birmingham case on the need to partner 
with a commercial operator in order to manage risk. Similarly in Sheffield the 
original sale of the network was closely linked to financial and risk-based 
concerns.  
 
In terms of the national approach to the role of local authority policy efforts and 
discourses were aligned with programmatic ideas which framed the local (and 
national) state as playing an enabling role in the energy system and privileged 
techno-economic rationalities. These programmatic ideas were themselves 
embedded in a neoliberal philosophy based on markets and competition and a 
‘hollowed out’ state which increasingly delegates its tasks and thus becomes 
less important (Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 2007; Schönberger, 2013). This was 
expressed by national policy actors through an emphasis on marketised 
approaches, concerns regarding the capability of local authorities to take a 
more central role and repeated reference to the ability of local authorities to 
‘enable’ investment.  
 
However many local actors presented a clear narrative of how they felt this 
‘enabling’ framing of local government was out of step of wider changes they 
were identifying in both the energy system and the role of local government. In 
terms of energy themes there was widespread reference to a perceived failure 
of competitive energy markets to deliver fair costs, the need to accelerate the 
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speed of decarbonisation and the need to integrate of social and economic 
concerns into decarbonisation. Additionally the various properties of heat 
networks which make them difficult to fit into existing (competition-based) 
energy system norms were highlighted. 
 
Significantly there was also evidence of discourses and ideas from outside of 
energy influencing the framing of energy issues and efforts to restructure policy 
and practice with local actors commonly linking debate of heat networks to 
issues of austerity and devolution. In particular the need to identify sources of 
revenue was referred to in all three English cases and there were numerous 
references to devolution (and the relaxing of borrowing rules) ‘unleashing’ local 
authorities to be more commercial. Importantly this tended to be framed as 
increased scope, within local authorities, to develop commercial undertakings 
which can then support wider public services and priorities. This was particularly 
evident in Bristol’s municipal energy company presenting themselves as ‘a force 
for social good’ (Bristol Energy, 2017) and in several interviewees specifically 
using the term ‘ensuring state’ in an explicit rejection of alternative framings 
(e.g. APSE, 2013). 
 
Whilst it could be assumed that individuals working for local authorities are 
more likely to hold worldviews which situate the (local) state as a key deliverer 
of social goods it is important to note that the ensuring state narrative was 
evident from a number of other (i.e. non-local authority) interviewees (such as 
interviews 49-NGO, 52-C, 54-C, 56-NGO, 60-C). Additionally, while some 
individuals may have long-held values which site the local state as central to the 
delivery of public services, interviewees were specifically reporting a shift in how 
they thought about a local authority role in relation to energy systems and there 
were some examples of this being operationalised in terms of Bristol Energy, 
the approach of APSE Energy and the number of heat networks owned and an 
increasing number of heat networks operated by local authorities (such as 
Islington, Camden, Aberdeen). 
 
In Germany there was also some reference to a more ensuring state but this 
was not framed as in opposition to national framings in the same way. A more 
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complex role for local government is already established in national and local 
discourses and institutions, with acceptance that they may play multiple roles 
concurrently. In Frankfurt and Rhein Hünsruck this incorporated coordination, 
planning and delivery and was based on partnerships which spanned the state-
market-civil society spectrum. In Hamburg the role of the local authority was 
more politicised reflecting the contested nature of energy system change in the 
city. This involved an increasing local authority role being disputed by some 
actors, however the referendum had institutionalised a more central role for 
municipal ownership going forward.   
 
However, despite a well-established openness to local authorities playing a 
range of roles in the energy system, both case studies and national 
interviewees also highlighted that conceptions of this role were changing as 
debate of the benefits of energy system privatisation became more common 
across a range of actors. This was most politicised in Hamburg where a diverse 
range of actors had been mobilised in a remunicipalisation campaign which 
linked private ownership with continued use of coal generation and a lack of 
local control. Similarly an increase in municipal buy-backs of energy networks 
and infrastructure in recent years, as discussed in chapter 2, was cited by many 
actors as part of a wider movement which was rejecting neoliberal approaches 
to rapid decarbonisation and locating the state (at a range of scales), as well as 
community organisations, as key to the Energiewende. 
 
In Frankfurt and Rhein Hünsruck, although there was less debate of how local 
energy governance approaches might be changing, a strong role was already 
established for local government in driving change in the energy system albeit 
in different forms in the two locations. In Frankfurt the city took a pragmatic 
approach to increasing its ownership of Mainova in 2009 indicating that it was 
both a sound investment and a means to increase control over energy 
objectives. The current structure of heat network provision in the city was not 
described as controversial with broad acceptance that the city plays a role in 
planning, facilitating and providing energy services. Although it should be noted 
that Mainova highlighted more difficulty in aligning commercial and non-
commercial priorities. In Rhein Hünsruck the small, rural nature of networks and 
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the desire to develop 100% renewable systems meant that there was limited 
involvement from commercial actors with development led by community 
groups and the municipality. The benefits of local ownership were widely 
recognised and had been embedded by the development of a significant 
number of renewable electricity projects over the last 20 years. 
 
7.2.5.1 Remunicipalisation and non-energy themes 
In terms of the broader debate of the ‘ensuring state’ narrative there was also a 
recurrent storyline in both England and Germany relating to the 
(re)municipalisation of energy. In England although there is currently very little 
municipal ownership of the energy system there has historically been a higher 
incident of municipal ownership and operation of heat networks114 and the 
recent development of a number of municipal suppliers or electricity and gas. 
This was closely linked to the ‘changing local government role’ discourse 
discussed in chapter 5 and related to a need to access new sources of revenue 
and be more entrepreneurial, as well as increasing reference to the failure of 
the privatised energy system to deliver social and environmental objectives.  
 
Both Birmingham and Sheffield have, to date, pursued commercial partnership 
approaches to delivering heat networks while Bristol is pursuing a municipally 
owned and controlled model. Despite these differences all cases referred to an 
increased interest in municipal ownership and referred to a wider resurgence of 
local authority interest in the energy system. However there was much more 
emphasis on municipal models in Bristol reflecting the linking of heat networks 
to the establishment of Bristol Energy which had raised the profile of ‘social 
good’ objectives in the energy system (Bristol Energy, 2015). The normative 
framing of increased local authority involvement in energy systems delivering 
better social outcomes was openly framed by some interviewees, both in Bristol 
and beyond, as informed by philosophical ideas relating to the need for greater 
local state involvement to deliver rapid and equitable decarbonisation. As one 
interviewee put it: 
 
                                                          
114 Such as in Nottingham and Sheffield. 
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‘there is genuinely a populist feeling of we should do something 
different, we should use the resources we’ve got in the city to do 
things better. We’ve always had a very individualistic approach to 
things…we want the local authority in our way as little as possible in 
Britain, that has changed to some extent and the local authorities 
have to some extent been trying to get that ‘we will be your 
champions’ mantle. Big government’s not working, central 
governments not listening to us, we’ll do it locally’ (interview 17-LA). 
 
Importantly there was considerable reference across cases and interviews to 
how non-energy drivers, such as devolution and constrained local government 
finances, were interacting with local governments approach to heat networks 
(and energy projects more widely). This was highlighted by all cases, 
particularly Bristol, and indicates how broader structural changes to local 
governance can influence specific policy areas such as energy. Austerity was 
often invoked as a rationale for local authorities engaging in local infrastructure 
projects such as heat networks where low cost local authority finance can be 
mobilised to deliver long-term (but low rates of) returns. This financial narrative 
was invariably linked to the wider localism and devolution agenda in that the 
‘flip-side’ of constrained public finances was the message from central 
government that local authorities could determine their priorities and solve their 
own problems more independently than before.  
 
In this way the linking of heat networks to both wider climate change and 
devolution agenda can be seen as a site of both cognitive dissonance  and 
constructive alignment. Firstly, despite the narrative of devolution, local 
authorities were critical of the extent to which real power was being devolved, 
echoing the critiques of many political analysts (Deas, Hincks and Headlam, 
2013; Lowndes and Gardner, 2016; Tomaney, 2016; Ayres, Flinders and 
Sandford, 2018). This dissonance between the narrative of devolution and the 
experiences of local authorities in terms of the lack of new powers and 
freedoms meant that senior managers in local authorities and non-energy 
teams such as finance and legal were more open to actual opportunities to act 
more entrepreneurially, particularly when there was the potential for long-term 
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revenues. Equally while the message from central government was that local 
authorities should focuss on an enabling role in heat networks, even this monir 
refocussing on local authorities as energy system actors provide a space for 
some local authority officers to present the narratives of energy system change 
and devolution as aligned, with closer involvement in heat network delivery as 
the logical conclusion of this alignment.  
 
Despite being consistently referred to by local actors the (re)municipalisation 
storyline was not influential in national policy debates which instead focussed 
on techno-economic appraisals of heat networks and the development of locally 
negotiated governance structures. However there may be some emergent 
institutionalisation of a more central role for local government with local 
authorities starting to collaborate more on energy projects and recent 
government support focussed on local authorities.  
 
In Germany, while the remunicipalisation storyline was unsurprisingly strongest 
in Hamburg, there was awareness across interviewees of a resurgence of 
interest in municipal utilities and the remunicipalisation of significant grid 
infrastructure across the country. This was linked to the opportunity to buy back 
grid concessions, a recognition of the need to accelerate the energy transition, 
and some disillusionment with the ability of private models to deliver multiple 
energy system objectives.  
 
Additional the need to engage a wide range of local stakeholders in heat 
networks (regardless of ownership structures) was a feature of debates in both 
countries. In particular a wide range of public and private delivery models were 
in place in both countries, with often blurred boundaries between the two. This 
included complex public-private partnerships and local authorities developing 
arms-length subsidiaries which may also include commercial shareholding. This 
highlights how simple conceptions of state or market do not reflect the 
complexity of actor relations and governance realities in relation to energy 
transitions, particularly in locally contingent infrastructures such as heat 
networks.  
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7.3 Exercising Ideational Power 
In order to examine the ability of the ideas discussed in section 7.2 to become 
influential to a wider range of actors this section explores processes of 
ideational power. Ideational power can be defined as the capacity of individual 
or collective actors to influence other actors’ normative and cognitive beliefs 
through the use of ideational elements (Carstensen, 2011). In an effort to 
provide a framework to analyse how power is exercised through ideational 
processes Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) developed a framework of three 
different types of ideational power: power through, over and in ideas. Power 
through ideas can be understood as the ideational capacity of actors to 
persuade other actors to accept and adopt their views; power over ideas relates 
to the coercive imposition of ideas and the power to resist the inclusion of 
alternatives; and power in ideas takes place through constraining the ideas that 
can be considered and the establishment of ideational hegemony. The following 
section relates the key ideational processes identified in the research to these 
three forms of ideational power in order to explore the route from discursive and 
ideational framing to institutuionalisation (or not) of particular ideas, norms and 
policies. 
 
7.3.1 Power through ideas 
As discussed power through ideas (the most common approach to ideational 
power among discursive institutionalists) is based on the ability of actors to 
persuade others to accept and adopt certain views. Persuasiveness depends 
on the cognitive and normative arguments adopted (Carstensen et al., 2016; 
Gillard, 2016). 
 
One of the key discourses promoted by central government and industry actors 
related to the idea that heat networks are a techno-economic ‘problem’ which 
requires a focus on de-risking investment. This cognitive idea, is superficially 
appealing as creating a financable business case for heat networks is a key 
challenge in most cases. However, it was limited in its persuasiveness for many 
local actors as it did not align with local framings of the problems heat networks 
can help to address. Instead local authority interviewees focussed far more on 
challenges relating to simultanteously delivering multiple priorities via heat 
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networks, how to progressively decarbonise heat generation, and ensuring 
connection risk was minimised through engaging a wide range of local 
stakeholders. 
 
The techno-economic framing can be seen as based on normative arguments 
about the nature of the ‘right’ way to deliver energy policy (see section 7.2.3 on 
marketised approaches to energy policy). However this normative stance 
tended to be out of step with what Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke (2007, p. 
755) refer to as the ‘intuitions of the moment’ in terms of locally constructed 
cognitive and normative expectations about how policy and the economy 
should/could work. While Widmaier et al.'s (2007) analysis referred to the 
relationship between mass public expectations and specific policy arenas, a 
parallel was evident in this research at the local scale with numerous energy 
and non-energy themes coming together (i.e. the key themes outlined in section 
7.2) to create an environment that allowed some local actors to construct a 
‘new’ role of local authorities in energy system change. The fact that this more 
ensuring role aligned with various energy and non-energy themes limited the 
persuasiveness of the entrenched national framing of an ‘enabling’ role. 
 
Although the framing of heat networks and the role of local authorities was more 
nuanced in Germany a similar shift in cognitive and normative expectations 
about the energy system at the local level can be seen in terms of the salience 
of remunicipalisation narratives. Indeed there was much more evidence in 
Germany of wider public mobilisation on the issue of local authorities and 
energy system change, with public campaigns in support of municipal 
ownership of energy infrastrcuture taking place within Hamburg, Berlin and 
other locations (Terhorst, 2014; Becker, Naumann and Moss, 2016).  
 
As highlighted by Carstensen and Schmidt (2016, p. 325) process of power 
through ideas tend to emphasise actors’ ‘ability to ‘stand outside’ and critically 
engage with the ideas they hold and promote’. In this way ‘actors not only have 
‘background ideational abilities’ that enable them to think beyond the 
(ideational) structures that constrain them...They also have ‘foreground 
discursive abilities’ that enable them to communicate and deliberate about 
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taking action’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 6). However despite extensive evidence of 
local authorities in England critically engaging with the philosphical and 
programmatic underpinning of their approach to energy systems, a lack of 
formalised engagement of local actors in national energy policy debates was 
limiting opportunities for these ideas to be incorporated into national debates. In 
Germany where more structured institutions exist to engage local interests in 
energy policy (such as a stronger tier of regional politicians and trade 
associations which represent the interests of stadtwerke) ideas relating to a 
more central role for local authorities were more established in national 
debates. 
 
In England, whilst there was limited evidence of local actors persuading national 
policy actors of the importance of a more ‘ensuring’ state and municipal 
ownership, the strength of these debate between groups of local actors 
appeared to help them to resist the ideational power of established norms about 
energy system operation (see power in ideas, 7.3.3). At the local level 
persuasively utilising cognitive and normative ideas about how and why local 
authorities should take a more central role in heat networks was important in 
local actor networks as evidenced by the fact that all six cases were actively 
(re)considering the balance of risk, reward and control of different ownership 
models and seeking to take a more central role in local energy planning 
(somewhat regardless of final heat network ownership structures). These 
debates about the ‘correct’ role for local authorities to play in energy system 
change were also a topic of current debate in several local governance 
networks such as APSE, the Core Cities, UK100 and in international actor 
networks such as Energy Cities and ELENA.  
 
7.3.2 Power over ideas 
The concept of power over ideas relates to the capacity of an actor, or group of 
actors, to control and dominate the meaning of ideas. Carstensen and Schmidt 
(2016) suggest that may involve directly imposing ideas, indirectly pressurising 
opponents into conformity or by excluding alternative ideas. 
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In this study direct power over ideas was less evident that the other forms of 
ideational power. Partly this results from the complexity of actor networks 
involved in heat networks and their locally contingent nature meaning that it is 
more difficult for ideas to be consistently imposed across a policy arena. For 
example, while in England there was a clear national focus on unlocking finance 
for heat networks and fitting them into existing energy system norms there was 
also recognition that a diversity of ownership, operation and financing models 
were already in existence and the most appropriate local arrangements will 
ultimately be informed by local conditions and networks.  
 
Additionally the fact that heat network development was being linked to multiple 
policy areas (particularly locally, see 7.2.2 and 7.2.5) meant that a wide range of 
ideas and approaches to delivery were being discussed locally, creating a 
difficult environment for any nationally imposed idea to have hegemony.  
 
As Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) outline this form of ideational power tends to 
more more evident in circumstances when policy is being shaped by a closed 
group of people, such as an epistemic community, that can mobilise enough 
legitimacy around their policy ideas to avoid considering alternative approaches. 
This can also be the case in area of high technical or scientific complexity 
where ‘challenger’ ideas can be more easily excluded. In Germany one 
example of the exclusion of alternative ideas was the focus on supporting gas-
CHP as the main focus for heat network policy. While this was resisted by some 
minority (NGO) voices, contestation to this programmatic idea was largely 
excluded due to the strength of the coalition of (climate activist, industry, 
municipality) interests which were aligned in lobbying for more support for CHP. 
 
7.3.3 Power in ideas 
The final form of ideation power – power in ideas – relates to the authority of 
some ideas to structure wider thought on a topic, or to constrain the ideas that 
can be legitimately considered. This tends to relate ideational power to 
structural and institutional forms of power in terms of how norms and 
institutional set-up shapes the ability of actors to promote their ideas. In terms of 
constraining what can be meaningfully be considered, power in ideas overlaps 
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to some degree with power over ideas, however this form of power tends to be 
exercised more implicitly in terms of norms and standard ways of operating 
rather than the explicit exclusion of a view point.  
 
In England power in ideas was evident in terms of the strength of the energy 
systems norms relating to the importance of industry knowledge in forming 
energy policy and the need to de-risk investment for commercial finance. While 
these norms did not explicitly exclude local authorities from the policy process 
they served to legitimise existing institutional structures which limited local 
authority engagement in the policy process. For example, there were limited 
agreed tools to incorporate the valuing of social outcomes into the appraisal of 
heat networks, and engagement between government and other actors 
focussed on industry associations (mainly ADE). While local authorities are 
engaging with government on heat network much more than they did in the past 
this tends to be through the HNDU and focus on the practicalities of carrying out 
feasibility studies rather on wider debates of the future of the policy agenda. 
Indeed several local authority interviewees highlighted the difficulty in engaging 
with national heat network policy debates due to limited resources and the need 
to focus on the dynamics of their acutal projects (interviews 62-LA, 64-LA, 66-
LA). 
 
A number of sub-national and NGO interviewees in England suggested that the 
options open to supporting heat networks were framed by the need for them to 
fit within the principles of the current energy system (interviews 3-NGO, 5-NGO, 
14-C, 15-NGO, 16-LA). In the UK the central tenets of the energy system 
include supplier choice, competitive energy markets and the dominance of 
privatised energy companies (Henning and Mårdsjö, 2010). The assumption 
that these main structural features of the UK energy system are set and not part 
of the debate ‘blackboxes’115 both the different characteristics of heat networks 
in comparison to other decarbonisation options and the fact that the wider 
energy system is undergoing significant disruption which could involve broader 
challenges to norms relating to supplier switching and the nature of energy 
                                                          
115 Blackboxing is a discursive mechanism which makes an issue appear as fixed, essential and 
beyond discussion (Hajer, 1995a). 
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companies. Specifically Hall and Foxon (2014) suggest the UK energy system 
developed based on competitive markets for generation and supply and the 
regulation of distribution and that this creates difficulties for heat networks as 
generation, distribution and supply are often integrated and long-term contracts 
are necessary in order to secure the high levels of upfront capital costs. Heat 
networks also tend to be monopoly suppliers once established as the cost to 
consumers of switching heat source, either to gas or to an alternative low 
carbon system, tends to be prohibitive.  
 
Despite the strong drivers to fit heat networks within existing energy system 
norms there was a growing ideational challenge at the local level to the idea 
that local authorities should only facilitate energy system change. Instead a 
refocussing on an ‘ensuring’ local state was linked to much wider debates 
relating to public finances, devolution and the need to deliver multiple energy 
system priorities. Cowell et al. (2017, p. 5) suggest that as political devolution 
can ‘represent a significant re-territorialisation of government and political 
processes’ it might be expected that it would have a significant effect on energy 
system governance norms. The analysis here provides some evidence of an 
effect on local governance norms albeit with limited evidence of this being 
integrated into national norms.  
 
In Germany there was evidence of more flexible institutional norms with 
acceptance, and formal institutionalisation, of a wide range of organisations 
engaging in the energy system through a mix of state, non-state and quasi-state 
actors. This led to an environment for local projects which was not particularly 
constrained by norms regarding the ‘right’ way for local energy systems to 
develop. This was partly driven by a less ideological commitment to marketised 
models of energy supply in Germany’s coordinated market economy, which 
accepts the inclusion of a variety of voices in policy debates, and privileges 
compromise and the formation of coalitions (Kemfert & Horne, 2013). 
Additionally the presence of a significant number of municipal utilities 
throughout the history of the German energy system also meant there was 
greater discursive space when grid concessions were due for renewal and a 
number of cities decided to remunicipalise energy networks (Wollmann, 2004). 
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German energy policy and wider governance confers significant autonomy on 
local energy actors and this established local role is supported by central policy 
support and the existence of a national technical and regulatory framework. 
 
There was also a tendency in Germany towards pragmatic policy making that 
accepts that sufficient rather than perfect consumer protection arrangements 
are acceptable. This led to less debate of consumer protection or heat network 
regulation, despite widespread acknowledgement that there were some 
limitations in the ex-ante regulation approach of the Bundeskartellamt. Instead 
norms around the need to rapidly move away from coal use had led to debate 
being largely dominated by the need to support gas-CHP. 
 
While there was a relative lack of discursive conflict regarding heat network 
development at the national level, there was considerable local politicisation of 
energy in the Hamburg and Rhein Hünsruck cases. In Hamburg this was part of 
a long history of energy related conflicts where various aspects of the energy 
system were disputed by different environmental, social and economic interests. 
In Rhein Hünsruck politicisation was less conflictual, in that the municipal and 
community interests were dominant and portrayed as aligned, but significant 
social capital had been mobilised around issues of energy system ownership 
and development. As Moss et al. (2014: 2) suggest such local debates can 
reflect ‘intense debates about how each locality stands to benefit or lose out 
from the Energiewende and how it can intervene to advance its own – and 
broader, collective – interests’. 
 
In constrast to these examples of local (re)politicisation, depoliticisation is 
framed as a key route through which power in ideas is exercise in terms of 
constraining legitimate points of view. Significant differences in the local 
politicisation of energy were evident between the case studies and countries 
studied. In general, debate of ownership was more politicised at a local level in 
both England and Germany with limited national debate of these issues. 
Hamburg and Bristol in particular sited their decisions on heat network 
ownership in relation to the failure of privatised energy systems. However in 
Germany there was more engagement of citizens in this politicisation with 
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citizens, community groups and civil society closely involved in discussions 
regarding the future of local energy infrastructure in both Hamburg and Rhein 
Hünsruck. Despite this politicisation of heat networks at the local level in 
England, in particular, the agenda was depoliticised at the national level through 
the discursive hegemony of ideas of techno-economic rationalities and derisking 
investment.  
 
7.4 Institutionalisation and incremental ideational change 
Analysis of the role of discourses in socio-technical transitions often consider 
specifically the interaction between discourses and policy change (such as 
Kern, 2009) and Schmidt and Radaelli (2004, p. 188) argue that new discourses 
can provide ‘actors with new ways of conceiving of a policy’ leading to the 
reconceptualization of actor interests and policy change. This study builds on 
this perspective but, in line with much of the wider discursive institutionalist 
literature, considers institutional change from a broader perspective than policy 
change, incorporating other formal and informal institutions. Discourses can 
therefore enable or constrain the role of actors or promote new actors engaging 
in a policy area which leads to different outcomes in relation to the priorities, 
norms and business practices pursued by actors involved in heat networks, 
somewhat regardless of policy. For example, increased debate of the role of 
heat networks in delivering complex local priorities and a reconsideration of the 
role of municipal ownership in some local authorities was influencing the 
approach of many of the case study cities and leading them to adjust how they 
appraised the risks and benefits of different approaches to heat networks, 
without explicit policy to drive this change. 
 
In Germany the presence of diverse heat network ownership structures and 
actor networks, together with the long-term existence of public utilities, meant 
that there were recognised routes for municipalities to have a voice in policy 
debates. This included both political influence through the Federal political 
structure of Germany and heat network policy influence through the VKU and 
AGFW. Additionally the established role for stadtwerke meant that a less 
dichotomous relationship between state and market delivery models was 
established with these municipal companies seen, to some extent, to mediate 
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between state and market as they operate with commercial objectives and can 
include private investment.  
 
Additionally, in Germany there was a wide range of institutional structures, 
operating across a range of scales, which represented local interests in energy 
policy. These included technical representation by the AGFW, public ownership 
representation in the form of VKU, CHP lobbying by the BDEW and more 
structured links between local politicians and national government. This is not to 
say that there was no conflict between interests and a number of NGO 
interviewees highlighted instances of both public and private actors 
simultaneously promoting the role of heat networks in decarbonisation whilst 
also seeking to still operate fossil fuelled networks or owning coal generation 
plant. There was also more national debate regarding local public ownership of 
the energy system which was largely lacking in England. 
 
In contrast, in England, while an increasing role was recognised for local 
government in heat (albeit largely portrayed as an enabling role at the national 
level), there was limited formal mandate. There are few structures through 
which local government can influence the wider national energy landscape and 
a large number of interviewees highlighted how, although some local authorities 
were likely to be very effective in driving heat network development, variation in 
local resources and skills was likely to lead to uneven and patchy development 
of networks nationally. Despite these concerns the developing role of the HNDU 
team and the HNIP were seen as the beginnings of a formalisation of a greater 
role for local government, although with the focus still on the commercialisation 
of projects. 
 
As Carstensen (2011, p. 596) emphasises most ‘theories about ideas in politics 
implicitly conceptualise ideas as relatively stable entities that act as a catalyst 
for political change in times of crisis’ but ‘overlook incremental yet significant 
ideational change in times of stability’. This is also true of discursive 
institutionalist literature which tends to say little about how ideational change 
can occur incrementally. Schmidt (2002, p. 223) does hint towards more 
incremental conceptions of ideational change in her framing of ‘evolutionary 
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change’ when policy discourses are renewed and there may be ‘minority 
discourses waiting in the wings proposing alternative policy programmes’. 
However overall she still argues that significant policy change happens through 
crisis. 
 
In order to make DI more sensitive to incremental ideational change Carstensen 
(2011) proposes the notion of ideational bricolage. This refers to ideas as being 
comprised of a web of related elements of meaning whose presence, linkages, 
and relative importance is prone to (incremental) change over time. These 
incremental change are easily overlooked, or even deliberately downplayed, but 
their cumulative effect and influence on policy can be significant (Gillard, 2016). 
 
In the cases examined in this research, while there was strong evidence of a 
city-scale ideational shift to a more ensuring role for local authorities (in heat 
networks) in both countries, there was limited evidence of a single ‘crisis’ driving 
these changes. Instead, particularly in England, interlinked economic, political 
and technical decentralisation trends were observed to be coming together to 
create the discursive space for local authorities to re-evaluate their role in 
energy systems. This incorporated; economic trends relating to austerity and 
reductions in local government funding, political trends in relation to devolution 
and a focus on local economic growth; and technical decentralisation trends in 
relation to energy systems which are becoming more localised and focussed on 
the need to decarbonise heat. Whilst some of these trends lent from ‘crisis’ 
narratives in relation to austerity and the need to rapidly decarbonise they were 
woven together to create a more incremental bricolage where storylines from 
multiple topic areas combined to allow local actors to create a compelling 
argument for a more interventionist role in energy infrastructure.  
 
However, despite these local ideational shifts, institutional norms and wider 
governance traditions persisted which were limiting the ability of local 
governments to enact a more central role in energy systems. Specifically a lack 
of institutional structures to include local authorities in energy policy debates 
and a national norm of ‘enabling’ modes of urban climate governance appeared 
to be limiting the ability of local authorities to translate the ideational power they 
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were exercising within their organisation and with peers (power through ideas) 
into influence on national policy. This highlights the ability of ‘power in ideas’, 
exercised through national norms and policy making processes, to constrain 
other types of ideational power – particularly those that originating from local 
actors.  
 
In Germany the ideation shift towards a more ensuring local state was less 
pronounced, largely due to the fact that a more varied role for the local state 
was already historically and institutionally embedded. However there was a 
significant shift in the local politicisation of remunicipalisation discourses with 
(some) local debates moving from a position that both state and market had 
place in local energy infrastructure to a position that local democratic bodies 
(municipalities and community groups) should be the key agencies in shaping 
the development of energy infrastructure. This was particularly evident in 
Hamburg and Rhein Hünsruck and tended to draw on storylines relating to the 
need to accelerate decarbonisation far more than the English cases, although 
local discourses in both countries also drew on narratives of a loss of 
confidence in the private sector to deliver the best outcomes.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the ideational underpinning of the key discourses 
discussed in chapter 5 and 6. It explored how a range of philosophical, 
programmatic, policy ideas were constructed, contested and maintained 
through processes of power through, over and in ideas. In particular it 
demonstrates how processes of ideational bricolage were being utilised by local 
actors in England (and to some extent in Germany) to bring together energy 
and non-energy debates and enable the local contestation of philosophical 
ideas relating to the role of the local state in energy systems.  
 
Currently much discursive institutional literature presents ideas as influencing 
policy outcomes only when fully formed (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016; 
Gillard, 2016), however, the findings of this research suggest that emerging, 
chaotic and conflicting ideas can also be powerful. In England ideas relating to 
an ensuring state and ‘remunicipalisation’ were being used in a variety of 
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contexts (electricity generation, energy supply, power networks, heat networks) 
to illuminate broader trends regarding the localisation of energy systems and 
the potential role of local authorities in delivering multiple local benefits. This 
debate was not substantially shaping national policy but beginning to influencing 
practice and approaches at a subnational level. However at the same time 
obdurate existing storylines, such as the need to focus on unlocking finance for 
heat networks, can act to marginalise other storylines. This highlights the 
complex interaction between dominant and emerging storylines with ideational 
bricolage at the local level leading to a reappraisal of the role of local 
government in energy system change. This was, to a degree, providing a route 
to resist embedded national norms and establishing a platform for ideas relating 
to a strong local governance role to be established in debates of 
decarbonisation and energy system change. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter reflects on the previous results, analysis and integration 
chapters (chapters 5-7) and clarifies the contribution of the work to debates of 
(urban) energy system change. It sets out how apply a discursive institutional 
approach can help to conceptualise urban energy governance and proposes 
that being sensitive to the scalar dynamics of ideational power provides for a 
more detailed understanding of how power in, over and through ideas relate 
and the notion of ideational bricolage. It also sets out how this approach can 
enrichen MLP approaches to socio-technical change. 
 
Firstly sections 8.2-8.4 consider each of the research questions posed in this 
research. Section 8.5 discusses these findings in relation to contributing to 
discursive institutionalist, urban governance and MLP literatures. The final 
sections (8.6 and 8.7) discuss the policy implication so of the research and 
propose areas for further study. Overall the research reveals the complex 
interdependencies between national and sub-national government in 
constructing and delivering energy system transformation. It suggests that 
processes of governance rescaling are interacting with the dominance of 
different ideas about the role of the (local) state in energy transitions. It also 
illustrates the struggles about meaning inherent in processes of change but 
suggests that these struggles play out differently at different scales.  
 
While the last 20-30 years have seen an increase in the development of 
marketised forms of local governance, such as contracting and public-private 
partnerships, this research suggests there is a growing appetite in local 
governments in both countries to adopt more direct forms of governance in 
order to secure wider public good benefits of energy infrastructure. City actors 
are playing a role in shaping the ideational context and institutional structures 
relating to heat networks, however this role is also constrained by powerful 
institutional norms relating to the functioning of the energy system. A range of 
different processes and capacities are also evident between, and somewhat 
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within, countries. In particular local authorities in England have no mandate or 
structure for strategic local energy planning and it remains to be seen if a more 
central role in relation to heat networks (and other energy infrastructure) will 
fully establish. Whilst many of the comparisons drawn in this chapter refer to 
differences and similarities between the English and German cases there was 
also significant variation between cases in each country. Complex, location 
specific, discursive dynamics - together with local political, social, economic and 
infrastructure histories - were critical in shaping each location’s approach to 
heat network development.  
 
8.2 How are heat networks developing in England and Germany? 
8.2.1 Which public and private actors are engaging in this scale of energy 
provision and why? 
As discussed in chapter 2, heat networks have only relatively recently been 
given an increased profile in England and Germany as part of energy transition 
discourses. Despite this local authorities have historically played a central role 
in heat network delivery in both countries, often linking the development of 
networks to economic growth, regeneration and social objectives, although 
some have been linking heat networks to carbon reduction priorities for several 
decades. To date local authorities, particularly in England, have tended to 
deliver heat networks through partnerships with commercial actors and large 
utilities, but increasingly local authorities appear to be seeking to take a more 
central role in both countries. 
 
This process has involved the engagement of local government in heat 
networks becoming more structured. In Germany this tended to include heat 
networks increasingly being linked to national Energiewende priorities, growing 
numbers of stadtwerke seeking to own and operate heat networks, and the 
embedding of a range of heat network and local governance institutions at a 
national level. In England this is through support for heat networks increasingly 
being focussed on local authorities as central coordination organisations, and 
(some) local governments developing revitalised competencies in the energy 
sector through the development of low carbon projects and municipal utilities.  
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The actor networks involved in heat networks are more established in Germany 
with several industry associations representing heat network interests. These 
associations tend to be well embedded in local, national and European policy 
processes and there was a perception across interviewees that a range of 
voices were incorporated into the policy process. In England actor networks 
were characterised as less established and more chaotic due to the embryonic 
status of the industry. However, local authorities were increasingly becoming 
the centre point for activity, although they had limited involvement in national 
policy processes.  
 
8.2.2 What storylines and discourses are being adopted by actors in the 
development of heat networks? 
A number of influential problem definition storylines relating to heat networks 
were emerging in England and Germany, with a degree on commonality 
between the two countries. Key storylines included: heat policy neglect, the 
multiple priorities heat networks can contribute to, challenges of financing, 
regulation and - most significantly - the (changing) role of local government in 
relation to energy system change.  
 
In terms of initial problem framing the development of a strong discourse 
relating to the neglect of heat decarbonisation provided an opportunity in both 
countries to consider heat networks in a different context. This includes the 
focus being put on their ability to integrate multiple forms of low carbon 
generation and meet multiple objectives.  
 
The ability of heat networks to potentially integrate a range of objectives, both 
within and beyond the energy sector116, was recognised in both Germany and 
England and consistently discussed in all case study locations. Despite this all 
three city case studies in England tended to problematize the achievement of 
multiple priorities to a greater degree than at the national level, where the 
difficulties in balancing complex, potentially conflicting, priorities was not widely 
debated. In Germany, whilst the potential to contribute to multiple objectives 
                                                          
116 As discussed in earlier chapters, objectives include carbon reduction, energy system 
flexibility, lower costs for fuel poor residents, regeneration and local revenues. 
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was recognised, all three cases emphasised carbon reduction objectives over 
other priorities. This partly reflects the lower profile of fuel poverty concerns in 
Germany and the more secure financial position of many local authorities. 
However this may also indicate the greater degree to which some local 
authorities are engaged in contributing to decarbonisation in Germany.  
 
The challenge of financing heat networks was a theme in all locations and but 
with some significant differences in the debate between the two country 
contexts. In particular all three of the German cases referring to the importance 
of the local and national public banking sectors which provides low cost capital 
for projects that meet carbon reduction objectives. In England there was 
emphasis at the national level on attracting third party finance which was 
leading to a focus on ways to reduce large-scale investor risk, for example 
through the HNIP, which aims to provide capital contributions to heat network 
projects in order to increase the internal rate of return for equity investors (BEIS, 
2016d). At the local level there was more focus on analysing the potential for 
local authority investment in networks, framed in terms of the lower cost of 
capital this might enable, the ability to deliver social objectives and as a 
response to financial pressures on local authorities. These differences between 
the national and local levels illustrates how energy system norms relating to the 
need to control risk to attract mobile international finance may be embedded at 
a national level but subject to more contestation locally.  
 
In terms of regulation and consumer protection, although there was some 
debate regarding the limitations of the ex-post regulation of heat network prices 
in Germany there was a general consensus that the current framework for 
regulation and consumer protection was sufficient. There was considerably 
more debate of regulation and consumer protection in Hamburg than the other 
German cases, reflecting the politicised nature of energy debates in the city. 
 
In England there was far greater debate of future regulatory options for heat 
networks, partly due to their current unregulated nature. Consumer associations 
emphasised the need for regulatory measures particularly in relation to pricing 
and dispute resolution (Which?, 2015; Citizens Advice, 2016). The monopoly 
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nature of heat networks was particularly cited reflecting the extent to which 
institutional norms regarding the importance of competition in delivering 
customer outcomes are embedded across actor groups, including those 
interested in consumer protection.  
 
8.2.3 What discourses are dominant in the different contexts? 
 
8.2.3.1 The role of Local Government 
Discourses relating to the most appropriate role for local authorities to play in 
heat networks, and energy system change more broadly, were a central theme 
in local debates. This included debate of the multiple modes of governing which 
local government can/should mobilise in energy system change, particularly in 
relation to the balance between enabling and ensuring approaches, and a 
locally situated narrative in both countries relating to (re)municipalisation and 
energy. 
  
Overall the importance of local government playing a role in heat network 
development was an established narrative in both England and Germany. There 
was acceptance at the national level in both countries and across all cases that 
local authorities play an important coordination and brokerage role in relation to 
heat networks. Despite this in England there was more local exploration of 
exactly what sort of local government role might enable the best local outcomes 
to be achieved across a range of financial, social and environmental outcomes. 
In Germany a more complex role for local government was established, with 
acceptance that they may play multiple roles concurrently. However locally 
debates regarding the role of re-municipalisation in accelerating the energy 
transition were being renewed.  
 
Incorporating discussion of the relative risks and benefits of (re)municipalisation 
into consideration of the modes of governing available to local authorities in 
energy transitions was a theme in both England and Germany. In England 
although there is currently very little municipal ownership of the energy system 
there has historically been a higher incident of municipal ownership and 
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operation of heat networks117 and the recent development of a number of 
municipal suppliers or electricity and gas. The role of re-municipalisation was 
closely linked to a range of energy and non-energy themes such as a need for 
local authorities to access new sources of revenue and be more 
entrepreneurial, a rethinking of the role of local government in light of the 
devolution agenda, and increasing reference to the failure of the privatised 
energy system to deliver social and environmental objectives.  
 
In England despite being consistently referred to by local actors the 
(re)municipalisation storyline was not influential in national policy debates which 
instead focussed on techno-economic appraisals of heat networks and the 
development of locally negotiated governance structures. In Germany, while the 
remunicipalisation storyline was unsurprisingly strongest in the politicised 
energy policy environment of Hamburg, there was awareness across 
interviewees of a resurgence of interest in municipal utilities and the 
remunicipalisation of significant grid infrastructure across the country. This was 
linked to the opportunity to buy back grid concessions, a recognition of the need 
to accelerate the energy transition, and some disillusionment with the ability of 
private models to deliver multiple energy system objectives. The exploration of 
these ‘modes of governing’ debates were therefore supporting cities to create 
their own discursive space on urban energy governance, informed by ideational 
framings not necessarily shared by national actors.  
 
Notwithstanding the similarities and differences between key discourses, all the 
cases studied also revealed the importance of locally contingent networks and 
historic contexts in shaping network development and governance structures. 
For example in Sheffield a strong local narrative relating sustainable energy to 
economic competitiveness and the ‘green economy’ was important in creating 
political momentum for expanding heat networks, as was the cities long history 
of operating heat networks. The local authority’s familiarity in coordinating 
action between public and private sector agencies was significant, but a more 
recent focus on opportunities for the local authority to develop revenue raising 
                                                          
117 Such as in Nottingham and Sheffield. 
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projects appeared to be influencing its approach to future network development. 
In contrast, in Bristol, a strong narrative of being a leading city on climate 
change, together with political support for energy projects and a history of local 
public sector partners working together allowed heat networks to be positioned 
as an important part of the cities long-term climate objectives. The wider context 
of the city establishing a municipal electricity and gas supply company, as well 
as the flexibility provided by a lack of historical delivery models, also prompted 
the city to reject commercial ownership or financing of the networks. The 
significance of local context and history in influencing the creation or 
maintenance of discourses was also evident in Germany where the long history 
of energy based conflict in Hamburg resulted in a wide range of civil society 
organisations being mobilised to engage in heat network ownership debates 
and a willingness of the municipality to consider novel approaches to energy 
system change (albeit in the context of some local actors seeking to maintain 
the status quo). Similarly the depoliticised development of heat networks in 
Frankfurt, with the city buying back a majority share of the utility Mainova with 
limited public debate, had persisted to the present day with the growth and 
decarbonisation of heat networks largely framed by a range of local actors as a 
technocratic process. 
 
8.3 How are heat networks engaging with, and potentially influencing, 
wider national and international transition processes? 
 
8.3.1 How do wider governance structures influence the development of 
heat networks in different contexts? 
In Germany the presence of diverse heat network ownership structures and 
actor networks, together with the long-term existence of public utilities, meant 
that there were recognised routes for municipalities to have a voice in policy 
debates. This included both political influence through the Federal political 
structure of Germany and heat network policy influence through the VKU and 
AGFW. Additionally the established role for stadtwerke meant that a less 
dichotomous relationship between state and market delivery models was 
established with these municipal companies seen to mediate between state and 
market to some extent.  
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In contrast, in England, while an increasing role was recognised for local 
government in heat networks there was limited formal mandate. There are few 
structures through which local government can influence the wider national 
energy landscape and a large number of interviewees highlighted how variation 
in local resources and skills was likely to lead to uneven and patchy 
development of networks nationally. Despite these concerns the developing role 
of the HNDU team and the HNIP were seen as the beginnings of a formalisation 
of a greater role for local government, albeit with the focus still on the 
commercialisation of projects. 
 
8.3.2 How do city-scale heat network projects interact with national policy 
and institutions? 
In England interactions between local heat network projects and national policy 
and institutions tended to be informal with a lack of capacity to engage with 
policy debates reported by sub-national actors. None of the case study 
locations reported close engagement with national policy formation although all 
were engaged with the HNDU in some form.  
 
Importantly there was considerable reference across cases and interviews to 
how non-energy drivers, such as devolution and constrained local government 
finances, were interacting with local government’s approach to heat networks 
(and energy more widely). This was highlighted by all cases, particularly Bristol, 
and indicates how broader structural changes to local governance can influence 
specific policy areas such as energy.   
 
In contrast, in Germany there was a wider range of institutional structures, 
operating across a range of scales, which represented local interests in energy 
policy. These included a diverse group of trade associations as well as more 
structured links between local politicians and national government. There was 
also more national debate regarding local public ownership of the energy 
system which was largely lacking in England. This involved the topic being 
relatively high profile nationally and Hamburg and Rhein Hünsruck seeking to 
engage the wider public in debates regarding ownership.  
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8.4 What role do city-scale actors play in shaping the ideational and 
institutional framework for heat networks in England and Germany? 
Discourses promoting a more entrepreneurial role for local government and 
questioning the ability of marketised models to deliver complex, locally 
contingent outcomes were beginning to have a transformative effect on some 
actor’s conception of the role of the local state in the energy system in England. 
This was evident to some degree in all three English case studies and was a 
wider theme in interviews with NGOs and other local governance organisations, 
although not high profile in central government interviews. This storyline of a 
changing local energy governance role is still forming so these conclusions are 
tentative. However further establishment was being limited by the wider 
institutional norms of the energy system in UK relating to the dominance of a 
market liberal approach. This storyline was more embedded in Germany, partly 
due to the historic institutionalisation of more complex decentralised 
governance but there was equally a resurgence in discourses of municipal 
ownership. 
 
Chapter 2 detailed the difference between local governance structures in 
England and Germany, including a long established norm in Germany of 
multiple forms of energy ownership, including municipal ownership (Cox, 2010).  
However a number of authors have also charted how market liberal principles 
have been embedded into the operation of the local state across much of 
Europe (Hood, 1995; Griffiths and Kippin, 2017). This involved a ‘reorientation 
of urban governance away from the local provision of welfare and services to a 
more outward-orientated stance designed to foster and encourage local growth 
and economic development’ (Hall and Hubbard, 1996, p. 153). These changes 
led Bulkeley and Kern (2006) to suggest that local government reforms in the 
UK and Germany over the past 25 years have, to an extent, ‘eroded some of 
the historical differences’ with both countries converging on a more partnership 
based ‘enabling’ model of governance and engaging less in ensuring, direct 
delivery modes of governing.  
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This claim was contested by a range of local governance, NGOs and consultant 
interviewees in both countries who suggested that this ‘enabling’ role for local 
government was being reconsidered. In England, all three case studies referred 
to an increased appetite to consider investing in large infrastructure projects 
and highlighted the benefits of more local authority involvement in terms of long-
term planning and multiple objectives. Despite this, norms regarding local 
government playing a market commissioning role and the need to attract mobile 
finance appear to be strongly embedded, particularly at the national level, 
although the development of the HNDU and HNIP represent some refocusing 
on the role of local government.  
 
In Germany local energy governance was more embedded in the energy regime 
with all three case studies indicating that there was an expectation that local 
governments could play a range of enabling, ensuring and coordinating roles in 
relation to the energy transition. The case studies and national interviewees 
consistently highlighted that the benefits of energy system privatisation were 
being question and that this was interacting with debates regarding the role of 
local governments in rapid energy system change. This was most politicised in 
Hamburg where a diverse range of actors had been mobilised in a 
remunicipalisation campaign which linked private ownership with continued use 
of coal generation and a lack of local control. However, even in this context 
there was a wide acceptance of the co-existence of a range of public and 
private actors in the local energy regime. 
 
8.5 Contribution 
 
8.5.1 The limits of historical institutionalism 
Analysis of the discursive framing of heat networks in the cases and country 
contexts indicates that an increased emphasis on local public ownership is 
related to both material (perceived) interests (such as the need to identify 
revenue sources, or the challenge of delivering multiple objectives), and but 
also related to changing, ideational factors. Examples include ideas about the 
role of (local) government in sustainability transitions, the risks of partnership 
with the commercial sector and the importance of delivering complex, multiple 
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objectives. Several of these themes challenge, to a greater or lesser degree, 
the dominance of market liberal ideas in the energy system.  
 
The findings of this research highlight the significance of historical contexts in 
shaping the ability of ideas relating to the role of local authorities in energy 
system change to establish and influence wider institutions. This was the case 
at both national and local scales; for example in Germany the long history of 
municipal ownership and operation in the energy system meant that there are 
significant energy sector skills within many local authorities, a familiarity with 
operating revenue generating operations, and established mechanisms for 
engaging with policymakers. At a local scale Hamburg, in particular, 
demonstrated the importance of local historical context with an extensive history 
of energy system politicisation creating an environment where a range of actors 
were engaged in energy issues, and ideas about energy system operation and 
ownership were regularly debated. In Bristol the city’s long history of action on 
climate change, the existence of several Green party councillors and other 
political figures with environmental priorities and the development of a municipal 
supply company based on trust/social good priorities resulted in an environment 
that was open to local authority-led approach, sceptical of public-private 
partnerships and seeking to develop a long-term strategic approach to energy. 
 
In areas where energy issues were less politicised historical factors were still 
important, for example in Frankfurt the long history of the stadtwerke operating 
heat networks effectively meant that the continued ownership and operation 
was largely seen as a technocratic project. Similarly Birmingham and Sheffield 
both have long histories of partnership approaches to heat network 
development which were influential in shaping current heat network 
discussions.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of historical factors the findings of this research 
highlight that historical institutional accounts of the development of heat 
networks in England and Germany are not sufficient. The two countries have 
very different histories (in terms of heat network growth, institutional links 
between local and national scales and the strength of devolution and austerity 
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discourses) but similar discourses were evident in relation to an ensuring role 
for local government, increased interest in direct ownership and the need to 
deliver multiple objectives in both countries, albeit with debate limited in 
England due to dominance of market liberal ideas at the national level.  
 
8.5.2 Ideational power and bricolage 
The findings demonstrate how local ideational change can be limited by 
embedded discourses and institutions in relation to both energy system 
operation and the role of local authorities. However, an ideation shift was 
identified in relation to the importance of an ensuring role for municipalities and 
the role of (re)municiplisation. The findings also indicate that gradual processes 
of ideational change are important with the discursive space for these themes to 
come to the fore created by complex interlinkages between multiple 
decentralisation trends.  
 
This incremental framing highlights the importance of ‘background’ discursive 
processes and frames processes of change as gradual and dynamic. In 
England in particular interlinked economic, political, technical decentralisation 
trends were, together, creating the discursive space for local authorities to re-
evaluate their role in relation to energy. This incorporates; economic trends 
relating to austerity and reductions in local government funding, political trends 
in relation to devolution and a focus on local economic growth; and technical 
decentralisation trends in relation to energy systems which are becoming more 
localised and more focussed on the need to decarbonise heat. These 
multifaceted drivers indicate that processes of endogenous and exogenous 
change are interrelated in complex ways. This also suggests that DI 
approaches may tend to over-focus on the strategic use of ideas by actors, as it 
is unclear if the interplay between technical, political and financial 
decentralisation factors was adopted strategically by actors. For example, 
political devolution and green growth discourses were propagated by central 
government (and other governance actors) and were influential in shaping local 
government conceptions of energy system change as an economic opportunity 
but it seems unlikely that the interplay between devolution, green growth and 
remunicipalisation was anticipated by government and policymakers. 
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Schmidt (2008b, p. 306) emphasises that philosophical ideas are rarely 
contested, except in times of crisis and occur as back-ground, underlying 
assumptions. On the other hand both policy ideas and programmatic ideas tend 
to be regularly discussed and debated and can be described as ‘foregrounded’. 
This research suggests that the contestation of philosophical ideas can be 
constituted through not a single large-scale crisis but the amalgamation of 
several challenges to existing ideas. A loss of confidence in the private sector to 
deliver the best outcomes, a financially constrained public sector, growing 
familiarity with sustainable energy projects in many local authorities and 
increasing recognition of the potential for heat networks to support the 
integration of the heat and power sectors118 have all led to ideas about the role 
of local government in the energy system to be challenged. Hence ideas can be 
influential, potentially at different scales, without necessarily being dominant 
nationally, or used consistently across local actor networks.  
  
Drawing on Carstensen's (2011a, 2011b, p. 147) notion of ideational bricolage 
the findings of this research suggests, not just that actors express agency 
through bringing together different ideas into new forms, but that actors such as 
local authorities which lack both agency and structural advantage may use 
ideational bricolage as a route to resisting the power of embedded ideational 
and institutional norms and challenging nationally constructed power in ideas at 
the local level.  
 
8.5.3 Transition literature and the Multi-Level Perspective 
As discussed in chapter 3 there are well established critiques of the extent to 
which the multi-level persepctive on socio-technical change accounts for regime 
interactions across scales. The findings of this research suggest that applying a 
discursive institutional approach is valuable in adding richness to explorations of 
regime politics, particularly in relation to revealing the complexity and spatial 
variation involved in processes of change.  
 
                                                          
118 As well as the basic properties of heat networks in terms of being local infrastructure that 
requires local coordination. 
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As discussed in section 3.2.1 MLP approaches to understanding socio-technical 
change characterise regimes as generally stable with relatively short periods of 
change initiated by niche experimentation before a new equilibrium is 
established. Drivers for change tend to considered to stem from pressures at 
the landscape level (exogenous changes in selection pressures) or radical 
innovations (endogenous change) (Geels, 2010). Recognising the need to 
develop a more detailed understanding of the links between endogenous and 
exogenous drivers, as well as the dynamics within endogenous change, Geels 
and Schot (2007) distinguish four transition pathways of substitution, 
transformation, reconfiguration and re/de-alignment, with each displaying a 
different combination of actor, technology and institutional dynamics. Firstly the 
(1) Substitution pathway is based on disruptive niche technologies which are 
sufficiently developed when landscape pressure occurs. Direct struggles then 
take place between (sets of) technologies and actors which aim to influence 
institutions, (2) Transformation refers to gradual change through the 
reorientation of incumbent actors in the context of landscape pressure, (3) 
Reconfiguration is based on niche-innovations and regimes combining to trigger 
a transformation of the system architecture, and (4) De-alignment and re-
alignment are where an external shock disrupts the existing regime, allowing 
the rise of multiple competing niche-innovations, one of which gradually 
becomes dominant. 
 
Geels et al. (2016, p. 896) expand on this characterisation of transition 
pathways to consider how shifts may occur between pathways, arguing this 
allows less focus to be put on external landscape pressure and more on shifting 
actor coalitions, struggles, and institutions. They also align various forms of 
institutional change, as outlined by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) with each of the 
pathways. These forms of institutional change can be summarised as (1) 
layering, in which new rules are layered on top of or alongside existing ones 
without affecting their core logic; (2) drift, in which implementation incrementally 
leads to policy changes without any institutional decision to do so; (3) 
conversion, in which old institutions are redeployed to new purposes, and; (4) 
displacement, in which new institutions slowly over-take existing ones. 
Generally ‘layering’ and ‘drift’ are characterised as more incremental changes to 
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existing institutions, while ‘displacement’ and ‘conversion’ represent more 
significant change. 
 
They suggest a transition may shift between pathways, displaying different 
forms of institutional change. For example, a transition may ‘start as an 
incremental transformation pathway, based on limited institutional pressure 
(‘layering’), but subsequently morph into a more substantial reorientation 
pathway if increasing institutional pressure incentivises incumbent firms to 
diversify or switch towards new technologies’ (Geels et al., 2016, p. 901). This 
perspective enables a more fluid understanding of shifts between pathways 
over time as well as on the processes of endogenous enactment. However this 
tends to focus on large-scale shifts between transition pathways and less on the 
potential for differing pathways to be dominant at different scales at various 
points. In contrast the findings of this research suggest that pathways (and the 
types of institutional change taking place) can vary between the local (city) and 
national scale. For example the national pathway in England can be understood 
to align more with a transform pathway with the drive to develop new heat 
decarbonisation strategies allowing incumbent actors to argue for incremental 
policies which support financial de-risking and regulate heat networks in line 
with existing energy networks (layering). At the local level the pathway aligns 
more closely to reconfiguration with a range of changes to ideas within the 
urban energy regime combining to allow (some) local authorities to transform 
their local approach (displacement), albeit with little change to the national 
system architecture. Applying a DI approach to understanding ideational power 
and bricolage allows for the examination of the processes by which competing 
discourses and ideas, at different scales, can influence transition pathways. 
 
Additionally, sub-national initiatives are often framed in the transitions literature 
as experimental ‘niches’ which are both enabled and constrained by wider 
social and political structures (Geels, 2014; Fuchs and Hinderer, 2016). This 
constructs locally communities ‘passively as seedbeds, but not as originators of 
powerful transition-oriented initiatives’ (Fuchs and Hinderer, 2016). However 
this study suggests that locally driven discourses, although clearly interacting 
with wider philosophical level storylines, can be influential as originators of new 
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(local) governance frameworks. This was seen in the increase in municipal 
utilities in both countries, with all case studies constructing storylines which 
centred local authorities in delivering multiple energy system objectives locally. 
However, despite established links between these local discourse and material 
changes to local energy regimes there was limited evidence of influence on 
national governing regimes. This differing engagement of central and local 
government in heat networks ownership debates illustrates the potential 
‘conflicts and tensions between actors and institutions embedded at different 
scales’ in the energy system (Bolton & Foxon, 2013: 2207).  Similarly the 
findings suggest that obduracy is not experienced in the same way across 
social-techincal systems with some (local) areas more able to experiment and 
adopt new ways of doing things based on both their historical context and local 
regime politics.  
 
Scholars such as Geels et al. (2016) and Andrews-Speed (2016) have already 
started to argue for more integration between institutionalist and socio-technical 
transitions approaches. This research supports this call and provides evidence 
that applying an institutional approach can provide a deeper understanding of 
both endogeous drivers for change within the urban energy regime and how 
transition pathways can differ between national and sub-national scales. As 
emphasised by Späth and Rohracher (2010, p. 14) ‘Cities and regions can be a 
very important arena of struggles about how to develop socio-technical regimes’ 
however it remains unclear the extent to which they can contribute to 
reconfiguration at other governance scales’. Further research, tracing the future 
development of heat networks (and other local energy infrastructure), as they 
become established could help to fill this research gap.  
 
8.6 Policy implications 
The findings of the research suggest a number of issues and recommendations 
relevant to heat and wider energy system planning.  
 
Firstly, the findings indicate that there is a need to develop better tools to 
integrate social and environmental benefits into the heat network financial 
calculus. This relates particularly to the long-term planning of heat networks, 
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where it is currently often difficult to build in passive provision to allow for future 
network growth. As Cowell et al. (2017) indicate the sub-national scale can be a 
key strategic space for managing tensions between economic and environment 
priorities so it is important to ensure mechanisms exist to balance local 
economic and non-economic issues. Heat networks may also provide 
considerable energy system value in terms of future proofing and keeping 
options open – such as the ease with which low carbon generation technologies 
can be retrofitted – these values do not accrue to local actors regardless of 
whether they are public or private and there is a need to further consider how 
such value should be accounted for. 
 
Policymaking should also recognise that, somewhat regardless of ideational 
factors, the drivers behind many local authorities taking a more central role in 
heat networks relate to a lack of any other coordinating body to plan local 
energy infrastructure between multiple local organisations. For example multiple 
public sector organisations (NHS, councils, Universities) are often key actors in 
network development, networks may cross local authority borders and heat 
networks may provide considerable energy system services in terms of 
reducing peak loads and integrating renewables, however current energy 
system governance does not provide structures to coordinate and manage 
action at this scale. These processes are more established in Germany where 
municipalities play a stronger role in energy planning (for example with powers 
to require connection to heat networks and significant influence over energy 
requirements in new developments). In England there is a need to reconsider 
whether a stronger local energy planning role is required, this is particularly the 
case as power, heat and transport are becoming both more integrated and 
more decentralised.  
 
The National Infrastructure Commission, in recent analysis of future heat 
infrastructure options, recognised the role of heat networks in reducing 
emissions at a low cost and suggested that there may be a role for local 
authorities in facilitating local coordination of heat decarbonisation technologies. 
This included highlighting that ‘it may be appropriate and beneficial for the 
public sector – most likely through the local authority – to develop ‘heat zoning’ 
293 
 
 
policy to incentivise and/or regulate the use of different heating and other 
energy technologies’ (Element Energy and E4tech, 2018, p. 10). Assessment of 
the role of local actors in energy system planning should include consideration 
of the role of heat zoning and planning policy in incentivising a locally co-
ordinated approach to decarbonisation across vectors.  
 
More broadly there is a need for consideration and debate of the links between 
different scales in energy transitions, particularly in relation to intrinsically local 
infrastructure such as heat networks. This could involve the development of 
more collaborative relations between national institutional structures and sub-
national actors and regulatory systems that are less siloed and nationally 
focussed. In England practically this could include measures to encourage local 
areas to include energy priorities in Devolution Deals as this would provide one 
forum for local/national discussion of priorities and barriers. Stronger measures 
to ensure local public actors are included in policy working groups and engaged 
in policy design may also be beneficial. 
 
It is also relevant for policymakers to note the complex interactions between 
energy system change and broader devolution trends. Whilst this research 
suggests that some local authorities are adopting a stronger ensuring role in 
local energy system change, given the financial pressures many authorities are 
experiencing and the lack of any statutory requirement to address energy 
system planning, it is likely that smaller and less resourced areas will not be in a 
position to take a central role in local energy system change. Given that heat 
networks are unlikely to progress without local government involvement this 
may have implications in terms of the speed and location of heat network roll 
out.  
 
8.7 Limitations and further research 
In identifying the limitations of this research and areas for further study it should 
be noted that several of the (particularly English) cases were still developing 
their approach to heat networks and were debating various ownership 
structures. Although the need to generate revenue was identified by many of 
the cases as a significant consideration it was unclear the extent to which this 
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factor would shape decision-making. In this regard there is extensive literature 
on both, the move towards a more enabling, partnership based state (at multiple 
scales), and urban entrepreneurial governance (Harvey, 1989) where the 
priorities of urban governance are focussed on local economic growth with 
locations competing to attract inward investment and skilled labour. In this 
context further research could usefully explore the extent to which public sector 
austerity in England is acting as an opportunity to challenge this marketised 
framing of the city with post-neoliberal and ecological alternatives (Brenner, 
Peck and Theodore, 2010; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Oosterlynck and 
González, 2013; McCann, 2017).  
 
Some authors have suggested that the transferral of the impacts of the global 
financial crisis from the financial sector to the national state and then (partly) on 
to the local state through austerity represents ‘just another phase in the ongoing 
neoliberal restructuring of cities’ (Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2010; 
Oosterlynck and González, 2013, p. 1076). However further examination of 
energy remunicipalisations could provide insight into the relationship between 
austerity, entrepreneurialism and ecological approaches to governing. 
 
The focus of this research on the interactions between scales in energy 
transitions also meant that the priority was to collect data from across multiple 
locations and scales. Unavoidably this meant that some of the nuance of 
competing local views on urban energy transitions were not captured in each 
case study. For example community energy groups (apart from in Rhein 
Hünsruck and Hamburg) were not interviewed in each location. Further 
exploration of individual cases could expand on the dynamics of competing 
views of urban energy transitions within cities. Whilst these issues were 
explored in most detail in the Hamburg case study – as the location where 
energy was most politicised and the widest range of actors mobilised – further 
exploration of those who claim to speak on behalf of energy transitions in other 
cities would be valuable. 
 
While this research considered local political history and the wider politicisation 
of energy in case study locations a broader piece of research could consider the 
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role of different forms of political leadership in shaping the approach of cities to 
energy transitions. At a high-level, the cases in England tended to be Labour-
led councils (or have a history of Labour leadership) and the German cases 
tended to have significant Green Party local influence. Further work could probe 
these themes in detail. 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter although all the cases studied in this 
research were what could be described as ‘climate leader’ authorities, it is 
important to note that ‘municipalities that have pursued a comprehensive, 
planned approach to climate governance are few and far between and most 
have encountered significant challenges related to institutional capacity and 
political economy’ (Bulkeley, Castan Broto and Maassen, 2013, p. 361). Given 
that a large number of municipalities are not pro-active in energy system 
change more comparative work on the processes at play in leading cities 
compared to inactive cities could help to expand understandings of local climate 
leadership.  
 
More specifically to heat networks, further large scale survey work could assess 
the outcomes of various different ownership and operation models to draw 
conclusions regarding the financial, environmental and social outcomes 
achieved under different structures. This could incorporate analysis of the 
extent to which those local areas generating revenue from heat networks are 
able to reinvent this in fuel poverty and other social objectives.  
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Appendix 1: Non-heat network specific policy support in the UK 
 
Due to their low penetration in the UK heat network policy has always been 
rather peripheral in energy policy, although there have been periodic spikes in 
interest in their potential. For example, post-1970’s oil shocks, the Government 
commissioned the Marshall Inquiry which recommended the expansion of CHP 
heat networks in major UK cities as a route to securing increased efficiency and 
resilience in the UK energy system (Dodd, 2008). However by this date North 
Sea gas reserves were being exploited and these plans were not pursued by 
the incoming Conservative government in 1979, in favour of focussing on North 
Sea oil and gas, together with nuclear power (Conaty, 2011; UKERC, 2013). 
There have therefore been limited specific policy measures to promote heat 
networks in England, although a number of broader policies aiming to promote 
renewable heat or industrial decarbonisation interact with heat networks. This 
includes policies such as the Climate Change Levy which incorporates an 
exemption for heat networks, and the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) which 
provides tariffs for a range of renewable heat technologies that can be utilised in 
heat networks (Connor et al., 2015). This appendix summarises the financial 
incentives and support schemes aimed at low-carbon energy technologies in 
the UK which interact with heat networks. 
 
As the majority of heat networks are based on CHP generation, policy relating 
to CHP development is particularly relevant to the development of heat 
networks. From the 1990’s a number of Government targets and policies have 
aimed to increase CHP capacity, recognising the efficiency benefits of the 
technology. Initially a target was set in 1993 to reach 5GW of CHP capacity by 
2010. This target was not achieved and a second target, to reach 10GW of 
‘Good Quality’ CHP (GQCHP119) by 2010, was set in 2000. This target was also 
missed and instead 5.950MWe of GQCHP was in operation in 2010 which fell to 
5,571 MWe in 2017 (BEIS, 2017a). Policy measures to support these targets 
have included potential eligibility for Renewable Obligation Certificates, 
                                                          
119 ‘Good Quality’ CHP is a quality standard based on efficiency and environmental performance 
and is certified by the CHP Quality Assurance Programme operated by government. 
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Renewable Heat Incentive, Carbon Price Floor relief, Climate Change Levy 
exemption (in respect of electricity directly supplied), Enhanced Capital 
Allowances and preferential Business Rates. Further details of these measures 
are included in appendix 1. However a number of studies have suggested that 
these measures have been unsuccessful in driving deployment of GQCHP due 
to the low price of electricity relative to the cost of natural gas and difficulties in 
small scale electricity producers interacting with centralised energy system 
structures (as discussed in more detail in section 2.7, see also Toke and 
Fragaki, 2008; Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). 
 
Between 2002 and 2010 there was some specific support for heat networks in 
the form of grant funding, with the Community Energy Programme (CEP) and 
the Low Carbon Infrastructure Fund (LCIF) both providing capital grants. From 
2002 to 2007 the CEP provided grant funding of up to 40% of capital costs of 
heat networks and supported projects in Aberdeen, Birmingham, Woking and 
Southampton. From 2009 – 2010 the LCIF supported the development of 
district heating in housing growth areas in England and allocated £21 million to 
13 projects (Sustainability West Midlands, 2014).  
 
 Carbon Price Support (CPS) exemptions. Carbon Price Support is a levy 
on emissions associated with fossil fuel use in power generating plants 
with a capacity of more than 2 MW. Heat networks with good quality gas 
CHP are exempt from paying the carbon price floor on the fuel used to 
generate heat and, from April 2015, for the electricity they use on site. The 
Association of Decentralised Energy (ADE) estimate that for 2015/16 
suppliers will save over £3 per MWh under this policy. However, the CPS 
exemptions do not include exported electricity generation. Fuel used in the 
main incumbent heating technology (gas boilers) is also exempt from the 
CPS.  
 Climate Change Levy (CCL): The CCL is a levy on energy (including 
natural gas and electricity) supplied to commercial, industrial, agricultural 
and public sector energy consumers. Good quality CHP is exempt from 
paying the levy on all gas and electricity used internally. The ADE 
estimates that this policy saves generators almost £2 per MWh for gas and 
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over £5 per MWh for electricity. As this policy is focussed on business use, 
it is likely to support building-level gas CHP, rather than suppliers of district 
heat networks that are connected to domestic users. As with the CPS 
exemptions, the CCL is that it does not incentivise electricity generation 
for export (Frontier Economics, 2015; DECC, 2015b). 
 Enhanced Capital Allowances: This policy allows 100% of capital 
investment on Good Quality CHP to be offset against corporation tax or 
business income tax liability in the tax year in which the investment was 
made. However it’s unlikely to have a significant impact on heat network 
projects as the long payback of heat networks means that few schemes 
will earn sufficient profit to have a tax liability within the relevant 
investment period. Companies with other profitable activities against 
which to offset their heat network investment may however benefit from 
the scheme.  
 Business Rates: Embedded Good Quality CHP plant and equipment is 
exempt from business rates. 
 Energy Company Obligation: ECO is a government scheme that requires 
large suppliers to deliver energy efficiency measures to domestic 
properties in the UK. Connections to heat network schemes will be 
eligible for ECO financial support in certain circumstances although 
suppliers are required to ‘bank’ their energy efficiencies within a two to 
three year period. Given long investment lead times for district heat, 
there is a high risk that efficiencies are not realised within this period. As 
such, suppliers tend to opt for alternatives which deliver energy 
efficiencies sooner.   
 Renewables Heat Incentive (RHI): The RHI is a long-term support 
scheme for renewable heating schemes. Renewable heating for heat 
networks is eligible for support under this scheme, which, provides 
funding through a tariff paid for each kilowatt hour of heat produced from 
renewable sources. The launch of the RHI in 2008120 represented a 
significant shift from grant based schemes to long-term tariff support 
                                                          
120 The RHI was introduced into UK legislation in the 2008 Energy Act but the commercial 
scheme came into operation in 2011 and the domestic scheme in 2014. 
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(Connor et al., 2015) but its primary aim is to support renewable heat 
technologies rather than heat networks specifically.  
 Capacity Market: The Capacity Market is the UK’s mechanism for 
ensuring adequate flexible electricity generating capacity exists to meet 
demand during times of electricity system stress. Gas-CHP is eligible to 
participate in the Capacity Market. However the majority of current CHP 
plant is unlikely to participate in Capacity Market auctions as these sites 
tend to self-supply electricity rather than export it to the grid due to the 
low value of export power. The Association of Decentralised Energy 
(ADE) has also suggested that a number of features of the capacity 
market design mean that it is not feasible for CHP heat networks to 
participate.  
 Renewables Obligation: The Renewables Obligation was introduced in 
England and Wales in 2002 to support electricity generation from 
renewable sources. It closed to new generating capacity on 31 March 
2017 however existing networks which receive heat from renewable CHP 
plant, may be claiming support via the RO where a 0.5 Renewable 
Obligation Certificate (ROC) uplift for Good Quality CHP.  
 Zero Carbon Homes policy: The Zero Carbon Homes policy announced 
in 2006 set a target for all new homes to be zero carbon by 2016 and 
made provision to enable this through the planning system, the Code for 
Sustainable Homes, and Building Regulations. Under the Code for 
Sustainable Homes heat networks could be employed to help developers 
meet the zero carbon standard in England. These standards were, 
however, cancelled in 2015 with the focus now on building regulations to 
drive down emissions from new buildings.  
 Licence Lite: Obtaining a good price for the electricity produced in CHP 
plants which provide heat to networks can be critical to the viability of 
networks. In order access higher retail prices for electricity generation 
some distributed energy generators, including CHP, wish to supply their 
generation directly to consumers rather than selling it to a third party. 
Recognising this issue the Government and Ofgem developed License 
Lite arrangements in 2009 which allow smaller scale electricity 
generators to gain better access to the electricity supply market and 
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obtain a higher price for their power. To date only one license lite 
derogation has been issued in 2017 with interested parties suggesting 
that the complexity and costs of development such arrangements with 
third parties have limited interest in the scheme. 
 Planning policy. Local authorities are encouraged to consider low carbon 
and renewable heat networks through the National Planning Policy 
Framework published last year. The framework encourages local 
planning authorities to identify opportunities for development can draw 
their energy supply from decentralised, renewable or low carbon energy 
supply systems and for co-locating potential heat customers and 
suppliers. 
 EU ETS: Combustion over 20 MW is included in the EU ETS. This 
means any boiler or CHP plant supplying heat to a heat network over this 
size requires EU ETS permits. This cost is not faced by domestic gas 
consumers. As the emissions cap is tightened, there will be an increasing 
disparity between the costs for gas faced by heat networks and for 
domestic boilers. 
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Appendix 2: Interviewees 
 
Name Organisation Category Abbreviation 
in text 
Country 
Benjamin 
Dannemann 
Germany Renewable 
Energy Agency   
NGO - Environment NGO Germany 
Bertram 
Fleck 
Ex-District 
Administrator,  Rhine-
Hunsrück 
Local authority LA Germany 
Christian 
Maaß 
HIC Hamburg Institut 
Consulting GmbH 
Consultant C Germany 
Daniel Ballin Bundeskartellamt 
(Federal Cartel Office) 
Government G Germany 
Dr. Günter 
Hörmann 
Vorstand, 
Verbraucherzentrale 
Hamburg (Consumer 
Association, Hamburg) 
NGO - Consumers NGO Germany 
Fabian 
Schmitz-
Grethlein 
VKU, Head of Energy 
Generation (German 
Association of Local 
Utilities) 
Trade association TA Germany 
Frank-
Michael Uhle 
Climate Protection 
Manager, 
Kreisverwaltung 
Rhein-Hunsrück-Kreis 
Local authority LA Germany 
Jens Acker Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and 
Energy (BMWi)  
Government G Germany 
Joel Schrage Project Manager, 
Department for Heat 
Contracting, Hamburg 
Energie 
Municipal utility MU Germany 
Katharina 
Seegelke 
Bund Hamburg 
(Association for the 
Environment and 
Nature Conservation 
Germany - Friends of 
the Earth) 
NGO - Environment NGO Germany 
Kay Pöhler Vice President, 
Product Management 
Infrastructure, KfW 
bank 
Other O Germany 
Kerstin 
Walberg 
Heat network lead, 
Hamburg City 
Administration 
Local authority LA Germany 
Kirsten 
Hasberg 
Distributed Energy 
Consultant 
Consultant C Germany 
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Klaus Jacob Freie University Berlin Academic/Research A Germany 
Lars 
Holstenkamp 
Leuphana University Academic/Research A Germany 
Marc Meurer  Simmern Hunsrück 
public utility 
(Energieversorgung 
Region Simmern, VG-
Werke Simmern 
Hunsrück) 
Local authority LA Germany 
Maria 
Grajcar 
AGFW (Energy 
Efficiency Association 
for heating, cooling 
and CHP) 
Trade association TA Germany 
Martin 
Breitbart 
District Heating Sales, 
Vattenfall Hamburg 
DH utility DHU Germany 
Paul Fay Energiereferat Stadt 
Frankfurt am Main 
(Energy Department) 
Local authority LA Germany 
Simon 
Weber 
Heat Network Unit 
Manger, BDEW 
(German Association 
of Energy and Water 
Industries) 
Trade association TA Germany 
Simona 
Rens 
German Energy Policy 
Advisor, Danish 
Government  
Government G Germany 
Thomas 
Gebhart 
Head of Heat, Mainova 
Aktiengesellschaft 
Municipal utility MU Germany 
Wendelin 
Friedel 
Abteilungsleiter 
Konzernentwicklung 
(Head of Corporate 
Development, 
Stadtwerke Frankfurt 
am Main) 
Municipal utility MU Germany 
Sören 
Becker 
Leibniz Institute for 
Regional Development 
and Structural 
Planning (IRS)  
Academic/Research A Germany 
Alastair 
Mumford 
Senior Project 
Manager, RegenSW 
NGO - Environment NGO England 
Andrew Filer Enviroenergy 
Nottingham 
Municipal utility MU England 
Anna Bright Sustainability West 
Midlands 
NGO - Environment NGO England 
Bruce 
Geldard 
Parsons Brinkerhoff Consultant C England 
Charlotte 
Large 
Heat Networks 
Delivery Unit, BEIS 
Government G England 
Fabrice 
Leveque 
Energy and Heat, 
WWF UK 
NGO - Environment NGO England 
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Hanae De 
Rochefort 
Policy Manager, 
Association for 
Decentralised Energy 
(ADE) 
Trade association TA England 
Helen 
Andrews 
Tipper 
Carbon Trust Public 
Sector Programme 
Consultant C England 
Ian Manders Danish Government 
UK Policy advisor 
Government G England 
Josh 
Thurmin 
Centre for Sustainable 
Energy  
NGO - Environment NGO England 
Mark 
Bramah 
APSE Energy Local authority LA England 
Mark 
Simpson 
Business Development 
Manager, E.ON 
Community Energy 
DH utility DHU England 
Martin Crane  Director, Carbon 
Alternatives (formerly 
SSE) 
Consultant C England 
Martin Holley  Centre for Sustainable 
Energy  
NGO - Environment NGO England 
Matthew 
Aylott 
Which? NGO - Consumers NGO England 
Michael King Consultant Consultant C England 
Nicky 
Butterworth 
Policy Advisor, Heat 
Networks Delivery 
Unit, BEIS 
Government G England 
Paul Barker Energy Infrastructure 
Manager, Bristol City 
Council 
Local authority LA England 
Paul Woods Concession Director, 
Cofely  
DH utility DHU England 
Peter Ellis Deputy Head of 
Planning - 
Infrastructure and 
Environment Division, 
Department for 
Communities and 
Local Government 
Government G England 
Peter North Senior Manager, 
Sustainable Energy, 
Greater London 
Association 
Local authority LA England 
Richard 
Rees 
Strategic Energy 
Delivery Officer, 
Birmingham City 
Council 
Local authority LA England 
Richard 
Scott 
Head of Community 
Energy, E.On 
DH utility DHU England 
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Robert 
Almond 
Policy and Project 
Development 
Manager, Sheffield 
City Council 
Local authority LA England 
Rufus Ford Heat Networks 
Development 
Manager, SSE 
DH utility DHU England 
Simon 
Woodward 
Chairman, UK District 
Energy Association 
Trade association TA England 
Tim 
Rotheray 
Director, Association 
for Decentralised 
Energy (ADE) 
Trade association TA England 
Tony Norton Director, Centre for 
Energy and the 
Environment, 
University of Exeter 
Academic/Research A England 
Zoe Guijarro Policy Manager, 
Citizens Advice 
NGO - Consumers NGO England 
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Appendix 3: Interview Guide 
No. Question Why ask it? 
1 
Intro - thanks for time, intro to my PhD etc (focussed on development and politics of DH - how different interests/ideas 
influence policy, role of LAs). Clarify recording, use of data, who else I'm talking to. Consent form.  
2 
Heat networks have had a higher profile in climate 
policy over the last 5 years. What are your views on the 
main drivers for this? Who have been the key actors in 
this? 
For context on why the current focus on heat. Has the push 
come mainly from government or elsewhere? 
3 
Do you think the organisations involved in DH 
policy/development have changed over recent years? 
Which organisations have most influence? How do local 
authorities engage in DH policy debates and 
development? 
Have any groups become more important over time. 
Explores key co-ordinating groups - where the influence is, 
who works together/competes. Do LAs work together or 
engage independently? Do they work with other actors? 
4 
A range of measures have been brought forward by 
government (and others) to support DH and CHP (list 
some of relevant country specific policies/activities). In 
your view is the current approach tackling the right 
things? What is missing? Should DH be regulated, if so 
how? 
Allows discussion of whether some sort of legislation (i.e. 
Heat Act) or specific DH/CHP strategy is needed. Might 
touch on requirement to connect, consent regime, heat 
mapping, price regulation, mandating DH planning to local 
areas, lack of low cost finance etc - if they suggest these 
things ask how they think they should be delivered/managed 
(locally, centrally, other) 
5 
What are main challenges to DH development (might 
need to refer to possible topics e.g. financial issues, 
market issues, regulatory issues, policy, local powers) 
Might be covered in 4 - if not use to prompt on issues of 
wider governance/institutional structures, role of sub-national 
powers in energy etc 
6 
What are the main areas for disagreement in DH policy 
- who disagrees? Where are the sites of conflict - who's involved? 
8 
Do you think the HNDU is an effective approach to 
developing DH? Is their focus on LAs correct? (UK) / 
Do you think the current incentives for municipalities to 
engage in HNs are appropriate (Germany)? 
Might be covered by 4 but if not allows discussion of value of 
feasibility funding/focus on LAs 
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9 
DH is currently under diverse ownership and 
management structures in the UK/Germany 
(public/private/PPP/community ownership and differing 
splits of generation/distribution/supply). What are your 
views on which ownership structure might dominate 
going forward? Why? 
Opener into lots of issues - LA ownership decision making on 
(based on RoR, risk, local politics and control). Finance 
issues - any probs with local access to appropriate finance? 
What extra benefits (or risks) does LA ownership bring? 
10 
How significant do you think the current increase in LA 
interest in involvement/ownership of energy 
infrastructure is? Follow on Qs…What might be the 
benefits/risks of more LA ownership/supply, what might 
it mean for policy? What are DH companies and the 
utilities saying about ownership? 
Explore issues of local ownership and how this links to 
questions of the role of the local in the energy transition - will 
LAs take a strong role in DH regardless of government 
policy? 
11 
LAs currently largely decide on the level of involvement 
they want with DH development - is this the right 
approach? If not what needs to change? 
Might be covered by  5 or 11 - if not allows discussion of 
whether there needs to be some sort of local 
powers/responsibility for heat planning and DH 
12 
Highlight researching is considering two country contexts and is interested in the interplay between local and national 
scales - do they have anything they want to say or things they think are important to explore? 
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Appendix 4: Coding and analysis structure 
 
Key: PO = policy idea, PR = programmatic ideas, PH = philosophical idea. 
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